




Faculty of Education
Ain Shams University

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST AFRO-ASIAN PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE

13th to 16th MARCH 1978

CAIRO (EGYPT)

PHILOSOPHY & CIVILIZATION

Editor : Mourad Wahba

CAIRO, 1978

The First Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference was organized by the Faculty of Education, Ain Shams University, in cooperation with the Arab Organization For Education, Culture And Science under the sponsorship of FISP (Fédération Internationale Des Sociétés De Philosophie) .

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IBRAHIM MADKOUR	*President of the Academy of Arabic Language*
ANDRÉ MERCIER	*Secretary General to FISP*
MOURAD WAHBA	*Chairman, Philosophy Dept., Faculty of Education, Ain Shams University*

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FOREWORD

It gives me great pleasure to introduce this book which is a compendium of the papers presented to the First Afro - Asian Philosophy Conference. Egypt had the priviledge of hosting this conference which was held under the auspice of Ain Shams University and FISP (Fédération Internationale Des Sociétés De Philosophie).

The theme of this conference «Philosophy and Civilization» was a most appropriate topic as both Africa & Asia are undergoing a remarkable change with regard to cultural values .

We are deeply indebted to our eminent participants in this conference for the production of these valuable documents which, I believe, will be a historic reference for sometime to come. We hope this conference will be a prelude to future meetings in different parts of Africa & Asia in order to consolidate our mutual relationship in the hope of promoting prosperity and the welfare of humanity.

Prof. Abdel-Salam Abdel-Ghaffar
(Dean)
Faculty of Education,
Ain-Shams University,

HOW IT CAME ABOUT

At the Pakistan Philosophical Conference that was held at Lahore in October 1975 I presented a paper entitled «Authenticity & Modernization in the Third World». The content of this paper provoked extensive discussions among the participants, followed by unanimous recommendation to hold a conference dealing with Afro-Asian issues. This recommendation was realized by the sponsorship of Ain Shams University and the FISP.

I am greatly indebted to Prof. A. Mercier, Secretary General to FISP for his keen personal help and active cooperation. Acknowledgements are also due to Prof. I. Madkour, President of Academy of Arabic Language and Prof. M. Saber, Director of Arab Organization For Education, Culture and Science, Prof. A. Nawar, Director of the Middle East Research Centre and all who have contributed to the success of the conference.

M. Wahba

Address of Welcome

to the First Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference

I. MADKOUR

President of the Academy of Arabic Language

Ladies and Gentlemen,

On behalf of the Egyptian Society of Philosophy and I can also say, on behalf of all Egyptian thinkers, I have to thank the great scholars who came from different parts of the world, West and East. They have kindly accepted to attend this meeting, and I am sure that we shall learn a lot from them. No need to speak about «Ain Shams University» the instigator and organizor of this meeting. It's Vice-President will say his word. I like only to mention the name of Professor Mourad Wahba who undertook all the background preparation and was instrumental in the success of this meeting. We cannot forget those unknown soldiers.

There is another group who promoted and sincerely helped our meeting, I mean, «The International Federation of Philosophical Societies». First talk concerning this meeting was with professor «André Mercier», General Secretary of the Federation. We have been working together for over a year. I am glad that Academician Ganovsky, President of the Federation, also assisted our meeting. In fact this meeting is a regional one of the Federation's meetings ; we feel it is a great achievement for us to have it, and I am sure that other meetings for the Federation will take place in other countries in Asia or in Africa.

I must address my best thanks to the Arab League, to the Ministry of Higher Education, and to the Arab Organization for Education, Culture and Science. All these organizations helped a lot for the success of this meeting. My friend, Mr. Mohyi Eddin Saber will give his word in this opening session. As a formality he will speak in Arabic. I am so sorry that we don't have a means of simultaneous translation, in general we shall use English or French.

It is really significant that the International Federation of Philosophical Societies holds one of its regional meetings in Egypt, a country of one of the most ancient civilizations in the middle east. We have here a young society of philosophy, I hope that it will soon join the International Federation.

Thank you for listening.

Address of Welcome
to the First Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference

NASR EL-SAYED NASR

Vice-President of Ain Shams University

Mr. President

Dear Colleagues

Ladies & Gentlemen

On the occasion of the opening of the Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference and on behalf of Prof. Abdel Aziz Soliman, the President of Ain Shams University, I welcome you and wish you every success in your conference. The University of Ain Shams feels honour to have the priviledge of organizing this conference which is convening for the first time and here in Egypt. That is no wonder, for Ain Shams University has been inspired by the Pharaonic Civilization which is the mother of all civilizations and to which philosophers in the past have travelled as pilgrims of learning. History records such names as Thales, Pythagoras and Plato among others of the Greek philosophers who have come to Egypt. And now we welcome among us the elite of the world's contemporary philosophers.

We also feel it is a great honour to have with us FISP who is sponsoring this Conference and considering it one of its regional conferences. Here again, I mention the Ministry of Higher Education, the Faculty of Education, the Arab Organization for Education, Culture and Science and the Middle East Research Centre.

This Conference has a historic significance by the fact that it will not just convene an end but will continue participating in the realization of world peace.

President Sadat's peace initiative gives momentum to this Conference which commends the efforts for the realization of world peace and which has for its theme Philosophy & Civilization.

Before I close I would like to mention the role played by Pakistan where a conference was held in 1975 to which Prof. M. Wahba, Secretary General of this Conference, was invited and presented a paper entitled. «Authenticity & Modernization in the Third World» which aroused controversial opinions and discussions and after which the participants made a recommendaton to hold

an Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference in Egypt. The University of Ain Shams has responded to this recommendation.

Dear Colleagues

We welcome you here in our country, Egypt, with great expectations of the fruitful outcome of this Conference.

Thank You.

Address of Welcome
to the First Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference

MOHI ELDIN SABER

General Director of Arab Organization For Education, Culture And Science

Monsieur le Président,
Messieurs les Membres,
Mesdames et Messieurs,

C'est avec une grande joie que je salue au nom de l'Organisation Arabe pour l'Education, la Culture et la Science et en mon nom, le Congrès Philosophique Afro-Asiatique, je salue l'idée et les membres et je félicite ses organisateurs et ses dirigeants qui ont choisi les problèmes de la philosophie et les civilisations comme objet de leurs études, sachant que la conception de la philosophie et celle des civilisations avec tout ce qu'elles comportent de liens intimes, d'idées et de méthodes, sont les fondements de la réalité humaine avec ses caractères communs et ses spécificités diverses.

Dans ce siècle, où les relations ont subi de grandes modifications qualitatives de matière et de faculté entre la nature et l'homme et entre l'homme et son semblable individuellement et socialement en fonction des inventions scientifiques et sociales, il en résulte que des valeurs humaines anciennes ont été, elles aussi, l'objet de modifications ou de bouleversement, des valeurs qui étaient les bases de très grandes civilisations et on a vu naître de nouvelles valeurs issues de la nature de la civilisation contemporaine amenée par les révolutions scientifiques, technologiques et sociales.

Vous vous réunissez ici venus des coins lointains mais vous vous rencontrez autour des idées fondamentales qui sont le souci de ceux sur lesquels tombe la responsabilité d'évoluer et d'évaluer les tendances intellectuelles mondiales à travers cette marche qui conserve à ce monde vivant dans le danger du suicide autonome, son équilibre et sa continuité.

En effet, nous vivons dans un monde en son genre dans l'histoire, un monde qui se caractérise par l'esprit d'universalité dans son organisation, ses valeurs et son genre de vie et les contradictions sociales et politiques, les réalisations positives qui démontrent la puissance de l'homme que nous voyons aujourd'hui sont les symptômes de la naissance difficile de ce nouveau monde issue d'un monde ancien qui garde encore beaucoup de ses fondements, et si notre foi dans la sagesse humaine ne nous protégeait nous dirions que cet accouchement finira par un avortement.

Mais la réalité scientifique évidente dans ce domaine est que la lutte entre les valeurs anciennes des civilisations historiques et les nouvelles valeurs créées par la civilisation scientifique et technologique contemporaine est une lutte féroce sur tous les fronts et sous le drapeau d'idéologies diverses en politique, en économie et en sociologie et il y a, là les sociétés en voie de développement qui cherchent à accéder à la civilisation et veulent en même temps conserver leurs propres valeurs, mais ces valeurs ne peuvent co-exister facilement et sainement avec les types de vie présentés par la civilisation contemporaine et il est nécessaire de trouver une forme pour cette coexistence. Cette lutte qui paraît évidente dans les milieux en voie de développement est une lutte à laquelle n'ont pas échappé les sociétés avancées qui souffrent sous différentes formes.

Malgré tout cela, je voudrais m'arrêter sur un fait important ayant une relation avec le grand problème, problème de la philosophie et la civilisation, c'est l'unité sociale, l'unité des valeurs qui est restée pendant très longtemps un rêve très cher à l'humanité. Ce rêve se réfère à l'unité biologique de l'homme ou à l'unité organique et cette équation grâce à laquelle se fait l'égalité sociale au même niveau où s'est faite l'égalité biologique à la première création, est le but que l'humanité a essayé de réaliser depuis qu'elle a prsi conscience de la vie sociale.

C'est de là que les grandes religions sont venues et se sont adressées à l'humanité et l'ont invitée à adopter des mêmes principes et des mêmes valeurs éternelles qui prêchent l'égalité parmi les hommes ; ce sont des valeurs liées essentiellement à la sagesse de Dieu Créateur de la vie. Historiquement, cette conduite c'est elle qui a été le moyen de l'homme.

C'est une valeur primordiale pour comprendre la philosophie de l'histoire et la civilisation contemporaine essaye d'établir cette unité sociale sur une base de valeurs technologiques. Les sciences, les mathématiques et la technologie sont un privilège qui est le monopole des sociétés avancées et c'est à partir de cela qu'est née cette philosophie sociale et ce trouble intellectuel dans le monde.

La philosophie dans ce monde, doit revenir pour être la mère des sciences humaines comme elle l'était et elle doit se fonder sur un programme global, non seulement pour expliquer ces phénomènes humains entremélés et compliqués, mais aussi pour proposer des conceptions scientifiques et positives en vue de résoudre les problèmes de l'humanité dans le cadre de changement spécifique et trouver une formule intellectuelle qui puisse les affronter. C'est ainsi que la philosophie prend son rôle vital sur la terre après avoir longtemps survolé dans le ciel et elle peut dès lors offrir une théorie totale et équilibrée des besoins de l'homme et de ses facultés dans et au delà de la vie.

Messieurs,

Les études profondes et fécondes que vous avez présentées à votre congrès en vue de discuter ces grands problèmes dans tous leurs divers côtés, aideront à formuler des conceptions intellectuelles qui peuvent donner une réponse à des questions nombreuses et pressantes.

Enfin, je vous félicite pour la bonne organisation et la préparation scientifique de ce congrès, tout en priant Dieu de vous accorder le succès.

Address of Welcome
to the First Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference

SAVA GANOVSKY
Fisp President

Highly esteemed Mr. Chairman and President of Ain Shams University,

Dear Colleagues,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure and honour to me, on behalf of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies, to greet the present AFRO-ASIAN PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE which is opening in the ancient city of Cairo and which is naturally drawing the attention of international public opinion. Our Federation has in the last few years organized several regional philosophical conferences. They have the task of promoting the extension and strengthening of the relations between philosophers of different continents and with different convictions in the name of the struggle for the triumph of the intransient values of world peace, humanism, and the superiority of reason. After the regional conferences in India, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, we are now for the first time holding a similar meeting on the antique soil of the continent of Africa, which has made a remarkable contribution to the development of the civilization and culture of humanity as a whole. Here, in Egypt, the cradle of one of the most ancient and glorious civilizations, we particularly intensely feel the grandeur of mankind's eternal striving for wisdom and beauty, for harmony between man and nature, for overcoming the bounds of time and space. We are greatly thrilled at the sight of the presence here of numerous representatives of Africa freed from colonialism, of the new Africa who, relying on her cultural and historical traditions and on the force of solidarity, as well as on the support of her many friends throughout the world, is confidently striving forward towards her bright future.

On the initiative of our esteemed Egyptian colleagues — and here I would like to particularly emphasize the special credit which goes to Professor I. Madkour and Professor M. Wahba — our regional Conference, which is held under the aegis of FISP, will examine the extremely topical and important problem of the interrelationship between philosophy and civilization. This is a theme which moves not only philosophers and scientists, but also the peoples of all countries, humanity as a whole, and we should not omit to congratulate our Egyptian friends on the choice of this theme, and we express the wish that it may be thoroughly and fruitfully discussed at our Conference.

As is well known, the concept of civilization may be said to have become a term in current use in the 18th century and afterwards, when it came to the fore in the writings of the French philosophers of the Enlightenment. Subsequently certain authors have attempted, with the aid of a misuse of the notion of civilization, to substantiate an absolutely unacceptable and unfounded view, that of the «Eurocentrism». For my part I believe in the unity of progressive culture and civilization in the service of humanism, which takes into account the characteristic features of the various continents. As to the self-styled «Eurocentrism» and to the other biased explications of the process of the creation of cultural values, all such attempts to artificially isolate and mutually oppose regional and continental concepts of civilization and culture are inadmissible because of their radical unfoundedness. This does not at all mean that we should underrate the peculiarities and the characteristic features of the historical process of the building and development of civilization. What is meant here is that we should reject that approach, which not only in the past has served, but also nowadays is occasionally serving to try to concoct some justification for racism, which is one of the most contemptible and most reactionary social doctrines.

Our philosophical Conference will consider the interrelationship between philosophy and civilization in various regions of the world and in various aspects of thought. This will undoubtedly enrich our knowledge of the unity and variety of the process of the development of civilization, and of the real contribution of the individual nations and continents to humanity's common spiritual depository. Experience teaches that only a consistently humane philosophy, resting on an integral scientific and social progress, can fructify civilization and can promote the affirmation of man as the creator of highest spiritual values. In a definite sense, philosophy itself is the highest expression of civilization, while on the other hand one or another civilization may leave its deep imprint on the emergence and development of philosophical conceptions. This complex interaction between philosophy and civilization yesterday, today, and tomorrow will undoubtedly be in the centre of our Cairo discussions.

Mr. Chairman,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In our present discussion of the interrelationship between philosophy and civilization we shall naturally get to the cardinal issue of our times, the vital necessity to preserve and strengthen world peace as the paramount precondition for guaranteeing humanity's existence and the future advance of science, culture and civilization. The International Federation of Philosophical Societies which comprises philosophical societies of all the planet's five continents and of different ideological and theoretical orientations, endeavours to contribute, to the full extent of its possibilities, to the establishment of a spirit of mutual

confidence between the creators of cultural values, the organization of joint discussions of most acute problems, and the development of a dialogue in the name of the triumph of good, of the triumph of light over darkness. That is why we express our most sincere gratitude to our Egyptian colleagues, who not only organized the present regional Conference, but are also extending hospitality to the Bureau of FISP, which will thus be able to hold here, at Cairo, an important session in order to discuss questions related to the forthcoming 16th World Congress of Philosophy, to be held in August, 1978, at Düsseldorf (Federal Republic of Germany) on the general theme of «Philosophy and the Scientific World View». We are confident that the present regional philosophical Conference, held at Cairo, will accomplish its work in a spirit of mutual consideration and true solidarity, and on a high theoretical level, and will leave its mark in the annals of the planet's contemporary philosophical life.

Conveying again, on behalf of FISP, our most cordial and friendly feelings to all participants to this Conference, who came here from Africa, Asia, Europe, and America. I would like to thank the University of Ain Shams, the authorities of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the people of Cairo for their hospitality. And to this Afro-Asian Regional Philosophical Conference I wish a complete success in the interest of philosophy, in the service of humanity and of mankind's peace and progress.

Thank you for your attention.

LA CIVILISATION LE MOT ET L'IDEE

IBRAHIM MADKOUR (Egypte)

La civilisation est un phénomène social très complexe. Des historiens et des hommes des lettres, des savants et des philosophes, des ethnographes et des sociologues s'en sont assez occupés. La notion est très vieille, peut-être le terme n'est-il pas auss ivieux. Il y a des vieilles civilisations, comme il y a des médiévales, et des modernes. C'est à tort de croire que cette notion est uniquement l'œuvre du temps moderne. Je ne parle pas de Platon, parmi les Grecs, dans sa **Republique** et ses **Lois,** ni de St. Augustin, parmi les Latins, dans sa **Cité de Dieu.** Je voudrais simplemnt attiré l'attention sur un auteur arabe qui a pu au XIVe siècle faire une étude remarquable de la civilisation. Je veux parler du fameux Ibn Khaldun dont la **Mogaddima** (Prélogomènes) est très connue(1). Elle fut traduite et examinée plusieurs fois en français, en anglais et en d'autres langues modernes. Ce livre peut être consideré comme un des premièrs écrits qui ont traité directement et longement le problème de la civilisation. Il est vrai qu' Ibn Khaldun parle plutôt **d'Al-Omran,** terme qui se rapproche beaucoup de ce que nous appelons aujour'dui «urbanisme». Mais pour lui, «Omran» et «Hadarah» (civilisation) signifient la même chose. Sans aucun doute, il a fondé en arabe la science de la civilisation (Ilm al-Omran). On s'y refère encore anjourd'hui avec beancoup d'intérêt. Je ne pense pas donner ici toute l'histoire de la notion de la civilisation, Je dois cependant faire remarquer que cette notion a été bien développer et enrichir par les anthropologues et les sociologues contemporains. Contentons nous de dire un mot du terme et de sa signification.

Le mot civilisation est, comme on le sait, d'origine latine : «civilis» en latin désigne ce qui concerne le citoyen et «civitas» désigne cité. On peut donc dire que la civilisation signifie le même sens du mot «Hadarah» en arabe dans sa signification étymologique. Le poète arabe avait déja dit :

ومن تكن الحضارة أعجبته   فـــأى رجال بادية ترانا

«Ce lui qui se plaît aux grandes villes, peut-il nous dire de quel désert sommes-nous» ?

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(1) Ibun Khaldun, Mogaddima, ed. «Aly'Abd El Wahid, Le Caire, 1965 — 68 on 4 vol.

Nous trouvons le mot civilisation déja chez Voltaire (1778) et chez Condorcet (1794). Peut-être, fut-il employé avant eux par d'autres écrivains ou auteurs. Une chose certaine est que le **Dictionnaire** de l'Académie Française ne l'a reconnue que dans son édition de 1835, un démi siècle environ après Voltaire. Au contraire, en arabe l'usage du mot **Hadarah** dans son sens étymologique est beaucoup plus vieux. Ce n'est que dernièrement qu'il a acquis une signification technique.

En fait, la notion de la civilisation a passé par une sorte d'évolutions successives. Dèja au XVIIe siècle, on l'opposait à la sauvagérie et à la barbarie. C'est un état social où règne plutôt la raison que le sentiment et dans lequel on cherche à chasser la misère et à éviter la guerre. Du XIXe siècle, avec le progrès scientifique et technique, la civilisation prends un sens plus matèriel. Elle s'applique surtout aux aspects de la vie moderne dans les grands pays d'Europe : planification et communication, industrie et commerce, division du travail et spécialisation, raffinement et goût prononcé. C'est ainsi que l'on a prétendu qu'il n'y a qu'une seule civilisation c'est la civilisation européenne par excellence. On a cherché même à la lancer dans d'autres pays par le moyen de colonisation ou d'investisments des capitaux étrangers. Les pays colonisés, eux-mêmes, ont en une certaine admiration pour cette civilisation.

Au XXe siècle, grâce aux recherches sociologiques et anthropologiques très developpées, on constate d'abord que c'est à tort que l'on parle d'une seule civilisation. Au contraire, il y en a plusieurs : des anciennes et modernes, des orientales et des occidentales. Peut-on nier par exemple qu'il y a en une civilisation égyptienne très ancienne ? Il y a en d'autres civilisations aussi anciennes, occidentales et orientales : grecque et romaine. Chacune de ces civilisations a ses caractéristiques et ses aspects propres. Il n'y a plus de doute que la civilisation musulmane a joué un grand rôle en Asie, en Afrique et en Europe. Elle a jeté en fait ses lumières dans le monde latin et a pu préparer la Renaissance Européenne. Cette civilisation a eu ses créations et ses additions dans l'histoire des civilisations humaines. Elle avait surtout ses lois, ses principes et ses valeurs qui étaient le secret de son grand succès. Un sociologue français contemporain Marcel Mauss (1956) a déja dit : «parler d'un peuple sans civilisation, c'est parler d'un chaos qui n'existe pas»(2).

On a auss isuggéré un domaine de recherche autre que celui de la civilisation, c'est le domaine de la culture. L'ethnographe anglais Edward Taylor (1917) en est peut être le promoteur. Les sociologues et les anthropologistes americains ont suivi son exemple et se sont fortement interessés à l'étude de la culture. Ils ont tenu à l'étudier dans ses différentes formes chez les nomades et les peuples primitifs. Ils parlent volontiers de cultures chez ces peuples,

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(2) **Mauss, Année Sociologique (1900 — 1901).**

mais ils ne leur accordent pas une civilisation. Pour eux, la culture est à la base de toute civilisation.

C'est ainsi qu'une question se pose dans les derniers écrits sociologiques et anthropologiques, à savoir : y a-t-il une différene entre culture et civilisation Cette question a été debattue à maintes reprises et autour de laquelle certaines écoles se sont formées. Je ne voudrais pas entrer dans le détail de ce debat qui est à mon sens un peu vain, Je me contente d'en signaler les grandes lignes.

Pour l'école allemande et son chef Weber, civilisation et culture sont distinctes. La civilisation s'applique plutôt aux faits materiels, elle s'attache à la science et l'âme et au cœur, elle a affaire avec un système de valeurs esthétiques, morales, et religieuses.

L'école français de Durkheim (1917) et de Mauss relient intimement civilisation et culture. D'après elle, un fait de civilisation et un fait de culture sont tous les deux des faits sociaux, il n'y a pas d'intéret de séparer l'un de l'autre. Ils sont tous le produit de la société avec sa conscience et son âme collective. Au fond, cette école ramène tout à la société, sans oublier le rôle de l'individu. Elle ne voit pas de société sans civilisation, y compris, bien entendu, culture. La civilisation est l'œuvre et le support de la société, elle est un des facteurs qui contribuent à son unité et à sa cohésion. Tout en étant l'œuvre d'un peuple, la civilisation peut passer à d'autres peuples et servir à leur rapprochement et à leur union. Comme chaque fait social, la civilisation évolue et suit avec la société la loi du progéès. Mais elle peut également décliner et tomber en déssiétude. L'historien nous apprends que les civilisations humaines évoluent sans cesse, elles sont tantôt en hausse, tantôt en basse. Elles peuvent laisser des traces, mais il n'y en a pas une qui soit immortelle.

L'école amercain qui s'interesse beaucoup à la culture,comme nous l'avons déja remarqué, est divisée en deux. Les uns disent avec l'école française que civilisation et culture sont une seule et même chose. Les autres cherchent à appuyer al séparation entre ces deux notions en se référant aux nomades et au type primitif des agglomérations humaines(3). Ils disent que chez les peuples primitifs one ne peut parler d'une certaine calture, sans avoir aucun aspect de civilisation. Mais là encore, il y a une confusion, une fait culturel peut aussi être consideré au même degré comme un fait de civilisation. Initule de faire remarquer que la science véritable est née dans le sein même de la magie et de la superstitution. Et encore, pourquoi tiennent-ils à rester unique-

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(3) **Kroeber, Culture, A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions,** ***Papers of American Archeology and Ethnology,*** **vol. 47, 1932.**

ment dans le domaine du monde primitif et à oublier les civilisations antiques, médiévales et modernes ? Dans ces civilisations, les faits matériels et les fait spirituels sent intimement liés. Enfin, le grand danger de cette séparation est de priver la civilisation de son caché spirituel. C'est de quoi souffre la civilisation occidentale. Je crains que cette civilisation est en train de devenir une espèse de barbarie ultra moderne.

Pour conclure, Je dois dire que pour ma part Je ne vois pas de civilisation sans cœur, sans âme et sans valeurs. La civilisation regnante aujourd'hui est plutôt matérialiste. Elle fait du bien, mais elle fait aussi du mal, Je crains que son mal commence à dépasser son bien. Je ne parle pas de guerre et de paix, ni des relations internationales que nous n'arrivons pas à régler comme i lfaut. Je m'arrête seulement à l'interieur de chaque société et Je ne puis qu'en donner quelques exemples.

En général, dans nos sociétés actuelles il n'y a pas de doute que la part de l'individu est plut prononcée, elle s'aggrandit de plus en plus, on reclame les droits de l'homme et on cherche à les respecter, c'est une belle acquisition. Mais on constate que le langage du devoir n'est pas aussi respecté, on évite généralement d'en parler quand on s'addresse à la masse. En tout cas, cet individualisme a l'air de se transformer en un certain égoisme farouche qui ne pense qu'à soi-même. Aujourd'hui, on ne s'occupe pas assez de père et de mère, on se soucie peu de frères et de sœurs. Les liens familiaux ne sont pas aussi solides qu'ils l'étaient dans le passé. La famille, qui est la pièce fondamentale de la société, se reduit à deux ou à trois membres. On se demande si elle, même dans cette forme étroite, n'est pas ménacée de disparaitre complètement, le nombre des célébateurs, hommes et femmes, va en augmentant dans les différentes classes de la société contemporaine. Je ne parle pas de voisins auxquels on était attaché et pour lesquels on avait une certaine responsabilité. Tout en habitant le même immeuble, les voisins se connaissent peu. Faut-il mentionner le respect que les jeunes avaient pour les vieux ou la pitié qu'on éprouvoit pour les faibles et les malades ? Ce sont des sentiments qui disparaissent de plus en plus.

Quant aux valeurs humaines, elles ne semblent pas être admises partout et si on les admet on ne les applique pas comme il faut sincérement et honnêtement. Ces valeurs sont l'héritage précieux de l'humanité, elles sont l'œuvre de l'enseignement religieux : juif, chretien et musulman. Les grands penseurs et réformateurs ont également participé à les élaborer. Je ne cherche pas à les énumerer ici, elles sont connues par nous tous, le maleur est que nous n'avons plus l'air d'y croire et nous ne tenons pas beaucoup à les pratiquer. Je cite seulement un exemple : la vertue dont Platon avait parlé depuis 25 siècles estelle aussi respectée dans le présnt que dans le passé et auxquelles vertues nous attacherons-nous ? Je crains que le mot vertue tout court n'est pas d'usage courant.

Là-dessus, on peut en dire beaucoup et pour ma part je ne suis pas très optimiste, je vois que la civilisation regnante est très en souffrance et les grands dérigeants du monde ne s'en rendent pas compte, ou tout au moins ne s'en occupent pas assez. Les grands écrivains, les sages et les philosophes ne sont pas très écoutes. En tout cas, c'est à eux surtout qu'incombe cette tache. Je profites des cette rencontre des grands penseurs de l'Occident et de l'Orient pour faire cet appel. Ce n'est jamais tard d'appeler à la vérité.



THE GREAT CULTURAL TRADITIONS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND IN THE ARISING WORLD

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Introduction

The progress of science, economics and technology during the last century has made available fast transportation and communication on such a large scale that man and goods have become dynamic and mobile as never before in history. Never before have so many travelled around the globe, being able to visit the remotest areas. The great centres of the world have become the crowded meeting grounds of the most variegated people from all parts of the world, and cultural goods from the past as well as the present time have during the last centuries spread around the earth, not only to museums and libraries, but also to the privacy of the homes. Never before has human life been so cosmopolitan as in our age, when our daily food, our dress, our houses, our means of transportation consist of prooducts brought over from distant parts of the globe, produced by various peoples and cultures. An amalgamation of cultures and civilizations has taken place on a worldwide scale and to a certain extent we even can say that a new world culture or civilization is arising, in which the spiritual and material goods of human cultural history come to a new and all-embracing confluence and integration.

It is in this context that it is worth our while to contemplate on the concept of culture and civilization, and on the basis of a renewed understanding of their elements and processes to observe converging tendencies of the great cultural traditions in the flux of change in our time. In this connection I consider it very fortunate that the FISP has decided to sponsore an Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference on Philosophy and Civilization.

The Concept of Culture and Civilization

We know that in no field of research and reflection the methods and objects as well as the concepts are so varying and contradictory as in the field of culture and civilization. In the French sociological school of Durkheim and others, there is the tendency not to speak about cultures and civilizations, but

to concentrate on societies as objects of sociological research. For the cultures of the great social entities is mostly used the term civilization, which includes the concept of culture in the widest sense. The large collection on the great cultural tradition, edited by Raymond Bloch bears the title of **Les Grandes Civilizations** and includes **La Civilization Romaine, La Civilsatono de la Renaissance** etc. In his recent book Roger Garaudy wrote on the **Dialogue des civilizations** in our time. The word culture is mainly used in the French language in relation to agriculture.

In the Anglo-Saxon tradtion, however, the word culture is mainly used in the field of anthropological research and theory, by scholar such as Bronislaw Malinowski, Raymond Firth, A.L. Kroeber, Ruth Benedict, Clifford Geertz, etc. Clyde Kluckhohn a.o. wrote about the five American cultures : the Navahos, Zunis, Spanish Americans, Mormons, and Texans. But in his great work on history, Arnold Toynbee speaks only of civilizations. In the course of history he discerned 21 civilizations. If we observe the usage of the term culture and civilization in the English language, we discover that the word civilization is usually used to indicate the great cultural traditions.

It is especially in the German tradition that various thinkers have attempted to come to a clear differentiation between the concepts of culture and civilization. For Spengler civilization is the unavoidable fate of a culture. It is the end of a culture ; it follows culture as death follows life, rigidity and petrification follows development (1).

Alfred Weber, who arrived at the definition of civilization and culture within the framework of the great historical entities, discerned **Geschellschaft** or social process which includes the process of the totality of the historical events within a certain historical area, which have their basis in the drives and ambitions of the members of the community. In this historical area play an important role the political, the social and the economic processes. The civilization process and the cultural movements are for him, in fact, quite different processes. Their forms are different and they are subjected to different laws of development and have a different phenomenology. The **civilization** process is practical, consists of a totality of intellectual knowledge, which

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(1) Oswald Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* 1, Munchen 1923, p. 41.

is logical and based on the inherent laws of causality. The totality of knoweldge is not created, but discovered. Before it was discovered, it was already there, it was preexistent from the standpoint of development.

The **cultural** movement, however, does not consist of a logical, universal and causal totality. It is, according to Alfred Weber, not an objective totality, but a system of symbols as expression of the soul (2).

In my theory of values (3) I discern six values namely the theoretical value, the economic value, the religious value, the aesthetic value, the power value and the solidarity value. Viewed from this standpoint every culture is the expression of a certain configuration of the six values, which are aprioris of the human mind.

What Alfred Weber called «der Geschellschafts process» is viewed from this value theory a combination of the vertical value of power and the horizontal value of solidarity. I call this **the social aspect** of every culture.

There is a relationship between the logic of the theoretical value and the economic value. A combination of both represents the **progressive** aspect of every culture, since the realization of the theoretical value as science and the realization of the economic value as economic goods are accumulative, progressive. The same is true of technology which is the result of the combination of the theoretical value and the economic value. This progressive aspect of culture runs parallel with the concept of the civilization process of Alfred Weber.

There is also a relationship between the religious value and the aesthetic value. Both are based on feeling, on intuition, and on the creativity of imagination. The combination of both values I call the **expressive aspect** of a culture, which runs parallel to the concept of cultural movement of Alfred Weber.

The origin of the great cultural tradition

Various scholars on the cultural history of the world have been struck by the great cultural events which took place around the fifth century B.C., or

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(2) Alfred Weber, *Prinzipien der Geschichts — und Kultursoziologie*, München 1951, p. 44.

(3) S. Takdir Alisjahbana, *Values as Integrating Forces in Personality, Society and Culture*, Kuala Lumpur, 2nd ed. 1974.

more accurately between 800 and 200 B.C. It is as if out of the immense fluid ocean of cultural history in a relatively short time arose highest mountainous islands, which changed the total cultural landscape of the world until our time. In China, India, the Arab Peninsula and Greece great thinkers and religious builders emerged : Confucius, Moti, Lao-tse in China, the thinkers of the Upanisads, Buddha and Mahavira in India, the Prophets in the Arab Peninsula, Parmenides, Heraclit and Plato in Greece(4).

This sudden synchronic outburst of human speculative and contemplative forces in places far and more or less isolated from each other, is the basis of the great cultural traditions of our time. Confucius' tenets still influence the living belief of hundreds of millions of Chinese, Buddha's doctrine is not only the basis of the dominating religion in Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Ceylon but it plays also an important role among the Chinese and Japanese. From the Semitic prophets of the Arab Peninsula derive the great religions of Christianity, which cover at present the whole of Europe, America, Australia and great parts of even Asia and Africa, and Islam which is the religion of hundreds of millions of people in Asia and Africa, while Greek philosophy is the very basis of our secular modern industrial civilization, which through its development during the Roman Empire, the Islam, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, has reached its highest scientific achievement in Europe, America and Japan today.

What are the characteristics of these first high cultures, if we compare them with earlier cultures ? It is as if man had discovered a new way of thinking, a new insight not only into himself and the world, but also into the forces around him and thus experienced a deep discontent with his existing culture. Through its most talented representatives mankind started to ask the most radical questions about life, the surrounding nature, and the mysterious powers, and thus arrived at new concepts, new ideals, which went together with a deepening of life experience and thought.

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(4) See a.o. Karl Jaspers, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte, Frankfurt/M, 1956.

One of the most characteristic tendencies of this new systematical and radical thinking is the pursue of extreme abstraction. While the Greek philosophy of nature attempted to arrive at the ultimate substance or truth of the world around man, the Jewish prophets were wrestling with the concept of the unity of God as the base and the ruler of the universe. In India to the concept of Brahma, as the total and ultimate concept to which atma returns, is added the Buddhistic concept of Nirvana, the ultimate goal of all life, when the curtain of ignorance is removed. In China Confucius laid the foundations of the largest social-political structure in history based on the loyalty of children to the parents and of the citizen to the king and the state, on moderateness, on realism, and on a system of education for an efficient civil service, which until our time still influences the cultural life and thought of the Chinese.

It is clear that there was a great difference between the concepts and ideals of Confucius and Buddha, between those of Buddha and the prophets and those of the prophets and the Greek thinkers. But compared to those of an earlier time, these concepts and ideals had many traits in common, such as the radicality of their questions, the uncompromising seriousness of their search for solutions, and the comprehensiveness and logic of their concepts and ideas. It is as if they all experienced the universality and unity of man and his destiny, and attempted not only to formulate this experience in a broad and severe rationality, but also attempted to live according to these experiences and concepts, regardless of their consequences. Out of this extreme power of thought and understanding, a new comprehensive world and life view emerged replacing the old, which had been bound to the tribes, to the local magical and mythological beliefs and practices.

The breakthrough of this new attitude and courageous reflection was not only a breakthrough of individualism, which gave to the world new religions and philosophies, but also went together with an expansion of ethical responsibility far beyond the border of the clan or tribe : an ethical universalism came into being, which became not only the basis of the new large kingdoms, but which also made it possible that the new religions, philosophies and ethical systems spread through the whole world. Thus Buddhism moved to Southeast Asia, China and even Japan. Greek thinking spread through the area around

the Mediterranean, to Western Europe. Chinese learning became accepted in Japan and the surrounding countries of Korea and Indo-China. We know that a half millennium later Christianity emerged out of the tenets of the semitic prophets and conquered the whole of Europe, where it came to a unique synthesis with the continuation of Greek thought, which we call European culture and which has such a great impact on the culture of the modern world all around the globe. A half millennium later Islam arose from the same semitic cultural atmosphere, which spread in a short time through Africa and Asia, from the Atlantic Ocean until the Malay Archipelago.

Thus the extraordinary mental and spiritual upheaval around the fifth century B.C., has had the most far-reaching consequences for the whole world. It is the birth of these broad, universal beliefs concepts, and ethics, setting free great expansive energy for the organizations of political entities such as the Han, Maurya and Roman Empires that brought about a new, hitherto non-existent communication between the human race.

South-East Asia as the melting pot of the great cultural tradition

Like Western Europe, Japan and many other parts of the world, South-East Asia did not belong to the cradle of the high cultures, which emerged during the first millennium B.C. Its high culture was of secondary character. The time of the great spiritual and mental upheaval in China, India, the Arab Peninsula and Greece was still the time of its prehistory when people came wave after wave from the mainland of Asia to inhabit the Southeastern coast of Asia, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philoppines until Madagascar, and the islands of the Pacific until Easter Island.

Many descriptions have been made of the culture of the people of South-east Asia, on the basis of pre-history, of language relationships, on economic conditions and various artifacts. Most important is the research which has been made on the adat law and the basic religious beliefs of the people of this area. In the most general sense, it can be said, that the pre-Hindu society in Southeast Asia consisted of small communities, mainly living in the plains, river valleys and hills, growing rice. The buffalo was already known and used. Women played an important role in community life. Society was democratic in the sense that the difference in status between the tribe or clan members was

not very large and that the most important decisions in the life of the community were taken by a council of elders on the basis of **mupakat,** i.e. mutual agreement ; the head was the **primus inter pares.** At all important social events as well as at events in the life circle of individuals, cooperation and mutual help existed between the members of the community.

Like all primitive people in history, the way of thinking was complex, all inclusive and highly intuitive. The belief in spirits and supernatural powers dominated all aspects of individual and communal life, so that the most fundamental concern was, how to get the support of the good spirits and how to avoid the evil ones, or in the case of supernatural power, how to strengthen oneself with this supernatural power, and even control or use it for individual or social interest.

Like Western Europe which came into the orbit of Hellenistic-Roman culture and Semitic prophetic religion, and was able to mould both cultural traditions into a new Germanic-Roman Christian culture of the Middle Ages, so in Southeast Asia the local cultures came to an exuberant blossoming under the influence of the high cultures of India. Large and powerful political units arose, a new vigorous culture developed, comparable to the highest peak of social and cultural achievement in any part of the world during the first one and a half millenia of the Christian Era. It was not only the time of the powerful kingdoms such as Funan, Sriwijaya, Cambodia, Majapahit, it was also the time that a strong organizational power and religious devotion and versatile artistic geniuses produced the Borobudur, Prambanan, Angkor Vat, which belong to the greatest monuments ever built.

We know, that, for example, the Indonesian chandi is not the same as the Indian temple, and that it was, in a sense, a continuation of the Malay place for ancestor worship. Angkor Vat has been designed on the basis of the topography of its water-rich country. Interesting is also the role of the snake, deriving from native mythology, in the sculpture of Buddha. We know that even in the wayang (shadowplay) repertoire of Java, figures from old Indonesian cults of ancestor worship have been added to the heroes of the Mahabharata.

The most remarkable fact of this cultural contact is that the native societies easily accepted this high culture from India and, what is even more surprising, they were able to utilize its elements in combination with their own cultural elements, to create an art which in many respects surpasses that of India. No wonder, because viewed from Southeast Asian cultural attitude, concepts and logic, the Southeast Asian cultures are not so different from the high culture of India. Between both existed so many resemblances in attitude, concepts and logic. First of all both are heavily spiritual in the sense that the deepest essence of reality is spirit and that the material reality follows the spiritual logic, which is, in the term of Hans Leisegang(5), the logic of the circle, in which god, man and animals are interchangeable in a cyclical incarnation. Basically, animism and the tenet of Atma-Brahma (with the concept of incarnation) derived from the same world view. The second is only an elaboration of the first so that by the acceptance of the Hindu religion and culture the old native religion and culture did not suffer a breakdown, on the contrary experiencing a relief of growth.

A very important element for the development of the secondary high cultures in Southeast Asia was the introduction of the Indian script, which made possible the inclusion of the whole religious and secular literature of India into the new Southeast Asian cultures. On the basis of this script, the Southeast Asian cultures were able to start to build up their own religions, literary and intellectual life. Thus the centuries of the first one and a half millennia were the Golden Age of Southeast Asia. The power of the kings, the concentrated organization of the state and of economic life, the comprehensive religious system as well as the artistic skill and dedication are manifested in the great achievements of Angkor Vat, the Borobudur, the Prambanan, etc.

It is interesting to note that the rational stratification of the Indian caste system was not accepted in Southeast Asia. Its strongest influence can be found in the stratification of the Javanese language which is only an aesthetic verbal substitute, compared to the rigid Indian caste system.

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(5) Hans Leisegang, *Denkformen, Berlin,* 1951, pp. 61 - 142.

The great cultural conflict took place with the arrival of Islam, which arose in the Arab Peninsula as one of the most vigorous offshoots of the semitic prophetic religion. Its characteristics as a semitic religion is its absolute monotheism, which does not even allow any artistic symbols of its entirely abstract God. At the time that it arrived in Southeast Asia, however, it had behind it a history of nearly half a millennium, during which it had spread through the area of the Mediterranean until Spain, and the Donau Valley. In its fast expansion, especially in the direction of the West, it had been strongly influenced by Greek thinking, which was characterized by its secularity and rationality. The Greek philosophy and science, which at the decline of the Roman Empire and during the Middle Ages receded more and more to the background in Europe, were absorbed and developed further by Arabic and Jewish scholars and philosophers. It was they who preserved the Greek tradition and later handed it over again to Europe at the end of the Middle Ages. On the other hand, a mystical branch of Islam also developed, under the influence of New Platonism and parallel to Neo-Platonism.

Through its expansion towards the East, Islam came into contact with Iran and India and to a certain extent under the impact of Indian pantheism. The Islam which arrived in Southeast Asia, and later on became gradually the dominating religion in a greater part of Indonesia, Malaya and some parts of the Philippines, had thus various potentialities. But in general, it can be said, Islam as an absolute monotheistic religion rejects the concept of the basic unity of animals, human beings and supernatural powers, and gives man special position above the animal and vegetative world. Man is given an opportunity to build his own world guided by his own intelligence. In contrast to the logic of the circle of old Malay and Indian culture, the logic of Islam is more that of the pyramid in which the highest position is attributed to God.

Another clear difference between Islamic and especially Indian Hindu culture is the democratic character of Islam with its doctrine that all men are equal before Allah. In this logic there is no place for the doctrine of incarnation and the Indian caste system.

Thus with the arrival of Islam, a strong conflict arose between the new and the established religion and culture.

Islamic culture brought about great changes in the fields of economics, law and social organization, mainly because of its practical and rational attitude towards life and also because of the fact that it was brought to Southeast Asai by merchants, supports the assumption that Islam constituted an important factor in the active commerce in Southeeast Asia at the close of the Hindu period and the beginning of Western influence.

The last representatives of the Hindu-Malay culture escaped to Bali, where they have remained until our days. In the continent of Southeast Asia however, Buddhism had a very strong foothold and has remained the dominating religion until our time.

Thus the 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries witnessed powerful Islamic kingdoms in the Southern part of Southeast Asia, especially on both sides of the Straits of Malacca and in Java. But as we know, Islamic society and culture in Southeast Asia were not able to maintain their expansion and growth. This decline was not only a phenomenon of Islam in Southeast Asia, but a general one in the whole Islamic world.

Compared to the cultural influence of India and Islam on Southeast Asia, the influence of Chinese culture is quite different. It is as if the Chinese high culture of the period of the axis of history did not have any expansive power in regard to Southeast Asia, with the exception of the areas on the border of China, such as Indo-China. And indeed, viewed from this standpoint Confucius is a thoroughly Chinese social philosopher, whose greatest merit was the organization of the Chinese state. His doctrine was intended to be applied to the people of the Chinese kingdom and not to other people.

As a rational and practical social philosophy, which built up a system of Chinese cultural behaviour, Confucianism formulated the ideals of the virtuous man, and especially emphasized the obligations of the citizen and of the members of the family. Loyalty to the king and the state and filial piety to the parent and the ancestors belong to its essential characteristics, besides an attitude of rational and practical compromise, i.e. the middle road, for the sake of social and individual peace. The systematic education and organization of a class of capable civil servants manifest further the rationality and practi-

cal attitude of Confucius'social philosophy. Thus Confucianism is more national. more soil-bound than Indian and Islamic culture.

But we know that during the last millennium nevertheless, about 10 million of Chinese have settled in Southeast Asia. On the island of Tumasek or old Singapore, for example, already in the 14th century there was a Chinese settlement.

But due to the special character of the Chinese cultural attitude, concepts and logic, Chinese religious and aesthetic influence, i.e., the expressive aspect of Chinese culture is very small in Southeast Asia, especially if compared to that of India and the Islam. Viewed from the Chinese vocabulary in the indigenous languages, its influence is greater in the practical aspects of life, i.e. concerning food and skills.

The Universality of modern industrial civilization

As has been said, it was especially in the culture of Greece of the axis of history, where the individualistic, rational thinking and objective observation of the surrounding nature broke through, creating the basis of our worldwide modern industrial civilization. Greek philosophy and science experienced a revival in Moslem philosophy and science in the Middle East as well as in Spain. The translation of Greek and Arabic philosophical and scientific works from the Arabic language into European languages, followed later by a direct translation of original works of philosophy and science from Greek after the fall of Constantinople into the hands of the Turks, marked the beginning of the Renaissance. Through the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the scientific, technological and economic revolution as well as the social and political upheaval in the nineteenth century, a continuous process of demythologization and dereligionization took place in an accelerating pace. And it was especially in the theory of Darwin, Marx, Comte, etc. that religion arrived at its lowest point in scientific or pseudo-scientific thinking. Even the large political structures on the basis of nationalism which were the own creation of the Renaissance, have in our age to go through a great transformation.

Millions of people are still unconscious not only of these worldwide amalgamating and unifying tendencies of our rational and materialistic industrial

civilization but also of its process of demythologization, dereligionization and denationalization. Viewed from the totality of the cultures, we can say that it is in this industrial civilization that all the present cultures of mankind find their common ground, because of the unversality of the logic of human reason as well as the unalterable laws of nature which are its very foundation.

Thus in our dominantly progressive modern culture for the first time in history the whole of mankind arrives at a common world view and a common way of thinking with their active centers in the universities, the banks and the factories. Against this unity of our secular world on the basis of the universal logic of thought and the universal and unchangeable laws of nature, the existing world religions with their various concepts of God, the world and man, their various rituals and institutions are in a rather embarassing situation of backwardness in the face of the unity of mankind in our shrinking planet.

Southeast Asia and the Arising World

In the beginning of this essay I have referred to the decisive epoch of history between 800 and 200 B.C., which Karl Jaspers called the **Achsenzeit**(6), e.g. the axis of history, when the foundation was laid for all the existing great religious traditions as well as for our secular industrial civilization of today. No people in the world has been able to escape its impact without being forgotten in primitivism.

Some speculations have been made about the cause of this more or less simultaneous, mysterious upsurge of human spiritual and mental life over a relatively small area of the world. Biological phenomena behind this change are not known, nor are other natural causes. Alfred Weber(7) made the bold assumption that it might be the use of the horse as a draft animal and steed which gave man not only a new feeling of self-confidence and power, but also a new perception of time and space, of life and the world.

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(6) Karl Jaspers, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte, Frankfurt/M, 1956, p. 14.

(7) Alfred Weber, Kulturgeschichte als Kultursoziologie, München 1950, p. 42.

I have already mentioned at the beginning of this paper the decisive influence of the fast transportation and communication in the great social and cultural change of our time. And, indeed, the whole history of man has testified that transportation and communication are functions of the expansion and intensification of social and cultural life. At the time that people have only their feet to move from one place to another and their mouths to communicate with each other, societies and cultures were limited to villages and their surrounding nature, since with their feet people cannot move faster than 5 or maximum 7 km an hour. The inhabitants belonged to a clan or to a number of clans which were related to each other by intermarriage. The government was in the hand of the elders in the community, who under the leadership of their head, took decisions in the affairs of the community by democratic deliberations. Such a community had its own unique religion and art.

For villages which were located on the side of a river or on the shore of a lake, the invention of the canoe or the raft, opened possibilities of growth. Also the domestication of the cow, the camel, etc. brought further development to the small societies and cultures. It is clear, however, that it was especially the horse as draft animal and steed, which opened wider perspectives of expansion. Alfred Weber rightly classified the human type which had the command of the horse as the complete master, against whom the cowstep of his predecessor disappeared and who as riding master of the most noble animal felt akin to the Gods(8).

With the use of the horse, a new dynamic came into the clan and tribal society and culture, since with this new means of transportation people were able to reach greater distances of hundreds and thousands of kilometers. It was not only exchange of goods and ideas with neighbour villages and tribes which came into being, but also stronger and expansive villages and tribes also started to conquer weaker villages and tribes and gradually established larger political and cultural units. The village where a powerful head resided, developped gradually into a capital, around which emerged a new and larger society and

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(8) **Ibid, p. 43.**

culture with a new power hierarchy, a new and broader economic life spreading over the conquered villages and tribes. Out of this situation emerged, during the centuries, the great kingdoms in all part of the world with the palace as the center of political, economic, religious and artistic life.

We know that with the invention of the steam machine, which was related to the use of iron and coal, came the steamship and railways, which opened the possibilities for the emergence of the large colonial imperiums such as Britain, France and the Netherlands, uniting parts of the globe, which were located thousands of kilometers away from each other.

Through the invention of the airoplane which in our time has reached a velocity faster than sound and with the invention of radio and the establishment of a telecommunication system over the whole world, people throughout the world come to conflicts and a confluence as never before in history. It is in this epoch that we feel to be in the throes of a great transformation. Not only the national states, which are a product of the Renaissance have become a danger to and obstacle for a world cooperation as is testified by the two world wars behind us, but also our political system, our laws, our economic relations, our religion and arts have to adjust themselves to the new situation of closer contact between the human race in our shrinking planet.

It is clear that it is in this context that problems of overpopulation, of scarcity of food and other resources like oil, iron, etc., pollution of air, sea and land, have become problems of the whole of mankind, regardless of nationality, race, religion or ideology. And especially with the tremendous devastating power of nuclear arms, which like transportation and communication are by-products of the progress of the industrial civilization, the whole of mankind is facing the urgent task of building up a new worldwide sphere of cooperation in the atmosphere of a broader responsibility than that of the national state, of the various religious or ideological beliefs. Without it mankind is facing its selfdestruction or even annihilation.

Viewed from this great social and cultural crisis of our time, in which the political, economic, religious and ideological structures are confronted with each other in the unrefutable converging tendencies created by the vanishing distances in the world, we undeniably are entering a new axis of history which calls for a totally new orientation in man's thought and conceptualization, and in

man's ethical responsibility. New all-embracing political, economic and religious structures have to arise, in which the criss-crossing national, economic and religious concepts and ambitions will find a new dynamic and creative integration.

It is in this sense that philosophy as the most embracing exercise of human speculative power and idea formation acquires a new meaning in the great need for a total reorientation, for a reordering of the tremendous results of human scientific, religious, economic and artistic conceptualization and creation during the centuries, into a global structure. A new world society and culture is arising in which all the cultures and civilizations of the past and present come to a new integration.

Coming back to the exceptional position which Southeast Asia occupies as the only region where all the great cultural and religious traditions come together to a confluence and conflict as nowhere else in the world, it is worthwhile to contemplate, to what extent, this simultaneous existence of the great cultural and religious traditions can be utilized for the promotion of a better understanding and cooperation between the great cultural traditions in our time, for a common solution of the multivarious fundamental problems in facing the inescapable impact of the rational, egalitarian and unifying tendencies of modern industrial civilization.

As has been said, Southeast Asia did not participate in the great spiritual and cultural upheaval during the axis of history, it is not the cradle of any of the great religious tradition, neither has it in the course of history produced great philosophical and religious thinkers. The easiness with which the Southeast Asian people have accepted the continuous wave of the great religions through the centuries testifies the great sensitiveness of the Southeast Asian soul for the multivarious religious contemplations and devotions. In the context of the new cooperation of the Southeast Asian countries to build up together a new future in the arising world community, the fact that in Southeast Asia all the great religious and cultural traditions live side by side, open possibilities for the awareness of the necessity of a broader framework of discussion, deliberation and exchange of ideas for a better understanding, and may be also for the construction of broader structures of political, religious and artistic ideas and concepts, which are so needed in the chaotic and criss-crossing encounter of so many currents and counter-currents in our time.

It is in this context interesting and meaningful that in the Indonesian State philosophy which is known as Pancasila (the five principles), the first principle is the unity of God. On this basis all the religions in Indonesia are treated equally and under the guidance of the ministry of religion the government is attempting to bring the various religious groups, deriving from the great religious traditions two and a halve millennia ago, to an atmosphere of tolerance, mutual understanding and cooperation.

PHILOSOPHY OF INDIAN CIVILIZATION

THAMBI SRINIVASAN (India)

At the outset a word of apology — and explanation — would be necessary, indeed essential. The subject, as indicated by the title, is too vast, too comprehensive, including in tis scope so many inter-linked disciplines, that in a brief essay like this it would be impossible to present a succint but definitive study. The wealth of Indian heritage in religion, philosophy, theology, the humanities, the plastic arts, literature, polity, sociology, folk-lore — the entire gamut of the strings that strum to make the Indian symphony, can only be covered by a college of scholors working on a series of volumes. The apology therefore is for inability to achieve a lucid exposition of the philosophical implications of Indian civilization. The most that can be done is to unveil facets of this fascinating theme, hoping to stimulate interest in the subject. Even if doubts, not conclusions, are created, the object would have been achieved. In the words of the American poet :

« He mixes music with her thoughts

And saddens her with heavenly doubts »

For it is from doubts that the learned proceed to certainties.

A little explanation on the title may also not be out of place. Are we talking of the impact of philosophy on civilization, or trying to evolve a philosophy of civilization, not unlike a philosophy of history, of art, of science and yet other disciplines ? Actually, both are attempted, albeit in a simplicistic manner. In the eastern way of life religion is the foundation with philosophy, theology and theosophy as integral components. The meaning of existence is interpreted as opportunity for devotion and service to the greater glory of God, in whatever form He may be worshipped : the divine principle is the prime mover for human endeavours. Thus culture, the hand-maid of civilization, is the by-product of religion. Hence the accent on philosophy in this study, to the virtual exclusion of other allied forces of social dynamics despite their origin in religion.

Again, the stress has been on the pristine origins of Indian philosophic traditions, with just a brief mention of developments in the mediaeval and modern ages. In any event, later reformist movements have only served to remove incrustations and promote revivalism. The main difficulty in any

historical survey of the Indian scene is the irrational division of the Indian epochs into Hindu, Muslim and British Ages as adopted by many historians, British and Indian. This gives the impression that by the thirteenth or fourteenth century A.D. the Hindu rajas were removed from the scene and the Muslims came in, mainly as the Mughals, to be replaced during their twilight by European elements. In a cultural, study such arbitrary classification makes little sense, ignoring as it does 2300/ year-old Indo-Arab relations, the influence of Islam and the advent of Christianity almost along with the crucifixion ; cultural history has to be chronologically true, more than a political account dealing with conquest and rule.

Essential in the preliminary stage is an examination of the terms adopted, particularly «culture» and «civilization».

The simplest definition of «culture» one can adopt for basic evaluation proposes can be«culture is the intrinsic value of society».

While it is deemed synchronic with «civilization» it may be noted that SPENGLER employs the term «culture» to define a civilization in its creative growth/period. Culture then would be the means — the tools, customs and institutions, of social groups — and the employment of such means.

An elaboration describes culture as a social heritage, the components including inherited artifacts, instruments, technical processes, ideas, habits, evaluation, language and the liturgical paraphernalia of religion. Material and psychological components interact in consonance with the intelligence of the social group(1).

Albert William Levi's studies(2) on the work and view points of three eminent historians of civilization-Oswald SPENGLER, Arnold TOYNBEE and Affred North WHITEHEAD, may prove illuminating signposts both to indicate the scope or restrict the limits even of a brief survey such as the present one :

Spengler's postulates are interesting, though not all acceptable, at least to an Eastern or better non-Western mind. To Spengler.

Culture is the period of flowering while civilization is the period of decay.

In history individuals are not important. Only those «inspired mass-units» — the Higher Culture-which mark the point where History intersects with the cosmic pulse.

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(1) **Encyclopedia of the Arts (1946), The philosophical library, New York. Entry in Culture by Ralpt W. Church.**

(2) **Philosophy and the Modern World 1959 : by A.W. Levi Indana University, Sidney Bloomington India.**

These Higher Cultures are eight in number — Egyptian, Babylonian, Indian, Chinese, Classical, Arabian, Aztec, Western.

Every great culture is a water-tight hermetically sealed organism. Borrowing may take place, but it is always merely superficial : the forms are transferable, the spirit never.

The eight cultures pass through the four seasonable phases of spring, summer, autumn and winter — Blooming, flowering and withering.

Thus, each cultura spring time marks the birth of a mpth, a new religious feeling. Such was the Vedic religion in India, the Gods of Homer, the piety of Bernard and Francis of ASSISSI.

Each cultural summer is an era of religious reformation and the beginning of philosophical thought. Such were the Brahmanas, Orphism, the ideas of Savonarola,Luther and Calvin. Philosophy began in the Upanishads, the great pre-Socrates of the Sixth century B.C. and with Bacon, Desartes and Galileo.

Each cultural summer has its rationalistic enlightenment and its great conclusive philosophical systems : Yoga and Vedanta in India, Plato and Aristotle in the classical world, Averroes and Avicenna in Islam, Kant and Hegal in the west.

And, finally, each cultural winter has its materialistic world outlook, its cult of science and utility, its emphasis upon ethics and society : Stoics, Epicureans and Cynics among the Greeks : Bentham, Comte, Marx in the West.

According to Spengler, each of these eight cultures (spelt with a capital «C») has both its phase of culture (with a small «c») and of civilization.

As Spengler points it : «Culture and civilization the living body of a soul and the mummy of it»(3). Spengler's obsession is with the fin de siecle, aptly expressed in the title **Decline of the West.** He attempts to force other cultures and civilizations into the Western mould, and when difficulties arise, chooses to ignore rather than revise his own conceptualization. His parameters are narrow and hence cannot serve to circumscribe non-Western studies. History simply as a chronicle upsets his reasoning and he ends up rejecting absolute values and adopting a sceptical view of the historical processes.

Toynbee, not unlike Splenger, distinguishes twenty-one cultures, of which five (Western, Orthodox Christian, Islamic, Hindu and Far Eastern) are extant today. The criterion of growth applied to civilization is, to Toynbee, a progressive movement towards self-determination. He acknowledges the work in this sphere of creative individuals and creative minority and his case studies

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(3) The Decline of the West by Oswald Spengler.

include leaders at turning points like the Buddha, Lenin, Solon, the Prophet Muhamed, Layola, Thucydides, Caesar and Confucius.

Like Splenger, Toynbee also attempts a postulation of the cyclic theory, with disintegration marked by the factor «NEMESIS OF CREATIVITY». His approach however is basically Christian, though he calls himself less a Christian than a «Symmachan». Toynbee does see hopes for Western resurgence in Christianity : «Under the aegis of Religion Western Man might find himself able to handle with spiritual impunity the material power thrust into his hands by the mechanisation of Western technology» (4).

As Levi puts it, «he (Toynbee) has a strong impulse to see the world through the prospective of a Christian unity» (5).

The modern world historian in the platonic tradition, Alfred North Whitehead, works on the basis that our history of ideas is derived from our ideas of history and that our ideas of history are a function of our cosmological outlook (6).

Whitehead, writing on the ingression of forms into the flux of history, dispells the concepts of a non subjective approach : «Thus notion of historians devoid of aesthetic prejudice, of history devoid of any reliance on metaphysical principles and cosmological generalizations is a fragment of the imagination» (7).

Whitehead's approaches to the definition of civilization are more specific in content but broader in concept :

Civilization is constituted out of four elements, (1) Patterns of Behaviour, (2) Patterns of Emotion, (3) Patterns of Belief, and (4) Technologies.

The impact of aesthetic, religious and moral notions is inescapable. They are the disrupting and energezing forces of civilization.

Civilization is the maintenance of social order by its own inherent persuasiveness as embodying the nobler alternative.

A civilized society exhibits the five qualities of Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art and Peace.

To Whitehead, God is the ultimate limitation and His existence is the ultimate irrationality, But as Levi points out :

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(4) **A Study of History by Arnold Toynbee.**

(5) **A.W. Levi Op. cit.**

(6) **A.W. Levi ibid.**

(7) **Adventures of Ideas by A.N. Whitehead.**

«God is one of the most important concepts in Whitehead's delineation of final metaphysical truth, but his importance consists, I think, not in the unconscious similarities with the inescapable God of Christian Theology but in the almost Platonic way in which he becomes the central fixture uniting a profound insight into the nature of evil with a truly Greek faith in the potency of an ultimate harmony and order» (8).

For our purposes the Spengler/Toynbee parameters maybe a trifle elaborate and perhaps confining : further, the link with Christian theology may imply exclusion of other religious influences. Could one, for instance, omit the glories of Granada and Cordova in any study of Spain ?

But the religious basic and the path to the Godhead have an indisputable validity.

The Indus Valley civilization is the most impressive and intriuging manifestation of the cuitural eminence attained by the original inhabitants of the Indian sub continents in the ancient period. Through the excavations at Mohenjo-Daro, Harappa and other sites in the North, even along the Gangetic valley, are falrly recent. It is considered that the Indus valley civilization is at least six or seven thousand years old.

Storeyed buildings, public baths, excellent drains, paved roads built to municipal regulations, ornaments of gold, silver and precious stones, seals, statuettes, exquisite pottery and toys with moving parts, testify to the sophisticated elegance of this ancient period. But this civilization vanished, from causes unknown.

The Aryan migration started more than a thousand years after the disappearance of the Indus Valley civilization. The Aryans came through the north-western passes, possibly one section of the great dispersal from the Mediterranean in all **directions.**

The early Aryans were pastoral momads, but once they reached the Indus, they chose to settle down along the banks of the river. The Indus, more properly Sindhu, gave the names Hindu and later India. As Jawaharlal Nehru has said : «We might say that the first great cultural synthesis and fusion took place between the incoming Aryans and the Dravidians, who were possibly the representatives of the Indus Valley civilization. Out of this synthesis and fusion grew the Indian races and the basic Indian culture, which had distinctive elements of both» (9).

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(8) A.W. Levi Op. cit.

(9) The Discovery of India by Jawaharlal Nehru, Meridian Books.

The Aryans brought with them their Vedas, magnificient hymns to the elements and to the Gods, touching upon man's role and posing philosophic subleties. The Vedas (from **Vid,** to know) became and continue to be revealed scripture for the Hindus. The old term for religion in India was Arya Dharma, standing for righteousness, duty and responsibility.

The word «Arya» came from a root meaning «to till», as the new migrants were agriculturists. Later, as conquerors, the Aryans attained a status higher than that of the indigenous population and «Arya» came to signify «noble» settlement on the land and development of society led to hierarchical stratification and sophistication of guilds which brought about the institution of the caste system. The system was originally fluid, permitting movement from one group to another, but gradually became rigid, with the non-Aryan populace relegated to the lowest strata and outside the system.

Despite the adumbration of the origins of the caste system in the **Purusha Sukta** of the Vedas, the Rig Veda hardly mentions any taboos on inter-marriage, or change of occupation. The author of one Vedic hymn declares : «I am a poet, my father is a doctor and my mother is a grinder of corn with on different views, seeking after gains, we run as after cattle».

Western observers are equally divided on the possible effects of the caste system on the political future of India.

Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Rudolf see in caste associations a useful way of linking traditional and modern political processes (10). Selig Herisson fears that their growth will pose a threat to the cohesion of a country already deeply divided by linguistic and regional loyalties (11).

The Vedas include the Rig Veda (hymns to the Gods). Yajur Veda (sacrificial formulae). Sama Veda (priests' chants) and Atharva Veda (magical chants). The theosophic contents of the Vedas form the first philosophic insights.

The Hindus regard the Vedas as nitya (eternal) and as record of the revelations vouchsafed to the rishis (sages) of ancient India.

Each Veda is divided into four sections called Mantras, Brahmanas, Aranyakas and Upanishads.

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(10) Lloyd I Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph «The Political Role of India's Caste ; Association, Pacific Affairs (1960).

(11) India : The Most Dangerous Decades : by Selig Harrison, Princeton New Jersey (1960).

The mantras are hymns addressed to various deities adored by the Aryans. The inspired poetic quality of the hymns are such that Rabindranath Tagore described them as the «poetic testament of a people's collective reaction to the wonder and awe of existence. A people of vigorous and unsophisticated imagination awakened at the very dawn of civilization to a sense of the inexhaustible mystery that is implicit in life» ([12]).

The Brahmanas lay down the rules and directions for the conduct of various sacrifices. They are prose passages with little philosophic thought of weight.

The Aranyakas (literally, forest treatises since they were composed in sylvan retreats) proceed in the direction of the Upanishads. They provide allegoric and mystic interpretation of some of the sacrifices and also suggest certain forms of meditation.

The concluding portions of Vedas are the Upanishads also referred to as Vedanta. They offer the quintessence of the theosophic and philosophic content of the Vedas.

The term «Upanishad» means to sit close by with devotion, referring indirectly to the lessons transmitted by the Guru or teacher to the Chela or disciple sitting at his feet.

The Upanishads are widely acclaimed all over the world. Thorean advised his fellow-Americans to give up the **New York Times** and read the Eternities as he termed the Upanishads. The Spanish scholor Juen Mascaro lauded the Upanishads as «The Himalayas of the Soul». Schopenhauer has said — «In the whole world there is no study so beneficial as that of the Upanishads. It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death». Max Muller, who has translated the Upanishads ,describes them as «the light of the morning like the pure air of the mountains so simple and so true if once understood».

Vedanta literally means the end of Vedas, the studies that begin after the four Vedas. The term is also applied to the Upanishads and the various systems of thought emanating therefrom. Vedanta would also include the **Bhagavad Gita** and the Vedanta Sastras (or Brahma Sutras) of the sage Badarayana.

The Gita (the Divine Song) is a chapter in the epic Mahabaratha. The royal cousins — The Pandavas and the Kauravas are in battle array on the field of Kurukshetra. The great archer Arjuna, one of the five victimised

(12) Hindu Scriptures : Edited by Nicol Mecnicol. Foreword by Rabindranath Tagore.

Pandavas, on the eve of battle, is despondent at having to fight against his own cousins despite the wrongs they have done to him and his brothers. He confides his despair to Krishna (an avatar of Vishnu) who is acting as his charioteer. Krishna then expounds the message of disinterested action and the way of the Karma Yogin, the man who seeks salvation through service.

The Gita is the most popular text of the Hindu through the ages, more than even the Upanishads because the message is easier to understand. Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan writes of the Gita : «It sets forth a tradition which has emerged from the religious life of mankind. It is articulated by a profound seer who sees truth in its many sidedness and believes in its saving power. It represents not any sect of Hinduism as a whole, not merely Hinduism but religion as such in its universality without limit of time and space, embracing within its synthesis the whole gamut of the human spirit from the crude fetishism of the savage to the creative affirmation of the saint»[13].

Despite its widespread appreciation abroad, Vedanta is not without its critics, particularly in the Western world. As Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao points out : «Philosophy according to the Western conception, is the pure intellectual interpretation of Reality. It is based on logic and inference. Reason is its guide and not revelation. In this sense, they assert that Indian Philosophy is not pure Philosophy»[14].

Dr. Rao argues that the Logical Activities are confined in their thinking, «to regard the senses and reason as the only sources of knowledge is to restrict the significance of Reality. These two faculties tell us very little about Reality. The knowledge they give us is mediate and relational. The mere fact that the human mind is not aware of what is beyond the senses is not the same as saying that there is nothing beyond the senses»[15].

Again, «Philosophy is not the mere discovery of truth but its realization. Along with this insistence on spiritual experience there is the recognition of the function and the legitimate use of logic, which makes Vedanta acceptable to the comtemporary votaries of science and reason»[16].

In the Rig Veda, the Hymn of Creation explains how the world came to be : (Existence was not, nor its opposite, Nor earth, nor heavens blue vault nor aught beyond. Death was not yet, nor death-lessness ; the day was night, night day for neither day nor night Had come to birth.

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(13) **Bhagavad Gita : Edited and translated by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan.**

(14) **Introduction to Vedanta (1960) by Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao, Bharatiya Vidys Bhavan, Bombay.**

(15) **Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao, Ibid.**

(16) **Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao, Ibid.**

Then That the primal fount of light immobile rest and action joined.

In the wide universe there was nothing Brooded in silent bliss.

The cosmogony of the Upanishads is interesting. Brihadaranyaka states «In the beginning, verily the waters above existed : from the waters was born Satya (truth) ; Satya produced Brahman, Brahman gave birth to Prajapathi and from Prajapathi were born the gods ; these gods worship Satya alone» (v5.1)

Katha Upanishad tells us that Fire entered the universe and assumed all forms, while the Chandogya would have it that fire was the first to evolve from the primeval being and that from fire came water and from water the Earth. However Pravahana Jaivali in the Chandogyopanishad states : «All these beings emerge from space and are finally absorbed in space ; space is the final habitant». Elsewhere the same Upanishad enjoins «Meditate upon space as the highest reality».

The Taittiriya Upanishad teaches that «at the beginning of all things what existed was Not Being. From it was born Being. Being shaped itself of its own accord. It is thus that it is called well-made or self-made». This seems an echo of the Masadiya-Sukta in the Rigveda, which states that at the beginning of all things there was neither Being nor Not-being but only an Ocean of Night (Rig Veda 129).

The Chandogya Upanishad links the philosophy of Not-being with the concept of the Cosmic Egg (Brahmanda). But just as the universe was regarded by the Upanishads sages as huge egg, it also came to be regarded as a huge chest with the earth as its bottom and the heavens as its upper lid, the sky as its inside and the quarters as its corners, containing in its inside a rich treasure» (Chandogya III 15.1) ([17]).

The personal element in creation came later to the naturalistic account of cosmogenesis. In the Prasna Upanishad, the sage Pippalada tells of the Creator, after practising penance. First created a pair called Rayi and Prana, corresponding to matter and spirit (I 9.13). The Taittiriya Upanishad postulates a substratum of philosophical duality to the personalistic process of creation.

«The creator at the beginning of things practised penance, and having practised penance, created all things that exist, and having created them entered into them and having entered into them, became himself both the manifest and the unmanifest, the defined and the undefined, the supported and the unsupported, the conscious and the unconscious, the true and the false» (II 6).

(17) **A constructive survey of Upanishadic Philosophy 1926. Reprinted 1968. by R.D. Ranade, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan Bombay.**

The Upanishads, mystical texts which succeed the Rigveda by at least a thousand years, can be said to mark the subjective phase of religion. While the Rigveda personifies the forces of nature and thus initiates the evolution of religious consciousness, the Upanishads aspire to a methodological search for the substratum in the phenomenal forces.

From godhead to mankind to the self — this is the path adopted in the Upanishads. There are no hymns to the gods, no prayerful pleas against the wrath of the divines. As Dr. R.D. Ranade says «we pass from prayer to philosophy, from hymnology to reflexion, from henotheistic polytheism to monotheistic mysticism»([18]).

Again, the Upanishads say in bold terms : «Seek not favour from any such divinity ; reality is not the divinity which you are worshipping — **Nedam yad idam Upasate** : the guardian of order is not outside, natural and moral order does not come from without ; it springs from the Atman, who is the synthesis of both outside and inside, who is veritably the ballast of nature, who is the unshakeable bund that prevents the stream of existence from flowing recklessly as it lists»([19]).

Unlike the Brahmanas which dealt with rites, rituals and ceremonies, the formalised aspects of religion, the Upanishads concentrated on philosophical thought.

It is a pitiful phenomenon to notice how at the time of the Brahmanas so much intellect should have been wasted on the formulation of the details of the various sacrrificial rites ; it only reminds one of the wheels within wheels of the scholastic interpretations of Christian dogma in the Middle Ages. The spirit of the Upanishads is, on the other hand, barring a few exceptions here and there, entirely antagonistic to the sacrificial doctrines of the Brahmanas»([20]).

This is spelt out in clear terms in the Chandogya Upanishad : «Our real sacrifice consists in making oblations to the Purana within us. One who does not know this inner sacrifice, even if he were to gon in for a formal sacrifice, throws oblations merely on ashes. On the other hand, he who knows this inner sacrifiçe is relieved of his sins as surely as wood is burnt in a flame of fire. Knowing this inner sacrifice, even if a man were to do acts of charity for a Chandala, he may verily be regarded as having sacrificed to the universal soul» (V 29.24).

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(18) **R.D. Ranade, Ibid.**

(19) **R.D. Ranade, Ibid.**

(20) **R.D. Ranade, Ibid.**

What are the problems that obsessed the Upanishadic philosophers ?

What is that which being known everything else becomes known ? (Mundaka).

What is it which persists when the body dies ?

What is it which lives and persistently creates even though the body may go into a state of sleep (Kartha) ?

What is the real root from which the Tree of Life springs again and again, even though knocked down again and again by that Dark Cutter, Death ? (Brihadaranyaka).

What is the real ?

What is the Atman ?

Varnashrama dharma is the doctrine that lays down the four ashrams through which the human being passes in the course of its life. The four stages are Brahmacharya (the celibate studentship years), Grihasta (the period of the householder), Vanaprastha (the phase of the forest dweller, the recluse withdrawing from worldly affairs) and lastly Sannyasa, complete renunciation of the world. The good Hindu is expected to pass through all these four stages so that his behaviour pattern and the ethical code he abides by conform to the successive plateaus whereby he progresses from the material to the spiritual, from this world to the godhead.

To cite Ranade : «Then again as regards the existence of Ashrams at the time of the Upanishads, we learn from the Taittyriya Upanishad that those of the student and the householder did definitely exist, while we have to conclude from other passages where one is advised «to leave the world as soon as one becomes weary of it» that the order of the reclines did also exist ; and finally from such Upanishads as the Mundaka as well as the mention of Sannyasa elsewhere that the order of the Sannyasis came last and was the completion of the three previously mentioned»([21]).

The four important smritis, attributed to Narada, Parasara Katyana and Brihaspati, deal with social structure and values, and belong to the same historical period (1st century to 6th century A.D.).

The Narada, Katyayana and Brihaspati smritis constitute the grand trio of ancient Indian jurisprudence.

In its wider sense the Smritis would include all literature except the Vedas and the srutis but the narrower meaning confines its scope to the dharma sastras.

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(21) R.D. Ranade, Ibid.

Earlier dharma sastra literature was in the form of Sutras (aphorisms) which needed oral expression for comprehension, but the smritis being easier to understand became available to a wider audience, serving as guide to proper conduct. The principles, laid down in the Smritis, covered family, marriage, status of women, ritual purity, Kingship and administration, law and legal procedures. In essence they form a compendium of social philosophy and are both empirical by relating to experience and authoritarian by resting on traditional teaching.

In Vedantic literature, the doctrine elaborated in the Brahma sutras of Badarayana have been re-stated, reinterpreted and even modified by later philosophers, notably Sankara, Ramanuja and Madhva.

Sankara (C 800 A.D.) enuniciated the doctrine of Advaita (monism) in his commentory on the Vedanta. He holds the Absolute to be personal in relation to the world, especially the philosophically untutored, but supra-personal in itself : the world and the individual to be only relatively or phenomenally, real : and salvation to consist in insight or Jnana after dispelling Maya (Illusion/ or the veil covering reality) of separateness from the Absolute.

Ramanuja (C 11th Century AD) restated within Vaishnavism (the traditions of the adherants of Vishnu of the Hindu Trimurthi of Brahma, Vishnu and Siva) the doctrines of the Vedanta. He held that the world and the soul were transformation of god articulated in various forms.

Ramanuja's philosophy of Visistadvaita (qualified non-duality) holds that the Absolute is personal : (the world and individuals real and distinct, and salvation attainable only by grace of God earned through Bhakti (faith, devotion).

Madhva (C 13th century AD), a Vedantist and a Vaishnavite, expounded the doctrine of dvaita (duality) holding that the world and soul as well as the highest reality are entities different in their essence and non-commutable.

Weber emphasises «the other worldly renunciation aspect» of Hinduism, while Singer charges Weber with ignoring those religious traditions more hospitable to economic enterprise that were associated with the merchant caste([22]).

Lloyd Fallers attributes the «apparent paradox» in the syncretism of traditional mysticism bound up with a unique social rigidity and, on the other, one of the most modernised occupational structures of all the new states» to the «extraordinary pluralism of the Indian religious tradition ([23]).

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(22) Old Societies and New States. edited by Clifford Geertz, Amerind Publishing House.

(23) Fallers, ibid.

Failers argues thus :

\# Hindu religion which presumably has been the dominant influence in moulding the culture of Indian stratification, appears to have been less directly concerned with the political order» *

\# The Indian society «upon which modernising forces worked hard had been to a large extent politically «decapitated» by several conturies of Moghul and European domination»[24].

Sometimes it is heartening to seek in the past a kindlier assessment of the Indian ethos. For instance, SEVERUS SEBOKAT, a Syrian astronomer-monk, writing in 662 AD declared : «I shall not now speak of the knowledge of the Hindus or their subtle discoveries in the science of astronomy-discoveries even more ingenious than those of the Greeks and Babyloneans- of their rational system of mathematics or of their method of calculation which no word can praise strongly enough- I mean the system using nine symbols. If these things were known by the people who think that they alone have mastered the sciences because they speak Greek they would perhaps be convinced, though a little late in the day, that other folk not only Greeks but also men of a different tongue know «something as well as they».

A religion as old as Hinduism, in a country as vast as India, is naturally susceptible to the forces of sohistication such as nicetes of theoolgical disputation, stratification of sects and sub-sects, stultification in the observances of rites and rituals, obscurantism in interpretation and fissiparous tendencies through cultsyncretism. Inevitably therefore from time to time there are reformist movements inside Hinduism aimed at cutting away the underbush and at restoring the pristine purity of Hinduism.

The most remarkable of these was Buddhism, named for the Sakya prince Siddhartha who renounced his throne, turned ascetic and sought the key to alleviating the sorrow of the world. Under the tree of Wisdom (Bodhi) he became enlightened, hence the appellation Buddha. He taught love, pity, joy and serenity as the four cardinal virtues and the Eightfold path as a practical code of conduct for attaining the state of bliss reached only by perfected beings.

The simple yet profound doctrines, based on an ethical framework, preached by the Buddha were soon to grow into a world religion influencing millions in Asia. Later followers appended textual authority and schools of philosophy, elaborated the mythology of the Boddhisattira and encouraged the construction of wondrous shrines. In India the most notable Buddhist monument is Ajanta, with its caves replete with frescoes of Buddhist legend.

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(24) **Fallers, ibid.**

The impact of Buddhism on Hinduism has been subtle yet firm. The Hindus, aware of the need for reform, ardently espoused the principle of Karuna (Compassion). The Gita Govinda, the sacred love songs of the twelfth century Bengali poet Jayadeva, contains one of the earliest lists of the Dasavathar or the Ten Incarnations of Vishnu, which states that Vishnu became Buddha out of compassion for animals, in order to put an end to blood sacrifices*

Ashoka (reigned 273 to 232 BC), whom Basham describes as «the greatest and best ruler India has known, and indeed one of the great kings of the world», was responsible for enunciating the Buddhist path of Dharma (righteousness) as state policy. As Basham declares it was in Ashoka's reign that Buddhism ceased to be a simple Indian Sect and began its career as a World religion. Ashoka had his edicts inscribed on rocks and pillars scattered all over India. He was the only emperor of old who abjured aggressive war.

The text of Ashoka's first pillar edict (Lauiriya Nandagarh C 242 BC) may be of interest. («Thus speaks the King Dear to the Gods, Priyadarsi. («When I had been consecrat twenty six years I ordered this inscription of Righteousness (Dharma) to be engraved. Both this world and the other are hard to reach, except by great self-examination, great obedience (to Righteousness) great respect (for Righteousness) great energy.

«But through my leadership respect for Righteousness and live for Righteousness have grown and will grow from day to day.

«Moreover my officers, of high, low and medium grades follow it and apply it, sufficiently to make the waverer accept it ; the officers on the frontiers do likewise.

«For this is my rule : government by righteousness, administration according to righteousness, gratification of my subjects by righteousness, protection by righteousness».

It is rather intriguing that not only Governmental framework, political tenets and social attitudes of the new emerging nations provide gist to the mills of the Western social scientists ; even aesthetic facts are deemed symptomatic of deep and devious machinations. The use of the Sanchi style torans as welcome archways, the design of the entrance of New Delhi's Vigyan Bhavan and Ashok Hotel are pointed out by the American social scientist McKim Marriott as indicative of the Indian Governments «symbolic adoption of the Buddhist robe». Interestingly, Marriott dismisses Emperor Ashoka as an archaic figure once hardly known to exist outside the work of British epigraphers.

Marriott states : «Ashoka who reigned in about 269 to 232 BC has about as much conscious continuity with Modern India as the pyramids have with Abdel Nasser's Egypt»[25].

On such premises one may question the sociological relevance of Jesus Christ.

One of the more stupid Marriott comments on the Buddhist connection goes and follows : «In the late 1950s one could hear the Prime Minister called a Buddhist by conservative southern Brahmanas who regard Buddha as an evil form assumed by Vishnu to tempt untrue Hindus from their faith».

This remark is ludicrous, but at the same time mischivious since it is made as part of an analysis by the Committee. For the comparative study of New Nations, with the guidance of Professor Edward A. Shib at the centre for Advanced Studies in the Behavioural Sciences, under a carnegie corporation grant. Shib himself speaks of the study as designed «to illuminate our spirits while it disciplines our minds» !

It was Kabir (1440 - 1518) a poor weaver of Varanasi (Benares), who taught the brotherhood of Hindu and Muslim alike in the fatherhood of god and opposed idolatry and caste practices, declaring that God was equally to be found in temple and mosque[27]. Guru Nanak (1469 to 1553) not only taught this lesson with greater dynamisn but also founded a religion synthesising the best in both Hinduism and Islam.

Nanak who had travelled widely in India and had also visited Persia, Turkestan, Iraq and even Mecca, laid down that the aim of a life for the Sikhs (from Siksha or disciples as his followers were called) was not to get salvation or reach paradise but to develop the best in them, which is God. The nature of the times made the Sikhs militant for they had to face the opposition of Aurangzebe and the later Mughals.

The religion of the Sikhs was designed both to develop themselves as individuals and mould them to be useful members of the community. Thus their militance was later transmuted into a discipline for social service.

Social historians tend to use the term Non-Indian religions, perhaps to refer to faiths which did not have their origins in the geographic confines of India. This may be a bit misleading : does one, for instance, hear of a non-European Christianity or non-Indonesian Islam ?

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(25) McKim Mariott, «Cultural Policy in the New States». Old Societies and New States edited by Clifford Geertz, Amerind Publishing House.

(26) McKim Mariott, ibid.

(27) The Wonder that was India : By A.L. Basham Fontana Books (1954 Forentena/ Rupa Edition 1971).

The point at issue, however, is that such a term ignores the hoary traditions of a particular religion in the country where it has been adopted fervently by a sizeable segment of its population, and consequently disregards the social interaction which influences the cultural development of that country.

Basham has pointed out that Arabs visited India long before the days of the Prophet Muhammad and that there is evidence of small Muslim communities in many of the coastal towns of the Penisula from the eight century onwards. «mappila (Moplah) community of Kerala is undoubtedly descended from settlers and converts of long before the days the Muslim invasion of India» (28).

In the wake of Arab traders came the arrival of the Khalifas from AD 632, onwards determined to unfurl the banner of Islam all over the world. In AD 637, one Muslim army reached Thana, off present- day Bombay. Expeditions to Gujarat and Sind followed. Plundering raids were made by the Ghaznavid Sultans, including the famous Mahmud of Ghazni. Annexation of territory, particularly of the Punjab and the north-western regions, were paving the way for further Muslim conquests and settlements.

The Arab conquest of Sind is held particularly significant in both exchange of ideas and dissemination of the seeds of Indian culture in foreign lands. As one authority points it. «We know definitely from Mas'udi and Ibn Hangal that Arab settlers lived side by side with their Hindu fellow citizens for many years on terms of amity and peace and Amir Khushran mentions that the Arab astronomer Abu Ma'shar came to Benares and studied astronomy there for ten years» (29).

Violence and turbulance marked the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in Northern India, but then came the establishment of the Delhi Sultante — the Slave Dynasty, the Khilji Sultans, the House of Tuglak, the Sayyid Rulers, the Lodi Dynasty, the House of Iliyas, and the Sur Kings, leading up to the Timurid Dynasty or the Barbas Turk or the Chaghatai Gurgani, better known to the world as the Mughals — Babar, Humayun, Akbar, Jehangir, Shanjehan and Aurangzebe — and followed by the Effect later Timurids who witnessed the decline and fall of the Mughal empire, with the aged Bahadur Shah II, exiled to distant Mandalay after the 1857 uprising, pining for two meters of gravesite in the street of his beloved, that is India. The highlight of this phase is not alien conquest but the inflowing of a new torrent into the mainstream of Indian life. The Mughal dynasty, the strongest element succeding the Delhi Sultanate, accepted a situation already in evidence, that now in India they were Indians.

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(28) A.L. Basham, ibid.

(29) An Advanced History of India by R.C. Majunder. H.C. Raychoudhury and Kalikinker Datta, Macmillan, London.

As Rushbrook Williams points it : It is also significant of Baber's grasp of vital issues that from henceforth the centre of gravity of his power is shifted from Kabul to Hindustan».

The dazzling grandeur of the Mughal empire (AD 1526 to 1707) — a mere 182 years in the history of the nation — has misled a few into believing that this epoch also marked the advent of Islam into India, thus according only a brief tenure of 450 years to the faith professed by some 70 million Indians. But as Prefessor Humayun Kabir has pointed out : «The Muslims form one of the most important constituents of the national economy of India. For at least a thousand years they have, particularly in the North, supplied one of the major forces in the shaping of India's economic political and social history» [30].

According to Professor Kabir the two forces that shaped the life and character of the Indian Muslim was firstly the influence of Islam and its philosophy of life ; secondly, Indian culture and civilization. Islams's contribution was the insistence on a miltant democracy, liberal rationalism in practical conduct and an uncompromising monotheism. However if Islam insisted on the unity of truth, the diversity and the manifoldedness of its attributes appealed to the Indian intellect, because India looked at Reality as a substance with infinite attributions, all of which had equal validity. Indian Muslims were influenced by this spirit of catholicity and the teachings of leading lights from both faiths kept moving towards an inevitable rapprochment.

«Just as the teachings of Ramananda, Nanak and Chaitanya tended to narrow the distinction between Hinduism and Islam there were also Kabir, Chishti and Dara Shukoh who attempted an understanding and unification of the two faiths from the side of the Muslims. Nor must it be forgotten that though orthodoxy looked askance one of the supreme architects of this movement for synthesis was Akbar the Great» [31].

Initial clash was followed by fusion and synthesis affecting changes in dress, food, language, literature, art, painting, architecture, music and philosophy. The advent of the Western powers, however, had divergent and far-reaching consequences. While many of the Hindus accepted Western education, the Muslims bitter in defeat maintained an attitude of non-cooperation, and deprived of their traditional modes of learning, fell into a long and grave period of intellectual sterility.

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(30) Humayun Kabir «Islam in India» The Cultural Heritage of India, Volume IV Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture Calcutta.

(31) Humayun Kabir, ibid.

One interesting development is the growth of Sufism in India. The Sufis came along with the Muslim conquerors at first preaching Islam and practising proselytision and later taking to study of Indian thought.

Their patience, tolerance, sympathy and friendly spirit brought them Hindu followers, though mostly from the lower and depressed classes. Taridud-Din-Garj-i-Shakar and Ali Hujwairi Data Gajn Bakshi belonged to this class of sufis. But later on many sufis gave up their evengelical zeal and instead devoted themselves to a comparative study of the religions and philosophies of India, Mian Mir, Dara Shukoh, Abdul Fazl and Fayzee come under this category[32].

Reacting to Aurengzebe's rigid orthodoxy, the sufis became more interested in Vedantic philosophy and the Bhakti movements. In the Punjab, the stronghold of Islam, Muslim mystics hold the view that nothing was real except God and everything else was illusion or Maya. The doctrine of Transmigration and reincarnation was soon taken up and was later supplemented by the theory of Karma[33].

Marriott however mentions : «Indian Islam is an import, even if it is an old one, and has often been suspected of dilution or corruption by its pagan milieu»[34].

But Basham declares : «India's ancient culture did not perish before the onslaughts of the Muslims, as did that of Persia ... in general the Muslims were reasonably tolerant. Hindu and Muslim lived side by side and after a few centuries, the Hindus in those parts of India dominated by Muslims often accepted the situation as normal. In such conditions mutual influence was inevitable»[35].

Christianity has likewise been mistakenly assumed to be one of the gifts of the East India Companies from the Western countries that came to trade and later conquered Indian territories. While in certain other parts of the globe the rapid succession of the scales, the Bible and the Flag formed a set pattern. Christianity came to India almost immediately after the crucifixion. with one of the Apostles, St. Thomas, who accompanied back from Syria the envoy of an Indian King Gondophares. The king wanted an architect, but the Apostle was able to persuade the monarch that a city is not built with hands but hearts. Legend has it that St. Thomas, who was matryred, in interred in

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(32) Hira Lall Chopra and N.B. Butani Safiam. The Cultural Haritage of India, Volume IV Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Calcutta.

(33) Hira Lall Chopra and N.B. Butani, ibid.

(34) McKim Mariott, op. cit.

(35) A.L. Basham, op. cit.

the church of Santhome in the suburb of Mylapore in Madras City. Evidences of early Christian activity are found in the Christian Topography, an account of the travels of Cosmas Indicoplevstes, an Alexandrine monk of the sixth century. At that time the Christians of Kerala subscribed to the Nestorian creed prevalent in Persia, though later turned to Syria looking for guidance to the Patriarch of Antioch. According to Basham, The Anglo-Saxon Chronick states that king Alfred- be of the Burnt Cakes- to fulfill a vow sent an envoy with rich gifts for the tomb of St. Thomas. It is not, however, clear whether the envoy was Swithelm or Bishop Sigelinus.

One may cite the verdict of Biblical scholar J.N. Farquhar : «Thirty years ago, the balance of probability stood absolutely against the story of the apostolate of St. Thomas in India ; today the balance of possibility is distinctly on the side of historicity» [38].

On the interaction of Christianity and Hinduism, the Reverend C.E. Abraham cites authorities like Garbe, Greeson, R.G. Bhandarkar and N. Macnicol to point out the influence of Christian ideas, particularly concepts like love (agape) and faith (pistis) on the Bhakti, movement of the twelfth and thirteenth centeries [36].

Dr. Abraham also quotes from Macnicol : «That the influence of Christian teaching on the ideas of later Vaishnavaite and Saivite theism was considerable and increasing from about the Thirteenth Century onwards seems highly probable» [37].

On the other hand, Basham while admitting that the extent of the spiritual influence of India on the ancient West is «much disputed», remarks :

«We can only say that there was always some contact between the Hellenic world and India, mediated first by the Achaemenid Empire, then by that of the Selevoids, and finally under the Romans by the traders of the Indian Ocean. Christianity began to spread at the time when this contact was closer. We know that Indian ascetics occasionally visited the West and that there was a colony of Indian merchants at Alexandria. The possibility of Indian influence on Neo Platonism and early Christianity cannot be ruled out» [39].

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(36) Rev C.E. Abraham, The Rise and growth of Christianity in India, V. IV The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Calcutta.

(37) Dr. N. Macnicot Indian Theism (Oxford University Press 1915). (Cited by Rev C.E. Abraham in op. cit.).

(38) J.N. Farquhar, «The Apostle Thomas in South India» Bulletin of the 1927 (cited by Rev. C.E. Abrsham in op. cit).

(39) A.L. Basham, op. cit.

Other religious communities that sought refuge in Indian tolerance were the Jews and the Parsis.

While the tradition of the Jews of Kerala has it that there was a large settlement at Cochin in the first century A.D. the earliest recorded reference is a tenth century charter giving land and privileges to Jaseph Rabbon.

Under Achmmerid and Sasanian emperors Zoroastranism was practised in north-western India ; however the first band of refugees from Persia settled in Diu (Saurashtra) and later on at Thana near Bombay. The Zorostreans are generally known as Parsis, and are noted for their industry, forward outlook and philanthropy.

Western misconcepts of a stagnant Indian society, shackled by the fetters of a rigid mediaeval orthodox, helplessly looking towards the west for both inspiration and means to repudiate a murky past and emerge into modernism, can and are being challenged. The search for personal identity and national ethos naturally involves reassessment of values, not for wholesale rejection of the old, but to rediscover the nexus in the variety of relationships. Man finds himself to wit, with self, nature, society, nation and the world, the entire exercise designed to apply the relevant from the past to the realities of the present.

Work done and news exchanged in recent times at one of India's promier institution of learning the Indian Institute of Advanced Study (IIAS) in Simla, point reassuringly to the dynamic nature of social change. The Institute's seminar on the Tradition of Dissent. Protest and Reform in Indian Civilization brought out the following interesting sidelights[40] :

Where there was a dilemma of choice between personal good and social good, there were reformers who deliberately chose the latter (S.C. Dube).

Indian consciousness and the intellectual tradition developed in a colonial situation continue even today (Suresh Sharma).

Ashoka's rule illustrated that protest, dissent and reform did not imply a complete break with tradition. Ashoka accepted selectively some early Hindu concepts which were relatively easily acceptable ; and he was following a policy of what may be called pragmatic idealism (Dr. Devahuti).

In thinking about Indian tradition, we must guard against imposition of Western categories that are unsuited to the Indian context. Our thinking must be inspired by native categories of thought and the meaning people themselves give to various concepts. (S.C. Dube).

(40) IIAS News letter, No. 4 October 1975, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla.

Another seminar at the IIAS held in October 1975 dealt with the framework of values in «Alternative Futures» which drew the following viewpoints(41).

A thoughtless invitation of the model of affluent societies leads to the perpetuation of social injustice (S.C. Dube).

Value is inter-subjective and public in character. Value also implies evaluation which is necessarily anthropocentric ; and because of its having this character an unilevel order of value is not possible. (S.S. Barlingay).

Popular appreciation of science is nothing but an awe of the power than modern technology creates. This has resulted in an almost total rejection of religious experience. Religious experience is concerned with certain realms of human experience that science either ignores or regards as irrelevant. An alternative framework of values must integrate these aspects of religious experience for a future life-ethic. (Dharmendra Kumar).

The only root of justification for a theory of value is that it gives shape and coherence to our pre-reflective moral life. (Syed A.R. Zaidi).

Law can never replace morality, it must assist it. (K.J. Shah).

Some of the values which were a part of the vigorous life during the creative phase of Islam must be revivified. This can be done in a meaningful way only if Islam was perceived from a new, living Indian perspective (S.T. Lokhandwalla).

An alternative value system which, reflecting the Indian reality, must enable us to transcend it, could be conceptualised as «Integral Pluralism» combining the features and virtues of Gandhism and Marxism with Aurobindo's Integralism. (V.R. Mehta).

It is necessary to reassess traditional values vis-a-vis the ones that had arisen as a result of the impact of science and technology. There will then be need in developing countries like India, for implanting values which emphasises an egalitarian outlook integrated with a rationalistic scientific one. (S.C. Malik).

These sidelights are presented here not necessarily as definitive conclusions of leading Indian thinkers on the progress achieved by Indian civilization, but more as indications of the ferment in the analysis of the forces and influences in the evolutionary process and as take-off points for future studies in the philosophy of Indian civilization.

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(41) IIAS News Letter Nos. 5 and 6, December 1976. Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla.

Despite the scanty material recounted, and the perfunator manner of its presentation, one may presume to postulate that today the end product of a civilization three millenia old will be an Indian National evolved from a composite blending of varied cultures, religions in outlook, democratic in his politics, tolerant in a social setting, investigative in natural philosophy and morally aware of a world brotherhood. The matrix that took three thousand years to cast has already produced prototypes.

The philosophy behind this evolution, the Indian credo, both in principle and in aspiration, is best expressed and exemplified by Swami Vivekananda, the renowned spiritual heir of Swami Ramakrishna Paramahamsa, in the following words :

> «We must show the spirituality of the Hindus, the mercifulness of the Buddhists, the activity of the Christians, the brotherhood of the Muslims by our practical lives».

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THE SUBJACENT PHILOSOPHY IN THE CIVILIZATION OF PAKISTAN

K.G. SADIQ (Pakistan)

Pakistan is a young state but its philosophical traditions go back to the times of early Arab settlers in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent in the 8th century. It was through the Arab traders and rulers that Islam was first introduced in the sub-continent. In the words of the Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Pakistan came into being when the first hindu embraced Islam(1). In the northern and north eastern parts of the sub-continent Islam found its roots with the conquest of the northern parts by Muslim conquerors and rulers who entered India through the Knyber Pass in the 10th century. Right from the beginning of the 8th century (711) to the middle of the 19th century (1857), the period which roughly marks the beginning, expansion and the end of Muslim rule in India, the Muslims always remained a minority. Most of the Muslim rulers had purely secular point of view in state politics. So far as the interest of the state demanded adherence to the principles of Islam, the kings tried to give religious sanctions to their otherwise purely secular laws. The total prohibition enforced by Alauddin Khalji (d. 1316), for instance, was only politically motivated. The participation of rulers in religious discourses and their affiliation to great mystic saints of their times could not inspire them to remodel the state on Islamic lines(2).

With the advent of Muslim Rule in the sub-continent the foundation was laid for a new culture which assimilated Turkish, Persian, Afghan and Moghal elements. The Persian influence excelled to such an extent that the Persian language remained court language for almost one thousand years. Knowledge of Persian was a necessary condition for being educated and cultured. The dress, food hadits, architechture, music, painting, literature of the rulers all influenced the local elements and as a result of the intermixture of the two a new cultural synthesis gradually took definite shape. Scholars, artists, workers, poets, saints, sufis from other parts of the Muslim world flocked to the sub-continent in search of employment and also for recognition of their talent.

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(1) Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Vol. II, p. 2.

(2) B.A. Dar, Development of Religious Thought in India, Iqbal, July 1964, pp. 33 — 34.

Multan, Lahore, Delhi became great centres of intellectual, religious and artistic activity. The sufis came primarily for propagating Islam among the Indians. The social conditions and the rigid distinctions of caste in Hinduism and the freedom and equality of treatment to all in Islam provided a very productive atmosphere for the sufis to complete their mission. The sufis displayed large humanity and mixed freely with the people. The Ulama and Scholars attached to the courts served as a channel for interpreting various aspects of Shari'at for the guidance of the Kings.

The subjacent philosophy in the civilization of Pakistan has a marked religious bias. It, in fact, is religio-philosophical to a very great extent. What goes under the name of Muslim civilization in the sub-continent derived its life and blood from the world-view which Islam projected and the values which it generated.

The growth of Muslim thought is associated with the works and practices of Muslim mystics and scholars most of whom remained away from the kings and their courts. Notable among them are the Sufis of the Chihsti order whose khanqas played a great role in the growth of Muslim Religious Thought in the sub-continent.

Since the Muslims always remained a minority in the sub-continent and the Muslim rulers secular in their administration of the state, the essence of Muslim religio-philosophical thought consisted in an exposition of the relation between man and God, the Law and the Truth, God and the universe and man Further, Muslim scholars and Saints strove rigidly to delineate various facets of the identity of the Muslims as a community and whenever there was any move to create a unified community of Hindus, Muslims and people of other faiths whether in the from of Bhakti Movement or Din-e-Elahi of Akbar it aroused very strong opposition from among the Muslim Scholars, Saints and masses. True, there has been some impact of hindu culture and civilization on the Muslim Culture in the sub-continent but the latter has maintained and developed its distinctive outlook on life and values and thwarted all attempts at secularisation of what it regarded as spiritual and divine. A community which found itself planted in an alien soil and gathered in numbers quite gradually could not hope to survive and develop its world-view and civilization without maintaining quite firmly its identity as a community. Thus the growth of Muslim thought has remained tied to the Ideology of Islam. Iqbal has put this idea very forcefully in the following verse :

گرتومی خواهی مسلمان زیستن   نیست ممکن جزبه قرآن زیستن

If you wish to live as a Muslim you cannot

hope to do so without conforming to the Quran[3].

Before proceeding further, I wish to raise a question on the legitimacy of designating as philosophical a metaphysical system which works within the fromwork suggested by religion. If a priori assumption or dogma is to be ruled out of court for being considered as philosophical, the case for a religion-oriented metaphysics may appear quite weak. The latter could hardly be termed as a piece of philosophical reasoning, for the spirit of free inquiry is considered as a defining characteristic of philosophical reasoning. Any piece of reasoning which lacks this characteristic cannot be termed as philosophical. In introduction to «Trends in Modern Philosophy» (Urdu) [4] I have discussed the limitations of the principle of free inquiry in philosophical reasoning in greater detail. I have held that a philosopher never relies on evidence in support of his thesis. He simply gives reasons rather supporting reasons to substantiate his point of view. **His basic thesis remains beyond reason.** Reason operates within the frame work suggested by his basic assumptions. A marxist and an idealist cannot resolve their differences merely by giving reasons, however cogent, in support of their thesis. Your metaphysics is a matter of choosing a point of view. If you choose to be an idealist you uphold the primacy of mind and the whole universe is conceived as an expression, in varying degrees, of mind. If you are a marxist you regard matter as primary and consciousness or mind only as a developed form of matter. A linguistic philosopher regards the efforts of both the idealist and the marxist as an exercise in futility. All the three of them repose great confidence in reason and yet cannot come to an understanding of the point of view of the other. What is it that exercises some sort of cramp on their thinking which hinders them from examining their own primary assumptions. Their starting point, perhaps, is not the result of any process of reasoning. It is perhaps born of a vision. Reasons only support but do not establish their thesis. History of philosophy is replete with instances where what was regarded as self-evident and irresistable principle by one was rejected by the other. Descartes regarded the idea of God as innate while Locke could not find any innateness in the same. Kant considered synthetic a priori propositions as beyond all doubt and only wanted to inquire how was synthetic a priori possible. Hume accepted Lockean premise regarding the origin of ideas and ended in solipsism but could not question the validity of the initial premise. All great thinkers start with some vision of life and values, of the possibilities of human experience. The spirit of free inquiry operates within the limits set by the initial vision or assumptions of the thinker concerned. In

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(3) Iqbal ASRAR-O-RAMOOZ p. 142 line 5 (Edition 1964).

(4) pp. 3 to 12.

case of the Muslim religio-philosophical thought in the sub-continent the greatest contributions were made by the Sufis. A sufi starts not with dogma or rationalization of dogma but with an experience, an experience of direct contact with God and it is on the basis of the unitary experience that he developes his views on Man, God and Universe. Further, a sufi takes great care to ensure objectivity of his religious experience. He uses maximum care in keeping his subjective desires, inclinations and interests in abeyance. This process of sifting the subjective and the personal elements from the objective contents of his experience, goes on till the final stage is reached. For achieving this end he even seeks a confirmation of his experience by discussing it with his preceptor. His mystical philosophy is thus rooted in experience and has a claim to be considered on its own merit. Further, as I have observed on a previous occasion, Religion does not put any censorship on creative activity. Religion is misconstrued when it is taken to imply a sort of cramp on the thoughts of a people or an individual. In its true nature religion is dynamic, it is essentially an experience, a rediscovery of the individual, a process of acquiring infinite power, power to change the contours of life and the very course of human history. Gautama left his palace only to walk into history. The Holy Prophet, peace be upon him, left the cave at mount Hira to bring about a great cultural revolution in the world. The spirit of religion expresses itself in seeking newer adjustments to ever widening horizons of human experience[5].

The first great Sufi scholar who wrote profusely on religion is Syed Ali Bin Uthman Hujwiri (d. 1071) whose Kashf Al-Mahjub, the oldest extant work on Sufism in Persian, is well known for its systematic and sound exposition of tasawwuf. The hold which this great mystic had on the public mind can be judged from the fact that even 900 years after his death his Mausoleum is visited daily by thousands of devotees from all over Pakistan. Visit to the shrines of great mystics is a culture-trait which is universal in present day Pakistani society.

While elucidating the meaning of the Path of Sufism, the nature of the «stations» of the sufis, of Divine Love and how it is manifested in human hearts, why the intellect is unable to get to its essence and why the spirit is lulled in its purity Hujwiri makes a significant assertion regarding the relation between Shari'at and Haqiq'at to emphasize harmony between the two. Shari'at is Man's act while Haqiq'at is God's keeping and preservation and protection, whence it follows that Shari'at cannot possibly be maintained without the existence of Haqiq'at, and Haqiq'at cannot be maintained without observance of Shari'at. Their mutual relation may be compared to that of body and spirit.

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(5) ***A Message For Young Philosophers, Sophia, Dec. 1974.***

When the spirit departs from the body the living body becomes a corpse and the spirit vanishes like wind, for their value depends on their conjunction with one another(6). For the spiritual growth of personality a union of the two is essential. «The Law (Shari'at) without the Truth (Haqiq'at) is ostentation, and the Truth without the Law is hypocrisy(7). Hujwiri rightly perceives that mere formal adherence to Shari'at without getting to the spirit behind lands a person into a situation where he simply owns a religion without being religious. There is a world of difference between having a religion and being religious. To have religion is to pay only a lip service to religion. Religion in this sense is only a verbal claim, a matter of social convenience, a system of ossified values. It is not reflected in the patterns of behaviour of its adherents. Religion thus conceived becomes a departmental affair. It is not regarded as an expression of the whole man. To claim religion in this sense is to exhibit alienation, to be torn and cut off from your roots or in the words of Iqbal to cease to live soulfully(8). To be religious is to live creatively, to open up new possibilities of collective existence and to create new patterns of behaviour in ever changing milieu. Keeping this distinction in mind Hujwiri says regarding pilgrimage : «Anyone who is absent from God at Mecca is in the same position as if he were absent from God in his own house, and anyone who is present with God in his own house is in the same position as if he were present with God at Mecca ... the true object of pilgrimage is not to visit the Ka'ba, but to obtain contemplation (mashahadat) of God(9). The position of Hujwiri on this issue is in sharp contrast to the orthodox point of view which simply expresses itself in outward observances of Shari'at without getting to the spirit behind. The greatness of Hujwiri lies in the fact that like Imam Ghazali he presented Tasawwuf as providing sound basis to the tenets of Islam.

The Sufis, who after Hujwiri contributed for over a century to the growth of religious thought in the sub-continent are the Sufis of the Chishti order. Noteworthy among them are Khwaja Muinuddin of Ajmer (d. 1236) Bakhtiyar Kaki (d. 1236) Shaikh Farid Ganj Shakar (d. 1265) and Khwaja Nizam-ud-Din Auliya (d. 1325). They lived and mixed with the general public and attracted people of different religions and sects to their Khanqahs. Their main creed was belief in the unity of God and equality of all men. This encouraged the hindus whose caste system had kept the lower classes away from the Brahmans and the Kshatriyas, the two upper classes, to visit the Khanqahs where they had no fear and were treated at par with others.

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(6) Kashf Al-Mahjub, p. 383 English Translation by Nicholson (New Edition).

(7) Ibid p. 384.

(8) K.G. Sadiq — Pakistani Culture : Proceedings of the 17th Session of the Pakistan Philosophical Congress, Lahore 1975.

(9) Kashf Al-Mahjub, p. 329 English Translation by Nicholson (New Edition).

Khwaja Moeen-ud-Din laid emphasis on Love of God and preached humanism. For him worship of God did not imply mere formal observance of rituals. It expressed itself in love of mankind, in showing sympathy towards them and serving humanity selflessly. The broad humanity which the Chishti Sufis showed to people of other religions is reflected in the observation which Nizam-ud-Din Auliya made on a certain occasion when he, along with Amir Khusrow, was walking on the roof of their Jama't Khana and saw the Hindus busy in worshipping their idols.

برقوم است راسی دینی وقبله کامی

«Every people have a way, a religion and a qiblah

of their own».

This attitude of love and respect for members of other faith was exhibited at a time when Muslim power was supreme in the sub-continent. Some Ulama were opposed to allowing Hindus freedom to perform their religious rites. Zia-ud-Din Barni in his book Fatawa-i-Jahandari, which he wrote during the reign of Feroz Tughlaq (1351 - 88), laments that the Muslim Kings in spite of their extreme power are allowing the Hindus to perform their rites([10]).

Mysticism suffered a set back in the reign of Mohammad Tughlaq (1325-1351) who showed greater interest in Fiqh, a discipline which could be helpful in the application of principles of Islam to the political and social life of his times. He believed in the unity of politics and religion and made a strong appeal to the contemporary Mystics, Saints and Ulema to help him in setting the state structure on purely Islamic principles. The mystics, however, were unable to provide any real guidance in the matter and thus Muhammad Bin Tughlaq's effort to spiritualise the secular basis of state ended in failure([11]).

At about the same time pantheistic ideas of Shaikh Al-Akbar found their way to India and were warmly received by mystics as the ground for their acceptance had been prepared by the humanism preached by mystics of the Chishti order. A number of commentaries on Ibn al-Arabi's **Fasus** appeared which helped the process of propagation of pantheistic ideas in the sub-continent. The doctrine of Wahdat al-Wujud as expounded by Ibn al-Arabi in **Fasus** assigns equality of status to all religious creeds and rejects the Muslim's claim to exclusiveness in this regard. Abdul Qaddus of Gangoh (d. 1537) expresses these ideas when he says «What a meaningless clamour it is to say that one is a believer and another Kafir, one is obedient and another sinful,

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(10) K.A. Nizami, Religious Trends of Sultans of Delhi (pp. 76 — 77).

(11) B.A. Dar, Development of Religious Thought, p. 38.

one on the right path and another astray, some Muslim, some virtuous, some heretic and some Christian» [12].

The doctrine of Wahdat al-Wujud leaves no scope for a belief in a personal transcendent God. It is true that pantheism can prepare, at the intellectual level, people of different faiths and creeds to sink their differences and regard themselves as members of a brotherhood. But when it was preached by Sufis like Shahbaz Qalandar (d. 1274), Bu Ali Qalandar (d. 1324) and Abdul Qaddus of Gangoh (d. 1537) all of whom had a large number of followers it became a cause of concern for the Ulema and the upholders of orthodox point of view. The situation was further aggravated by the rise of Bhakti Movement in Southern India which later on spread to almost all parts of the country. Ramananda, Kabir and Gru Nanak were its great champions. It was a reform movement in Hinduism in the 14th century to meet the challenge of Islam. The teachings of Ramananda were anchored on the two principles :

i) The essence of Bhakti or faith in God consists in perfect love of God ;

ii) As servants of God all men are brothers.

The founders of the movement employed the language of the masses for communicating their message. The movement removed caste barriers and admitted people of all castes to its discipleship. It stopped considerably the conversion of Hindus to Islam and helped converting Muslims back into Hinduism.

In Bengal the mission of Hindu revival was taken up by Chaitanya (d. 1533). Bengal had come under the Muslim rule early in the 13th century. The message of Islam had been propagated by a number of Sufis notable among them were Shaikh Jalal-ud-Din Tabrizi (d. 1244), Sheikh Siraj-ud-Din Uthman (d. 1537) Shaikh Alaul Haq (d. 1398) and his son Nur Qutb Alam. Chaitanya created a great stir among the Hindu masses by his public songs in praise of Krishna.

A further confusion was created by Akbar's promulgation of Din-e-Ilahi in 1581. The climate for this had been prepared by the preaching of the doctrine of unity of all religions by the Hindu saints and the Muslim Sufis. With the Sufis it was a logical result of their accepting the premises of Wahdat al-Wajud while for the Hindu saints it followed from their doctrine of the unity of Ram and Rahim. Akbar founded his Ibadat Khana in 1575 whose doors were opened to Muslim Ulama and followers of all other religions. As a result of discussions in the Ibadat Khana Akbar appears to have accepted the doctrine

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(12) A.K. Nizami, Religious Trends of Sultans of Delhi, p. 449.

of the unity of all religions as true. The regulations which Akbar issued were in direct conflict with the tenets of Islam([13]).

A well-directed move to remedy the sad state of affairs produced by Akbar's religious policy and the Bhakti movement was initiated by the renowned Naqshbandi scholar Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind (d. 1624). He adopted the title of Mujaddid Alfi-Thani (which was endorsed by the Ijma) to silence the critics who had propagated that in the second thousand years (alfi-Thani) people needed a new religion which would be better adopted to the requirements of the time. He repudiated the doctrine of unity of all religions and to a hindu questioner who wanted to elicit Shaikh's opinion on the identity of Ram and Rahim he replied firmly that Islam and Hinduism stood for two diametrically opposed points of view and that there was no basis for identifying the two «To regard Ram and Rahim identical is the height of folly. The Creator and the creature cannot be identical — Before the birth of Rama and Krishna no one called God by these names. How could he assume these names after their birth»([14]) ? He clearly perceived that the doctrine of unity of Religions was calculated to undermine the solidarity of Muslim Community and there was no course open to him except to take a firm and bold stand and lead a crusade against the heresies that were erroding the very basis of Muslim Community. He wrote letters to a number of scholars and the elite of the society to uphold the orthodox point of view regarding various tenets of Islam. His polemic against and refutation of the doctrine of Wahdat al-Wujud which the sufi orders had assimilated into their systems shows his great philosophical vision and logical acumen. He argued that as the doctrine of Wahdat al-Wajud negates all existence except that of God, it is in conflict with reason and religion([15]). It is to be noted, he argued, that God is existent and is unique in His Self (dhat), qualities (sifat), and actions (afa'l) and no created object can be a part of Him. Qualities and actions of His creatures whose existence has been possible because of His will cannot be compared to His qualities and actions which are unique. Therefore it is wrong to say «All is God» (hama Ust), it is more appropriate to say «All is from Him» (hama azust).

Thus the doctrine of ontological monism (Wahdat al-Wujud) was refuted by the Shaikh and he replaced it with the doctrine of phenomenological monism (Wahdat ul-Shuhud). The former makes the universe static while the latter conceives of it as dynamic. The mystic relationship, which the latter enjoined, between man and God was that of love and not that of union (wasl). In the Creator - creature relationship one was with the other. Creatureliness is the

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(13) Din-e-Ilahi, pp. 143 — 144.

(14) Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi, Maktubat I, 171.

(15) Ibid I, 57, 410 — 14.

highest stage of saintliness and Sufis who, in a state of ecstasy, claim to have transcended this relationship have committed excesses(16).

Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi thus tried to bring Sufism very close to the core of Islam and to resolve whatever the conflict there was between the Sufis and the Ulama uniting them in a single synthesis of solidarity. Aziz Ahmad summing up the contribution of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi observes. He reintegrated the formalistic dynamics of religion and the inner vitality of deep mysticism. This is perhaps the most distinct contribution of Indian Islam to the religio-mystical thought of Islam in general. But on the other hand his easy victory, especially the one against the rationalists, gave to Indian Islam the rigid and conservative stamp it bears today. In a way he was the pioneer of what modern Islam is today in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent — isolationist, self-confident, conservative, deeply conscious of the need of a reformation but distrustful of innovations, accepting speculation in theory but dreading in practice, and insular in its contact with other civilizatons(17).

The dangers which Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi alluded to inherent in the Ram and Rahim unity cult against the solidarity of the Muslims were not realized by the Muslim scholars, divines and sufis. There was no attempt to prepare Muslim masses against these dangers. Mian Mir Qadri of Lahore (d. 1636) and his disciple Mullah Shah Qadri (d. 1661) were staunch upholders of the doctrine of unity of being. There is a strange indifference in their life to the teaching and practices of the Shari'at. Mullah Shah is reported to have composed the following verse :

پنجه نپجه خـــدا دارم　　　من جه پروائی مصطفی دارم

I have given my hand into the hand of God

what care have I now for Mustafa(18).

Shah Wali Ullah (d. 1762) took up the task of welding Muslims into a well-knit unit by bringing sufism and orthodox Islam closer together. Earlier this move had been initiated by Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi. Shah Wali Ullah laid special emphasis on Ijtihad, the principle of movement in Islam for it is only through Ijtihad that progressive adjustment to environment is possible. The dynamism of religion can only be maintained if requirements of ever changing social milieu are effectively met. Time has come, he wrote in the introduction

(16) Ibid I, 38, 57, 311, 316.

(17) Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment, p. 189.

(18) Quoted by B.A. Dar, Development of Religious Thought in India, Iqbal, July 1964, p. 66.

to Hujjat Allah al-baligha that the religious law of Islam should be brought into the open fully dressed in reason and argument[19]. Shah Wali Ullah's great contribution to sufism is his reconciliation of Ibn al-Arabi's doctrine of ontological monism (Wahdat al-Wujud) and Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi's doctrine of phenomenological monism (Wahdat al-Shahud). The two doctrines are not antagonistic to each other, rather reflect two ways of looking at the same reality[20]. The difference between the two is one of linguistic nature. Ibn al-Arabi's ontological monism does not stand for the identity of creator and creatures.

Assessing the impact of Shah Wali Ullah on later thinkers Aziz Ahmad says : «For him reason and argument had perhaps a more fundamentalist significance, but they inspired the formula of neo-Mutazilite modernism of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who had received his early education in the seminary of Wali Ullah's successors in Delhi, of Shibli's scholasticism and of «religious reconstruction» in the thought of Iqbal. In his exegesis of the Quran, which raised such a storm of controversy, Sayyid Ahmad Khan leans heavily on the work of this eighteenth century theologian. The more classical influences of Wali Ullah's concepts of Ijtihad are reflected in the work of the Ulama of Deoband whose religious ideology was directly shaped by his school[21].

Shah Wali Ullah marks the beginning of Muslim Renaissance in the sub-continent. He stood for providing a sound rational basis to religion but at the same time he preserved the inner core and dynamism of Islam by channelling the streams of sufi spiritual heritage into traditional Islam.

With Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898) begins the era of modernism in the political life of the Indian Muslims. Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898) was primarily a political thinker, a social reformer and an educationist. He focussed all his energies on the welfare of the muslims of the sub-continent specially after the unfortunate debacle of 1857.

During the pursuance of his primary objectives he evolved a comprehensive philosophy of religion too. Religion, of course, was not his main concern, but he had to write extensively on this subject due to the fact that the Muslims of his times had developed the «erroneous» habit of quoting religious authority in favour of, or against, the performance of every sort of action. It is this «all-important» context of religion that he tried to set in order so that their behaviour and their attitudes could be reformed accordingly.

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(19) Hujjat Allah al-baligha, i, 4.

(20) Maktub-i-Madni pp. 5 — 6 from Urdu Translation by M. Hanif Nadvi.

(21) Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment. p: 205.

The appellation that suitably characterizes the religio-philosophical thought of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan is «Rational Supernaturalism». He was a religious man through and through as is evident from his letters, speeches and writings of which he produced volumes. He tenaciously held on to Islam with all its supernatural components, He was equally impressed — rather awe-stricken — by the contemporary Western culture and sciences which were naturalistic and atheistic in outlook. In fact, the world of God, he was firmly of the opinion, could not be disharmonious with the work of God i.e. the physical nature which the sciences were investigating. No religious concept could contravene the laws of nature. «Islam is nature and nature is Islam», is the burden of all his teachings. Consequently in his philosophy of religion, he explained the allegedly other-worldly concepts of religion in a phraseology which naturalism could understand. This he did in three ways : (i) Lexicographic analysis (ii) Psychologizing and (iii) Metaphorization. Applying this triple process to the teachings of the Quran specifically, he came to such conclusions as that prayers are not accepted and answered by God : they only provide psychological satisfaction to the prayee, Mi'raj was only an experience in dream. Adam was not specially created : it stands for the human race that evolved out of lower forms of life and existence. Angels are nothing but laws of nature, Satan stands for evil forces and all disvalues recognized by the Quran, heaven and hell are psychological states and not localities, miracles cannot happen at all, and so on. Rules of morality too, according to him, are not derivable from revelation. They are discovered independently by the natural reason of man.

Thus the concept of religion developed by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan is deistic i.e. the one in which God has practically nothing to do with the affairs of the world here and now.

There was a lot of protest against the approach of Sayyid Ahmad to religion. But it must be said in fairness to him that it was mainly through his example, writings and teaching that Indian Muslims were introduced to western learning and sciences. From 1857 to 1947 is a period of great strife and struggel for the Indian Muslims for it is the period during which the Pakistan Movement, a movement for peaceful coexitence of Hindus of muslims and for the preservation of Muslim heritage took a definite shape and under the dynamic leadership of the Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah the Muslims succeded in winning their freedom and a homeland — The Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The foremost among the thinkers who revitalized the Muslims and put a new life into them in the subcontinent by his writings and poetical works is Allama Mohammad Iqbal (d. 1938) the poet-philosopher of Pakistan. Iqbal in his famous Allahabad address at the Annual Session of the All India Muslim League in 1930 recommended the setting up of an independent Muslim state in the sub-continent as the only solution to resolving the Indian political tangle. The Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah rallied the Muslim masses

under the banner of the Muslim League and in a short period of seven years (from March 1940 to August 1947) against strong opposition from the Indian Congress and other political parties guided the nation to her cherished goal.

Iqbal's contribution to the Indian Muslim thought is very great. In his famous Madras Lectures (1929) he undertook reconstruction of religious thought in Islam and thereby developed a dynamic philosophy of religion and metaphysical system which is vitalistic, pluralistic and monotheistic in nature and has a deep existential import. In Pakistan, all thinkers after Iqbal, as always happens after a great mind is gone, have stuck to the frame-work set by Iqbal and their works exhibit an elucidation of some aspects of the thought of Iqbal or they carry further the unfinished task left by Iqbal. It is true that the philosophical movements that have appeared in the West in the twentieth century have found ardent supporters among some of the Pakistani thinkers but such philosophies have not found roots in our soil and by and large philosophical tendencies are religion-oriented or what is the same are tied to the ideology which formed the basis of the creation of Pakistan. Iqbal is the first among the Pakistani thinkers who had a thorough understanding of the Western thought and was equally acquainted with Muslim thought. He was thus in a position to communicate to the younger generation in a language which they understood. Under the long colonial rule and the consequent backwardness of the Muslims in almost all fields — political, educational and economic — they had been cut off from their cultural moorings and were fast losing their sense of national identity. Iqbal, under these distressing conditions undertook the task of reconstruction of religious thought to restore to the Muslims their sense of identity and assure them of the great future that yawned at their feet. Considered in this context Iqbal is regarded by some as «the voice of Muslim culture in the modern world»([22]), for he combated quite effectively the challenge which the western civilization had posed to Islam. Addressing first to the Indian Muslims Iqbal soon turned to address Muslims in Bilad-i-Islamia and at a still later stage to the people of the East who had been constantly exploited by the West over the past few centuries.

Iqbal set about the task of reconstruction in two different ways. The first related to providing sound basis to the truths revealed by the religion of Islam to help the younger generation to have a proper understanding of religion. The second related to discovering the spirit of Muslim culture, to give some clear idea to his people, of their outlook on life, their pattern of thought and conduct as it expressed itself in their arts and sciences together with the type of manhood and polity which sprung out of the message of Islam. This would help,

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(22) Mumtaz Hasan, Foreword to B.A. Dar's. A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy. p. x.

thought Iqbal, the Muslims understand how best they could meet the challenge of the new socio-economic philosophies of the West. Iqbal's «Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam» deals with this problem in a systematic way. Iqbal's Philosophy of self which lies spread over a number of his Persian poetical works figures prominently in «Reconstruction of Religious Thought».

Through his analysis of conscious experience Iqbal tries to establish the spiritual character of Reality and this is in consonance with the Quranic concept of Reality. Iqbal wanted to show that in this age of empiricism together with its emphasis on naturalism the case for religion and the world-view that it presents is strong enough to vie with any system which great philosophies in the past have put forward. The great merit of Islam is that as a polity it lays emphasis on the establishment of a social order which provides opportunities for inner expansion to the individual along with his economic well-being. Marxism lacks the former aspect while existentialism fails to construct any social philosophy. Iqbal laments the plight of modern man in the West who by his adherence to empiricism is entirely cut off from the depths of his own being. In the East the situation is no better. The technique of medieval mysticism has failed to reintegrate the forces of the average man's inner life and thus prepare him for participation in the march of history. No wonder then that the modern Muslim in Turkey, Egypt and Persia is led to seek fresh sources of energy in the creation of new loyalties, such as patriotism and nationalism (23).

The progress of thought after the death of Iqbal has been along the lines set by Iqbal. Khalifa Abdul Hakim (d. 1959) in his «Islamic Ideology, Islam and Communism, Fikr-i-Iqbal» has elaborated in greater details subjects which Iqbal had just touched. Prof. M.M. Sharif's (d. 1965) Dialectical Monadism also lays emphasis on the spiritual character of Reality. Dr. C.A. Qadir (President, Pakistan Philosophical Congress) one time known as a logical positivist leaned to existentialism and to a defence of the language of religion in the early sixties. His articles on Language and Religion, «Psycho-analysis and Religion», «God and Logic», «Question of the Pot» and «God and War» contain the fruit of his mature thought on religion, its role in establishing peace and a defence of religion in the context of contemporary philosophic thought.

Theism continues to be a pivotal point in the thought of thinkers in Pakistan. With God as the supreme creator and also the locus of all values the requirements of religion-oriented society are fully met.

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(23) **Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 188 (Reprinted June 1951).**

SUBJACENT PHILOSOPHY IN THE FAR EAST CIVILIZATION

TOSHIMITSU HASUMI (Japan)

Far East is not only the wealth of the Earth with the huge population, but the diversified deepness of its civilizations as well as a mighty impact on world history. The continent is culturally dominated by the ancient civilization of China. When one sets out from the east and travels toward deep in continent,he could clearly observe the influence of Chinese culture. The main religion of the Far East is the Mahayana Buddhism and its principal thought is concentrated on the Zen Buddhism. Zen thought is the great synthesis of the Mahayana Buddhism and Chinese Taoism. At present the Mahayana Buddhism is confined to the northern half of the Buddist world which includes Nepal, Tibet, Vietnam, China, Korea and Japan. When we observe Buddhism, Sri Lanka or India will move out o fthe dominion of Theravada into the way of Mahayana. The line of demarcation between two main religious tendencies of Buddhism has not always been constant. For example, today Vietnam is the Land where both tendencies meet.

India is the native place of Buddhism, where many streams of which it originated and flowed outward at various periods of its missionary activity. Mahayana Buddhism developed in the monasteries of India and is deeply rooted in the spirit of India. From view-point of history, the rise of Mahayana coincides with the beginning of the christian era, but many of its basic ideas go back to the fourth or fifth century B.C. But the specific Mahayana doctorines are attested only at the beginning of the christian era, which has raised an interesting and so far unresolved historical problems. Simultaneously Christianity itself arose and underwent a radical change of its basic text which made it much more similar to Christianity of to day. But we know little about actual causes which brought about the revolution in Buddhist thought. These two tendencies of Buddhism i.e. Buddhism before and after this revolution, however, have seen certain exhaustion of the Arhant ideal and the plaesure of the laity. As for the first, the other Buddhism was designed to produce a type of Saint known as Arhant, a person who has been liberated once and for all from the cycle of birth and death.

The Mahayana Buddhism, as we have already shortly explained, which began in Buddhist monasteries of India in the initiating era of Christianity, has been introduced into China together with Theravada Buddhism in the first

centuries. But whereas Theravada Buddhism was not able to stay in Chinese civilization, Mahayana Buddhism was estimated very deeply in Chinese spiritual tradition. This fact is the most important problem for the formation of the Far East civilization. And the implantation of Mahayana Buddhism in China has given a definitive influence all over the Far East Civilization. Upon reception of Buddhism from India, the Far East religions have not only known the deep religious spirit, but also the intellectual speculation of metaphisical value. The spirituality as well as the intellectual metaphysical speculation of Mahayana Buddhism had changed really the essence of the Far East Civilization. After the translation of enormous number of the Buddhist sutras from Sanskrit to Chinese language, the wealth of the spiritual and metaphysical value of Mahayanist doctrines could also be easily assimilated mto the chinese civilization.

Now we have to explain the doctorines of Mahayana Buddhism. But we have to depict shortly ourselves of all Buddhist doctorines and its basic concepts. These explanations include the clarification of original words of the Buddha and their formulation, in confrontation with the other indian religions. Practically all the basic notions proved multifaced and consequently, a number or schools or sects developed in Indian Buddhism, some of which have become what is now known as Mahayana. First of all the development of Buddhology, which led to a monistic identification of the Buddha with the universe and the self and to a recognition of the Buddha as the principle of absolute reality. In the ordinary sense Buddha means the person of the Gotama Buddha, and second it means also the man who had arrived at the state of highest awareness. In the third sense it means the absolute Buddha, identifical with the universe through his apparitional body, is manifest in many froms. And in the fourth sense more significant for religious practice was the Bodhisattva ideal developed by the Mahayana schools. A Boddisattva is an enlightened being who out of infinite chain of the compassion renounce the entry into final Nirvana, in order to help all living beings obtain the release from the cycle of suffering, of birth and death, until all beings are completely saved. The Bodhisattva ideal became the epitome of Mahayaha Buddhism. The ultimate unity of all forms of Buddhism remains intact even in case of conceptual experience which constitutes the essence of Buddhism.

The history of Buddhism shows us that the Mahayana Buddhism comprises many differing movements and teachings. The doctrines of the various Mahavana systems developed in each independent shool and sects. In the Tang Period the great Buddhist centres in China were established all over the Empire of T'ang. These centres were important for Mahayana as the early Indian ones were for all Buddhism. Today we have a clearer view of the history of Mahayana Buddhism in China. During the T'ang period (618-906) all the Mahayanist schools firmly established their monastic centres. During the Sung

Period (960 - 1279) Buddhism retained its vitality. The Zen schools were especially fruitful in art and culture, But real development of Zen in all branches of human activities were achieved in Japan from 13th to 15th century. During its periods of fruition and even later, Chinese Buddhism sent out impulses to almost every Far East country. This mahayanist heritage in the Far East was most deeply implanted in Japan, where a wealth of scriptural texts and works of art have been preserved up to the present day. China should be really regarded as the motherland of Mahayana Buddhism in Far East.

There is a lot of schools and sects of Mahayana Buddhism and each school or sect has a special formulation of its teaching and method. The basic speculative and metaphysical teachings of Mahayana are found in the Mahayana sutras as well as specialized philosophical works of the various schools and sects. Actually, there are also different sects, for example, Amitaba Buddhism — particularly in Japan — Zen Buddhism, and Tantarism which are very important schools. But out of all the Zen Buddhism is the most important, particularly from the view point of philosophical and cultural influence. Zen is mother of the Far East spirituality.

Nagarjuna (c.A.D. 100), the greatest philosopher of the Mahayana, has really found the metaphysics of Mahayana Buddhism in his school of «Madhyamika». The Mahayana is all a way of life with an ideal of spiritual perfection. The Bodhisattva ideal and the doctrine of «Emptiness» (sunyata) are the two great contributions by the Mahayana who has changed the spirituality of Far East civilization, while the philosophy of Emptiness has proved an unfailing source of the intellectual metaphysical speculation. We could see here the two tendencies of the doctrinal development of Mahayana Buddism. These two ideas of the Mahayana doctrines show us one sided attitude of devotion with the idea of Bodhisattva as well as the other side of the metaphysical character with the idea of the «Emptiness». Because of these two characteristics the Mahayana had a great success as a religion and simultaneously, as a philosophy in Far East. It could easily win an admiration of the people, for it reflected the best teachings. And it could also become a basis for immediate action. Consequently the Bodhisattva ideal has been one of the most powerful ideas of Buddhist thought. But what then is «Bodhisattva» ? It would be best for us to explain the Sanskrit term : Bodhi means «enlightenment», and sattva means «being» or essence». A Bodhisattva is thus a person who, in his essential being, is incarnated to win full Enlightenment in order to become a Buddha. Buddha is selflessness and he is free from the world of suffering, birth and death, which means he is in Nirvana. All human beings, are all capable of enlightenment. Each one of them is a potential Buddha. We have the nature for attainment of Enlightenment. The way to Buddhahood is always open to all, not only human beings, but also animals.

One day only Buddha-nature mannifests itself in its full glory. This compassion for all things is great and boundless and it does not make distinctions. In the Bodhisattva-ideal Mahayanist combines enlightenment and compassion. The compassion is the selfless desire to make others happy. In any case this selflessness is the basic attitude of Mahayanist for enlightenment and also for compassion.

But what is Enlightenment ? We meet here also another concept «Dharma». Prof. Etienne Lamotte has resumed the great thesis of Nagarjuna in six points.

1) All Dharmas have not proper nature; empty of proper nature.

2) All Dharmas are not born and not dead.

3) All Dharmas are originally Karma. Consequently Tathata is the Sunyata (Emptyness).

4) All Dharmas are characterlessness, consequently (Suchness) Dharma is inexplicable and unthinkable.

5) All Dharma are equal and without duality.

6) The Emptyness is not being.

These six grand theses of Madhyamika by Nagarjuna show us the antinomy between Sunyata (Emptiness) and Karma, where in any case, without Dharma, beatitude is not possible. But we must ourselves possess the Dharma in order to give it to others, and only way to get hold of it is through Enlightenment. For this reason Bodhisattva wishes to win full Enlightenment.

What then is this Enlightenment ? An answer will be followed, but the most important point here is the distinction between Buddha and Bodhisattva. In Mahayana Buddhism «Buddha» means the highest goal of all himan beings and he is always in the state of Enlightenment, which is the ultimate goal of a Bodhisattva. The Mahayanist quite goes to this highest achievement of man in a cognitive insight into a true reality which transcends this fleeting world. But the man who has cognized this reality, will save the others. This fleeting world is not the real world and the phenomenal person is also not the real person, but only imgined entities. Enlightenment means the cognition of this true reality. And in any case we can achieve this reality with attitude of selflessness, by congnition of sunyata. This unselfish omniscience is the distinctive character of the Enlightenment of Buddha.

LAMOTTE, Etienne, — L'enseignement de Vimarakirti. Louvain. 1962 pp. 46 — 56

According to Mahayanist Buddha is not only omniscient in the full sense of this word, but he is also identical with the Absolute and also with the total entities at all times. But Boddhisattva is, on the other hand, nearer to us, human beins. In ordinary sense Buddha is total transcendental omniscient.

But if the Bodhisattva wishes to become a Buddha, then the distance between a person and the state of Buddhahood will be very large. This distinction seems to be difinitive and infinite. But a Bodhisattva should reach his goal of being absoulte Buddha. In order to achieve this, a Bodhisattva needs the Perfection of Wisdom. We, all human beings, are the potential Bodhisattvas. What a Bodhisattva needs is necessary for each human being. Of this Bodhisattva ideal, Prof. Conze has so clearly explained in his works, particularly in his work, «Buddhism, its Essence and Development», Cassirer, Oxford, 1951 and «Buddhist Wisdom Book All, the Diamond Sutran the Heart Sutra». Allen & Unwin, London 1958. e.t.c.

Now we have to explain another concept of Mahayana «Emptiness». This Emptiness is a translation of sanskrit sunyata. It means an absolute transcendental reality beyond our intellectual speculation and expression. This Emptiness is also named «tathata», or in our philosophical expression, «Negative Essence of being». This concept of «Emptiness» is difficult for us to define. In other words, we can say that the whole of the Buddhology had tried to give its definition. But this negative and transcendental concept is out of capacity for an yexpression. I have tried also in my work «Elaboration Philosophique de la Pensee du Zen» (Paris 1973), but I have never achieved its real definition. All definitions are contradictory.

But these Mahayanist doctrines of Buddhism has entered in China and established their monastic centres. During the Tang Period (618 - 906) and the Sung Period (960 -- 1279) the Zen schools were especially developed in its doctrinal and cultural creation. During this period of fruition Chinese Buddhism dispatched the missionary nearly all over Far Eastern Areas. In a certain sense, China should be regarded as the motherland of Mahayana Buddhism in Far East. In the Tang Period there were schools and sects of Buddhism in China, but at the End of the Sung Period the Zen schools dominated and during last 300 hunderts years, except Tibet and Mongol. Zen Buddhism had become very deeply rooted in China. Zen meditation method was bounded also closely to the Mahayana doctrines. All the important contents of the Zen Buddhism were found in the great Mahayana sutras and treatises of the school of Madhtamika. Nagarjuna was the main representative of this school and he taught the Emptiness of all things and the way to Enlightenment. Zen means in sanskrit «dhyana» and is rela-

ted very strongly to Yoga, but it was the great syntheseis of the Mahayana Buddhism and the Taoism in China. The meditation method of Taoism was accepted in Zen method. Notwithstanding, the other elements were assimilated. Zen is the method of the experience and realization of the Mahayana ideals of Enlightenment and Buddhahood. It is hardly possible now for anyone to recognize how much particularly in philosophy and art, the development and deepening of the Far East Civilization in its entirety is indebted to Zen Buddhism. The Essence of Zen is not something the ordinary spirit can grasp off hand. Zen is not philosophy in an European sense. The other Buddhist schools such as, for example, Shingoh (Tantarism), Tendai (Tien T'chain) and Kegon (Avatamsaka) schools are much richer in logical and metaphysical speculation. Zen is not a theology in ordinary sense. Zen refuses any concept of entities. In contrast to the theological basis for religion, Zen is the living pactice of man striving for deliverance. Zen itself has no dogmas. It is the immediate, and there-fore inexpressible, individual experience whose aim is inner Enlightenment. Enlightenment itself occurs suddenly, like a lightning flash. This Enlightenment-experience is an inward event that occurs only once, but persists throughout life. This experience grows into a capacity that can be realized at any time. It depends essentially on a contradiction that cannot be grasped by formal logical thought. For something would have to be expressed which is simply inexpressible. Undoubtedly the artistic formation and way of thinking of the mentality of the Far East peoples, for example Japanese, based as it is on the wholeness and selfcontained nature of human existence, is deeply indebted to the influence of Zen, as we have already explained. In so far as we still encounter a contradition and a dialectic form of logic in Japanese philosophy we have to do with an inner experience flowing from that of Zen.

Nevertheless, we still do not know what Zen really is, just because Zen cannot be grasped with words. In order to experience this we must enter into a Zen monastery and take part in the meditation-exercises under the direction of a profound and experienced master. We must learn through control of breathing to attain unity of soul and body, and at the same time to feel incessant shocks within through the reflection of the theme of meditation - Koan -. Then the soul mirrors itself suddenly in itself with the tide of strength — overflow hidden inward. When after decades of striving and exercise we attain Enlightenment, we still cannot say what Zen really is, because the essential remains inexpressible. The man who attains the contradictory expression must recognize where the limit of reason is drawn. The man who transcends the scale of reason — who achieves the point where the intellect falls into silence — enters into the realm in which the soul operates fully and freely and comes into contact with the Nothingness. By means of Enlightenment the whole world, too, is bathed in a newly different light, and everything takes a differently deeper meaning that Man himself has become, from within outward,

calm, strong, and serene. A stone, a plant, the song of a bird, or even a shred of flying cloud points to the ultimate and all-embracing something. But the important thing is that man in his own existence manifests being itself. When the ultimate Nothingness is attained, the oppositions of every day are transcended. Yet this experience can still be expressed only by means of the contradiction inevitably inherent in every statement about Zen. Moreover, the prime opposition between the I and the world i.e. between the consciousness and its object, has disappeared. That is to say, the experience has grown into prime consciousnes, the Nothingness has been attained. This ultimate experience of aloneness in the Nothingness gives rise to that calmness of existence so peculiar to Zen. We see the pure form of the world as it was in the beginning. In the context of such an experince painters employ sparing but sure brushstrokes to create a picture of the landscape full of profound meaning, in which the even stones become alive on the canvas. Poets likewise, sparing in the use of words, depict some piece of nature in which the meaning of eternity can be felt. The Nothingness is in everything.

The most important is the fact that Zen is not simply restricted to Buddhism. It is something to be experienced in every field of man's spiritual intellectual activity. We can follow Zen and at the same time be Buddhist or Christian, scientist or plain manual labourer. All that Zen does is to awaken the prime consciousness hidden within us which alone enables the human acitivity. To sum up — Zen is the concentrated, universal and utterly free strength attained by complete emptying of the consciousness ; it is the inwardly enlightened and fulfilled life ; it is the absolute inner freedom perfectly dispensed at every instance.

We have not yet explained why Zen becomes the subjacent philosophical thought of the Far East Civilization. We must formulate Zen as a Philosophy for the routine o flife. After this experience, the beautiful is that which, in aranscendental fashion gives a form o fspace and time to the Nothingness. This concept of «Nothingness» is a substantialization of the concept for «Emptiness». And at the same time the art is an endlessly immanent development of the soul i.e. a revelation, within limits, of the Nothingness inherent in the individual being. The idea of beauty is a personal and particular insight into the essence of the soul in a form appropriate to reality. Where the harmony between outer and inner is achieved in an aesthetic form. i.e. where the artist could be endowed with the talent for assimilation of both his world and his own self for the purpose of outward expression therefrom the subjective activity of the personality immanent therein achieves the hight of transcendent objectivity. Subjectivity can realize itself only in so far as it gives itself share by entering into the objective world. Subjective immanence and objective transcendence are inextricably linked in creative art. Only when the painter stands with

his brush in hand in front of the canvas, the way for a unique definitive idea does open before him. When at one glance a poet enters into the heart of nature, the idea translates itself into speech in the same instance. The creative art has a profound operation on the soul. The more deeply grounded the artist's soul is, the more original is to deepen the beautiful the furthermore. Together with the concrete personality there is maifested beauty that stands behind it. The beautiful is an embodiment of the Nothingness mediated through the personality. The ultimate and all-embracing can be apprehended as the metaphysical background of a work. As an expression of the creative spirit, a work of art also mediates that which cannot be directly expressed without mediatation. Because of the hidden character of the background, logical perception is out of the question. The problem is how a penetration into the Nothingness would be made accessible to the senses. Extremely difficult is the task is i.e. expressing the inexpressible and giving form to the formless, nevertheless, it is strange enough how the message conveyed only in hints becomes feasible and intelligible. The work of art is, so to speak, a portion inseparably connected with the whole, which is itself an essential part of the work. This aesthetic background — the unity embracing everything — can be clearly understood from the Buddhist art of the Far East. The various forms of art are the product o fthe connection between the background and what is brought into realization thereon. The general lack of an individuality in Far Eastern arts must be derived from the fact that an essential part of it is this all-embracing background.

In order to define the indefinable and simultaneously to express the inexpressible as well as to give form to the formless, there is a need for certain ideas to be borrowed from connoisseurship which are generally popular in Far East. By the way of indicating the variety of the inner breadths and depths we could utilize frequently the complementary method. One speaks of high breadth, deep breadth, and flat breadth. At this point the world of actual reality would disappear. Similarly a distinction is drawn between the spiritual ground, i.e. that which is endowed with a form and that which lacks a form. The formless, however, according to the complementary method, possesses a height without any height, a depth without any depth, a breadth without any breadth. The world of common sense undergoes a change, and the world of transcendent intuition aolne does remain. When we make our way through the forms and the formless, and pursue a sympathetic vibration and consonace deeply into the unfathomable ground of our soul, the effect is that both ground of our own self and the ground of the world are the one entity of all embracing Nothingness. In the Nothingness there is neither inner nor outer, neither above nor below. The Nothingness would come thence from where the Nothingness is and thither the Nothingsness goes. There would be heard of a faint sound echoing in the human soul.

This inner transformation seems to be the source that has given rise to the school of thought which, in the shape of Zen, has set Buddhism free from every specific form and simultaneously has developed into the soul-rhythm of life. In such an experience of art we have explained how Zen the subjacent thought of the Far East civilization is. Zen is not yet clearly formulated as a Philosophy, but Zen has given the basic spiritual source of the Far East civilization.

UNE POLITIQUE DE LA CULTURE AU SERVICE DE LA PAIX

MOHAMED AZIZ LAHBABI (Maroc)

Le dessein de cet exposé est double. Montrer :

— que l'engagement vis-à-vis des valeurs humaines universelles est la seule garantie pour la paix dans le monde, et ce, par l'intermédiaire des cultures nationales

— que le fait de disposer de beaucoup d'informations, d'en approfondir l'analyse et de les dialectaliser ne sert à rien si les méthodes ne procèdent pas d'une «sagesse» finaliste, et les applications d'une intention sincère.

Conséquence : pour les tiersmondistes, la culture ne saurait se séparer d'une mobilisation militante.

Qu'est-ce que la culture ?

En arabe, «culture» se dit «thaqâfa».

Ce terme dérive d'un verbe qui, s'appliquant à une lance, signifie la redresser et la faire briller. A partir de cette étymologie, «thaqâfa» s'est vu élargir le sens pour englober les acceptions suivantes : rencontrer, trouver et concourir; ensuite : transformer pour redresser (et éduquer) ; enfin : acquérir une vivacité d'esprit, être apte à bien comprendre.

La culture serait donc : l'ensemble des efforts fournis par un groupe humain pour aboutir à l'unité des expériences et les activités de ses membres (alimentaires, mentales et leur équilibre dans le travail) avec le milieu historique et géographique. Autrement dit : **la culture se constitue de l'ensemble des possibilités acquises par un homme** ou par un group d'hommes, **d'investir le bon sens et le savoir-faire dans la vie pratique.**

Les résultats d'un tel investissement se manifestent dans tous les modes de vie et dans les comportements individuels et collectifs. En font partie les arts (y compris les arts ménagers et l'art culinaire), les attitudes diverses et les idées qu'on se fait de soi, de la société, de la nature et de l'audelà (autant le théisme que le panthéisme ou l'athéisme). Chaque culture repose sur un réseau de croyances, une «idéologie»,...

Selon cette définition d'approche, nous pouvons affirmer que le culturel et le cultuel sont liés et que leur union donne des spécificités particulières à chaque société.

Cela ne s'oppose point à l'universalisme. Au contraire. En effet, il n'y a pas d'universel sans particulier (s). **Le particulier représente la culture nationale** (ou régionale, ou tribale), alors que **l'universel représente le patrimoine commun** ou **la civilisation humaine**. La civilisation coincide avec l'Histoire générale de tous les peuples.

Passage de l'histoire subie à l'histoire assumée.

A proprement parler, il n'y a pas un «passage du sacral à l'historique», selon l'expression chère au Professeur Jacques Berque ; il y a seulement, nous semble-t-il, une certaine laicisation du social ; une désacralisation de quelque manière. Une culture ne se met jamais hors de l'Histoire. Aucune vie sociale ne s'accommoderait de la marge de l'Histoire sans s'étouffer par inanité. Tous les peuples sont de l'Histoire, et dans l'Histoire, bien qu'ils n'y participent pas aussi activement les uns que les autres. Ce qui correspondrait le mieux à la réalité, à propos des cultures du Tiers-Monde, c'est de parler du «passage» de l'histoire subie d'antan (imposée, entre autres, par le colonialisme) à l'histoire assumée, avec plus ou moins de bonheur, en l'étape actuelle de la décolonisation néocolonialiste.

La stratégie de l'époque coloniale consistait à jeter les peuples du «Tiers-Monde»[1] hors de l'Histoire. Au lieu de la conscientisation de la continuité historique qui s'incarne dans les cultures nationales, l'impérialisme théorisait et cultivait, en ses dominés, la conscience de la marginalité. L'être qu'on amène à culpabiliser ses aieux de n'avoir rien donné à la civilisation humaine, ni légué une culture nationale, finit par vivre intensément un sentiment de vide historique ; il s'émerveille devant l'Autre qui l'a sorti du néant ! ... «Si tout vient de l'Occident, tout doit être dominé par l'Occident». La domination se trouve ainsi légitimée agréée, psychologiquement et moralement.

Dès lors, les tiersmondistes se sentent de parfaits pique-assiettes dans le monde culturel et technologique. Qu'ils se soumettent donc, en toute «logique» aux maîtres du Monde et des Destins. Cette reconnaissance du Maître-tuteur, par le mineur, «vide» le second de l'Histoire réelle pour le situer dans une histoire artificielle, falsifiée.

Ainsi, il ne s'agit point du passage du «sacral à l'historique», mais plutôt du passage d'une histoire construite artificiellement dans une conscience naive

(1) Nous employons cette appellation à cause de sa commodité, bien qu'elle n'ait vu le jour que dans la période de la décolonisation néocolonialiste.

conditionnée, manipulée, à une histoire qui retrouve son courant continu normal. Les luttes contre le colonialisme ne sont jamais séparées des luttes pour démasquer l'histoire bâtarde qui se voulait le reflet du passé des peuples du Tiers-Monde. Avec l'indépendance, on a cherché l'authenticité, la récupération de la culture nationale. Une purification en vue de redresser le réel sur son socle réel.

Certes, la culture chez certains pays tiersmondistes a été décalée par rapport à l'histoire se faisant, à un moment où à un autre, ce qui a facilité la pénétration coloniale et l'application de la stratégie dépersonnalisante.

Exemple de la réussite de cette stratégie : un leader politique algérien, se sentant tellement marginal voulait se rattacher à une Histoire, à une culture ; il a demandé avec insistance, à ce que l'Algérie fût assimilée à la France. Une Algérie sans passé, sans personnalité n'est pas vivable. L'appel de Ferhat Abbas a été refusé par les colonialistes : l'assimilation est une politique dangereuse. Car, assimiler l'Arabe aux citoyens français reviendrait à lui donner un statut qui faciliterait sa prise de concience des paradoxes de sa vie et de sa dépersonnalisation. Les Algériens francaisés auraient été reconscientisés, indirectement, dans leur culture arabo-musulmane, dans leur personnalité historique. Le refus de l'assimilation a produit une détraumatisation sur Ferhat Abbas et son parti, «Le Parti du Manifeste» et ils se sont engagés dans la lutte contre le sentiment des orphelins abandonnés, des marginaux, pour réintégrer l'Histoire, se récupérer culturellement et se réhabiliter. La réalgérianisation a pris le chemin de l'indépendance par la révolution. Ferhat Abbas, l'intégrationniste dépité d'hier, a été le premier président de la République Algérienne en exil qui combattait le colonialisme français pour recouvrer l'Indépendance de l'Algérie de demain. La France colonialiste n'avait pas compris la dialectique de l'entransigeance : le tout opposé au rien.

Le mouvement d'Abdelhamid Benbadis, de El-Bachîr El-Ibrâhimî et de leurs nombreux collaborateurs, était un mouvement préparatoire nécessaire à la révolution politico-militaire. En alphabétisant enfants et adultes, en leur enseignant leur histoire nationale, les écoles des «salafi», «réformistes religieux» ont fait passer le feu sacré, le message de reprise de soi dans le vrai cadre culturel algérien. En 1945, une manifestation monstre à Sétif (ville natale de Ferhat Abbas) a surpris le colonialisme : les Algériens ont marché par milliers derrière le drapeau algérien, substitué au tricolore. Vieux, jeunes, femmes et hommes criaient : «Vive l'Algérie indépendante» ! et chantaient : «Le peuple algérien est musulman et l'arabité est sa source»(2).

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(2) **C'est le refrain d'un hymne algérien (réformiste), interdit par les autorités d'occupation, qui est redevenu très populaire après l'Indépendance.**

Cette manifestation (Mai 1945) a été un signe et un signal. La personnalité algérienne s'est dégrimée. Des centaines de morts ont signé par leur sang cette reprise de conscience nationale. Puis ; 1952, Ce fut la grande surprise : le F.L.N., la guerre totale et ... l'Indépendance.

Ainsi, le politique se détermine par rapport à l'économique, mais leur soubassement commun est d'ordre historico-culturel. L'ensemble constitué par les quatre activités forme ce qu'on pourrait considérer comme le fondement de toute société, son véritable «infrastructure».

Auto-conspiration

L'autre aspect de la culture dans le Tiers-Monde post-colonial, c'est une orientation qui, objectivement, aboutit à une conspiration contre sa propre histoire dans son devenir. Dans le passé, c'était l'impérialisme qui conspirait contre l'histoire et la culture «indigènes». Celle-ci, grâce aux efforts des autochtones, et aux acculturations avec l'Occident, ont été ressuscitées. Cependant, des responsables dans certains pays tiersmondistes, se comportent vis-à-vis de leurs propres cultures nationales, avec indifférence. Il y en a même qui se dressent contre elles en adversaires, parce qu'elles leur font peur, de par la dynamique libératrice qu'elles portent ; ou bien, tout simplement, parce qu'ils préfèrent à la culture, d'autres domaines plus voyants qu'on utilise dans la propagande électorale.

Les cultures nationales se trouvent, une fois encore victimes de l'ignorance ou de la politique politicienne, elles qui, pourtant sont la source de toute connaissance et de la vraie politique. Aussi, la culture que le colonialisme assassinait pour les besoins de sa cause, se trouve-t-elle objectivement orientée ou sacrifiée pour la cause du néocolonialisme (bien qu'indirectement, voire même, dans certains cas, inconsciemment).

Nécessité et urgence donc, pour le Tiers-Monde, d'avoir une politique de la culture pour sortir des labyrinthes de l'obscurantisme et de sous-développement.

Acculturation et Civilisation.

Pour mieux cerner ce que nous entendons par «culture nationale», nous empruntons à l'essai «Du clos à l'ouvert» [3] la définition suivante : La culture est «l'ensemble des valeurs et formes de vie matérielles, intellectuelles et spirituelles, conçues et mises en pratique par un peuple au cours de son histoire. Toutefois, comme l'histoire dont il s'agi n'est pas celle des porcs-épics mais des êtres humains naturellement sociaux, c'est-à-dire naturellement et nécessaire-

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(3) M.A. Lahbabi, *Du clos à l'ouvert* (Vingt propos sur les cultures nationales et la civilisation humaine), 2ème édition, SNED, p. 197.

ment portés à vivre en groupes, dans des zones d'échanges affectifs et économiques (et partant dans des zones de mélanges ethniques et de valeurs) une société ne saurait être elle-même qu'en s'ouvrant aux autres. C'est ce double mouvement d'attraction et de répulsion qui constitue le moteur de la civilisation humaine. Par ce double mouvement, et en lui. chaque peuple se découvre, à la fois lui-même et projeté hors de lui même. Il se découvre comme un tout, et comme partie d'un tout, l'Humanité. Toute culture est donc finaliste. Parmi ses fins, l'acculturation.

Ainsi, **plus une culture nationale s'éveille à la conscience de son originalité** (son particularisme), **plus elle sent vivement le besoin de s'ouvrir aux autres cultures** (non moins originales). De par leur diversité et leurs spécificités respectives, les cultures s'aperçoivent qu'elles vivent d'une complémentarité foncière les reliant les unes aux autres» (p. 15).

C'est l'acculturation : grâce à elle s'unissent et se consolident les forces vives qui coexistent. De cette complémentarité culturelle s'effectue le sens de l'humain, et en elle les valeurs communes trouvent leur garantie.

L'Histoire humaine coïncide justement avec l'histoire de cette complémentarité foncière des cultures différentes. Les domaines d'échanges interculturels se créent et se fécondent en temps de paix, comme en temps de guerre. En effet, l'acculturation n'est pas toujours parfaite. Il y a des phases d'allergie, de refus. Cependant le refus n'est pas complétement négatif. C'est une attitude active qui participe à la prise de conscience. Celle-ci finit,. dialectiquement par engendrer du positif : activer un secteur en hibernage, créer une réaction, accélérer un rythme, ... La tension est créatrice.

Dépassant le niveau des cultures nationales, c'est-à-dire le niveau des particuliers, envisageons le niveau universel, celui de la **civilisation.**

Celle-ci est un patrimoine historique commun, la plus grande aventure de l'Histoire de l'humanité dans ses flux et reflux. C'est pourquoi, la Civilisation ne saurait être mortelle ; elle vit des éléments hétérogènes que lui fournissent les cultures vivantes et les mortes. La Civilisation, c'est le devenir historique réalisé dans la vie matérielle, physique, morale et mentale des hommes, en tant qu'espèce.

A la différence des cultures nationales qui reflètent, chacune à sa manière, les données locales et temporelles que lui imposent les situations géographiques et historiques, **la civilisation concrétise le devenir global de l'ensemble des peuples.**

Notre effort à vouloir déterminer le sens de «civilisation» nous semble justifié, car ce concept n'a pas encore reçu une acception précise. C'est pour-

quoi nous nous sommes permis d'en proposer une nouvelle (une de plus).

En voici le résumé :

«La Civilisation est l'histoire des actes conscients des êtres humains au cours de l'Histoire commune de l'humanité» (4).

Si vous agréez cette définition, nous en tirerons quelques conséquences :

l'Histoire humaine a été, et reste, l'oeuvre de tous les peuples ; il s'ensuit que la civilisation, en tant qu'ensemble des apports des cultures nationales à travers les âges, n'appartient à aucun peuple en particulier. La civilisation est le brassage de la diversité dans l'un, alors que les cultures sont le divers désuni tendant vers l'unité (les acculturations en sont des étapes décisives).

Cela nous conduit à dénoncer quelques mythes créés, couvés et entretenus par les forces d'exploitation, les colonialistes et les monopolisateurs de l'intérieur (des autochtones aveuglés par leurs entérêts particuliers).

Les premiers se servaient de la culture, comme il a été déjà dit, pour dominer des peuples étrangers et justifier cette domination, les autres faisaient (et font encore) de la culture, une chasse-gardée de prestige et de privilèges, quand ils n'en font pas une marchandise.

Pour «cultiver», pour «civiliser», on occupe votre pays, militairement et économiquement ; on vous déracine dans votre société et dans vos traditions, en y implantant habitudes, moeurs et goûts étrangers et en désarticulant votre langue et vos dialectes. Alors vous devenez comme cet animal de la fable qui ne sait plus s'il est oiseau ou souris. Alors vous n'êtes plus vous-même et vous n'êtes pas l'autre. Alors vous vous contentez de singer le puissant qui vous a, malgré vous et sans préparer l'impact mental et social, imposé l'importation de sa culture et de «sa» Civiilsation. Il vous les distribue, au comte-gouttes, pour former le personnel subalterne de service et quelques cadres moyens et supérieurs pour constituer un corps d'intermédiaires entre lui et les masses analphabètes.

D'ailleurs, au XVIII ème siècle, on employait le mot «civilisation» dans deux sens spéciaux :

— ensemble des caractères communs aux pays d'Europe jugés les plus cultivés,

— action de «civiliser», c'est-à-dire d'exporter la culture européenne.

A remarquer que ces deux sens correspondent à la période héroique de l'impérialisme moderne.

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(4) Notre *Du clos a l'ouvert* ..., les trois premiers propos.

Certes, l'Occident a une avance culturelle sur le Tiers-Monde. Si les jeux n'étaient pas faussés au départ, les cultures occidentales auraient pu fortifier et enrichir les cultures nationales des pays «d'Outre-Mer». Ce faisant, l'Occident aurait fait fructifier ses propres cultures. Mais voilà, il a manqué à l'Occident «une politique de la culture», désintéressée, non mercantile. Au lieu de cela, il a politisé sa culture avant de l'exporter[5].

Et maintenant, en cette ère de la décolonisation ?

Avant de répondre à cette question, nous tenons à revenir à la conception que nous nous faisons de l'acculturation, pour en expliciter davantage le sens et la portée. Dans la perspective d'une politique de la culture, sans équivoque et sans démagogie, l'acculturation véritable consistera à abattre les frontières entre les cultures nationales et à ne pas enfermer la civilisation humaine dans des définitions exclusives ou restrictives. Cela ne se réalisera que si, préalablement, on arrive à élaborer une politique mondiale de la culture pour assainir les rapports entre anciens colonisés et anciens colonisateurs, en purgeant le passé et en «détraumatisant» les hommes : créer une ambiance confiante de libre jeu entre les hommes et les peuples, sans arrière-pensée néocolonialiste, et avec beaucoup d'humilité.

A cette seule condition, s'établirait une intercommunication efficace entre toutes les cultures du monde. Le bénéficiaire en sera la Civilisation humaine.

La paix mondiale :

Après avoir explicité dans quel sens on entend, dans cet exposé, «culture» (s), civilisation et acculturation, il faut préciser, que la condition sine qua non de leur réalisation se trouve être aussi le but qu'elles doivent viser : la paix mondiale.

Le Monde est assoiffé de paix. Le pathologique, l'immoralisme, l'inquiétude, l'angoisse, la menace d'une guerre planétaire, hantent tous les hommes. Une jeunesse sans espérance, en quête vaine d'un sens pour la vie ; le règne des drogues ; les coeurs et les esprits sentent le trouble et l'aliénation. Le Godot si attendu serait-il la Paix ?

La paix mondiale mettra-t-elle fin à cette tension fiévreuse et fervente vers un changement, vers des hommes neufs dans un monde nouveau ?

Quelle acception (acceptions) donner à «Paix Mondiale» ?

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(5) Il s'agit, ici, des théoriciens du colonialisme et de sa perpétuité. Il faut, bien entendu, reconnaître la valeur humaine de certains Européens qui ont collaboré à l'acculturation et à la libération des peuples du Tiers-Monde.

Aucune réponse n'est possible sans un postulat : la paix mondiale est, d'abord, l'égalité entre toutes les personnes et entre tous les peuples.

Or, tous les observateurs constatent que ce postulat n'est point admis et respecté, surtout par les Etats les plus puissants (y compris, dans le fameux Conseil de Sécurité où les quelques grandes Puissances Atomiques disposent, à elles seules, de voix plus grasses et plus grosses que l'ensemble des représentants du monde entier).

La paix veut dire aussi, la victoire sur les maladies contagieuses, sur l'analphabétisme et, avant tout, sur la pauvreté par une répartition équitable des productions mondiales. Bref, la paix mondiale, c'est la paix des coeurs et la guerre contre les divers sous-développements.

Est-ce décent, est-ce digne de l'humanité, qu'aujourd'hui les misères les plus atroces continuent à sévir dans le monde ? Dans le même pays coexistent l'enfer du dénuement et l'opulence ostentatoire de l'ère du prêt à emporter, ou bon à rejeter, dans les sociétés de consommation, voire de gaspillage.

Qu'est-ce qu'on veut au juste ?

On veut des cultures nationales qui, collaborant sans arrière-pensée néocolonialiste et sans préséance, nous donneront une civilisation moins féroce, moins martiale, plus humaine, une civilisation de paix.

Cette paix n'est pas celle de la «coexistence pacifique», conçue et protégée par les Grandes Puissances pour leurs usages particuliers. La vraie paix sera universelle ou elle ne sera rien. La paix, les paix que décident l'O.N.U. et son Conseil de Sécurité sont des paix purement platoniques, des voeux faussement pieux qu'on sait condammnés d'avance à l'inefficacité.

La vraie paix ne sortira pas des décisions prises à l'O.N.U., en toute mauvaise conscience ; la paix véritable viendra de la volonté des peuples quand les cultures les auront éveillés à la conscience des catastrophes qui se tissent autour d'eux. Là se trouvent tracées les tâches des gens de culture : se mobiliser pour aider les peuples à s'engager au service de la paix.

Au lieu de la «coexistence pacifique» qui sert et garantit la permanence des plus puissants dans leur puissance, il faudra prêcher le principe de la «coexistence égalitaire» : reconnaître l'égalité à chacun avec tous, et l'égalité de tous les peuples entre eux ; libérer les hommes des inégalités afin qu'ils réalisent la libération de l'avenir et garantissent la paix mondiale.

Le principe de l'égalité radicalisée et amplifiée à l'échelle planétaire, supposera une transformation globale des modes de production industrielle et la fin du culte de la croissance indéfinie qui submerge les sociétés d'opulence et les affole.

Le monde industriel, affaissé par ses crises, s'apercevra-t-il que la paix de ses nerfs, l'apaisement de ses réflexes de peur et d'agressivité dépendent du principe de l'équité mondiale ?

L'inversion des institutions devient plus urgente à mesure que la conscience sociale du Tiers-Monde s'éveille. Les signes précurseurs se multiplient : le Sommet des Non-Alignés, en Août 1973, à Alger, la «Guerre du pétrole», la crise de l'Energie, le désarroi monétaire...

Le Tiers-Monde n'est porteur d'aucun message, mais il se dresse en témoin. Ce sont là des données historiques pour une réflexion philosophique réaliste, conséquente et «demainiste».

Le point aveugle de la pensée occidentale, c'est qu'elle a pris l'habitude de faire la sourde oreille, de s'efforcer à **ignorer les témoins non-occidentaux.** Une autre source manifeste des crises morales et culturelles de notre époque est l'incapacité de croire, sincèrement, à ce qu'on décide. La consommation frénétique des tranquillisants ou des drogues ne donne pas la quiétude. **Une culture ne meurt pas de ses fautes ou de ses défauts, mais de n'être pas à même de les reconnaître ;** elle meurt de n'avoir pas le courage de faire son autocritique.

L'Occident a besoin d'un très grand courage et de beaucorp d'humilité pour une telle cure d'autocritique. C'est un préalable à toute réforme du monde, un préalable à la véritable paix du monde. Celle-ci seule pourrait sortir la civilisation de ses déboires et de l'attente angoissée qu'infecte, effroyablement, le manque d'espoir.

Et il y a aussi l'impuissance contre l'inflation générale des valeurs (les valeurs morales et les valeurs de la Bourse). **Le menu social ne contient guère de fraîcheur, de poésie et de chaleur humaine.** Le rituel bureaucratique glace les rouages sociaux et les fait grincer. Rien n'est identifié, rien n'est à sa place, et les rapports personnels et internationaux demeurent privés de toute légitimité.

Les promesses de la science et de la technologie arriveront-elles, un jour prochain, à modifier la situation ?

En partie, certainement : lorsque la méfiance envers la parole cessera de germer dans les esprits des «tiersmondistes», et lorsque l'égoisme sera exorcisé des coeurs, dans les pays industrialisés. Ainsi, les peuples renoueront avec le bon sens et conjugueront leurs cultures nationales pour favoriser l'émergence d'une civilisation nouvelle, véritablement humaine. Alors nous connaîtrons une politique mondiale de la culture au service de la paix universelle, une politique civilisatrice qui instaurera l'égaltié des conditions propres à donner les mêmes chances pour la réalisation des aspiratoins de tous.

IDEOLOGIES AND CIVILIZATION

MOURAD WAHBA (Egypt)

The attempt to study civilization from a scientific standpoint must necessairly encounter the problem of bias and objectivity. This problem is in one sense the root of what is known as the sociology of knowledge or, more specifically, the sociological study of ideology.

The origin of the sociological study of ideology can be traced back to many sources. It means that Destutt de Tracy was the first person to use the term to refer to a projected «science of ideas». Bacon's theory of idols may be regarded as another precursor of the sociology of ideology. Bacon argued that men could acquire knowledge of nature only if they rid their minds of imperfections. The philosophers of the French Englightenment interpreted Bacon to imply that men cannot understand their society because their position in society forces them to select particular facts and to interpret them in a biased way.

The Marxist theory of ideology synthesized these insights, and placed the problem of ideology within a dynamic theory of class society.

Here a question has to be raised :

What caused the emergence of the class society ?

It is the crisis in the hunting society owing to the disappearance of large animals from wherever they could be easily hunted, and to the changes of climate, which replaced the open happy hunting grounds by forests in some regions like western Europe or by deserts in others, as in Africa. These difficulties that men faced led to an intensive search for new kinds of food. This pursuit was to lead to the invention of the technique of agriculture, and this invention led to a new relation of man and nature. Man ceased to be parasitic on animals. In practising agriculture man controlled nature and thus achieved independence o fexternal conditions. Individuals began to stress their claims to what they had produced and private property came into being with its inequalities of wealth, and thus the formation of social classes began to develop. Thus the transition from hunting to agriculture was transition to civilization. And that is why civilization had originated and took root in the well watered river valleys where cultivation by natural flow irrigation canals could be practised. Early civilizations were, accordingly, limited to a number of favoured areas, the main ones known to us being those of Mesopotamia, of Egypt, and of the Indus valleys.

As a result of the agricultural civilization, the city was founded where the surplus from the remaining villages would be collected, and stored. The city was centred round a temple in which one God usually came to dominate assisted by his priests. From the beginning these priests ran the cities and formed the first administrative class, they arranged for the distribution of water and seed, for the timing of sowing and harvest, for storing of grain. Thus the establishment of the city revealed the origin of the class-divided society with its mythology. Myth was the central organizing principle and accordingly it gained an absolute authority in matters of science as well as in those of morals. But the history of civilization shows us how the human mind has managed to emancipate itself from the mythology of the agricultural civilization. The Greeks were the first to transform the ideology of myth of the agricultural civilization into something more rational, transformed Mythos into Logos. Thus they rejected the complicated elaboration of theology and superstition. From that time to the present day that thread of rationalism has been lost at times, but ti has been possible to find it again. If has been lost in the feudal civilization where the demand for useful science was reduced to a minimum so as the religious institutions could be in power to back Feudalism by showing it to be an intergral part of an unchangeable universe. Thus philosophy, on which theology was based, was assimilable to another wordly religion. Universities were mainly institutions for training the clergy. In this way a religious society is born assuming a divine character and tending to become an absolute authority. But the economy of feudalism faced a crisis that differed from food crisis in the hunting age. It was not a crisis of man against nature but a crisis of man against man, man imprisoned in a closed system of ideas against man emancipating himself from this system and paving the way towards an open system of ideas. The economy of feudalism proved to be against the development of this open system incarnated into the structure of capitalist system based on the principle of laissez-faire that was giving momentun towards the end of the Middle Ages. By the fifteenth cuntery the bourgeoisie had grown so strong that they were beginning to transform a religio-feudalistic civilization into a secular civilization based on a capitalist system. This transformation needed an ideological struggle as a prelude to the emergence of this new civilization. This ideological struggle could be divided into two major phases : Renaissance and Enlightenment.

The Renaissance occupies an important place in world history for two reasons :

1. Going back to the Greek civilization, to Logos.

2. The cult of the individual.

These two ideological trends fitted the emergence of the capitalist class.

As for Enlightenment, it is considered as the age of reason. The conclusions of the mid eighteenth-century writers challenged views of the history and nature of man and of the universe which were endorsed by the church of Rome. Kant is considered to be the philosopher who summed up the achievement of Enlightenment. In «Critique of Practical Reason», moral duty was withdrawn from possible determination by the material world of perceived phenomena. This means a refusal to subordinate the material of social facts to religious and moral principles. In this sense the concept of social contract was adopted as a doctrinal counter balance to the theory of the divrine rights of kings. It was adopted to show the sovereignty of the people as the ultimate source of authority.

But gradually the capitalist system was transformed into a closed system due to the emergence of monopoly and imperialism. Thus the emergence of socialism was a must.

Now the question is :

Could the socialist system prevent man from being imprisoned into a closed system ?

In my opinion this could be possible if man is considered as an end in himself. And in this case man will discover his own destiny :

The conquest of cosmos based not on Mythos but on Logos.

CIVILISATION NOIRE ET PHILOSOPHIE

ALASSANE NDAW (Senegal)

La prodigieuse variété des interprétations données à la pensée négro-africaine manifeste, par delà le foisonnement des théories, son caractère essentiellement aporétique. Une lecture philosophique de ce type de pensée ne va pas sans de grandes difficultés. Car le contenu de la pensée cosmologique de l'Afrique ne peut jamais coincider avec celui des concepts formés par la pensée occidentale. Dans la tradition de l'Occident, quelles que soient les écoles et la diversité de leurs interprétations, les propositions métaphysiques se formulent toujours à l'aide des mêmes concepts et des même couples d'oppositions : l'être et le devenir, l'essence et l'existence, la substance et les accidents, la matière et la forme, la puissance et l'acte, l'être nécessaire et l'être contingent, les vérités empiriques et les vérités a priori, les vérités temporelles et les vérités éternelles.

Les métaphysiciens les plus récents n'arrivent pas à se déprendre de ces catégories fondamentales. Par exemple, on voit aisément que l'eidos husserlien emprunte sese caractères à l'idée de Platon et à l'entéléchie d'Aristote. Au cours de l'histoire de la pensée philosophique, tout se passe comme si les catégories aristotéliciennes avaient déterminé une structure mentale commune qui serait la métaphysique sponténée de l'esprit humain. Mais il suffit de se retourner vers les «philosophies» de l'Inde, de la Chine et de l'Afrique, pour découvirir des systèmes de pensée qui mettent en oeuvre de tout autres catégories, de tout autres principes directeurs que ceux de la métaphysique d'Aristote.

Historiquement, les premières approches à prétention scientifique de la pensée négro-africaine ont été effectuées par les savants occidentaux, de la fin du XIXème siècle à nos jours.

Auparavant, les relations de voyage parues dès l'antiquité et au Moyen Age, les récits des voyageurs arabes, ceux des missionnaires, des explorateurs et des commerçants avaient donné une description plus ou moins fantaisiste des modes de vie et de pensée des Anciens Négro-Africains.

Les théories édifiées par les observateurs occidentaux pour comprendre et expliquer les mécanismes de la pensée négro-africaine, parce qu'elles se réclament d'une haute scientificité retiendront particulièrement notre attention. En mettant à nu les postulations philosophiques qui sous-tendent les recherches ethnographiques sur les langues et la psychologie de nos peuples, on pourra

espérer jeter quelques lumières sur les aspects vraiment fondamentaux de la pensée négro-africaine.

En effet, une littérature extrêmement bigarrée au point de vue des principes méthodologiques (Tylor, Frazer, Lowie, Boas, Lévi-Bruhl, Malinovski) a étudié sous une forme plus ou moins systématisée la pensée des peuples archaiques ou en voie de développement — selon l'expression à la mode.

Il nous semble inutile de partir en guerre contre les théories qui ont été abondamment dénoncées au cours de ces vingt ou trente dernières années. Aujourd'hui la majorité des spécialistes sérieux s'accordent à reconnaitre que le succès de certaines théories doit davantage à leur fonction de justification de la domination coloniale qu'à leur valeur scientifique proprement dite. Une deuxième génération de savants et de chercheurs (Lévi-Strauss, Leenhardt, Griaule, Balandier, Mercier, L.V. Thomas, Zahan, pour ne rester que dans le domaine français), a entrepris une approche du problème avec le louable souci d'éliminer tout préjugé ethnocentrique. Le sentiment de la supériorité européenne qui inspirait la majeure partie des recherches d'ethnologie scientifique ne fait plus recette. A l'ethnologie de la raison triomphante a succédé une ethnologie plus humble et plus consciente de ses limites. Les ethnologues occidentaux tentent aujourd'hui de comprendre l'Africain comme il se comprend luimême, par une reprise intime du sens de sa vie.

Enfin, phénomène extrêmement important, des spécialistes africains se mettent à étudier leur propre culture, non plus d'un point de vue sentimental et nostalgique, mais sous l'angle de l'objectivité scientifique.

Pour tenter de voir clair dans l'immense confusion provoquée par le foisonnement des doctrines, on ira chercher chez les ethnologues et chez quelques grands théoriciens de l'Anthropologie les principes directeurs qui permettent de s'orienter à travers le labyrinthe des spéculations africaines sur le monde, l'homme et Dieu, telles qu'elles ont été rapportées dans les «documents institutionnalisés».

Ces recherches auxquelles on attache une importance philosophique se multiplient de nos jours. Or elles s'accomplissent sur un terrain jadis réservé à l'ethnologie, à l'anthropologie et plus récemment à la sociologie, à la psychologie sociale, voire à l'ethnopsychologie. Les spécialistes de ces disciplines sont prêts à tourner en dérision les élucubrations des philosophes. Mais il devient nécessaire de tenter une justification théorique de la thématisation explicite du contenu des visions africaines du monde.

L'examen de la situation africaine montre l'absence à peu près totale d'implications philosophiques dans l'intérêt porté en Occident à la pensée en Afrique. Cet intérêt s'est en quelque sorte concentré sur l'ouvrage du R.P. Tempels «la philosophie bantu».

Comme si les choses s'étaient terminées avec Tempels, comme si c'était là le dernier mot et l'ultime expression de la philosophie en Afrique.

Les conséquences pour les Etudiants venant s'initier à la philosophie en Occident ont été souvent graves. Alors que les Occidentaux ont été amenés depuis longtemps à réfléchir sur l'histoire de leur philosophie et sa «periodisation», laquelle procède justement du sentiment du temps historique particulier à la conscience occidentale, la philosophie en Afrique n'a pas de place dans une région de concepts d'où elle pourrait éclairer le projet de l'homme africain contemporain.

C'est dans cette mesure que l'apprenti philosophe africain a dû le plus souvent se laisser imposer des catégories étrangères aux lieu et place de ce que son sentiment aurait dû laisser spontanément éclore.

Entre ces idéologies qui lui étaient étrangères, les unes de caractère dogmatique et confessionnelle, les autres à tendance essentiellement socio-politique et agnostique, il ne lui restait plus qu'une seule issue : la restauration de sa métaphysique traditionnelle, malgré le caractère épisodique et fragmentaire de ce qu'on pouvait connaître de celle-ci.

Ce fait se comprend aisément, à cette réserve près, que l'idée de tradition se confond trop souvent pour un occidental avec celle d'un magistère dogmatique, n'autorisant qu'une scolastique rigide. Au contraire, l'effort philosophique en Afrique requiert que la pensée qui nous a été transmise puisse reprendre dans la tradition ce qui y était inscrite sans être expressément pensé.

Une deuxième constation du philosophe africain, c'est l'apparent paradoxe sous lequel de nos jours, la réalité africaine se présente à ceux qui ne l'abordent que de l'extérieur. A ces derniers, la pensée de l'Afrique se présente comme quelque chose de tout à fait étranger à la philosophie entendue au sens de la «philosophia perennis». En effet, certaines études majeures ne sont devenues accessibles qu'à un petit nombre d'initiés. Il nous faut pourtant partir de cet état de fait pour reconnaître la situation philosophique, non seulement à l'intérieur de l'Afrique, mais par rapport au monde contemporain. A cet égard, une comparaison avec l'histoire de l'enseignement de la philosophie en Inde est particulièrement significative. On sait qu'à un moment donné de son histoire, l'Inde a pu adopter l'hégélianisme, alors fort en honneur en Angletterre. L'adoption massive de cette doctrine en Inde est particulièrement significative. On sait qu'à un moment donné de son histoire, l'Inde a pu adopter l'hégélianisme, alors fort en honneur en Angleterre. L'adoption massive de cette doctrine en Inde est sans doute dûe en grande partie au fait qu'elle coïncidait en grande mesure avec les anciennes philosophies indiennes traditionnelles. Il apparaissait à beaucoup d'Hindous que la philosophie occidentale redécouvrait des vérités que leurs propres sages avaient énoncées longtemps auparavant. La situation en Afrique est fort différente. Il n'y a aucune philosophie occi-

dentale qui puisse être agrée par un par un système philosophique déjà prévalent en Afrique puisque notre continent ne possède pas l'équivalent des anciens textes philosophiques qui abondent en Inde. Il n'existe en Afrique aucun système de philosophie élaboré de façcon explicite où puissent être decelées des affinités avec telle ou telle philosophie occidentale, comme cela s'est passé en Inde.

Dans le cas de l'Inde, la philosophie prévalente à l'époque pouvait convenir à une ancienne philosophie de type fort semblable et aucun abîme ne séparait donc les deux cultures. La philosophie occidentale fut aisément assimilée et pouvait être considérée par les penseurs indiens comme une redécouverte de vérités que la sagesse de l'Orient connaissait depuis des siècles. l'accès de la philosophie Occidentale étant ainsi facilitée, la philosophie indienne et celle de l'Occident pouvaient dialoguer sur un plan d'égalité relative et conquérir de pair des positions nouvelles. Mais la situation, en ce qui concerne l'Afrique est totalement différente. Il n'existe aucune longue tradition de pensée philosophique explicitée dans des textes comme les anciens textes sanscrits de l'Hindouisme. Comme on le sait, l'accès à la tradition orale est extrêmement difficile.

A ce jour, la seule chose qui puisse être tenue pour représentative d'une philosophie africaine est l'ensemble des croyances traditionnelles. Des tentatives ont été faites dans ce sens, avec plus ou moins de bonheur.

Les responsables de l'enseignement de la philosophie, sous la période coloniale, estimant que l'Afrique n'avait aucune philosophie à proposer, considérèrent que la propagation de la phhilosophie occidentale était la meilleure voie pour la faire entrer dans le courant de la pensée moderne ; éventuellement des philosophes africains paraîtront qui pourront s'entretenir de plain-pied avec leurs homologues européens des mêmes questions et de la même manière.

Notons au passage que cette position est soutenue par beaucoup d'étudiants africains marxisants.

Cette proposition implique le rejet absolu d'un système autre de pensée, tenu pour ridicule et absurde. Une telle réaction nous semble superficielle ; elle a déjà retardé l'étude les trésors de la pensée africaine et elle serait également hostile à toute évaluation des concepts spécifiquement africains.

Une autre question que l'on peut se poser est celle de savoir sous quelle forme se préciserait l'actualité du message spirituel de l'Afrique devant la conscience que l'on appelle moderne. Plus d'un témoignage atteste l'impact massif d'idéologies envahissant la conscience africaine, sans contrepoids ni contrepartie. Cette contrepartie, la spiritualité africaine ne la détiendrait elle pas ? Elle permettrait de résister à l'investissement total de notre âme par des idéologies dont elle ne peut elle-même secréter l'antidote parce que les prémisses de ces

idéologies lui sont étrangères. La vérité et le sens d'une doctrine n'apparaissent que due fait qu'on l'assume soi-même.

Une tentative intéressante, quoique nous l'accueillons avec une certaine réserve, est celle qui consiste à essayer de déterminer les affinités qui existent entre tel système occidental et le point de vue africain et de montrer comment à l'aide de ce système, la philosophie implicite dans la vision africaine due monde peut devenir explicite. Selon cette perspective, alors que le positivisme de type Comtien apparaît comme totalement étranger à la pensée africaine, l'existentialisme, sous certains de ses aspects s'en rapprocherait dans la mesure où la philosophie doit traaiter de problèmes provenant de situations vécues, où l'individu doit par exemple affronter des forces hostiles, influencer les objects ou les êtres selon ses propres fins et être conscient de participer lui-même à la situation de la réalité humaine dans ses aspects les plus fondamentaux, et cependant sans jamais la traiter comme objet d'enquête scientifique. Ce comparatisme nous paraitrait légitime si les études que nous avons pu récemment lire sur ce sujet n'étaient pas entachés d'une forte tendance réductrice par manque de données précises sur la pensée traditionnelle de l'Afrique. Toutefois ces présentations maladroites ne doivent pas conduire à la disqualification de l'idée de philosophie comparée.

L'homme contemporain doit tenter de se situer au point de rencontre des grandes formes de la pensée humaine et découvrir du même coup la relativité du mode de pensée privilégiée par les Occidentaux et la vanité des prétentions de supériorité toujours sous-jacentes dans le dialogue que l'Occident entretient avec les autres cultures. La philosophie occidentale a été le plus souvent une ontologie de la totalité, une réduction de l'autre au même ; la neutralisation de l'autre devenant thème ou objet est précisément sa réduction au même. Le dialogue véritable suppose la reconnaissance de l'autre à la fois dans son identité et dans son altérité. Ce n'est pas le rejet du «barbare» hors de la civilisation.

Réfléchir sur la pensée traditionnelle africaine peut contributer à faire comprendre aux Occidentaux ce qui est pensé et vécu dans un monde spirituel différent de leur environnement intellectuel et en même temps aider ceux qui avaient grandi dans cet autre monde à prendre conscience des valeurs que le contact avec l'Occident «technicisé» leur faisait perdre.

La culture philosophique propose à celui qui veut se comprendre la réflexion. La grande tradition occidentale qui part de Descartes et de Kant, passe par Schelling, Fichte, Maine de Biran pour aboutir à Husserl et Heidegger est essentiellement un vaste retour à soi. C'était aussi la grande idée de Socrate et de Platon.

La réflexion philosophique africaine qui ne sera pas seulement restitution, ni répétition d'une tradition figée, mais création à partir d'un fondement authentique, devra permettre de tirer de cette réflexion spéculative les déterminants culturels d'un moi africain qui s'assumera entièrement.

On sait que Levy-Bruhl, dans la première partie de son oeuvre, soutenait qu'il existait deux types de pensée qui avaient chacune leur langage propre et ne pouvaient entrer en communication. Nul n'ignore que Levy-Bruhl a systématisé la documentation ethnographique à partir d'un point de vue bien déteminé, à savoir la théorie mystique de la pensée. Cette documentation, il ne l'a pas réunie lui-même ; elle l'a été principalement par les émissaires de l'administration coloniale et par les missionnaires. D'une masse infinie de faits, les informateurs ont choisi ceux qui sautent aux yeux par leur caractère inhabituel et exotique. Les informateurs qui ont recueilli cette documentation ethnographique ont souvent perdu de vue la principal ; ce qui semblait ordinaire et peu différent de la conduite de l'homme à culture dite «développée». Les observateurs plus récents ont reconnu que les autochtones poursuivent des buts déterminés et que, dans les conditions du milieu où ils vivent, ils tiennent compte des lois de la nature et accomplissent un travail quotidien ordinaire. Or ce sont justement ces faits ordinaires de la vie quotidienne des Africains qui sont les plus précieux pour juger des formes fondamentales sous lesquelles se manifeste leur pensée. La mauvaise méthode dans le choix de la documentation est une des voies qui conduisent à de fausses déductions. On décrète que la magie, le fétichisme, l'animisme, la pensée mythique sont entièrement privés de signification rationnelle.

Or, tout laisse croire que primitivement, chez tous les peuples, il y avait indistinction de la raison, du mythe, de la science, de la technique et de la religion.

Des historiens sérieux ont pu constater, en Grèce, que les progrès de l'explication rationnelle et de la réflexion critique ont accompagné une désagrégation de la cité grecque dont la religion fondée sur très belle mythologie avait jusque là garanti la cohésion.

En effet, quand Platon fonde l'Académie, la philosophie s'est instaurée par une rupture avec la religion et a la politique traditionnelle.

Or la culture africaine passe en ce moment par une période de transition dont les caractères dominants sont la désagrégation des formes traditionnelles et le déséquilibre politique, résultant de la lutte pour le pouvoir à la suite des indépendances négociées. Par comparaison avec la naissance de la philosophie en Grèce, la crise africaine actuelle apparaît comme une situation éminemment philosophique. Ce qui explique sans doute, le goût des jeunes africaines pour cette discipline.

Quoi qu'il en soit, il nous faut rejeter l'idée d'une Afrique entièrement irrationnelle, mystique et confuse. L'Afrique comme les autres continents, s'est faite au moyen d'un processus d'antagonismes et de différenciation. A la structuration de ce processus, ont contribué des forces rationnelles et irrationnelles. ...

C'est précisément parce qu'il existe des diversités que la prétention est légitime de rechercher les faits communs qui autorisent à parler de culture africaine ou de pensée africaine.

Ces faits communs sont les modes d'une prise de conscience de la réalité. Il y a des manières africaines de prendre position devant la vie, l'art, la politique, la religion. Ce qui fait l'unité et l'originalité de notre culture, c'est l'ensemble de ces attitudes diverses. Dans la pensée africaine s'exprime tout l'ensemble des valeurs, des expériences, des idées, des conceptions de l'existence et des fins dernières qui constituent la vie humaine. Chaque groupe a essayé de réfléchir, d'ordonner ou de comprendre la vie telle qu'il la voyait, mais cette diversité naturelle ne brise pas l'unité de la culture africaine, bien au contraire, elle l'enrichit. Sans doute, est-il impossible d'établir une unification doctrinale selon les catégories occidentales. Mais les diverses conceptions de la réalité reposent sur les constantes de l'esprit africain, qui ne s'expriment pas dans des doctrines élaborées — et communiquées — mais dans des prises de positions devant la vie, dans des conditions préalables à toute attitude devant celle-ci.

Ce qu'il est convenu présentement d'appeler philosophie africaine n'est rien d'autre que la tentative de donner un fondement conceptuel à la vision de la réalité propre aux peuples de l'Afrique.

Mais pour éviter toute confusion dans le jugement que l'on forme sur la culture africaine, il importe de distinguer entre la philosophie au sens technique du mot et la pensée.

La phhilosophie possède sa méthode propre. Elle est une discipline stricte parce qu'elle constitue l'engagement théorique de mener à bonne fin d'investigation des causes ultimes, au moyen de la démonstration ou de la preuve. Elle est la critique de sa propre méthode, de même que les données objectives qui en sont le fondement constituent la garantie de sa pureté et de sa rigueur scientifique.

Que signifie penser ? On prendra ce mot aussi bein dans le sens courant d'action et d'effet de penser que dans le sens idéal de ce qui a été pensé, mais la pensée, dans cette acceptation n'est pas seulement la représentation logique et rationnelle, mais aussi le fruit de l'imagination et de l'intuition poétiques. La pensée ainsi entendue n'exige pas nécessairement la démonstration des idées proposées ou une base de données réelles pour conserver le caractère qui lui est propre. La philosophie comme la pensée, suppose toujours une grande capa-

cité abstractive. L'élévation de l'esprit d'un pouple à la compréhension conceptuelle de la réalité, même s'il manque la démonstration ou la preuve de la vérité de cette compréhension, n'est pas possible sans une certaine capacité abstractive qui puisse transformer le monde en contenu conceptuel. C'est ce que la pensée réalise, mais d'une autre manière que la philosophie.

Lorsque nous parlons de la pensée africaine, nous entendons d'une part, marquer l'appartenance de cette pensée à l'ensemble de l'Afrique, mais en même temps situer et défendre cette appartenance en raison de la spécificité de l'apport négro-africain à la culture du continent en général. Il est apparu qu'il était possible de dégager un certain nombre de présupposés commune à la plupart des sociétés africaines qui commandent la génèse de leur conception du monde, une conception qui, dans son origine, ne doit rien au savoir de l'Occident. L'Afrique traditionnelle a su conserver et transmettre d'âge en âge, un lot de certitudes issues peut-ètre d'un mème enseignement, d'une mème tradition. Il se trouve que cet apport spécifiquement négro-africain, est celui qui nous perment de parler sur quelques points précis d'une continuité de la conscience philosophique entre l'Afrique traditionnelle et l'Afrique moderne.

On sait qu'on se heurte en Occident, à un certain étonnement nuancé de refus, lorsqu'on formule l'idée d'une philosophie africaine. Cette idée semble un paradoxe, allant à l'encontre des opinions généralement reçues dans l'Africanisme. D'une manière générale, on s'en tient à la locution courante, imposée par le livre du R.P. Temples, la "philosophie Bantu". Il faudra revenir longuement sur cette expression qui nous a amené à nous interroger la signification et l'histoire de la philosophie.

Si l'on accepte l'idée que c'est en Europe que la philosophie a eu surtout sa vie propre et son progrès, une des questions fondamentales de notre propos sera de tenter de déceler la «philosophie» impliquée dans la pratique sociale des Africains et de déterminer à quelles conditions il sera possible de l'expliciter.

Et si le mot philosophie pose des difficultés insurmontables, nous tenterons de mettre en évidence, à l'intérieur de la pluralité des formes et des niveaux du discours africain, cela mème qui serait l'équivalent du Discours philosophique, tel qu'il s'est déployé dans l'espace culturel de l'Occident.

Si nous récusons l'usage que les Ethnologues, à la suite de Tempels, font du terme de philosophie, nous devrons répondre à une autre série d'objections formulées par les «philosophes de métier» : ceux-ci ne manquent pas d'objecter que certains problèmes traités ne sont plus de la philosophie, car le concept de philosophie, en Occident, a fini par s'identifier dans l'esprit de beaucoup de gens avec les différentes formes de l'agnosticisme et du rationalisme.

Mais les chercheurs en sciences philosophiques et religieuses africaines se trouvent mis en présence d'une masse de conceptions qui débordent l'espace de la pure rationalité. Son devoir est de les examiner avec attention et respect, de ne pas le considérer comme le balbutiements des linéaments du savoir, mais le produit d'une pensée qui se désintéresse de l'expérience positive, parce que son intérèt est ailleurs, autrement dit son choix et non par impuissance. l'Africain traditionnel reste fidèle à luiparce qu'il garde le sens de sa place dans l'Univers et la conscience du prinipe sacré qu'il port en lui. Il ne s'agit pas d'un vague concept métaphysique, mais d'une réalité, d'une dimension dans laquelle chaque homme se meut. Ce principe est dans l'homme africain plus réel que n'importe quelle partie de son corps.

L'oeuvre de Marcel Griaule a su montrer avec un rare bonheur la perfection des civilisations africaines, leur choix délibéré d'une voie qui n'est pas celle dans laquelle avance l'Occident, se dirigeant vers l'esprit invisible qui gouverne l'univers et non vers la conquète de la matière.

Nous nous efforcons de déterminer un cadre culturel aux propositions fondamentales différent de celles de l'Occident. Ce que nous parait constituer l'idéologie permanente de l'homme d'Occident, c'est la croyance à la réalité de l'individuel ou l'identification entre réalité et individualité, par oppositon à l'idéologie fondamentale de l'Afrique traditionnelle, telle qu'elle transparait à travers les productions culturelles qui ont pu être conservées et dont la vitalité a pu être sauvegardée.

De la philosophie en général, on peut dire qu'elle est l'acte de la conscience réfléchissant sur elle-même. L'expérience est déjà par elle-même porteuse de sens. Mais ce sens ne devient vérité que dans la mesure où la réflexion le reprend et le transforme en conscience.

Au moment où l'Europe se pose la question du sens et de la tâche de la philosophie et se demande si elle n'est pas un luxe superflu dont la civilisation peut se passer sans préjudice, la pensée africaine, d'abord révélée par le discours de l'Ethnologue, manifeste une volonté singulière d'accéder au Discours de la philosophie.

Sans doute avant toute reprise de la problèmatique occidentale issue des grecs, faut-il pouvoir contribuer à préciser le dessein d'une herméneutique philosophie africaine, c'est-à-dire la lecture du sens que donne une certaine situation de la culture africaine.

Toute tentative pour interpréter les systèmes de pensée africaine avec les concepts élaborés par la philosophie Occidentale expose à l'accusation de falsification. Aussi ne doit on procéder à l'interprétation de ces systèmes qu'avec d'infnies précautions et se résigner à n'en pouvoir donner qu'une vue déformée.

Mais, nécessairement, pour nous faire comprendre et nous comprendre nous-mêmes, nous sommes amenés à lire les données de la pensée traditionnelle avec les idées de notre temps et à leur poser des questions que nos ancêtres ne se souciaient guére d'évoquer.

Au plan méthodologique, nous ne nous méfierons jamais suffisamment de l'illusion de retrouver trop facilement des pensées et des théories élaborées dans d'autres aires culturelles.

Au contraire, nous devons toujours tenter d'être à l'affût des différences. Il s'agit de faire comprendre qu'il faut viser certaines notions africaines à l'aide de plusieurs notions modernes se rectifiant mutuellement, sans jamais atteindre d'une façon absolue ce que la pensée africaine a de spécifique.

La pensée africaine, celle qui veut passer au concept et procéder à sa propre théorisation suit un mouvement pendulaire dans un duel dramatique entre la pensée archaïque et la conscience moderne. Les pays du tiers-monde empruntent leurs modèles d'organisation à l'Europe. Certains prennent pour guide le capitalisme, d'autres optent pour le socialisme. Mais ces deux modèles sont des variantes de l'esprit occidental et s'engendrent dialectiquement en direction d'une civilisation dite planétaire et qui n'est autre que la civilisation de l'Europe se développant et se répandant sous l'égide de la rationalité scientifique.

La conscience africaine est à la fois attirée par ce courant unificateur tout en manifestant avec vigueur une exigence diversificatrice, en revendiquant sa différence.

Comment échapper à une civilisation universelle abstraite et sauver de la disparition les cultures singulières ? Telle est la question à laquelle nous sommes présentement confrontés.

Le besoin actuel de philosophie en Afrique, s'explique par ce quel l'expérience africaine, l'histoire africaine ont besoin d'être dévoilées et articulées dans un langage ordonné afin qu'elles soient manifestes et que leur vérité soit saisie dans levaste horizon de la totalité. Car il y a un universel, jamais parfaitement dicible, qui s'instaure et se dissimule dans les événements. Toute société tend à se donner une représention de l'Univers, de la nature, de la destinée humaine, de Dieu.

Comme l'écrit Masson-Oursel, «Chaque société ne se conçoit que mythiquement, mais cette conception prend nécessairement l'aspect d'une religion, susceptible de se schématiser en système philosophique. Toute mentalité de groupe admet quelque vitalisme ou dynamisme expliquant et l'ontologie du réel et la phénoménologie de l'expérience concrète ; toute morale respecte les valeurs

ainsi déterminées, toute magie met en oeuvre les essences impliquées dans les dégrés du réel, que la langage permet de penser».

On peut dire que la pensée humaine est universelle dans ses fins et particulièrement dans ses formes.

Aussi la question d'une certaine unité de la pensée africaine pose-t-elle de redoutables problémes à toutes les sciences humaines. Elle est, à n'en pas douter, une difficulté réelle.

Est-il possible de savoir en quoi réside la structure essentielle de l'Univers africain et de détermineer ce qui constitue son unité ? Dans de très nombreux cas, les réponses fournies par l'enquête ethnologique présentent une convergence remarquable bien que dans le détail leur pertinence ne soit pas toujours égale.

Sans doute le philosophe africain doit-il être ouvert aux voix de son temps. Mais les faits politiques et les transformations économico-sociales ne sont pas présents dans le discours philosophique selon leurs aspects particuliers. Une philosophie donnée parle de son époque ; elle ne se situe nullement dans un espace intemporel ; elle est étroitement liée à la situation particulière, mais elle transpose les problèmes qu'elle examine dans une situation universelle ou universalisable.

La philosophie transforme l'expérience autant qu'elle est transformée par elle. De ce point de vue, elle se révéle comme donatrice de nouvelles significations et, dirons-nous, comme force révolutionnaire. La tâche de transformer l'expérience africaine en événement philosophique formalisé semble se justifier aujourd'hui.

A la suite de Heidegger, nous pensons que la rationalité de l'humanité occidentale s'est constituée sur un mode philosophique. Celle-ci, -tout en se dissimulant, est agissante dans la quotidienneté, dans la science et la technique, dans la philosophie morale et la religion. L'Occidental comprend l'être selon un mode bien déterminé et cette détermination est philosophique.

Il convient de rechercher les caractéres propres de ce que nous avons désigné par les expressions de «pensée africaine» et de «philosophie occidentale» et de surprendre les réactions que suscite chez les Africains aux prises avec les problèmes culturels la double perspective représentant deux mentalités : celle de l'Afrique et celle de l'Occident.

En effet, connaître la pensée de l'Afrique ne se résume pas en une accumulation d'informations que l'on ordonne après en avoir vérifié l'exactitude. Certes pareil travail est toujours nécessaire. Mais il importe de pénétrer le

sens profond de cette sagesse. Ce qui pouvait apparaître alors comme le signe de l'inachèvement, se révèle au contraire plénitude philosophique «empirie totale» selon l'expression de Hegel ou plus exactement analyse déjà transcendantale, non des conditions de possibilité de l'expérience, mais plutôt d'un savoir de l'expérience.

La pensée africaine a su établir dialectiquement des principes à partir d'une phénoménologie de l'expérience sensible et forger des instruments pour penser le réel expérientiel selon ses articulations les plus exprimables et ses propositions les plus fondamentales.

Une investigation réfléchie devra contribuer à préciser le dessein d'une herméneutique philosophique africaine dans une perspective qui n'implique pas la possession sereine du savoir, mais qui au contraire, se manifeste dans le développement toujours inachevé des questions et des réponses qu'élaborent les spécialistes contemporains de la philosophie africaine.

L'élaboration de ces questions et de ces réponses elle-même fait problème. L'interrogation essentielle porte sur la notion même de philosophie africaine.

La pensée africaine n'est pas une philosophie au sens occidentale, mais une manière de penser, une vision complète de l'individu au sein de la société et dans le monde. Cette pensée s'exprime dans la vie sociale, dans la vie religieuse, dans les différentes techniques par une série de symboles polyvalents dont le déchiffrement est du plus haut intérêt pour la connaissance de l'homme africain et de l'homme tout court. Le fait que la pensée africaine ne sépare pas le rationnel de l'irrationnel ou du prérationnel, n'autorise pas une certaine ethnologie à la considérer comme représentant l'enfance de l'esprit.

La pensée africaine n'est pas une première ébauche de science au sens où l'entendent les Occidentaux mais une connaissance et une authentique prise sur le réel obtenue par des voies différentes. Elle n'est pas «irraison», mais science du concret.

La fièvre de modernisation qui risque de mutiler l'homme doit être contre balancé par la volonté de retrouver l'expêrience vècue de nos devanciers, et qui s'exprime dans cette connaissance affective de l'espace, du temps, de l'homme et de Dieu.

THE MEANING AND ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN ISLAM

SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR (Iran)

To speak of philosophy and civilization in the past twelve hundred years in the Middle East is to deal with Islamic philosophy and Islamic civilization even if one is also concerned with philosophy among such minorities as the Christians and Jews. Before the Islamic period, philosophy as a distinct discipline was practically non-existent in the two dominant civilizations of what is now called the Middle East, namely the Sassanid and the Byzantine while philosophy in the sense of wisdom or **sophia** was to be found as an integral part and in fact the heart of the religious dominant over these two civilizations, namely Christianity on the one hand and the Iranian religious especially Mazdaeism and Manichaeism on the other. Strangely enough, philosophy in its Graeco-Alexandrian sense was cultivated in this early period mostly by small religions and ethnic groups which lived between the two major civilizations of the region, such groups as the Monoplysites, Nestorians and the so-called Sabaeans of Harran who were heir to the more esoteric dimensions of the Graeco - Alexandrian philosophical heritage. With the advent of Islam the situation was to change completely. A new civilization came into being which replaced and also integrated the earlier civilizations of the region. Islamic civilization became so dominant that even other relfgious minorities breathed within the atmosphere o fIslamic culture and produced philosophical works very much akin to those of Muslims and in fact most often written in Arabic. In dealing with philosophy in the Middle East, it is therefore to Islamic philosophy and its significance in Islamic civilization which we must turn.

In discussing the meaning and role of philosophy in Islam we must turn before everything else to the exact meaning of the term «philosophy» and also to the structure of Islam in its essence and historical deployment. Islam is hierarchic in its essential structure and also in the way it has manifested itself in history(1). The Islamic revelation possesses within itself several dimensions and has been manifested to mankind on the basic levels of **al-islam, al-iman** and **al-ihsan** and from another perspective as **Shari'ah, Tariqah** and **Haqiqah**(2). When we speak of the role of philosophy in Islam we must first of all ask which

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(1) See S. H. Nasr, *An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines*, 2nd ed., London, 1978, pp. 13 ff.

(2) See F. Schuon, *L'Oeil du coeur*, Paris, 1974, pp. 91 ff. ; and Schuon, *Understanding Islam*, trans. by D.M. Matheson, London, 1963.

aspect of Islam we are dealing with. In any case we must avoid the mistake made only too often by many Orientalists during the past century of identifying Islam with only the **Shari'ah** or **Kalam** and then studying the relationship of «philosophy» or metaphysics with that particular dimension of Islam. Rather, in order to understand the real role of «philosophy» in Islam we must consider Islam in all its amplitude and depth, including especially the dimension of **al-Haqiqah,** where precisely one will find the point of intersection between «traditional philosophy» and metaphysics and that aspect of the Islamic perspective into which **sapientia** in all its forms has been integrated throughout Islamic history(3). Likewise, the whole of Islamic civilization must be considered in its width and breadth, not only a single part of **dar al-islam,** for it is one of the characteristics of Islamic civilization that the totality of its life and the richness of its arts and sciences can only be guaged by studying all of its parts. Only in union do these reveal the unity that lies within all the genuine manifestations of Islam. One cannot understand the role of «philosophy» or any other intellectual discipline in Islam by selecting only one dimension of Islam or one particular geographical area, no matter how important that dimension or that area may be in itself.

As for «philosophy», the sense in which we intend to use it in this discussion must defined with precision, for here we are dealing with a question of some complexity. First of all it must be remembered that terms have a precise meaning in the sciences of traditional civilizations such as Islam. We can use the term «philosophy» as the translation of the Arabic **al-falsafah** and inquire into the meaning of the latter term in Islam and its civilization. Or we can seek to discover how the term «philosophy» as used today must be understood within the context of Islamic civilization. Or again we can seek to find all these Islamic sciences and intellectual disciplines which possess a «philosophical» aspect in the sense of dealing with the general world view of man and his position in the Universe. For our own part, we must begin by making the basic affirmation that if by philosophy we mean profane philosophy as currently understood in the West, that is, the attempt of man to reach ultimate knowledge of things through the use of his own rational and sensuous faculties and cut off completely from both the effusion of grace and the light of the Divine Intellect, then such an activity is alien to the Islamic perspective. It is a fruit of a humanism which did not manifest itself in Islam except for a very few instances of a completely peripheral and unimportant nature. It is what the Persian philosophers themselves have called mental acrobatics or literally «weaving» (**baftan**), in contrast to philosophy as the gaining of certainty, or

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(3) On the rapport between *al-Haqiqah* and traditional philosophy see H. Corbin (with the collaboration of S. H. Nasr and O. Yahya), *Histoire de la philosophie islamique*, vol. I, Paris, 1964, pp. 14 ff.

literally the discovery of truth (**yaftan**). But if by philosophy we mean a traditional philosophy based on certainty rather than doubt, where man's mind is continuously illuminated by the light of the Divine Intellect and protected from error by the grace provided by a traditional world in which man breathes, then we certainly do have an Islamic philosophy which possesses illumitable horizons and is one of the richest intellectual traditions in the world, a philosophy that is always related to religious realities and has been most often wedded to illumination (**ishraq**) and gnosis (**ma'rifah or 'irfan**) [4]. If we view philosophy in this light, then the title of «philosopher» cannot be refused to those in Islam who are called the **falasifah, hukama'** and **'urafa'** [5].

Moreover, if one takes the whole of the Islamic world into account, including the Persian and the Indian parts of it, one certainly cannot call Islamic philosophy a transient phenomenon which had a short lived existence in a civilization whose intellectual structure did not permit its survival. One can no longer speak of Christian and Jewish philosophy and then refuse to accept the reality of Islamic philosophy [6]. One can with some logic assert, as has been

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(4) See S. H. Nasr, *Islamic Studies*, Beirut, 1966, chapters eight and nine ; also Nasr, *Three Muslim Sages*, Albany (New York), 1976, introduction and chapter I.

(5) «Nous n'avons aucun doit d'en refuser la qualification à ceux qui veulent etre des *hokama*, des *falasifa*, de la leur refuser sous pretexte qu'ils sont en meme temps des *«orafa*, des theosophes mystiques, et que leur idée de la philosophie et leur programme ne concordent pas avec l'idee que certains d'entre nous, en Occident, se font de la «philosophie». La cassure, helas ! est vieille de plusieurs siècles ; elle remonte jusqu'a la scholastique medievale. Cette cassure ne s'est pas produite en Islam, chez nos pensuers iraniens, parce que l'on peut dire symboliquement que pour eux l'Ange de la revelation divine est le meme que l'Ange de la connaissance. Le soummet de l'intellect (*'aql Nous*) est *l'intellectus sanctus*, l'intellect prophetique ; il y a quelque chose de commun entre la vocation du philosophe et la vocation du prophete», introduction of H. Corbin (p. 3) to S. J. Ashtiyani, editor, *Anthologie des philosophes iraniens*, vol. I, Teheran, Paris, 1972.

(6) For example, L. Gardet writes, «La question centrale est celle posée naguere par M. Gilson : peut-on parler d'une philosophie musulamane, au-sens analogique — ou nous parlons d'une philosophie chretienne ? «He answers this question negatively adding, «De ce point de vue historique, on peut donc appeler Farabi, Avicenne, Ibn Tufayl et Averroes des philosophes musulmans. Mais si l'on entend parler *mutatis mutandis* d'une 'philosophie musulmane' au sens où l'on parlera d'une 'philosophie chretienne' des grands medievaux, il faut reconner à leur donner ce titre. On ne peut guere les designer qué commé philosophés d'inspiration hellenistique, d'expression arabe ou persane, et d'influences musulmanes». in «Le probleme de la 'philosophie musulmane», *Melanges offerts a Etienne Gilson*, Paris, 1959, p. 282.

done by F. Van Steenberghen(7) and certain others, that philosophy, as understood by the scholastics, was not called specifically Christian by them but was conceived of as philosophy as such. In the same way in Islam one reads usually of the term **al-falsafah,** the philosophy, but not **al-falsafat al-islamiyyah,** just as most authors have usually written of **al-din,** the religion in itself, rather than of **al-islam** as a distinct religion. The homogeneity and unity of traditional civilization was such that for its members their world was **the** world. Western man certainly produced Christian art during the Middle Ages but this art was usually called art as such. Islam produced some of the greatest architectural marvels in the world, which were, however, very rarely referred to as Islamic architecture by their own makers. They simply called them architecture. This characteristic is a profound aspect of the medieval world and of traditional civilization in general which must be taken into full consideration in the present discussion. But if we stand «outside» of these worlds and study them in comparison with the secular modern world or with other sacred civilizations then in the same way that we can call Chartres Christian architecture and St. Thomas a Christian philosopher we can refer to the Alhambra as Islamic architecture and Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi as Islamic philosophers. In all honesty and taking into consideration the long tradition and the still living character of Islamic philosophy we cannot refuse to recognize the reality of this distinct type of traditional philosophy as being just as closely allud to the structure of Islam, and just as closely related to a particular dimension of it, as other traditional philosophies are related to the tradition in whose bosoms they have been cultivated. For the Islamic philosophers, especially those of later period, traditional philosophy has always been a way in which the truths of religion have been expressed in the language of intellectual and rational discourse. The truth reached by traditional philosophy is for the **hukama'** an aspect of the Truth itself, of **al-Haqqq,** which is a Divine Name and therefore

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It is difficult to sustain the view of M. Gardet if we take into consideration such figures as Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra or the Islamic philosophers of Farangi mahalland Khayrabad in India. Even the earlier Peripathetic (mashsha'i) Muslim philosophy is much more Islamic than an appraisal such as that of M. Gardet would indicate. I. Madkour answers the claim of Gardet and others holding a similar view in these words : «Nous avons demontré il y a long temps, qu'il existe une philosophie arabe, comme il existe une philosophie grecque et une philosophie latine. Nous pouvons dire aujourd'hui qu'il existe une métaphysique arabe ou musulmane. Elle est musulmane par ses problemes et par sa facon de les resourdre». «La Métaphysique en terra d'Islam», *Melanges Inst. Dominicain d'Etudes Orientales du Caire* 7, 1962 — 63, p. 30. See also the introduction to his *Fi'l falsafat al-islamiyyah*, Cairo, 1968.

(7) See F. van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIIIe siecle*, Louvain, 1966, pp. 533 — 540.

the source of all revealed truth(8). For the Islamic **hukama'**, as for Philo, philosophy was originally a form of revealed Truth, closely allied to revelation and connected with the name of Hermes, who became identified by them with Idris, who was entitled «The Father of Philosophers» (Abu'l-hukama'). The identification of the chain of philosophy with an anti-dibevian prophet reveals a profound aspect of the concept of Philosophy in Islam — far more profound than that any historical criticism of such a link could claim to negate it(9). It was a means of confirming the legitimacy of **hikmah** in the Islamic intellectual world.

Having established the existence of Islamic philosophy as a distinct school of traditional philosophy, we must now probe into its meaning and definition. We must frist of all make a distinction between philosophy in the general sense as Weltanschauung and philosophy as a distinct intellectual discipline in the technical sense. If we think of philosophy in the general sense of **Weltanschauung**, then outside of **al-falsafah** and **al-hikmah**, with which philosophy has been identified by most schools, we must search within other traditional Islamic disciplines for «philosophy», these disciplines including **Kalam** or theology, **Usul al-fiqh**, or principles of jurisprudence, and especially Sufism in particular, its intellectual expression which is also called **al-'irfan** or **al-ma'rifah** (gnosis). This fact is especially true of the later period of Islamic history when in most of the Arab world **falsafah** as a distinct school disappeared and the intellectual needs corresponding to it found their fulfillment in **Kalam** and Sufism(10). As for philosophy in the technical sense, it embraces not only Peripatetic

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(8) M. Horten came close to expressing this close link between Islamic philosophy and religion when he wrote, «Fur den Philosophen ist die Philosophie seine Religion ; denn sein philosophisches Systemist die Form, in der er sich Gott und des weltall denkt und zugleich die Grundsatze, nach denen er sein sittliches Lehen einrichtet. Die Religion des Islam will aber nichtes anderes sein als eine lehre uber Gott und die Welt und eine Direktion des sittlichen Handelns — Philosophia theoretica et practica», «Religion und Philosophie in Islam», *Der Islam*, 1913, p. 1.

(9) On the significance of Hermes for Islamic philosophy see Nasr, *Islamic Siudies*, chapter six. Mir Findiriski, the 11th/17th century Persian philosopher, calls Aristotle (or in reality Plotinus, for he was thinking of the author of the *Theology of Aristotle)* «a prophet who did not bring a law (*ghayr mursal*) ». See S. J. Ashtiyani, *Anthologie des Philosophes iraniens*, p. 73.

(10) Already Ibn Khaldun in his *Muqaddimah*, trans. by F. Rosenthal, vol. 3, New York, 1958, pp. 52 ff., considered the later school of *Kalam* as philosophy and many contemporary Arab authors have emphasized the importance of *Kalam* and also Sufism as forms of «Islamic philosophy». See for example Mustafa 'Abd al-Raziq, *Tamhid li-ta'rikh al-falasafat al-islamiyyah*, Cairo, 1959.

philosophy in its early phase, known in the West thanks to medieval translations and modern research following the earlier tradition, but also later Peripatetic philosophy after Ibn Rushd and beginning with Khwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, the School of Illumination (**ishraq**) founded by Suhrawardi, metaphysical and gnostic forms of Sufism identified closely with the school of Ibn 'Arabi, and the «transcendent theosophy» (**al-hikmat al-muta'aliyah**) of Mulla Sadra, not to speak of philosophies with specific religious forms such as Isma'ili philosophy, which possesses its own long and rich history(11).

Because of the vastness of the subject we shall confine ourselves in this essay to the role and meaning of **falsafah** or **hikmah**, or philosophy in its technical sense, in Islam, always keeping in mind, however, the richness of Sufism and **Kalam** in the domain of ideas which concern the Islamic **Weltanschauung** and man's position in the Universe and **vis-à-vis** God. The most profound metaphysics in Islam is to be found in the writings of the Sufi masters, especially those who have chosen to deal with the theoretical aspects of the spiritual way or with that **scientia sacra** called gnosis (**al-'irfan**). A more general treatment of the meaning of philosophy in Islam would have to include Sufism, **Kalam, Usul** and some of the other Islamic sciences as well, but as already mentioned, these lie outside the boundaries of the present discussion, which concerns only **falsafah** or **hikmah** as these terms have been understood by the traditional Islamic authorities themselves.

To understand the meaning of Islamic philosophy it is best to examine the use of the terms **falsafa** and **hikmah** in various traditional sources and the definitions provided for them by the Islamic philosophers themselves(12). The term **hikmah** appears in several places in the Holy Quran, of which perhaps the most often cited is, «He giveth wisdom unto whom He will, and he unto whom wisdom is given, he truly hath received abundant good». (Quran, II ; 269 Pickthall Translation)(13) ». It also appears in the **Hadith** literature in

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(11) Except for H. Corbin and T. Izutsu, and to a certain extent M. Horten before them, no one in the West has dealt with Islamic philosophy in all its richness and diversity. Rather almost always it has become identified in the West with early Peripatetic philosophy, to which an appendix concerning Ibn Khaldun and one or two other later Muslim philosophers has been added. The writings of Corbin are particularly important in dispelling this illusion.

(12) On the meaning of *falsafah,* the problems of its study and its definitions see G. C. Anawati, «Philosophie médiévale en terre d'Islam» *Mélanges Inst. Dominicain d'Etudes Orientales du Caire*, 5, 1958, pp. 175 — 236.

« يؤتى الحكمة من يشاء ، ومن يؤت الحكمة فقد أوتى خيراً كثيراً » .

عليك بالحكمة فإن الخير فى الحكمة

such sayings as «The acquisition of **hikmah** is incumbent upon thee : verily the good resides in **hikmah**»[14], and «Speak not of **hikmah** to fools»[15]. Muslim authorities have debated as to what **hikmah** means in such different verses and sayings and many theologians such as Fakhr al-Din al-Razi have identified it with **Kalam**. But also throughout Islamic history many have identified it with the intellectual sciences (**al-'ulum al-'aqliyyah**) in general and traditional philosophy in particular. In fact traditional philosophy came to be known, especially in Persia, as **al-hikmat al-ilahiyyah**, or **«theosophia»** in its original sense. Even early in Islamic history certain authorities used the term **hikmah** in the sense of the intellectual sciences and philosophy as for example Jahiz, who in **al-Bayan wa'ltabyin** refers to it in connection with Sahl ibn Harun[16], and Ibn Nadim, who calls Khalid ibn Yazid, known for his interest in the «pre-Islamic» or **awa'il** sciences, the **hakim** of Al al-Marwan[17].

The definitions given by the Islamic philosophers themselves are more revealing than those of literary figures in elucidating the meaning of philosophy for Islam. In his well-known definition of **falsafah**, the first of the great Muslim Peripatetics, al-Kindi, writes, «Philosophy is the knowledge of the reality of things within man's possibility, because the philosopher's end in his theoretical knowledge is to gain truth and in his practical knowledge to behave in accordance with truth»[18]. His successor al-Farabi accepted this definition in principle, making in addition a distinction between «philosophy rooted in certainty» (**falsafah yaqiniyyah**), which is based on demonstration (**burhan**)[19], and «philosophy deriving from opinion» (**falasafah maznunah**), based upon dialectics and sophistry[20]. He also gives the well-known definition of philo-

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(14) al-Darimi, *Muqaddimah*, 34.

(15) al-Darimi, *Muqaddimah*, 34.

al-Darimi, *Muqaddimah, 34.*

(16) M. 'Abd al-Raziq, *Tamhid li-ta'rikh al-falsafat al-islamiyyah*, p. 45 where reference is also made to various other Islamic sources using the term *hikmah.*

(17) See *The Fihrist of al-Nadim*, trans. by B. Dodge, New York, 1970, vol. 2, p. 581.

(18) From his *On First Philosophy* quoted by A. F. El-Ehwany, «Al-Kindi», in *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, ed. by M. M. Sharif, vol. I, Wiesbaden, 1963, p. 424.

الفلسفة ... علم الأشياء بحقائقها بقدر طاقة الإنسان لأن غرض الفيلسوف في علمه اصابة الحق وفي عمله العمل بالحق

(19) The meaning of demonstration as used in Islamic thought is not exactly the same as one finds in Western logic and has an element of certitude in it that is derived from the illumination of the mind by the light of the Intellect.

(20) See al-Farabi, *Kitab al-huruf (Book of Letters)* ed. by M. Mahdi, Beirut, 1968. pp. 153 — 157.

sophy as «the knowledge of existents **qua** existents» and adds that «there is nothing among existing things with which philosophy is not concerned»([21]).

The master of Peripatetics, Ibn Sina, again adds an element to the definition of **hikmah** and relates it more closely to realization and perfection of the being of man when he writes, «**Hikmah** is the perfecting of the human soul through the conceptualization of things and the judgment of theoretical and practical truths to the measure of human capability»([22]). This close accordance between knowledge and its practice, so important for later Islamic philosophy, is repeated in the definition of the Ikhwan al-Safa' when they say, «The beginning of philosophy is the love of the sciences ; its middle is knowledge of the reality of things to the extent to which man is capable ; and its end is speech and action in conformity with this knowledge»([23]).

With Suhrawardi and the **ishraqi** school, the close rapport between philosophy and religion or more precisely between philosophy as an aspect of the esoteric dimension of revelation and the ascetic and spiritual practices related to religious discipline, which in Islam are connected with Sufism, becomes fully established. Not only was Suhrawardi himself a Sufi and a **hakim** at the same time, but also he concevied a true **fayalsuf** or **hakim** as one who possesses

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« لا يوجد شيء من موجودات العالم إلا والفلسفة فيه مدخل » « إنها العلم بالموجودات بما هي موجود » .

al-Jam' bayn ra'yay al-hakimayn Aflatun al-ilahi wa Aristu, **Hyderabad, Daccan, pp 36 — 37.**

« الحكمة استكمال النفس الإنسانية بتصور الأمور والتصديق بالحقائق النظرية والعملية على قدر الطاقة الانسانية » .

'Uyun al-hikmah, Cairo, 1326, p. 30.

« الفلسفه أولها محبة العلوم ، وأوسطها معرفة حقائق الموجودات بحسب الطاقة الانسانية ، وآخرها القول والعمل بما يوافق العلم » .

Rasa'il, Cairo, vol. I, 1928, p. 23. **The Ikhwan have a conception of philosophy very close to that of the *ishraqis* and the whole later tradition of Islamic philosophy, in which philosophy is considered sa veritable philosophy only if it is able to transform the being of man and enable him to have a new vision of things made possible by this very transformation. As such it is nothing other than a particular expression of the esotericism *(al-batin)* of religion, accessible only through spiritual exegesis or hermeneutics *(ta'wil)* of the revealed truths contained in religious sources. See Nasr, *An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines*, pp. 33 ff.**

both theoretical knowledge and spiritual vision[24]. He calls such a person **muta'allih,** literally he who has become «God like», and speaks in his **Partawnamah** of **hikmah** as «The act of the soul's becoming imprinted by the spiritual truths and the intelligibles»[25]. After him philosophy and spiritual realization were always wedded together and **al-hikmat al-ilahiyyah** became, especially in Persia and other eastern lands of Islam, the bridge between the formal religious sciences and the verities of pure gnosis.

The Safavid **hakims,** who brought many trends of Islamic philosophy to their full fruition and flowering, continued to relate philosophy closely to the esoteric dimension of religion and considered the traditional philosopher as the person who possesses not only theoretical knowledge but also a direct vision of the truth, so that he speaks to mankind as a sage fulfilling a certain aspect of the prophetic function after the close of the cycle of prophecy. In the Shi'ite world many an authority has identified the term «scholars» (**'ulama'**) in the famous prophetic saying, «The scholars of my community are like the prophets of the Children of Israel»[26], with the **hukama',** who in the later period were mostly also Sufis and gnostics. **Hikmah,** therefore, continued its close relation with Islamic esotericism and became identified in the context of Sh'ism with the «cycle of initiation» (**da'irat al-walayah**) following the cycle of prophecy « (**da'irat al-nubuwwah**) ». Mir Findiriski, for example, considers the **hukama'** as standing in the class immediately below the prophets and writes, «The utmost extremity reached by the **falasifah** is the point of departure for prophecy»[27].

With Sadr al-Din Shirazi (Mulla Sadra), who achieved such a vast synthesis of the various schools of Islamic philosophy and intellectuality, the definition of **hikmah** also reaches a fullness and synthetic quality that embraces so much that came before him. In one of his famous definitions he writes, «**Falsafah** is the perfecting of the human soul to the extent of human possibility through knowledge of the essential realities of things as they are in themselves

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(24) Suhrawardi, *Opera Metaphysica et Mystica,* vol., 3, ed. by S. H. Nasr, Tehran, 1970, p. 69.

(25) This aspect of Suhrawardi's teachings has been dealt with amply by S. H. Nasr, *Three Muslim Sages,* chapter II, and his «Suhrawardi», in *A History of Muslim Philosophy,* ed. by M. M. Sharif, vol. I, pp. 372 — 398. See also the numerous studies of H. Corbin on this theme including his *En Islam iranien,* vol. II, Paris, 1971, and his two prolegomenas to Suhrawardi, *Opera Metaphysica et Mystica,* vol. I, Tehran, 1976, vol. II, Tehran, 1977.

» علماء أمتى كانبياء بنى إسرائيل « .

(27) From *Risala-yi sina'iyyah* in *Anthologie des philosophes iraniens,* vol. I, p. 73 (of the Arabic and Persian text).

and through judgment concerning their existence established upon demonstration and not derived from opinion or through imitation. Or if thou liketh thou caust say it is to give intelligible order to the world to the extent of human possibility in order to gain «resemblance» to the Divine»[28]. Similarly in another definition he considers **hikmah** as the means whereby man becomes an intelligible world resembling the objective world and similar to the order of universal existence[29]. Referring to the first principles discussed in **hikmah,** Mulla Sadra says, «It is this **hikmah** which the Holy Prophet had in mind in his prayer to his Lord when he said, «O Lord ! Show us things as they really are»[30], moreover, he gives a spiritual exegesis of the Quranic verse «Surely We created man of the best stature, then We reduced him to the lowest of the low, save those who believe and do good works» (Quran, 95 ; 4 - 6) in this way : «of the best stature» refers to the spiritual world and the angelic part of the soul, «the lowest of the low» to the material world and the animal part of the soul, «those who believe» to theoretical **hikmah** and those who» do good works» to practical **hikmah.** Seen in this light **hikmah,** in its two aspects of knowledge and action, becomes the means whereby man is saved from his wretched state of the lowest of the low and enabled to regain the angelic and paradisial state in which he was originally made. **Hikmah** is, in his view, completely wedded to religion and the spiritual life and is far removed from purely mental activity connected with the rationalistic conception of philosophy that has become pre-valent in the west since the post-Renaissance period.

Having surveyed the meaning of philosophy through the eyes of its supporters a few words must now be said about the different forms of «opposition» to it, before turning to its role and function in Islam. It must, however, be remembered that «opposition» in the context of a traditional civilization is

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«إن الفلسفة استكمال النفس الانسانية لمعرفة حقائق الموجودات على ما هى عليها والحكم بوجودها تحقيقاً بالبراهين لا أخذا بالظن والتقليد بقدر الوسع الانسانى . وان شئت قلت نظم العالم نظاماً عقليا على حسب الطاقة البشرية لتحصيل التشبه بالبارىء تعالى :

Al-Hikmat al-muta'aliyah fi'l-asfar al-arba'ah, **vol. I, part I, Tehran,** 1387 (A. H. lunar), p. 20.

« وصدور عالما « عقليا » مضاهيا للعالم العينى ومشابها « لنظام الوجود »

Introduction of S. J. Ashtiyani to Sadr al-Din Shirazi, *al-Shawahid al-rububiyyah,* Mashhad, 1346 (A. H. solar), p. seven.

(30) *Al-Hikmat al-muta'aliyah* ... known usually simply as the *Asfar,* p. 21.

very different from the opposition of contending philosophical schools which have no principles in common. In Isalm there has often been a tension between the various components and dimensions of the tradition but a tension that has been almost always creative and has never destroyed the unity of Islam and its civilization([31]). With this reserve in mind it can be said that «opposition» to **falsafah** in Islam came mainly from three groups, but for different reasons : The purely religious scholars dealing with **fiqh** and **usul,** the theologians (**mutakallimun**), especially of the Ash'arite school, and certain of the Sufis.

Some of the scholars of the religious sciences criticized **falsafah** simply because it stood outside the domain of the **Shari'ah** with which they were solely concerned. Some like Ibn Taymiyyah in Sunnism and Mulla Baqir Majlisi in Shi'ism wrote specifically against the **falasifah** and in the case of the former against logic, although he himself made use of logical discourse. Their opposition to **falsafah** is related to their mission of preserving the purely transmitted sciences on the exoteric level. Thus they refused to be concerned with either the intellectual sciences or the esoteric dimension of Islam which alone could integrate these sciences, and chief among them philosophy, into the Islamic perspective.

As for the theologians, the opposition of the Ash'arites to **falsafah** was of course much greater than that of the Mu'tazilites, while in the Shi'ite world, Isma'ili **Kalam** was always close to Isma'ili philosophy and Shi'ite **Kalam** became closely wed to **falsafa** with the **Tajrid** of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi. In fact later **falsafah** or **al-hikmat al-ilahiyyah** in Shi'ism itself claimed to fulfill the true role of theology and in reality contains much that in Western terms would be considered as theology([32]). The well-known attack of al-Ghazzali against **falsafah** was not simply a negative act of demolishing **falsafah. First of all it** attacked only Peripatetic philosophy and moreover the rationalistic tendencies within it. Secondly the criticism was of such a positive nature that it changed the direction of the flow of Islamic intellectual life rather than put an end to it. The background which made possible the spread of the sapiential teachings of Suhrawardi and Ibn 'Arabi owes much to al-Ghazzali, while the later resival of Peripatetic philosophy by al-Tusi is related closely to the criticism of Ibn Sina by another Ash'arite critic of **falsafah,** Fakhr al-Din al-Razi([33]). The

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(31) We have had occasion to refer to this matter in several of our works including *An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines,* Introduction, and *Science and Civilization in Islam,* Cambridge, (U.S.A.), 1968, and New York, 1970, introduction.

(32) See S. H. Nasr, *«Al-Hikmat al-ilahiyyah* and *Kalam», Studia Islamica,* vol. XXXIV, 1971, pp. 139 — 149.

(33) See M. Horten, *Die Philosophischen Ansichten von Razi und Tusi,* Bonn, 1910. S. H. Nasr, Fakhr al-Din Razi, in *A History of Muslim Philosophy,* ed. by M. M. Sharif, pp. 642 — 657 ; also L. Gardet et M. M. Anawati, *Introduction à la théologie musulmane,* vol. I, Paris, 1948.

criticism of **faslafah** by the **mutakallimin,** therefore, was more than anything else a creative interplay between **falsafah** and **Kalam** which left an indelible mark upon both of them. **Kalam** forced **falsafah,** even the Peripatetic school, to deal with certain specifically religious issues while **falsafah** influenced ever more the formulation and argumentation of **Kalam** itself, starting with Imam al-Haramayn Juwayni, continuing with al-Ghazzali and al-Razi, and in a sense culminating with 'Adud al-Din al-Iji and his **Kitab al-mawaqif,** which is almost as much **falsafah** as **Kalam.** In Shi'ism also it is difficult to distinguish some of the later commentaries upon the **Tajrid** from works on **falsafah.** The «opposition» of **Kalam** to **falsafah,** therefore, far from destroying **falsafah,** influenced its later course and in much of the Sunni world absorbed it into itself after the 7th/13th century, with the result that, as already mentioned, such a figure as Ibn Khaldun was to call this late **Kalam** a form of philosophy.

As for the criticism of **falsafah** made by certain Sufis, it is too much to be taken in the light of the nature of Islamic esotericism. Sufi metaphysics could not become bound to the «lesser truth» of Aristotelianism against whose inherent limitations reacted and whose limits it criticized. But the criticism against the substance of **falsafah** came, not from the whole of Sufism but from a particular tendency within it. In general one can distinguish two tendencies in Sufi spirituality, one which takes the human intellect to be a ladder to the luminous world of the spirit and the other which emphasized more the discontinuity between the human reason and the Divine Intellect and seeks to reach the world of the spirit by breaking completely the power of ratiocination within the mind. The final result, which is union with God, is the same in both cases, but the role played by reason is somewhat different in the two instances. The first tendency can be seen in Ibn 'Arabi, 'Abd al-Karim al-Jili, Sadr al-Din al-Qunyawi and the like and the second in some of the famous Persian Sufi poets such as Sana'i and Mawlana Jalal al-Din Rumi and in the Arab world in certain early Sufi poets as well as Shaykh Baha' al-Din 'Amili, who wrote in both Arabic and Persian[34]. In the case of those following the first tendency, many sapiential doctrines belonging to ancient schools of philosophy such as Hermeticism, Neopythagoreanism and Neoplatonism were integrated into Islamic esotericism through the light of Islamic gnosis. It must be remembered that one of the titles of Ibn 'Arabi was «The Plato of his time» (**Aflatunu zamanihi**). In the second case there is a greater criticism of ratiocination (**istidlal**) for a spiritual reason, and throughout Islamic history followers of this type of Sufism have criticized **falsafah,** particularly of the Peripatetic kind, severely, in order to open before man the luminous skies of illumination and gnosis. Without Sufism and other aspects of Islamic esotericism contained in Shi'ism the rise of a Suhrawardi or Mulla Sadra would be inconceivable. In

(34) See S. H. Nasr, «The School of Ispahan», pp. 912 — 913.

fact both tendencies within Sufism have played a critical role in the later history of **falsafah**, one **more** positive and the other in a sense more negative, while both aspects of Sufism have remained the guardians and expositors of traditional **falsafah** or **hikmah** in its profoundest and most immutable sense or what in Western parlunce is called **philosophia perennis. Falsafah** for its part benefitted immensely from this interaction with Sufism and gradually became itself the outer courtyard leading those qualified to the inner garden of gnosis and beatitude.

The criticism of Sufism against **falsafah** and the rebuttals of the **hukama'** are well illustrated in the following assertion of Rumi and the responses it brought forth. In his **Mathnawi,** he says :

The leg of the syllogisers is of wood :

A wooden leg is very infirm(35).

This verse was answered by Mir Damad in his own well-known poem in these terms :

O thou who hast said that reasoning is like a wooden leg

— Otherwise Fakhr al-Din Razi would have no peer —

Thou hast not distinguished between intellect and fantasy

Do not reproach demonstration, oh thou who hast not understood correctly(36).

Again in the 12th/18th century the famous Sufi master of Shiraz, Mawlana Sayyid Qutb al-Din Muhammad Shirazi, rose to defend Rumi from the attack of Mir Damad in yet another poems, some of whose lines are as follows :

Oh thou who reproacheth the Mawlawi (Rumi),

Oh thou who art deprived from an understanding of the **Mathnawi,**

The **Mathnawi** is the ocean of the light of the soul,

Its poetry is replete with pearl and coral.

If thou hadst an understanding of the **Mathnawi.**

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(35) پای استدلالیان چوبین بود　　پای چوبین سخت بی تمکین بود

The Mathnawi, trans. by R. A. Nicholson, vol. 2, 1926, p. 115.

(36) اینکه گفتی پای چوبین شد دلیل　　ورنه بودی فخر رازی بی بدیل

فرق ناکرده میان عقل ووهم　　طعنه بر برهان مزن ای کج بفهم

Thou wouldst never raise the tongue in its reproach.
Although the weaknesses of the faculty of reason.
Have been accounted by Mawlawi in the **Mathnawi.**
He did not intend by reason (**aql**) the Universal Intellect, (**'aql-i kull**).
For the latter is the guide upon all paths.
Rather, he meant the philosophical and particular reason.
For this is without the light of the face of Joseph[37].
Reason (or the particular intellect) is mingled with fantasy.
Therefore is it considered blameworthy by the Saints[38].

The criticism made by Sufis of **falsafah** and their influence upon its development was like the transformation brought about by the alchemist through the presence of the philosopher's stone : The very substance of **falsafah** was changed during later Islamic history from simply a rational system of thought with an Islamic form to an ancillary of esotericism closely wedded to illumination and gnosis. Likewise Islamic philosophy was saved from the dead lock it had reached with the type of excessive Aristotelianism of an Ibn Rushd and was enabled to channel itself into a new direction, a direction which bestowed upon it renewed vigor and made it a major aspect of Islamic intellectual life in the Eastern lands of Islam during the light centuries following the death of the Andalusian master of Aristotelianism with whom the earlier chapter of Islamic philosophy had drawn to a close.

In discussing the role and function of **falsafah** in Islam and Islamic civilization we must note the change that took place to some degree after the period leading to Ibn Sina in the East and Ibn Rushd in the West. During the early period, which is also the formative period of the Islamic intellectual sciences,

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(37) **Referring to the Quranic story of Joseph.**

(38) ایـکه طعنة میزنی برمولوی ایـکه محرومی زفهم مثنـوی

مثقـوی دریای نورجان بود نظم آن بر لؤلؤ ومرجان بود

کرتو فهم مثنـوی می داشتی کی ربان طعنـه می افراشتی

کرجه مستی های استدلال عقل مولوی در مثنوی کرده است نقل

لیك مقصودش نبوده عقل کل زانکه أو هادیست درکل سبل

بلـکه قصدش عقل جزوی خلقی است زانکه أو بی نوروی یوسفی است

عقل جروی جون مشوب وهم هاست زان سبب مذموم نزد اولیاست

The same type of debate can also be found in the annals of Arabic literature.

falsafah performed an important role in the process of the absorption and synthesis of the pre-Islamic sciences and the formulation of the Islamic sciences. The science of logic, the problem of the classification of the sciences, the methodology of the sciences, and their interaction with the rest of Islamic culture were all deeply influenced by **falsafah** and its particular elaboration in Islam. Moreover, during this early period most of the great scientists were also philosophers, so that we can speak during the early centuries, and even later, of a single type of Muslim savant who was both philosopher and scientist and whom we have already called philosopher-scientist(39). The development of Islamic science in the early period is related to that of Peripatetic philosophy as well as to the philosophical trends of an anti-Peripatetic nature. **Al-Farabi,** Ibn Sina, Muhammad ibn Zakariyya' al-Razi and al-Biruni were all prominent figures of Islamic science. In fact the anti-Peripatetic view, which is nevertheless **falsafah,** is particularly significant in the development of many new ideas in the sciences(40). In any case during early Islamic history the cultivation and the development of the sciences would have been inconceivable without those of **falsafah.** The meaning of the term **hakim,** which denotes at once a physician, scientist and philosopher, is the best proof of this close connection(41).

Not only did **falsafah** aid closely in the development of the intellecttual sciences, but also it was the major discipline in which tools and instruments of analysis, logic and rational inquiry were developed for the transmitted sciences and other aspects of Islamic culture as well. The tools of logic developed mostly by the **falasifah** and in conformity with the particular genius of Islam, in which logic plays a positive role and prepares the mind fo rillumination and contemplation, were applied to fields ranging far and wide, from grammar and rhetoric to even the classification and categorization of **Hadith,** from organizing economic activity in the bazaar to developing the geometry and arithmetic required to construct the great movements of Islamic architecture. To be sure the function of the **falsafah** with which we are concerned here does not concern the rationalizing tendencies of the Graeco-Alexandrian doctrines adopted by the Muslim Peripatetics or specific Aristotelian teachings. It concerns the development of a climate of rational thought and the instrument of logic and logical reasoning which once developed were adopted by the various Islamic arts and sciences for their own ends and in accordance with the nature of Islam and its teachings.

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(39) See S. H. Nasr, *Three Muslim Sages*, chapter I.

(40) See S. Pines, «Quelques tendances anti-péripatéticiennes de la pensée scientifique , *Thalès*, vol. 3 — 4, 1937 — 39, pp. 210 — 220.

(41) We have dealt more fully with this subject in the introduction to our *Science and Civilization in Islam.*

Also during this early period when Islam made its first contacts with the arts and sciences of other civilizations, falsafah played an important role in enabling the Muslims to integrate the pre-Islamic sciences into their own perspective. Its role on the formal level complements that of Islamic esotericism, whose insistance on the universality of revelation of the supra-formal level made possible positive contact with other religions and traditions([42]). For the **falasifah**, as al-Kindi asserted so clearly from the beginning, the truth was one, therefore they were certain that the tuth, wherever and whenever it might be discovered, would conform to the inner teachings of Islam, simply because the instrument of knowledge for both **falsafah** or **hikmah** and religion was the same, namely the Universal Intellect or Logos, which plays such an important role in the theory of knowledge of the Islamic philosophers. Such facts as the attention played to Hermes as Idris and the identification of the Sabaeans with the followers of Hermes, the belief that the early philosophers of Greece learned their Sophia from Solomon and, looking eastward, the open interest shown by the **falasifah** in the wisdom of India and ancient Persia all attest to the important role of **falsafah** in early Islam in providing the appropriate intellectual background for the encounter of Muslims with the arts, sciences and philosophies of other civilizations. This role was in fact crucial during the early period of Islamic history when Muslims were translating the heritage of the great civilizations which had preceded them into their own world of thought and were laying the foundations for the rise of the Islamic sciences. This role was particularly important then, but it did not cease to manifest itself even later. The translation of the Chinese sciences during the Il-Khanid period was supported by men whose background was that of hikmah, such men as Rashid al-Din Fadlallah, who was both vizier and philosopher-scientist([43]). And during the Moghul period in India the movement of translation of Sanskirt works into Persian incited by Akbar and reaching its culmination with Dara Shukuh, a movement whose great religious and cultural significance is not as yet generally recognized outside the Indo-Pakistani sub-continent, is again closely connected with the later tradition of **falsafah** and **hikmah** as it spread from Persia, starting mostly with the reign of Skandar Lodi, to the Indian sub-continent. Finally it must be re-asserted that during this earlier phase of Islamic history one of the important and enduring roles of **falsafah** was its struggle with **Kalam** and the particularly «philosophical»

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(42) See S. H. Nasr, *Sufi Essays*, London, 1972, chapter IX.

(43) Unfortunately little attention has been paid until now to the philosophical and scientific works of Rashid al-Din save his interest in medicine. But this aspect of his personality and thought deserves a much more extensive treatment. A preliminary study has been made by S. H. Nasr, «*Maqam-i* Rashid al-Din Fadlallah dar tarikh-i falsafah wa 'ulum-i islami», *Iranshinasi*, vol. II, no. 1, 1349 — 1970, pp. 7 — 22.

structure it finally bestowed upon **Kalam.** The difference between the treatises of **Kalam** of al-Ash 'ari himself or his student Abu Bakr al-Baqillani and Razi, Iji and Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjani is due solely to the long struggle with **falsafah.** Though Kalam, falsafah as an Islamic discipline left its indelible mark in the Sunni world even after it nearly ceased to exist as a separate subject of study in many areas of that world.

Something must also be said about the position of **falsafah** in Islamic universities during this early period. The official position accorded to **falsafah** in the curriculum of the Islamic universities varied greatly from land to land and period to period, depending upon theological and political factors of a complex kind which we cannot analyze here[44]. In Jundishapur and the Bayt al-hikmah in Baghdad, **falsafah** was respected and taught, as it was also in the Azhar, established by the Fatimids. But its teaching in official **madrasahs** came to be banned with the rise of Ash'arite power among the 'Abbasids and Seljuqs, to the extent that in his will and testament for the trust (**waqf**) of the Nizamiyyah school system, Khwajah Nizam al-Mulk asked specifically that the teaching of **falsafah** be banned from the university system founded by him. This ban in fact continued in most of the Sunni world afterwards except for logic, which was always taught there. But later the teaching of **falsafah** was made once again a part of the curriculum by Khwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi at Maraghah and Rashid al-Din Fadlallah in the Rub' al-rashidi in Tabriz, and, despite a checkered career, it has continued as a part of the **madrasah** curricula in Persia and many schools of the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent and Iraq to this day. In any case, however, the role of **falsafah** must not be judged solely by whether it was taught in universities or not, thus making a comparison with the situation in the West. In Islam, because of the very informal structure of traditional education, much of the instruction in **falsafah** as well as in the esoteric sciences has always been carried out in private circles and continues so to this day.

When we come to later Islamic history, or what we might call the post — Ibn Rushd phase of Islamic philosophy, the role and function of **falsafah** is seen to be somewhat different from what it had been until then. The Islamic sciences, both the intellectual and transmitted had by now already become elaborated and were following their own course of development. Peripatetic philosophy, moreover, had reached an impasse, as seen in the far-reaching attackes of al-Ghazzali and the much less influential rebuttal of Ibn Rushd. New intellectual forces had appeared upon the scene, of which the most important were those identified with the names of Ibn 'Arabi and Suhrawardi. Politically also the symbolic unity of the Islamic world was soon brought to an

(44) We have dealt with this matter in our *Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines*, pp. 11 ff.

end by the destruction of the 'Abbasid caliphate by the Monguls and the emerging of a new pattern, which finally led to the establishement of the three major Muslim empires of the Ottomans, Safavids and Moghuls. In this new situation **falsafah** was to have a different function and role in the Western and the Eastern lands of Islam.

In the Western lands of Islam, after Ibn Rushd **falsafah** ceased to exist as an independent and rigorously followed discipline, with a few exceptions in the Arab world like Ibn Sab'in and Ibn Khaldun. Among the Turks and the Arabs of Syria and Iraq also a certain amount of philosophic activity continued, associated mostly with the school of Suhrawardi and the metaphysical doctrines of Ibn 'Arabi, but unfortunately this tradition has not been investigated thoroughly until now[45]. In the Western lands of Islam the life of the main substance of **falsafah,** however, both in its logical aspects and cosmological and metaphysical doctrines, continued to pulsate within **Kalam** and also within Sufism of the gnostic and metaphysical type, associated with Ibn 'Arabi and his commentators such as al-Qunyawi, Da'ud al-Qaysari, 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Sha'rani, Bali Afandi and 'Abd al-Salam al-Nablusi. The continuation of the intellectual life of the Muslims of the Western regions, a life which manifested itself in **falsafah** as well as **Kalam** and **tasawwuf** in the early centuries, is to be found during the later period only in **Kalam** and Sufism. One would, therefore, have to say that although until the revival of Islamic philosophy in Egypt by Jamal al-Din al-Astarabadi (known as al-Afghani) in the 13th/19th century **falsafah** or **hikmah** was only pursued scarcely and was not cultivated avidly in the Western lands of Islam, it nevertheless continued to possess a certain mode of life within the matrix of **Kalam** and Sufism.

In the eastern lands of Islam and particularly in Persia the role of **falsafah** was quite different. Thanks to Suhrawardi and Ibn 'Arabi new schools of **hikmah** grew while the teachings of Ibn Sina were reviewed by al-Tusi. As a result, a rich intellectual life came into being which reached its apogee in many ways in the Safavid period with Mir Damad and Mulla Sadra and which also played a major role among the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent[46]. Besides its function in aiiding to sustain the intellectual sciences, which continued to be cultivated in Persia and India and also to a certain extent among

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(45) For a reference to this tradition see Z. Ulken, *La pensée de l'Islam,* trans. by G. Dubois, M. Bilan, and the author, Istanbul, 1953, chapter XV ; also Mubahat Turker, Uc, *Tehafut Bakimindan Felsefe ve Din Munasebeti,* Ankara, 1956.

(46) We have dealt extensively with this subject in our *Three Muslim Sages.* See also the important studies of H. Corbin particularly his *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabi,* trans. by R. Manheim, New York, 1969 ; and his *En Islam iranien,* 4 vols., Paris, 1971 — 72.

the Ottomans — up to the 12th/18th century, and besides its role in the various aspects of the religious life of the community, **falsafah** or **hikmah,** which by now had come much closer to the heart of the Islamic message and had left the limitative confines of Peripatetic philosophy, became the bridge for many men to Sufism and Sufi metaphysics. In the same way that in the Sunni world one observes in many circles to this day a certain wedding between Ash'arite **Kalam** and Sufism, in Persia and to a certain extent in the Indian sub-continent there came into being an important wedding between **hikmah** and **'irfan,** and many masters appeared who were both **hakims** and **'arifs** (gnostics). On the one hand **hikmah** became profoundly imbued with the gnostic teachings of Ibn 'Arabi and his school and was able to present in such case as Mulla Sadra more systematic and logical interpretation of Sufi metaphysics than found in many of the Sufi texts themselves and on the other hand it became in turn the major point of access to the teachings of Sufism for many men of intellectual inclination who were engaged in the cultivation of the officiial religious sciences. As a result of the transformation it received and the role it fulfilled, **falsafah** or **hikmah** continued its own life and remains to this day in Persia and certain adjecent lands as a living intellectual tradition.

In conclusion and in summary, it can be said that **falsafah** in Islam satisfied a certain need for causality among certain types of men, provided the necessary logical and rational tools for the cultivation and development of many of the arts and sciences, enabled Muslims to encounter and assimilate the learning of many other cultures, in its reactions with **Kalam** left a deep effect upon the latter's future course, and finally became a handmaid to illumination and gnosis thus creating a bridge between the sejour of logic and the ecstacy of spiritual union.

Today Islamic philosophy remains a living intellectual tradition, and, because of the harmony it has achieved between logic and the spiritual life and because of the profound doctrines it contains within its long and extended historical unfolding, it remains of the greatest pertinence for the modern world[47]. Furthermore, because of the present encounter of Islam with an alien philosophy and science — this time from the West — Islamic philosophy must be called upon to play the role it fulfilled in early Islamic history, namely to provide the necessary intellectual instruments and the requisite intellectual background with which to face various alien philosophies and sciences from a position of discrimination and intellectual sejour. Otherwise the encounter

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(47) See S. H. Nasr, «*The Pertinence of Islamic philosophy Today*» in *Islamic Studies*, pp. 97 ff.

with the West coul donly result in calamity for the future of Islamic intellectual life and threaten the continuation of the life of **falsafah** itself. Only in remaining true to its own genius, to its own roots and to the role it has always played in Islamic history can **falsafah** or **hikmah** fulfill this vital function of providing the Muslims themselves with the necessary intellectual background to confront the modern West and the world with long forgotten but urgently needed truths which Islamic philosophy has been able to preserve within its treasury of wisdom over the centuries and which it is able to present in a contemporary language to the world today.

ON PHILOSOPHY AND HUMANISM IN AFRICA

ODERA ORUKA (Kenya)

The argument to be advanced in this essay can be stated briefly :

«That the ultimate or most basic standard of the moral good is or should be humanism which in this context» means the quality and security of human life. ...

«That it is within the nature of philosophy to discern, safeguard and promote humanism and the moral good ; which means that it is an inescapable function of philosophy to concern itself with the quality and security of human life and existence».

«Where humanism is in danger or decline the call for a remedy is empty or incomplete unless it is also the call for philosophy».

«In the absence or a confusion of a philosophy that is to help spell out for the society the necessary minimum for a tolerable human life there is likely to be absence or a confusion of what is to be treated as objectively good or objectively evil in the society. The symbol of such a confusion is the practical identification of the moral good with the political and military might and the moral evil with the opposition or objection to this might.

«But saying that philosophy concerns itself with the moral good and humanism is not confusing philosophy with other disciplines such as ideology and religion which also in some way concern themselves with problems of this kind». ...

«That in African Continent today there is the absence or a confusion of what is to count as the objective (or positive) moral good and an obscene disregard of humanism. The consequence has been inhumanity parading itself as a natural and undeniable characteristic of the social order. And one of the main reasons for this state of affairs is the absence of a philosophy or humanism that would help point out the minimum requirement of moral or human good that cannot be contravened without making human life a mockery and a tragedy».

«That the social order in ARID (which is one of the African republics) is a classical example of the degree to which inhumanity has replaced humanism in the Continent».

«That it is an urgent challenge for African philosophers to create a critical and dialectical philosophy, or at least an organization, that would help

safeguard and promote the value of human life and discourage the prevailing and impending inhuman practices in the Continent. Such a philosophy or an organization should take cognisance of the findings of science and the reality and nuisance of political and mystical powers in Africa. But it should not be subservient to technology, mysticism or politics — it must apply its critical and dialectical reason to them and tolerate nothing in anything which is against the quality and security of human life in Africa, and elsewhere».

«That one of the great obstacles to a critical and dialectial philosophy needed for the humanization of human existence in Africa is the prevailing philosophical conception among many African scholars (at least in Black Africa) that «African philosophy» or philosophy for Africa is and must be wholly ethno-religious-therefore, given this conception, African philosophy can, at least, only be «ethno-philosophy». And as ethno-philosophy it is innocent of critical and rigorous speculative components.»

There are apparently many standards of the moral good. History in fact reveals that there have been as many such standards as there have been significant disagreements among the various systems of morals. It is possible to take-and indeed some have taken the standard of the moral good to be man's happiness, freedom, duty, perfection, power, economic-welfare, self-realization, knowledge or faith in god etc. etc. But all such standards obviously points only to one ultimate or most basic standard: the priority of human existence measured, in any one society, by the quality and securit yof the individual and collective life and well-being. This is or ought to be the first and most fundamental principle of any conception or meaning of humanism. Real, or the highest ethics of, humanism may only be an ideal which cannot be attained in practice, but any humanism worth its salt defines and ensures the milimal moral good necessary for any tolerable human life. In modern times every political philosophy that is well considered (regardless of its ideological lining) treats humanism-the positive qualtiy and security of human life and well being-as its basic ideal or ultimate goal.

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(1) This is true for both Marxist oriented political philosophy and the Western-liberal oriented one. Some examples can be cited : In *Dialectics and Humanism* (The Polish Philosophical Quarterly) Autumn 1973 which was a special issue prepared for the *15th World Congress of Philosophy* the main focus of the articles was that Humanism — the realization of that which is good and morally just and serves to liberate man as the ultimate ideal of Marxism. Marxism it is argued not quietism in historicism or a derivation of the moral good from historical necessity ; it is «a humanistic ethics *par excellece*» (see for example in this collection Mark Fritzhand : «Historicism and Marxist Humanism»).

The claim that the priority of human life measured by the quality and security of the individual and collective existence is the ultimate standard of the moral good can be validated by weighing it against/other/any alleged standard of the moral good(2). Take fo rexample the standard of happiness. Happiness is not real happiness unless it is a result or a symbol of the good and true quality and security of one's life. Happiness derived for instance from stolen goods or a sweet poison cannot be real happiness. Like happiness freedom is no real — it is meaningless and dangerous — if it is not in line with the quality and security of one's life. Freedom of a destitute, a slave or a madman cannot be real freedom. The possession of power is futile and undesirable unless it guarantees the security of he who has it and those on behalf of whom it is possessed and excercised. And faith in a god is (in all rational fairness) absurd unless it is at least a licence for security and high quality of existence in the kingdom of that god. These few examples suffice to show that various alleged standards of the moral good are standards only in so far as they are less basic and in line with the most basic or ultimate standard namely the priority of human life expressed in terms of the its quality and security.

Philosophy is an art of reasoning and provides a critical intellectual weapon and methodology for analysing and synthesizing the basic problems of man, society and nature. In dealing with the problems of man and society philosophy is moral and social. And the problems and definition of the moral good and the ideals of humanism fall within the realm of moral or social philosophy. The main function of moral or social philosophy is to apply rigorous analytic and synthetic reason to the basic moral and social problems and help explain or define the moral good, the moral evil and the requirements of a humanist social order(3).

In *Man, Science and Technology* (USSR Academy of Sciences) a special issue or anthology which was prepared by the institute of Philosophy for the same Congress, a similar to the Polish one is taken. See for example I. Frolov : «Contemporary Science and Humanism» (p. 117 — 131) of this anthology.

In John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* (1971) a work which treat as a classical example of modern western liberalism or capitalist humanism the priority of human or individual liberty is regarded as the most basic principle of Justice treated as fairness.

(2) I forgo any ethical theory such that of G.E. Moore which claims that it is a fallacy to define or explain the moral good in terms of the non-moral or naturalistic benefits.

(3) I do not agree with the idea, now common among the logical positivists and linguistic philosophers in Europe and America, that the function of ethics or moral philosophy is only the analysis and elucidation of judgements and terms used in moral discourse. But there is no space to argue against this idea here.

Philosophy may perform this task in three significant stages. First, it can apply critical analytical reason to the prevailing social and moral order and place this order in a historical context. In this stage the humanizing ethics or principles of the system are separated from the dehumanizing ones. In the second stage philosophy can synthesize the humanizing ethics with ideals of humanism. In the third stage, philosophy can (and should) subject the resultant synthesis to the test and analysis of dialectical reason :

The synthesis is treated as a provisional principle of the moral good but further objections are brought to it and various alternatives are contrasted with it. These will help prune and purify it until it becomes much more positive, beneficial, objective and workable than it could have been earlier. The end product can then be utilized as a basis for a humanist moral or social order. In this process philosophy serves the course of humanism and helps to explain the basic requirement of humanity and the possible levels to which it can be advanced or abused.

The proposition that philosophy concerns itself with the quality and security of human life appears to open the door for those who would like to mix up the nature or the functionof philosophy with that of ideology, religion technology, politics or law. These disciplines also deal in some way with the quality and security of human life ; but they do not and cannot rightly replace or substitute for philosophy.

Ideology, unlike philosophy, usually claims perfection in knowledge and embodies itself is dogmatism. Although always critical towards other ideologies, ideology is uncritical of itself while philosophy is critical even of itself. Every truth of a genuine philosophical inquiry is treated not as final and perfect but as dailectical. That is it is treated as merely a provisional or plausible assertion which is nevertheless still open to alteration when and if new relevant and more rational evidences emerge. But ideology usually is supposed to be permanent and unalterable. There are however two main types of ideology : absolutist ideology and philosophic ideology. The former is uncompromisingly dogmatic and claims perfect or total knowledge(4).

Philosophic ideology is an outshoot of a well-considered philosophy. And its claim to total knowledge is tempered or moderated by the philosophy underlying it. To this extent philosophic ideology may be less dogmatic and more open to changes in historical and epistemological developments than the absolutist one.

(4) This type of ideology is what I infer M. Wahba means when he refers to ideology that claims «total knowledge» and transforms itself into an absolute or an «ism» — see his «The Twentieth century Man-ism» in the Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of philosophy Vol. I, p. 393 — 395.

Religion, unlike philosophy, is a form of myticism. It is a characteristic of all forms of mysticism that they defy or violate the principles o fempirical inquiry and the laws of logic(5). Religion replaces critical and dialectical reason inherent in philosophy with absolute faith and often claims to be the embodiment of absolute truth.

Technology, broadly speaking, is the practical utilization of the ideas or techniques (usually scientific techniques) to produce tangible effect that is deemed to be of immense material value to man. But unlike, philosophy, technology is never concerned with humanism and the moral good, (though when dominant and unchecked it may generate «a morality» of its own) but with scientific possibility and utility.

Politics is concerned with practical application and sharing of the power of men over men and the conflicts of interests on the redistribution of the common good. And law often is an instrument by which the dominant political will maintain the status quo. But neither politics nor law can be a substitute for philosophy since neither of them is concerned with the rigorous and uncompromising quest for knowledge and the ideals of human existence.

Thus although such things as ideology, religion, technology, politics and law do in their own way concern themselves with or contribute the quality and security of human life, they cannot substitute for philosophy since they cannot perform the real function of philosophy. Where humanism and the moral good has declined none of these disciplines or a combination of them would be a sufficient rescue without the participation of philosophy.

One of the realities in most of modern Africa is the glowing absence or disregard of the ideals of humanism and subvertion of the moral good. One cannot of course claim that all the African republics or states have identical or similar social systems. Nevertheless the social system in ARID (which we describe below) is not uncommon to many of them.

In Arid (African Republic of Inhumanity and Death) the group that has the political power identifies itself and its power with the moral law and moral good. Truth his recognized to be nothing but the expression of the will and interest of the supreme political personality. Opposition parties, institutions and personalities are branded as the very opposite of the truth and good of the nation. Opposition in Arid is treated as nothing but the incarnation of falsehood and evil. Its exisence is supposed to spell doom for the Republic. It must then be wiped out ; and it is indeed ruthlessly wiped out.

(5) For the substantiation of this proposition see for example Prof. Kwasi Wiredu's paper on «Philosophy, Mysticism and Rationality» in the *Universitas* Vol. 2 No. 3, March 1973 — Legon, Accra. The article is a very competent philosophical analysis and evaluation of mysticism.

Lip service is sometimes paid to democracy and individual freedom, but in reality there are no such things: all the mass media has become the propaganda machine of the prevailing might, there is never any national election and all the politicians are personal appointees of the Supreme political person.

In Arid the political authority is either a military regime or a civilian government that has acquired the power and ruthlessness of the military. It is ready to use-and indeed it does use-utmost physical force and severity to silence or wipe any discontent however slight. The authority is omnipresent. The police force and the state securiy militia form the very severe and pervasive hand of the political authority. They arrest, torture, detain and kill with impunity and undiscriminately except for the unmistakable members and associates of the regime. These must not be touched except by the order and the green light from the supreme political person. Members of the regime who fall out with him or whom he dreams are not strong in heir loyality he orders to be wiped out with the utmost speed.

The police and the security militia in Arid are to the people (the citizens) what the cats are to the rats. They arrest and swiftly detain or kill the intellectuals, the trade unionists, the writers and the students, the workers, the peasants and any persons who are suspected of failing to praise or toe the line of the prevailing political might. There is economic mismanagement and degeneration and widespread unemployment. Towns are full of jobseekers and beggars whose conditions of life form a sharp contrast with the patches of the affluence of the few favoured and most advantaged people of the Republic. But from time to time jobseekers and beggars are arrested and charged with holiganism, vagabondry or drunknness. The power and number of the police and the security militia intensify and spread directly in proposition to the peoples paurerization. The law courts have become nothing but the precipitation of the action of the police. The courts have no significant judgement of their own that would or will contradict the recommendation of the police and security militia. The seemingly naive maxim, law is a manifestation of the will of the prevailing political might ceases to be naive in Arid. It is the truth, the sad reality.

The political might in Arid is not only physical (using the power of the police and security militia), and moral (using the mass media to proclaim itself as the truth and good); it is and it must be also religious and magical. Religious bodies are infiltrated and made to sing and preach to their followers the diving right of those in power. In the churches and mosques God is worshipped, but no prayer, no Sunday service would end befor the political authority has been prayed for. The followers are poor, but this reverberates in them as a blessing: poverty is a lincence for entering the kingdom of God. And they would not condemn (even secretly) the prevailing affluence and wealth of these with the political advantage or power. They would not condemn afflu-

ence around them because they have been made to believe that the political authority with its affluence is a special gift of God to the Republic. Like the religious bodies the magical personalities are also made to serve prevailing power. Magicians and fortune-tellers are given prominence and fake jobs in the Republic under pretext of promoting the indigenous national culture. But they are used in a secret way to impress on their followers and admirers the magical and supernatural powers of those in political power. Any narrow escape by the supreme political person or his close associate from an attempted assassination, or a discovery of a plot to overthrow the regime, is utilized to illustrate the magical and supernatural power and knowledge of the authority. It is then claimed that the supreme political person has a supernatural and certain knowledge about his own fate and that of the Republic. The citizens thus have not only the physical and moral fear of the political might, they also have a psychological fear of it.

The value of human life in Arid is below the minimum demanded by humanity, and intolerable to any normal human conscience. Life is hard and foodless ; it is «brutish, nasty and short». Thus Arid is completely arid when the question of humanism is raised. There is no single humanist ideal in it. And worse still, there is no philosophy or ideology coming to it either from within or without which would help liberate the people. Frantz Fanon saw it long before : the great danger to Africa is the absence of ideology(6).

Although in Arid humanity has sunk the people, being Africans, still appear to substantiate and radiate the concept of African personality of people like Alex Quaison Sackey : «The concept of the African personality embodies the humanity of the African — his courtesy, tolerance, ready smile, and warmth of friendship toward all people»(7). In Arid, it is true, the citizens offer «ready smile and warmth of friendship toward», their killers. They can't do otherwise.

What does or can philosophy contribute to the enhancement of the value, security and dignity of human life in Africa ? The question can be asked in another form. What do or can philosophers in Africa do to help liberate Arid or safeguard the rest of Africa from the fate of Arid . I cannot pretend to have the correct answer to this question. The correct answer is however, likely to come from organized deliberations of all those philosophers and thinkers interested in the question. Whatever I suggest here therefore should not be treated as a claim of the correct answer or solution to the problem, but merely as a tentative proposal and a request for the attention to the problem.

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(6) Frantz Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth.* But Fanon meant more than just ideology. He meant the absence of a philosophy or a system of humanist ideals which would guide and promote humanism and idependence in Africa.

(7) Alex Quaison Sackey : *Africa Unbound* (London, 1963).

Following from our discussion in section I of of the essay, it is logical to propose that philosophy can contribute to the ideals of humanism and moral good in Africa by postulating alternative and a negative system of thoughts to the current prevailing and dehumanizing ethics of political might. Such a system may offer a weapon and inspiration for liberating and avoiding any social order of the Arid type. However, a system of thoughts (to be respectable) is usually an outcome of a long philosophical or intellectual culture that has undergone certain historical tests. It is not therefore something that an individual or a group can easily produce on the moment. Therefore by calling for a system of thoughts I am not expecting it to be created here and now. I am calling for what should be a long term expectation. And I am arguing for the urgency and necessity for the current African and Afro-Asian philosophers and thinkers to encourage the founding or promotion of the tradition of the critical and dialectical philosophy of humanism. But the situation is such that we cannot afford to wait only for the long term expectation or solution. Immediate solution must also be hatched. We can as philosophers initiate the formation of OPHA — the Organization for the Promotion of Humanism in Africa. OPHA would have the function, among others, of promoting critical philosophical thinking and evaluation of the social and moral order in the various African states. And it would define the minimal moral good below which no state could go without meeting with a continental and global condemnation and excommunication.

I have talked of the promotion «critical philosophical thinking» in Africa. But I am convinced that one of the great obstacles to this is the identification of philosophy with ethnological or religious beliefs which up to now has been a common trend in Black Africa. The underlying presupposition here has been that African philosophy is and must be naturally and radically different from what passes in the West or East as philosophy. Since in the West philosophy is known to be systematic, rationalistic and rigorous, in Africa philosophy is supposed to be unsystematic, spontaneous, non-rationalistic and devoid of criticality of the Western philosophical thought. Thus African philosophy, given this conception, is regarded as a totality of ethno-religious beliefs, taboos, and poetical or mystical songs dominant in the traditional

African culture (8). I submit that a philosophy of this kind would always prove to be completely unsuited for the task of analysis and evaluation of modern social and moral orders. A spontaneous, non-rationalistic and mystical thinking is too precarious or fickle to perform the rigorous and dialectical function or form the foundation, of a critical philosophy.

If I have given the impression that philosophy, the way I conceive of it, is a guarantee for the solution of all the problems of the kind I have discussed then I must straight away deny it. Philosophy is not a guarantee but only a platform on which to search for the guarantee.

Philosophy is free thinking and a free thinking society is more able to find an alternative or a solution to its problem than a non-free thnking one in which the guns and swords reign.

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(8) This confusion of Philosophy and Ethnology has been done by African scholars such as Professor John Mbithi (in *African Religions and Philosophy)* and Alexis Kagame *(in La Philosophie bantu-ravandise de l'etre)* and by non-African Africanists such as Fr. P. Tempels (in Bantu Philosophy) and Professor E.A. Ruch in «Is There African Philosophy in the *SECOND ORDER* (An African Journal of Philosophy) Vol. III No. 2 and in his «The Philosophy African History» in the *Philosophy in Africa (Contemporary* Perspectives) Edited by H. Odera Oruka (E.A. Publishing House — the book is still in the Press).

In the *Philosophy in Africa* (op. cit.) we have brought together a number of essays on the general theme of philosophy and African philosophy written by contemporary teachers and Professors of philosophy in Black Africa. Most of the articles take the position that African philosophy or philosophy in Africa is or must be more than ethnoreligious system of thoughts.

PHILOSOPHY AS AN AGENT OF CIVILIZATION

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The relations between philosophy and civilization are relations among facts and among conceptions, not in the sense of facts conceived as objects of thoughts or of conceptions presented as comprehensions of facts, but in the sense of thoughts perceived and treated factually and of facts constituted and ordered conceptually. Civilizations are recognized and described by discovering and relating the facts which characterize them. Among these facts are the philosophies which organize and qualify communities as ways of living together, or cultures, or civilizations. Civilizations are produced by men conditioned by particular circumstances occasioning common needs and wants, and by particular actions taken to relate individuals to each other iin societies for common actions to satisfy needs and to achieve ends. Civilizations come into contact with other civilizations, by which they are influenced and which in turn they influence. Facts are recognized to be characteristics of civilizations, and civilizations are recognized by facts which define them and they are related to one another, and to the individuals who form them and are formed by them, in inquiry and knowledge, by use of a conception of civilization applied to relate facts and to define civilizations. Philosophies and civilizations characterize and condition each other reflexively.

There are as many philosophies and kinds of philosophy as men think there are and construct in organizing the facts of experience, the arts of expession and communication, the activities and policies of association and community, and the schemata and symbols of systems of thought. Philosophies are related to one another and to their subjects and circumstances by a conception of philosophy which differentiates issues and relates presuppositions, consequences, and conclusions. A plurality of civilizations, simple and complex, primitve and advanced, old and new, provides the materials and forms the stuctures from which a single conception of civilization is formed and used in a plurality of applications. A plurality of philosophies, thought or lived, provides the instances and distinctions from which a single philosophy emerges used in the oppositions and the reconciliations of philosophies, but assimilated to one of the opposed philosophies in any statement of the multiplicity of modes of philosophical statement.

The operational interrelations philosophy and civilization have two dimensions. There are perpendicular relations between civilizations and the individual members of civilizations who are at once operative parts and cognizant

agents. There are horizontal relations among civilization which have contacts with one another in various guises and on various levels, reported and recorded in accounts of travellers, adventurers and explorers, of commercial transactions, military conflicts, political and diplomatic negotiations, cultural influences by arts and sciences, and structures of philosophical speculation and argumentation. Philosophy is the connecting link in the operation and characterization of the various levels of civilizaton and of kinds of civilizations.

Philosophy is usually thought of primarily as a doctrinal or intellectual or verbal construct — an inclusive or architectonic structure of thought and expression, formulated and defended by schools and successions of schools in controversial opposition. That structure of rigor and precision in thought and expression usually has little connection with philosophy conceived as an order and quality of individual or communal life, and the human and civil arts seldom have direct connections with the heuristic and demonstrative discursive arts. They may nonetheless share the names of the liberal arts, any one of which may, in any one of their forms, theoretic, practical, or productive, assume priority over the others, and wisdom may take the form of prudence, art, or science. Philosophy may also be expressed in culture by the fine rather than the liberal or applied arts — by poetry, literature, history, the visual arts, and music. We characterize civilizations by their cultures, and culture in turn, like philosophy, ranges through all human activities and human ends — agriculture and the culture of domesticated animals, the culture of souls and minds, and the cult of the divine. Philosophy is a **characteristic of civilizations** because philosophy is an operative agent in the formation of civlizations and has therefore left its imprint not only in the plurality of philosophies which characterize and distinguish civilizations but also in pluralities of humanisms and civilities and cultures. Philosophy is an **agent of civilization** in each civilization and in the contacts of civilizations .

In ancient civilizations, philosophies, in explicit statement, were pronouncements of wisdom, but ancient sages or wise men were also statesmen, prophets, poets, saints, and physicians. Philosophical civilities, humanisms, and cultures took many forms, but in each tradition of philosophical operation contacts of civilizations were recorded as dialogues between different cultures. The tradition of Western philosophy is a long sequence of such dialogues in which a representative of Western civilization and philosophy discusses and disputes with a succession of representatives of other cultures. Ancient Greeks differed concerning the origin of philosophy, some tracing it back to contacts with the older barbarian cultures of the Egyptians, the Persians, the Babylonians, the Indians, the Gauls, the Phoenicians, Thracians, or Lydians, and some arguing that the origin of philosophy, and even the invention of the word, was Greek. Sometimes the beginning of philosophy was made to coincide with the beginning of the human race : Hephaestus was the son of the Nile, and philosophy

began with him and was expounded by priests and prophets ; Linus was the son of Hermes and the Muse Urania, and he wrote a poem on the creation and evolution of the world, the first line of which, «Time was when all things grew up at once» is said to have influenced Anaxagoras. For centuries the Romans adapted Greek philosophy and rhetoric to Roman education and culture, and from time to time banished teachers of philosophy and rhetoric in order to preserve the purity of Roman culture. Christians used Greek philosophy in the formulation of Christian doctrines and beliefs, or opposed and condemned Greek philosophical doctrines as sources of error. Justin Martyr and the pseudo-Clement examined other philosophies and religions before choosing and preaching Christianity ; Hippolytus found the origin of all heresies in Greek philosophies ; and some sects and heresies, like the Manichaeans and the Nestorians, moved from East to West and from West to East. In the tradition of the monotheistic religions, dialogues between a Jew, a Christian, and a Muslim became a frequently used literary genre, in which the victory might be won by any one of the three disputants depending on the convictions of the author of the account. All three religious traditions borrowed from Greek philosophy, yet Latin Christian philosophers learned about Greek science and about the writings of Aristotle from translations of Arabic works of medicine and philosophy in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Within cultures, branches of knowledge developed at the same time and in contact with each other, as philosophy, medicine and astronomy flourished in Ionia in the fifth century B.C. ; in the second century A.D. in the Roman empire in the work of Ptolemy and Galen ; in the Islamic tradition a philosopher was frequently also a physician and a jurist ; and in the eleventh and twelfth centuries in the schools of Salerno and Chartres, where translations of Arabic medical works by Constantine the African were studied. Philosophy entered into like relations with the new sciences of mathematics and mechanics in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, building a new philosophy on science and setting religious doctrines in oppositon to new scientific discoveries. In the same period the Jesuits contributed to the formation of scholarly techniques for the study of ancient Chinese and Indian philosophy and brought back to Europe Eastern philosophical ideas which profoundly influenced Western educational procedures and examination techniques and democratic political philosophy.

At the end of the eighteenth century Kant announced a Copernican turn or revolution in philosophy from dogmatic metaphysics to a critical philosophy which ushered in a variety of idealisms and of common-sense, utilitarian, and positivistic philosophies in the nineteenth century ; and the study of cultures took new turns which gave the study of civilization new scopes of meaning. Samuel Johnson's **Dictionary**, in 1772, restricts «culture» and «civilization» to limited senses : «culture» is the act of cultivation or tilling the ground, and the

art of improvement and melioration ; «civilization» is a law, or act of justice, or judgment, which renders a criminal process civil. But «civility» has three definitions : freedom from barbarity, politeness, and rule of decency. The new history in the nineteenth century turned to accounting for civilizations. Burckhart's **Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien,** published in 1860, was translated into English under the title **The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy.** In 1888 Mathew Arnold wrote a book on **Civilization in the United States.** James Harvey Robinson stressed the importance of studying the sociology of peoples and their achievements in the arts and sciences in **The New History** in 1911 and presented the trends of that development in **The Ordeal of Civilization** in 1926. The new anthropology did not seek culture among the achievements of civilization : all people are characterized by their particular cultures in as much as they use language and symbols, have a learned social heritage, and operate ni societies whose forms of organization are peculiarly and particularly human, and civilization is that kind of culture which includes the use of writing, the presence of cities and wide political organization, and the development of occupational specializatoin.

Western philosophy began the twentieth century with a series of revolts from idealisms and psychologisms to varieties of realisms, naturalisms, pragmatisms, neo-Thomisms, phenomenologies, existentialisms, logical positivisms, analytical, linguistic, structuralistic, marxistic, and anarchistic philosophies. These revolts began the century in the classrooms of philosophy departments of universities or in the learned journals published by professors of philosophy. By the middle of the century the revolts were taken to the streets by students and were transformed into revolts against the philosophies of the classrooms. In earlier periods universities were not the prime and proper sites for the teaching of philosophy or for revolutions in philosophy. When Socrates revolted against the naturalistic and mathematical tendencies of Ionian and Italian philosophers and brought philosophy down from the skies to dwell in the homes and lives of men, Athenian youths learned philosophy from their elders in the streets and baths of Athens and from visiting paid professors of philosophy, the Sophists. In the Hellenistic kingdoms the teaching of philosophy moved from its central position in Athens to the cities of Asia Minor, Africa, and Europe and underwent a revolution in which it became learned and bookish, deriving its materials for study and teaching from the libraries of Alexandria and Pergamon. Roman youths learned philosophy in schools of rhetoric designed on the teaching of Cicero and Quintilian to reunite eloquence and wisdom, rhetoric and philosophy.

The teaching of philosophy moved into the universities when they were founded during the Middle Ages, but there were no departments of philosophy or courses in philosophy in medieval universities. In collegiate courses preparing for the baccelaureate, philosophy was the body of the seven liberal arts

and students mastered philosophy by learning the arts of words and the arts of things. In the graduate faculties of theology, law, and medicine, philosophy was the organizing principle of the program of study, and in the treatment of the substantive and professional problems of those schools many of the problems which became the body of philosophy were initiated and formulated. Modern philosophies were constituted from selections of problems treated by medieval graduate schools of theology, law, and medicine or «physics», and from selections of methods taught in undergraduate schools of liberal arts, from the verbal arts of dialectic, logic, rhetoric, or grammar and from the real or mathematical arts of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, or music. In the revolution of the Renaissance, philosophy became a humanity ; in the revolution of the seventeenth century, philosophy became a science ; and in the revolution of the nineteenth century, with the emergence of the social sciences, philosophy became a social science, or to use Comte's word, a sociology.

These structures and oppositions of philosophies were introduced into university courses taught in India and Japan, setting up philosophies and departments of philosophy distinct from or in opposition to the philosophies oriented to the traditional wisdom or religion of those countries, which were frequently taught in different departments. After the October Revolution of 1917, that structure of philosophy was reduced to the status of capitalistic ideologies, and philosophy was oriented in a new stage of the history of society and the history of science to problems of production, relations of production, and ownership of instruments of production in the hegemony of the Soviet Union and to an aphoristic philosophy, similar to that cultivated in the West during the Renaissance, and opposed to the philosophy of Confucius, in China. In the West, John Dewey returned after the first World War from his teaching in China and Japan to turn the revolt of pragmatism, in **Reconstruction in Philosophy,** to the re-establishment of philosophy in the problems of life, community, and civilization, and French existentialists like Sartres, Simone de Beauvoir, and Merleau-Ponty, found the expression of philosophy in dramas and novels and in tracts on rights of minorities, with Marxists tendencies and oppositions, as well as in traditional philosophical treatises and journals. The European structure of philosophies had been introduced into colonies and dependencies in Latin America, Asia, and Africa and was made the basis for the opposition in revolts by which new nations were established in Latin America in the nineteenth century, and in Asia and Africa at the end of second World War. In the Americas there was little philosophical communication between North America and Latin America : North America borrowed from the idealisms and empiricisms of Europe during the nineteenth century, while Mexico and the South American countries were strongly influenced by positivism ; in the twentieth century one form of the revolt against idealism the United States turned to neopositivism, at a time when the revolt against

positivism in Latin America took its forms from phenomenology and existentialism. The young in the United States, educated in forms of the opposed philosophies, have revolted against the established structure by imitating or adapting forms of transcendental meditation oriented to Eastern wisdom or forms of Marxist philosophies, Western or Eastern, oriented to liberation from the constraints of political and economic power structures .

Since the end of the nineteenth century, philosophers have sought to increase the contacts of philosophies and to make use of them for the advancement of philosophy by meeting together in International or World Congresses of Philosophy. Such meetings have taken many forms. They are sometimes organized according to an accepted structure of philosophy and of its parts and are conducted as enlarged national or regional associations of philosophy. They are sometimes organized to characterize and relate the different philosophies of the world, East and West, North and South, as understood and expounded by adherents and by external observers and students. They are sometimes organized to promote international discussion of some branch of philosophy — metaphysics, logic, esthetics, morals, political philosophy, the philosophy of science, of religion, or of history. They are sometimes organized to examine a concept and its use in the different philosophies of the world — the idea of reality, of the individual, of law, of God — or to compare and contrast the treatment of common problems in the different philosophies of the world — the problem of knowledge, of argumentation, of existence, of human rights, philosophy and civilization. The present Afro-Asian Conference on Philosophy and Civiliizaton falls into that pattern : representatives of the various cultures present in turn philosophy and civilization in the Far East and subjacent philosophy in Japan, in the Indian subcontinent and subjacent philosophy in the civilization of Pakistan, philosophy and civilization in the Middle East and the subjacent philosophy of Iran and the Middle East, civilization without philosophy and the rise of philosophical thought within Black Africa, philosophy and the Mediterranean Civilization and subjacent philosophy in North Africa and the Mediterranean Basin. The shadow of the unrepresented and unpresented structure of European-American philosophies is cast by questions about civilization, ideology, the impact of science, tradition and revolution derived from memories of numerous presentations of those philosophies and by representatives from those civilizations who raise questions about the impact of civilization on the exercise of philosophy, philosophy as an agent of civilization, and reasons for a unique philosophical doctrine and for a pluralistic philosophy in a world of tomorrow. In this conference, as in other world congresses, there is a balance between the use of philosophy as a characteristic of civilizations and its use as an agent of civilization, and the consideration of philosophy can be moved from use as a description of what is and what has been the case, from the representation and understanding of

cultures and philosophies, to operational use as an agent in the promotion and advancement of civilization and of philosophy, only by using the thread of philosophy to relate the schematic places of philosophy to each other and to newly conceived subjects. By using philosophy as an agent of civiliziation this conference might make a contribution to designing a needed new form in the dialogues of civilizations. Wold philosophy may be seen to operate in its various forms as world humanism, world civilitiy ,and world culture as well as in its form as world philosophy in explicitly formulated principles and methods of thought and organizations of arts and sciences, of communities and communications.

1. World Humanism. Philosophers, historians, critics and poets have often argued in all times and in all cultures that men of different cultures, convictions and classes understand each other better through the arts than by any other mode of communication or action. They conclude that such mutual understanding is possible because the motions of music have an immediate impact on the motions of the body and the soul ; the visual arts present forms of beauty and sublimity to the senses and emotions without the intrusion of non-sensuous meanings and symbolisms ; the literary arts communicate thoughts and emotions, cognized feelings and felt cognitions. Humanism has promoted understanding of the human accompplishments of other civilizations, but it becomes world humanism only when acquaintance with the characteristic accomplishments of alien and strange civilizations is transformed into an appreciation and promotion of common accomplishments of humanity. The human arts are arts of perception, judgment, and appreciation. They are humane and liberal : they are the arts which form man and the arts which liberate him. The humanities are the products and the source of human achievement : they consist of the creations of individual men which attain and express values common to all men. World humanism is the realization and expressiion of men and of civilizations, of humanity and the humanities, of man and mankind.

2. World civility. Men form societies and societies shape the characters and actions of men. Civility is good behavior, and civility is justice. There are as many kinds of justice as there are forms of human association, yet the contacts of societies and nations is governed by a justice which is the same in the East and the West, in the North and the South — in Persia and in Greece, in Athens and in Sparta ; in the Union of Soviet Republics and in the United States of America ; in China and in the Soviet Union ; in the United States, the Soviet Union and the African states ; in Israel and the Arabic States, and in the Arabic countries and thePalestinian Liberation Organization. Justice is a balance of laws and rights, of distributive justice and retributive justice. In the contacts of formed societies organized according to recognized codes of distributive justice there is a balance and interplay of eternal laws,

divine laws, natural laws, and human laws. In the contacts of communities, societies and states in process of formation, retributive justice takes precedence to rectify the inequities of established forms of distributive justice. Underprivileged and minority groups must first achieve sufficiency, recognition and dignity before they take their places as actively functioning parts of more inclusive societies and states and in world civilizaton and civility. World clivility is a **confederation** of communitiies and societies which preserve and advance their own values in the context of a world civilization which provides the circumstances, the norms and the incentives for justice in common living and cooperative activity. It is a **federation** for the enforcement of laws and the advancement of rights.

3. World culture. When Aristotle inquired into the nature of wisdom at the beginning of the **Metaphysics** he found its first manifestation in the arts ; when he defined wisdom as an intellectual virtue in the **Nicomachean Ethics** he generalized from the wisdom he found in the excellence of great artists to wisdom in general and not limited to any particular field, and he distinguished excellence in the practical arts of politics and prudence from wisdom which is knowledge of the highest objects and which provides the governing principles of other arts and sciences. The productive, the fine and the practical arts are forms of knowledge. They are based on sensation, but they are acquired by habituation, learning, and cultivation. The productive, applied arts of agriculture and husbandry cultivate means of satisfying needs and wants, and the arts themselves are cultivated in the minds of men. The practical arts of prudence and politics cultivate the means of satisfying desires and aspirations by choice and deliberation, and they are cultivated as virtues of men. The productive, fine arts of poetry, music and the dance cultivate a pleasure proper to the arts, and the arts are cultivated, in creation and appreciation, in the minds of men. Once the arts and sciences which are directed to utility and pleasure had ben invented, men had the leisure to turn their attention to arts aimed at knowledge and understanding. It was for this reason, Aristotle concluded, that he mathematical arts were founded in Egypt where the priests were allowed to be at leisure. Leisure (**schole**) is the school for the cultivation of the arts and wisdom. In the contacts of culture technologies are exchanged, both technologies in the modern sense of the application of arts and sciences to production and technologies in the older sense of books expounding the liberal arts of interpreting and understanding the arts and sciences and their applications. World culture is an extension and ordering of the contacts of cultures in which the technological applications of the sciences and the artistic achievements of all cultures are made available and accessible to all men and in which ways are opened up to new cultural developments in the arts of life, perception, and appreciation. World culture is the cultivation of communication, innovation, and expression.

4. World philosophy. Master-craftsmen or achitectons direct the work of craftsmen, and architectonic arts, theoretic, practical and productive, order and relate arts and sciences. Philosophy in its various forms is an architectonic art of the principles of arts ,sciences and action. The contacts of philosophies are not limited to the oppositions, reconciliations, or reductions of philosophies. World philosophy will never be, as it has never been, a single philosophy which has found single univocal expression and common effective acceptance in thought and action. There will always be a plurality of conceptions and of expositions of philosophy, but they need not be related only in ambiguous adversary controversy in which refutation is rendered easy by bending other philosophies in interpretation to presuppositions and definitions laid down in one's own philosophy. The coming of world philosophy will be marked by the development of sense of philosophy to relate the varieties of philosophies and to make possible the supplementation by discussion. Discussion may take the practical turn of deliberation, or the productive turn of invention, or the thecretic turn of inquiry. In any of these forms, discussion will promote development and enrichment of each of the many philosophies and discovery of and insight into new possibilities and new problems opened up in the interactions of philosophies. The operation of a world philosophy should be manifested in new philosophies, new cultures, new civilities, and new humanisms, in the development and use o fnew arts of thought and understanding, new arts of communication and expression, new arts of action and cooperation, and new arts of self-realization and fulfillment.

When one turns from the philosophies which characterize, condition, and order civilizations to consider the civilizations of the modern world which embody and express philosophies and which seek philosophy for use in conservation and change, for tradition and revolution, we find worlds ranged in multiple oppositions, readjustments, and transformations. We meet to discuss philosophy and civilization as representatives of those four worlds.

There is a world in which philosophy is taught in universities which are a few hundred years old, and in which philosophy has a subject matter which is divided into traditional parts which have undergone shifts and changes in methods, and which has been related to matters treated in the arts and sciences, in politics, business, and religion. There is a plurality of philosophies. Philosophers form national associations of philosophy and of metaphysics, logic, aesthetics and philosophy of science, and they meet in international congresses. Philosopy is no longer connected closely with religion, and in any case God has died and worchippers have been reborn. It is not thought to have much effectiveness in life or politics, and its attractiveness in education to students fluctuates with changing common opinion concerning its relevance, utility, and reliability.

There is a second world in which one true philosophy is promulgated. It is advocated as a world philosophy, and its advocates claim that its truths are established by the method of science and that it contributes to the advance of science. It prepares for a liberty free from the constraints of law and the state, and it liberates men from the drugging superstitions of religion. Both worlds advocate the extension and protection of human rights, and each criticizes the other for threatening and destroying the rights of man : philosophers and statesmen of the first world argue that political equality and freedom of thought and expression are essential prerequisites to the attainment of economic and social rights, while philosophers and statesmen of the second world point out that political rights and freedom of expression cannot be exercised effectively by men who have not yet acquired economic and social rights and equality.

There is a third world which has recently acquired rights to choice, self-determination and independence. The philosophies of the civilizations of this world are embodied in their new communities and states. Their verbally stated philosophies owe their vocabularies and subject matters to various forms of cultural imperialism, but carry remnants of traditional wisdom and mythical history. In the formation of their philosophies of civility and humanism they are sided and manipulated as parts of the political and material philosophies of the first two worlds, and they seek a philosophy which will characterize them, and distinguish them from and relate them to, other civilizations.

There is a fourth world in which philosophy is wisdom and in which scholars have for centuries discovered equivalences to all other philosophies — metaphysics and logics, materialisms and idealisms, morality, civility, and humanity — and which today seeks to preserve its integrity from philosophical influences and to achieve universality in intelligibility to all men.

Philosophy is operative as an agent of civilization in all its parts and aspects — individual, social, national, regional, and world life and activity. In antiquity the wisdom of sages made all who heard them wise to a degree ; the city of God was a model for the cities of men ; and self-evident truths were recognized in common opinions universally accepted as wel las in unique insights persuasively, authoritatively, or prophetically pronounced. Today we meet to discuss a plurality of new philosophies which profess to destroy old errors or reanimate old truths, and we use new and old philosophies to establish

and spread civility, morality, and culture in new communities, new rights, new arts, and new values. It would be a mistake to limit philosophical discussion of world philosophy to one of these forms and manifestations of philosophy or to think of one civilization as the unique or prime professor and promoter of philosophy. A world philosophy can come to life and function effectively only as it gains insight into and promotes the varieties of philosophies in comprehensible and consequential discussion, and a world civilization will emerge in operation, recognition, and appreciation only as it provides places and incentives for the cultivation of the values of the varieties of civilizations in the realization of the potentialities and ideals of men and mankind.

CIVILIZATION WITHOUT PHILOSOPHY

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As a result of the findings and propagation of linguistic philosophy, the maxim that words have different uses in diverse language-games has penetrated the mind of the philosophical community and, in a measure, the thinking of the wider society. In the light of this maxim, the terms «civilization» and «philosophy» have varieties of meanings in different environments with their characteristic language systems. Here we shall discuss «civilization» and philosophy within the writer's linguistic perspective. First, there will be delineation of this linguistic standpoint and, secondly, the concept of «Civilization without Philosophy».

1. Civilization :

First, the term civilization implies a system of shared ideas within a definite portion of mankind, a cluster of ideas which makes it possible for such a portion, which normally comprises people with various ethnic backgrounds, to have cohesion. The forces that lead to this phenomenon of shared ideas are best studied within a historical perspective and are revealed by history and the social sciences. For our purposes here ,it is sufficient to point out that the birth of a civilization means the emergence of a «form» whose nature is elusive. This «form» is a certain consistency in orientation, a cultural style, which is recognized by discovering a point of view from where seemingly unrelated facts acquire coherence and meaning. A civilization dies when coherence and meaning are lost.

Even though the «form» of a civilization remains intangible, it is implicit in the preoccupations and valuations of the people, and «imparts to their achievements—to their arts and institutions, their literature, their theology—something distinct and final, something which has its own peculiar perfection»(1).

The «form» or the cultural style of a civilization is not merely grasped by indulgence in scientific descriptions of the observable products of a civilization, such as architectural designs, means of transport and various forms of overt behaviour. Such scientific descriptions merely scratch the surface of a civilization ; they do not reach the heart of a civilization, which is essentially the spirit of a civilizaton. Indeed the fundamental feature of a civilization is

(1) Henri Frankfort, *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East,* (London : Ernest Benn Limited, 1951) p. 32.

constituted by the beliefs, intentions, tendencies to respond to challenges and a world-view which is not, in its totality, expressed in scientifically describable behaviour and products, though certain aspects of this world-view take the form of institutions that are amenable to a measure of scientific description.

The second feature of civilization is the element of transcendence, a going beyond the primitive form of existence, a phenomenon which, for instance, characterized the early civilizations of Egypt and Mesopotamia. This emergence of neolithic culture that superseded the paleolithic age. Neolithic culture was characterized by the appearance of agriculture with emmer wheat and barley as the main crops, a development which was accompanied by a simultaneous diffusion of the odd complex harvesting tool used in Egypt, Iraq, and Persia (2). Such other activities as irrigation, pottery-making, weaving and invention of writing that characterized early civilizations of the «Near East» transcended previous forms of primitive existence.

This transcendence is, from the viewpoint of social living, exemplified in the complexification of societies as seen in the emergence of cities and nations. In the modern world, one of the marks of civilizations is the introduction of rationality, as opposed to living in accordance with the dictates of biological origins ; in this connection, for instance in Africa and Asia, «reason , as opposed to biology, is being employed to manage the new nations in such a way that variious groups with different ethnological roots, with their attendant biological foundations, are living and working together for the good of the entire new civilizations.

The third characteristic of civilization is militancy. There is the will not to succumb to the challenges of the environment. As Toynbee points out, civiilization is attained in a process involving response to a challenge. When challenged ,some communities are apt to succumb while others «manage to survive the crisis by waiting until some creative individual or creative minority has shown the way through(3). It is a fact, for instance, that the challenge of colonialism in Africa and Asia has, subsequent to militant response by these continents, culminated in the present civilizations found in these lands. Considering the world as a whole it can be observed that the threats of global conflagration arising from economic interests, political disagreements and social antagonisms present a challenge that is being positively responded to through the creation of institutions and ways of life that are laying the foundation of universal civilization ; in this connection, the formation of the United Nations and its agencies that have global significance,

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(2) Ibid. p. 35.

(3) Ibid. p. 28.

the cross-cultural ideological borrowing and collaboration in various projects, the international condemnations of various forms of inhumanity of man to man, are signs of the existence of measure of universal civilization that has been born as a result of response to various challenges.

What then has been the role of philosophy, if any, in the birth and preservation of civilizations ? Is it possible to have a civilization without philosophy ? What, for instance, was the role of philosophy, if there was any, in the emergence of the civilizations of Egypt and Mesopotamia ? Has philosophy been instrumental in the emergence of the new nations of Africa, for instance, and in the production of the shared ideas that augur well for international civilization ? These questions cannot be answered adequately without first delineating the concept of philosophy.

2. Philosophy and its relationship to civilization :

The fact that there is no universally agreed definition of philosophy has not militated against indulgence in philosophy. Indeed the term philosophy subsumes under it varieties of intellectual activities. Our «craving for generality», to borrow Wittgenstein's words, seeks what is common to all these intellectual activities. Many ask «what is philosophy» ? and expect an answer that tells them the essence of philosophy. To give credit where it is due, I should point out that many philosophers, especially linguistic philosophers who are in the Wittgensteinian tradition, have enlightened us by showing that this quest for the «essence» of philosophy is misguided and fruitless pursuit if such a preoccupation seeks a «universa lessence» that is actualized in all those activities which bear the appellation «philosophy». The reason for this verdict is that the term «philosophy» has many uses depending on the environment in which it is used. By the expression «using the term philosophy» we mean «delineating the area or areas for philosophical investigation and, in some cases, actually carrying out the investigation». The delineation of the areas for philosophical investigation and the carrying out of the investigation have taken varieties of forms. For instance, the use of the term «philosophy» among laymen (non-professional philosophers) is sometimes different from the way it is used by professional philosophers. Even among professional philosophers the term philosophy is used differently depending on the philosophical school in question ; the analysts, scholastics, neo-thomists, existentialists etc. may use the term philosophy differently. Furthermore, even within the same philosophical tradition we find variations in the understanding of the term philosophy ; for example, within the analytic tradition we find variations in the understanding of the term «philosophy», for example, within the analytic tradition we find cases of logical positivists having a conception of philosophy that differs from that of logical atomists and ordinary language analysts.

So, to ask «what is philosophy» ? and expect a universal essence, something other than the way the term philosophy is used in these manifold situations, is to expect to find nothing ; there is no philosophy that is divorced from the different uses of the term «philosophy», that is, there is no hidden essence of philosophy which is the business of philosophers to discover. We know what philosophy is by delving into those areas of inquiry that men consider to be, or call, philosophical ; delving into them involves conceptualization of the various features of these areas in accordance with our own conceptual structures.

In the light of these considerations, the delineation of the concept of philosophy in these pages will be structured by the linguistic tradition of the writer. This delineation will be effected step by step and in each step philosophy will be related to civilization. First, we shall consider the general use of the term «philosophy» and its relationship to civilization. Secondly we shall consider some of the more specific uses of the term and their relationship to civilization. Thirdly we shall discuss the question of the institutionalization of philosophy, that is, the issue of professional philosophy, and civilization.

The first use of the term «philosophy» to be considered is a general one and is synonymous with the «form» of a civilization. It is the point of view which gives coherence and meaning to apparently unrelated facts in a civilization. In this sense of the term «philosophy» the emergence of the «form» which structures a civilization is also the emergence of philosophy. The emergence of philosophy is, therefore, the transcending of primitive existence which, in its extreme nature, is characterized by rugged individualism which seeks only biological satisfaction. If philosophy is understood this way, then to talk of civilization without philosophy is to indulge in contradiction in terms, for the very being of civilization presupposes the «form» which is philosophy, the world-view that, as it were, animates a civilization. The emergence of philosophy, understood in this sense, is correlated with the appearance of co-operation among men whereby they produce new thoughts, new techniques; it is the origin of socialization which a famous philosopher and paleontologist, Teihard de Chardin, likens to a civilization(4), as Leopold Senghor of Senegal notes in his **On African Socialism.** Tribal life, though philosophically above the life governed by the law o fthe jungle, still lacks the form, the philosophy, which makes it possible for men to form nations ; it is deficient with regard to the fullness of socialization, a plenitude which is possible through a philosophy that transcends individual nations.

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(4) Leopold Senghor, *On African Socialism* (London : Fredrick A. Praeger, 1964) p. 137.

The attainment of the fullness of socialization is, according to Leopold Senghor, the realization of maximum-being which is an upsurge that results from four factors : «technical development, national development and development of international life»(5). Senghor notes also that for Engels and Marx, maximum-being consists, negatively, in the elimination of all material and spiritual alienations, and, positively, it comprises freedom of accorded individuals by the collective organization of society to develop fully in body and mind(6).

The foregoing considerations bear testimony to the central position of philosophy in the formation not only of the relatively less developed civilizations but also in the realization of a higher civilization of the world. In the African context, for instance, we find a basic philosophy that gave coherence and meaning to African societies, according to the findings of certain philosophers. Kwame Nkrumah, for example, affirms that the traditional African cosmological standpoint maintained that «everything that exists, exists as a complex of forces in tension»(7). Discussing this point further Nkrumah contends that in holding force in tension to be essential to whatever exists, the African is endowing matter with an original power of self-motion ; he was endowing it with «what matter would need to initiate qualitative and substantial changes»(8).

Nkrumah's interpretation of the traditional African cosmology is corroborated by Placide Tempels in his **La Philosophie Bantou** which has been translated into English under the title of **Bantu Philosophy.** Melville Herskovits, in his **The Human Factor in Changing Africa,** indicates that Placide Tempels, intent on penetrating into the depts of the African personality, examines the traditional African philosophy of nature and finds that «in the thought of the peoples he studied, he found, first of all, an over-riding value in the concepts of power and the life force (force, force vitale)»(9). For the Africans he studied Placide Tempels found that everything in the universe, animate and inanimate, each element, each living growing thing, was endowed with a component of energy or power and from this it followed that the relations of the concepts of power, of energy, and of being was basic to this world view. In evaluating Placide Tempels' **Bantu Philosophy,** Herskovits in his **The Human Factor in Changing Africa** asserts that though it is not clear how far PlacideTempels' analysis applies to the belief systems of people in Zaire

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(5) Ibid. p. 138.

(6) Ibid. p. 141.

(7) Kwame Nkrumah, *Consciencism*, (New York : Monthly Press, 1964) pp. 97 — 98.

(8) Ibid.

(9) Melville J. Herskovits, *The Human Factor in Changing Africa* (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1962) p. 92.

other than the Baluba, the group from whom Tempels seems to have gathered most of his data, and though it is not altogether clear whether Tempels' treatment of these people is merely an interpretation in terms of European philosophical concepts, we can be certain of this : «the gods and spirits, magic and divination, ancestors and ancestral taboos of each people embody a view of the universe and the forces that rule it which unifies the supernatural world and makes life itself meaningful to those who live in accordance with its precepts» (10).

The second use of the term philosophy that I shall consider pertains to that use whereby it means «metaphysics» or simply metaphysical reflection. Here I am not concerned with «metaphysics» as understood or carried cut in professional philosophy. Rather I am concerned with that aspect of human thought which does not have to be systematized in philosophical treatises in order to exist. While this aspect of philosophy could be discussed in relation to theology and ethics, I shall for the moment treat it in relation to science. The general position here is that metaphysics is necessary for scientific development of any civilization and that without its thrust no scientific development can be attained. What then is the role of philosophy, understood as metaphysical reflection, in scientific discovery ? Karl R. Popper, the distinguished philosopher of science, rightly points out that «scientific discovery is impossible without faith in ideas which are of purely speculative kind, and sometimes even quite hazy ; a faith which is completely unwarranted from the point of view of science, and which to that extent, is «metaphysical» (11). In this connection, Popper quotes Einstein who speaks of the «search for those highly universal laws ... from which a picture of the world can be obtained by pure deduction. There is no logical path ... leading to these ... laws. They can only be reached by intuition, based upon something like an intellectual love (Einfuhlung) of the objects of experience» (12). Is this the intuition which led Democritus to posit his atoms and thus opened the way for the Atomic Theory ? Popper's answer here appears to be affirmative ; he states that «it cannot be denied that along with metaphysical ideas which have obstructed the advance of science there have been others—such as speculative atomism—which have aided it» (13). Speculative atomism goes back to the Ionian Philosophers : «The Atomic Theory ... goes back to the Greeks, yet we always speak to-day about Dalton's Atomic Theory. There is good reason for this. The reason is that, while the Greeks put forward the idea that atoms exist, they did no more. They left

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(10) Ibid. pp. 92 — 93.

(11) Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London : Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1959) p. 38.

(12) Ibid. p. 32.

(13) Ibid. p. 38.

this idea vague and untested. Dalton changed this vague imagining into a set of concrete suggestions about atoms which could be tested by experiment. This change from vagueness to precision and experimental test justifies his claim to the theory» (14).

Furthermore, philosopher E.A. Burtt points out in his **Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science** that implicit in the metaphysical idea of the Pythagoreans, namely, that the world is made of numbers, was the doctrine of atomism» : The famous Pythagorean doctrine that the world is made of numbers is apt to appear quite unintelligible to moderns till it is recognized that what they meant was geometrical units, i.e. the sort of geometrical atomism that was taken over later by Plato in his **Timaeus**. They meant that the ultimate elements of the cosmos were limited portions of space» (15).

This Pythagorean idea is seen in the thought of Galileo, as E.A. Burtt shows: in the metaphysics of Galileo, space (or distance) and time become fundamental categories. The real world is the world of bodies moving in space and time. (16) Thus there are cogent arguments to show that the quantitative view of the world, a view that has played a vital part in the growth of science, has a metaphysical, and therefore philosophical, foundation. The famous German astronomer Kepler also viewed nature mathematically; believing that the world emanates from the Causality of God, Kepler reinterpreted this Causality in terms of mathematical simplicity and harmony. (17) In Kepler's case, however, it is not clear whether his belief in the Causality of God gave him the idea of mathematical simplicity and harmony or whether he arrived at the latter idea first and then introduced Causality in terms of mathematics.

While philosophy, and in this case metaphysics, has been instrumental in bringing about scientific progress, it has also been responsible for scientific stagnation. It is common knowledge that certian aspects of Aristotelian metaphysics were not conducive to scientific progress. It appears that the Aristotelian qualitative approach to the study of nature slowed down the progress of science, especially its great emphasis on essences. This Aristotelian approach is different from that of Galileo who, when studying Force, did not care about its essence. According to Gelileo, we know nothing about the inner essence

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(14) A. Holderness and John Lambert, *A New Certificate Chemistry*, (London : Heinemann Educational Books Ltd. London, 1961) p. 38.

(15) E.A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science*, (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1950) p. 30.

(16) Ibid. p. 83.

(17) Ibid. p. 54.

of force, we only know its quantitative effects in terms of motion. (18) It is worth noting, however, that whether metaphysics brings about scientific progress or stagnation it is always the leader. For, as Kral Popper points out in the **Logic of Scientific Discovery,** it is a fact that purely metaphysical ideas-and therefore philosophical ideas-have been of the greatest importance for cosmology. From Thales to Einstein, from ancient atomism to Descartes speculation about matter, from the speculations of Gilbert and Newton and Leibniz and Boscovic about forces to those of Farady and Einstein about fields of forces, metaphysical ideas have shown the way (19).

The foregoing account suggests that civilizations without philosophy, and in this case metaphysical reflection, cannot make scientific progress. To develop scientifically they have to undertake the metaphysical enterprise with the hope that their metaphysics will lead to the desired results. However, there is no guarantee that such an enterprise would lead to the sought end; their success will be one of those accidents in history. Some civilizations have not been fortunate enough to produce a metaphysics that is conducive to scientific progress. One of the reasons for this metaphysical backwardness can be attributed to the value systems of such metaphysically underdeveloped civilizations. In such civilizations there may be hindrances to engagement in metaphysical thought, hindrances which are embodied in the taboos of such civilizations. In other words, certain world-views hinder the development of science. We are therefore in confrontation with a paradox. The paradox is that philosophy can hinder the progress of philosophy ! ; in this case, philosophy conceived as a world-view can hinder the philosophy which is conducive to scientific development, that is, metaphysics.

It is at this juncture that we consider value, the other philosophical dimension of civilization, the aspect which for good or ill binds people together. Value is central in any civilization. The very emergence of the «form» which animates civilization is correlated with the emergence of value. The supreme value is to recognize the need to work together within a framework of laws and regulations; it is recognition of an ought or obligation. What is most frightening is that the values of a civilization, which constitute the moral philosophy of such a society, govern the intellectual, spiritual, and physical activities of peoples. We can state with complete certainty that the underdevelopment of civilizations hinges on their values. «Value» rendered it possible for the civilizations of Egypt and Mesopotamia to emerge. The intellect of the Egyptians and Mesopotamians was not a sufficient condition for their involvement in, say, agriculture and irrigation; true, the intellectual

(18) Ibid. p. 93.

(19) Ibid. p. 19.

grasp of the nature of agriculture was itself an advance, but the realization of agriculture was the product of value.

Similarly, the understanding of a possible world order characterized by peace and economic prosperity etc. is one thing. To actually carry out the programme that would produce such a world order is another thing; this is the work of value. As philosopher E. M. Adams notes in his **Philosophy and Modern Mind,** «regardless of how badly needed, a world government, for example, is not now a possibility, for there is not common worldwide perspective constituted by shared beliefs, attitudes, aspirations, and commitments to give life and spirit to such an institution and to sustain it in its work» (20). Value, then, is required as a philosophical posture to create an enriched world civilization.

These considerations vindicate the proposition that civilizations without philosophy i.e. without a world-view, metaphysics and value (ethics) are inconceivable. The term «philosophy» so far has largely been used in its non-professional sense. But now we must grapple with the issue of professional philosophy, that is, the philosophy which is institutionalized in institutions of higher learning, and raise the question whether civilization can do without it.

A civilization can exist without professional philosophy, just as it can do without professional science, but at a price. Indeed, a civilization without professional philosophy (or systematic philosophy) is analogous to a man who has no means of medicinal therapy; the «form» of such a civilization does not have the means of diagnosing the truth of its assumptions. Lack of systematic philosophy tends, for instance with regard to traditional African socities, to favour the preservation of the status quo. The need for a systematic philosophical machinery for exposing the presuppositions of a civilization is paramount. This need is all the more pressing in those societies which social scientists call «monist», that is, those societies which are characterized by a high degree of uniformity in the behaviour of its members. Civilizations tend to guard, somewhat religiously, the assumptions raised to the level of truth. The systematic philosophy which endeavours to question the assumption of such civilizations is at times ruthlessly suppressed and the philosophers for it are subjected to humiliation, ostracism or death.

Socrates presents a classic case of a philosopher who had to die for questioning, in a systematic philosophical fashion, the pressupositions of the Greeks. It is also worth noting that after Nicholas Copernicus had formulated the heliocentric theory of the world, Giordano Bruno preached this theory enthusiastically and was, as a consequence, burnt publicly in Rome in 1600. Galileo

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(20) E.M. Adams, ***Philosophy and the Modern Mind,*** (Chapel Hill : The University of North Carolina Press, 1975) p. 3.

Galilei held this doctrine and since the Church was unwilling to contemplate the truth of a New System of the world which seemed to contradict a passage in the Old Testament, he was tried by the Inquisition, and forced to recant his teaching ; the view that was the bone of contention was the fact that the new theory of the world clashed with the doctrine of the Book of Joshua. In those days the world-view of Europe was dictated by Theology while philosophy, which at that time included the physical sciences, was considered to be the handmaiden of Theology. In recent times we have the classic case of Charles Darwin (1809 - 1882) who, in his **Origin of Species**, formulated an evolutionary theory which sees man as a late arrival in the long chain of beings, a doctrine which fundamentalists considered to be in opposition to the Book of Genesis.

Despite the difficulties which the philosophers who endeavour to question the «forms» of cviilizations face, it appears that one of the pressing needs of civilizations is to have philosophers who not only know the forms of civilizations but who also question the rationality of such world-views. It is to be noted, however, that professional philosophy today has difficulties coping with certain aspects of world-views, especially those aspects which pertain to factual data. The areas of factual reality are best handled by the physical and social sciences; erroneous physics, sociology, psychology, mathematics and logic in a civilization are best found out by those who are engaged in these sciences. Such scientists, however, need training in philosophy of their disciplines at least. Thus there should be philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics etc. and we could suggest that those who give training in these «special philosophies» should not only be philosophers but also specialists in these fields. Instructors of political philosophy and philosophy of education, for instance, should not only be philosophers but also political scientists and educators respectively. There can be no doubt that we badly need philosophers of these fields to critically penetrate into the presuppositions of these sciences. Without such philosophies the erroneous world-views stemming from wrong scientific presuppositions in these fields would not be found out and a civilization would suffer gradual impoverishment.

But what would training in philosophy, considered as distinct from these special sciences, involve ? Here we are raising the question of the nature of philosophy as distinct from the special sciences, a question which has been the preoccupation of many epistemologists. Different philosophical traditions have answered this question differently. Logical positivists tend to view philosophy as the handmaiden of science ; philosophy in this view is considered to be the discipline which should «clarify» the language of science, but it is not clear what type of training programme should be followed by those who would be versed in «clarification» of the language of science. This goal of philosophy, however, if it were realized, would be salutary to a civilization, for it would remove the logical errors that may be found in science and would sharpen the

scientists with regard to what they do. Insofar as civilization requires science, such a philosophy would be vital to a civilization.

So far we have reached at the point where philosophy is a handmaiden, a discipline which is dependent on another for its existence. But the question can be raised with regard to the autonomy of philosophy and its importance in civilizations. To raise the question of the autonomy of philosophy is tantamount to asking whether after the physical and social sciences have done their work there is anything left for philosophy as a separate discipline. There is no doubt that philosophy as an independent discipline has raised a number of questions which are not found in the other disciplines, and these questions give philosophy a certain autonomy. For instance, philosophers, seeing that there are many knowledge-claims in ordinary discourse and in various non-philosophical fields wonder about the nature of knowledge, certainty, truth and validity. They wonder about the nature of the good since men claim to do certain good things; they raise questions pertaining to the objectivity of morality, a question that is tied up with the problem of of the objectivity of social philosophies. They raise questions pertaining to being, its meaning, origin and purpose. They delve into the problem of reasoning itself, for example in logic, and endeavour to formulate laws or rules of thought. These questions which are metaphysical, logical, epistemological, ethical, etc. impinge on the consciousnesses of philosophers all over the world and are seen as having a great importance and requiring an urgent answer.

In trying to answer these questions, there has developed what I would call division of labour among philosophers whereby some philosophers concentrate on logic and, in the process, throw light on the nature of mathematics. Others have concentrated on the nature of ordinary language to the confusion of the outsider who cannot, if not involved in it, understand linguistic analysis and its purpose. Others have found great interest in ethical language and especially in metaethics. Others delight in metaphysical and epistemological questions while some indulge in the study of theological language.

In all these inquiries the philosopher critically examines the presuppositions that exist in civilizations with regard to the nature of knowledge, the good life, cosmological and ontological assumptions, and logic. One thing that he is bound to come across is the existence of contradicions within a civilization. He has to locate the origin of these contradictions. In the process he is enlightened and may develop a maturer view of reality which he may communicate to others. His findings are among the intrinsic values of the human spirit.

One of the contradictions that philosophers today confront pertain to assumptions about the nature of knowledge. With the propagation of the scientific method and the realization of its ability to solve human problems of the technological kind, there is a prevalent attitude, which certain philosophers have

helped to develop, that the only kind of knowledge worth its name is scientific knowledge, that is, the knowledge that we find in the physical social sciences. Science understood in this way, then, has become the model for knowledge.And the humanities have been influenced by this scientific craze, so that we hear of scientific history, scientific literature, scientific study of theology etc. For example the scientific study of belief involves the observation of the overt behaviour of men; to believe in God, for instance, is interpreted in behavioural terms such as going to Church or Temple or Mosque and using an extraordinary language. The dispositions of the believer are largely left out because they are not amenable to scientific treatment. Metaphysical problems which men grapple with are considered to be illegitimate problems which language analysis can obliterate or they are considered to be superstitious hangovers.

To the philosopher, this scientific spirit and other spirits which I cannot mention here in detail may be seen as one of the possible expressions of the human consciousness in its historical march or journey. In the past, theology was the paradigm, the model, of knowledge. Today science is the model. What about tomorrow? There are signs that many people are beginning to feel that they have been cheated by science, that science is not able to cope with many human problems. Referring to the situation in the western world, E.M. Adams in his **Philosophy in the Modern World,** affirms that «in our present cultural crisis, with our materialistic values being called into question, there are indications of some loss of faith in science. Indeed some see it as a god that failed. There are signs of new interest in the humanities, in those arts and disciplines which draw especially upon our experiences of value and meaning and the language and symbolism appropriate there to in semantically appropriating and representing reality. (21).

These considerations point to the fact that one of the roles of philosophy in a civilization is to diagnose the spirit of the age and to unearth the assumptions inherent in that civilization. Philosophy carried out this way tends to produce in the philosopher a certain degree of liberaton. He sees, for example, that the epstemological standpoint that glorifies the methods of science is a moment in the history of the human spirit whose future development may take a different turn and, in a measure, repudiate the previous commitments. Furthermore, philosophy may note that in different ages the term «knowing» has its paradigms which have their corresponding commitments. For instance, in the medieval ages there was a commitment to the view that the supreme knowledge, the highest form of knowledge, could be achieved through pure thinking; this was the age when metaphysics was the Queen of the Sciences. This epistemological viewpoint had its corresponding commitments which culminated

(21) Ibid. p. 206.

in the production of metaphysical systems whose methods were rational as opposed to empirical. This conception of knowledge with its attendant commitments has given way to the modern scientific view of knowledge and to the preoccupations correlated with this conception of reality, preoccupations which have at last led to the modern commitments to technology. We are at the juncture when the human spirit may work a new paradigm for knowledge and work out corresponding commitments.

It appears that the urgent philosophical problems that man has to grapple with in the next phase of the human spirit pertain to value. The question is this : «what will man do with the products of science» ? There is the apprehension that failure on the part of man to develop new ethical visions may lead to the destruction of all the good that science has brought. With the proliferation of nuclear weapons, of communication skills that could be used to manipulate men, of efficient scientific methods of producing economically valuable goods, there is the question of the use to which these products of civilization will be put and the modes of disposing of them. There is the urgent question of what professional philosophy could do in this human situation.

Philosophical treatment of the questions of value is already militated against by the existing epistemological views as a result of whose existence subjectivism in ethics si in full swing. Indeed a few of the modern philosophies which have had considerable influence in the area of value, such as existentialism, have tended to accentuate «freedom» at the expense of order. Such philosophies are incapable of coping with the need of creating a world civilization, unless the various «freedoms of individuals» merge in a harmony as it were accidentally. The prospects of such a harmony without there being a consciously formulated philosophy of life that embraces harmony-justice-love yielding social philosophies appear impossible. No wonder that socialist philosophies, which appear to give direction to humanity as a corporate, as opposed to atomised entity, have had such a great appeal. The direction-yielding philosophies, however, have not been the characteristic preoccupations of many philosophers today and as a consequence the traditional position of systematic philosophy as a leader in human affairs has been superseded by the social sciences which, by the virtue of their very nature, are at a loss in the field of leadership, for all leadership presupposed commitment to values.

We can say with certainty that modern civilization is in dire need of philosophy, systematic philosophy, to help in the illumination of man's present dilemma and to suggest the new path that man has to follow in the pursuit of value, coneived in moral terms, a path which combines freedom and justice in a manner that will enable men to share a fuller human life «together».

This goal of philosophy is handicapped by a certain «laissez-faire» attitude towards values. There is an assumed view that left to themselves, without the

aid of systematic philosophy, societies will work out their relations for the good of man. This assumption is reminiscent of the old lassez-faire economics which, having ushered in the industrial revolution, was characterized by exploitation of man by man. Marx's insight was to see the erroneous presuppositions of this view and its attendant ills. Philosophy today, however, faces even a more serious challenge in that scepticism with regard to the objectivity of all values is all-encompassing. Philosophers, who are undoubtedly the children of their age, have joined the camp of this scepticism and, unable to rise above the situation, have found it easier to indulge in «non-value» aspects of philosophy such as logic and lingustic analysis, etc. While these «non-value» concerns give a higher quality to civilization, and while without them a civilization would be qualitatively low, the philosophy of value, directed towards humanism, would add a needed dimension in civilizations. The destiny of the world can no longer be left to the unexamined intuitions of even those who have the best intentions for the good of the world. Such intuitions constitute unsystematized philosophy and they ought to be examined and given philosophical foundation ; here I refer to those inuitions which have given rise to United Nations, greater co-operation among nations in trade, cross-cultural borrowing and such venues of exchange of ideas as the Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference in which all of us, I hope, happily participate.

LA PHILOSOPHIE AFRICAINE HIER ET AUJOURD'HUI

ELUNGU PENE ELUNGU (Zaire)

Il y a dix à quinze ans, quelque temps après l'Indépendance de nos Pays, la question se posait, radicale, de savoir si oui ou non il existait une philosophie africaine. Cette question constituait, à elle seule, une remise en question de différents courants de pensée philosophique qui s'étaient manifestées jusqu'alors sur le Continent. En effet, il existait depuis le début du siècle un mouvement d'idées de contestation de la domination coloniale parmi les intellectuels noirs africains en contact, grâce à l'Europe, avec leurs confrères noirs américains ou antillais. Ce mouvement d'idées allait avoir de plus en plus une allure et une prétention philosophique, c'est le mouvement que nous pouvons appeler le mouvement de l'Idéologie Africaine, qui avait pris de noms différents de Pan-africanisme, Négritude ... et qui est allé se métamorphosant au fur et à mesure de la libération du Continent. Il existait également, depuis bientôt une quarantaine d'années, un mouvement de pensée qui, s'appuyant sur les études ethnologiques, s'efforçait de comprendre «philosophiquement» l'âme africaine. Le mouvement de pensée critique, plus récent, se situe en fait par rapport aux deux autres grands mouvements auxquels il dénie le caractère philosophique, se réservant à lui seul le titre de «Philosophie». Ainsi est né, en fait, un troisième courant de la pensée philosophique africaine. Car la prétention de la Philosophie critique africaine ne peut être prise au sérieux — et par conséquent relativisée qu'en nous plaçant du point de vue de l'histoire de la pensée africaine. C'est à ce point de vue que nous plaçons, lorsque, dès le départ, nous prenons en considération toute la littérature africaine à prétention philosophique, qu'elle soit d'inspiration politico-idéologique ou mystico-religieuse, qu'elle soit l'oeuvre de penseur isolé ou celle d'une institution universitaire ou nationale. Or le survol de cette littérature de plus en plus abondante, de plus en plus diversifiée, nous laisse entrevoir l'existence ou mieux la coexistence de trois mouvements de pensée, que nous venons d'évoquer. Ces courants nous les examinerons en deux parties de notre exposé ; dans la première partie nous les décrirons dans leur spécificité, dans leur diversité ; dans la deuxième partie nous les définirons dans l'unité radicale qui les fonde. Ces deux parties auront comme titres :

I. Les trois grands courants de la pensée philosophique africaine.

II. L'unité potentielle des grands courants de la pensée philosophique africaine.

1. Les trois grands courants de la pensée philosophique africaine :

Les trois courants que nous évoquons ici et qui à nos yeux résorbent tous les autres sont :

1) Le courant des philosophies ethnologiques.

2) Le courant des philosophies idéologiques.

3) Le courant des philosophies critiques.

1. Commencons par le premier de ces courants : le courant des philosophies ethnologiques :

De tous les courants de pensée philosophique africaine, le plus riche en littérature est certainement le courant qui prolonge les efforts des ethnographes et des ethnologues dans tantative de compréhension spécifique de l'Africain. L'ethnologie est née avec la découverte de l'Afrique par l'Europe. Elle se veut une approche scientifique d'observation et d'explication des modes de vie des «primitifs». L'Afrique coloniale a été alors explorée de part en part; des musées ont été construits dans les Métropoles pour conserver les vestiges matériels de ces sociétés primitives ainsi que les vestiges spirituels tels qu'avaient pu les recueillir-en les interprétant-les récits des coloniaux, missionnaires, soldats et fonctionnaires ... puis les professionnels du métier.

L'ethnologie n'a cessé, comme beaucoup d'autres sciences humaines, à devenir de plus en plus scientifique, à s'atteler ainsi à une description de plus en plùs rigoureuse, à une explication de plus en plus globale visant à mettre en relation les différents faits sociaux les une avec les autres dans la recherche d'une structure fondamentale d'une société donnée.

Les sociétés africaines traditionnelles étaient, en général, trés restreintes; elles étaient si peu évolutives qu'elles ont paru à l'évolutionisme du 19é siècle européen comme les modèles mêmes des sociétés statiques, figées, des sociétés, en un mot, «sans histoire». Cette conviction trouve quelque fondement dans le spectacle qu'offraient aux dynamiques sociétés industrialisées les sociétés africaines traditionnelles. Mais, en même temps, cette prise de position indique dès le début combien l'ethnologie est mêlée à laphilosophie. L'ethnologie s'appuyant sur des méthodes de plus en plus scientifique demeure commandée par des besoins d'ordere philosophique. Parmi les Occidentaux intéressés à l'ethnologie, deux grandes catégories se dessinent : il y a d'abord, ceux qu'effraie le récent développement de la science avec le bouleversement qu' il entraine dans le domaine social et moral suite à une industrialisation rapide et sans fin. La scission qui s'est faite, à cause de la science, entre Nature et Culture devient de plus en plus un abîme infranchissable. Pour ces Occidentaux qu'effraie la Culture sans Nature, le salut semble dans le retour à la Nature.

Pour eux c'est la civilisation qui corrompt, c'est la perspective adoptée qui est foncièrement mauvaise, celle de l'homme qui s'est détaché de la Nature et qui par le logos, la raison trouvée dans son for intérieur, s'efforce de devenir la mesure de toutes choses, tente par calcul de s'assujetir le monde converti en objets

de satisfaction de ses besoins. En un mot, c'est le rejet de la civilisation prométhéenne et le retour à la Nature.

Le mythe rousseauiste du «Bon Sauvage» n'a jamais quitté l'Europe industrialisée, l'Europe au plus fort de son pouvoir sur les choses et hélas sur les autres hommes du monde. Pour ces nostalgiques, la découverte des sociétés sans histoire, sans «logos», sans culture, représente encore en plein 19è et 20è siècle la possibilité d'une existence «naturelle», la possibilité de refuge pour «le civilisé». Cette nostalgie reste encore vivace chez beaucoup d'ethnologues européens, elle est, pourrions-nous dire, fonction des blessures que fait à l'âme la civilisation technicienne.

Il y a eu aussi une autre catégorie d'Européens qui assigna à l'ethnologie une autre fonction philosophique. Cette catégorie est celle des partisans de la civilisation industrielle contemporaine et de son esprit.

Le rôle de l'homme est de dominer la nature en l'humanisant; l'humaniser c'est, en d'autres termes, en découvrir tous les secrets, la soumettre à l'action technologique pour la rendre apte à satisfaire des besoins de plus en plus grands et nombreux, de plus en plus affinés. C'est selon l'expression d'Eric Weil, l'esprit «matérialiste», «calculateur et utilitaire», c'est, en un mot, l'esprit de l'Europe triomphante et deminatrice; de l'Europe de la domination coloniale. La démarche est toujours la même qui méne à la domination des choses et des hommes : connaissances scientifiques et manipulations techniques. A l'ethnologie il est demandé la somme de ces connainssances scientifiques sur les Africains et leurs sociétés; à l'Etat, aux Entreprises, aux Missions ... il sera recommandé sur base de ces connaissances du doigté dans la manipulation des primitifs qu'il faudra rendre semblables aux colonisateurs pour l'instauration de la Civilisation.

Ainsi le mythe du retour à la Nature coexiste-t-il paradoxalement avec le mythe de la Mission civilisatrice. Dès le point de départ l'ethnologie est de la sorte en liaison étroite avec la philosophie, secrétant des mythes qui lui ont donné naissance et lui apportent sa justification. Il est vrai que l'ethnologie s'est décidément orientée vars l'objectivité scientifique par la mise entre parenthèses des mythes qui la sousentendent, cette mise entre parenthèses n'a cependant pas été totale; de plus, si elle est de plus en plus rigoureuse dans les milieux scientifiques européens, où elle se rapproche de plus en plus de la sociologie, cette mise entre parenthèsesa été souvent lâche du temps colonial et aprés nos Indépendances, elle l'est encore beaucoup plus chez les Africains en quête de philosophie. L'ethnologie en Afrique est ainsi restée mi-scientifique, mi-philosophique. Une discipline nouvelle, hybride est née, que l'on a baptisée différemment :

— «La Philosophie du Sauvage» et Brelsford en NADA - 1938.

— «La Philosophie des Négres» de Madeleine Rousseau in Musée Vivant — (Paris — 1948).

Cette discipline nouvelle suivit les fillières de l'ethnologie dans l'étude des peuples et des sociétés particulières.

— «La conception du monde et de la matière au Soudan» de M. Griaule et G. Dieterlen, in Atomes (Paris) — 1950.

— «L'Ethique chez les Pygmées» in Congo 1928 de P. Schumacher.

Il n'est pas possible d'énumérer toute cette littérature ancienne ou récente. Mais nous ne pourrions pas passer sous silence les écrits les plus symptômatiques d'une telle discipline, ceux qui l'ont définie dans sa structure, dans son orientation et dans sa méthode, ceux qui ont fait le plus de bruit et qui par les réactions positives ou négatives qu'ils ont provoquées ont contribué à en préciser le contours et à en déterminer la problématique. Il s'agit de deux ouvrages parus dans les anciennes possessions belges d'Afrique, publiés l'un par un missionnaire blanc, le R. P. Tempels, l'autre par un prêtre autochtone rwandais, l'Abbé A. Kagame, tous deux largement initiés à la philosophie aristotélico-thomiste, doctrine alors officielle de l'Eglise catholique.

Le livre du R.P. Tempels «La Philosophie bantoue» a suscité beaucoup de réactions. Disons d'emblée que cet ouvrage peut être considéré comme le prototype de cette nouvelle discipline, de ce courant puissant de la pensée philosophique africaine. Les commentaires et les critiques qui en furent faits, contribuèrent à en faire le chef d'oeuvre du genre. Sa pensée fit école et vit naître dans son sillage des oeuvres d'Européens mais aussi et surtout d'Africains qui vinrent orner la galérie de la Philosophie ethnologique ou Ethnophilosophie. **Citons pêle-mêle :**

1. «La philosophie bantu-rwandaise de l'Etre» de Kagame — 1956.

2. «La notion luba-bantoue de l'Etre» de Lufuluabo — 1964.

3. «Clairières métaphysiques africaines» de Jean Calvin Bahoken — 1967.

4. «La philosophie africaine de l'existence» de J. Fouda — 1967.

5. «Can there be an African Philosophy» de Théophile Okere (Louvain) etc... car, ils sont nombreux des écrits de ce genre qui se poursuivent en Afrique, avec une plus ou moins grande originalité dans la voie mixte de la philosophie et de l'ethnologie. L'analyse de l'un ou de l'autre de ces écrits, de Tempels et Kagame surtout, nous conduit aux caractéristiques générales suivantes de l'ethnophilosophie que nous nous contentons de résumer.

1. Les ethnophilosophies sont généralement des philosophies à prétention ontologique. La prétention pour la pensée de coller à la réalité demeure, à leurs yeux, indiscutable. De la même façon, le contenu de ces philosophies, c'est-à-dire la matière sur laquelle elles s'exercent directement, la réalité sociale des sociétés primitives, est considérée d'emblée sous l'angle de la totalité. Comme ces totalités sont en rapport ontologique avec le reste du monde, avec la divinité, la philosophie comme instrument de travail est en rapport avec l'objet imaginé comme totalité.

Tempels s'est appuyé sur l'ontologie de la tradition scolastique sans aucune discussion ; Kagame, lui aussi, s'est appuyé sur la métaphysique de tradition aristotélico-thomiste, mais avec un esprit critique remarquable. Seulement la critique de Kagame tendait à démolir la critique pour asseoir la métaphysique. Car seule une pensée procédant par dégagement précis de concepts, par leur enchaînement interne, par leur vérification grâce à la confrontation incessante avec la réalité, est une pensée «scientifique» au sens strict ; elle ne permettrait pas de saisir la totalité de l'être social, «l'âme bantoue», d'ailleurs en communication essentielle et existentielle avec le reste de l'Univers. D'ailleurs quand même elle le pourrait, qu'en fait elle serait irréalisable, car elle n'est en réalité qu'un processus fini en conquête de l'infini. Le principe «le fini de l'humain dans l'infini de l'Etre» est ignoré par nos auteurs, du point de vue des idées et des méthodes dont ils usent comme du point de vue de l'objet qu'ils explorent. La pensée humaine «s'infinitise» en prétendant, du discours logique, atteindre l'essentiel des êtres, la substance de la société, de l'Univers.

Aussi partant des données ethnologiques, espère-elle atteindre l'esprit d'une société et la façon dont cet esprit communique avec l'Univers. Ici les ethnophilosophes se distinguent les uns des autres. Il y en a qui positivement arrêtent la pensée à la lisière de l'Etre affirmant méthodologiquement «l'autonomie» du système social.

Ils se contentent, comme Agblemagnon dans «Totalités et systèmes dans les Sociétés d'Afrique Noire» P. A. 1962, de dégager «le système général de la personnalité de l'individu» ainsi que «la société toute entière comme un système». Dans le courant général de l'ethnophilosophie, de telles facons de penser constituent une famille à part : certes, elles continuent à chercher les principes philosophiques régissant nos sociétés traditionnelles comme «totalités» et dans ce sens, elles sont des ethnophilosophies mais ces ethnophilosophies s'appuyant plus sur les schémas sociologiques d'explication et de compréhension tirés des sociétés occidentales, semblent renoncer à la dimension «ontologique» propre aux sociétés africaines traditionnelles.

Le sens du mot «Philosophie» reste ainsi encore très large ; la Philosophie reste encore intimement liée à la science (ethnologie ou sociologie) qu'elle est appelée à prolonger et à compléter. **Méthodologiquement** elle renonce à

l'ontologie mais ne semble avoir d'autre fin qu'elle : la compréhension la plus large possible et la plus profonde possible. Au sein de la société dans laquelle une telle compréhension a lieu, se réalise la conscience de soi comme totalité et système autonome. Même la philosophie, conçue comme **herméneutique** c'est-à-dire comme réflexion sur les symboles d'une culture donnée, symboles à interpréter de façon à en découvrir le sens caché, reste une sorte d'ethnophilosophie dans la mesure, tout au moins, où elle présuppose l'engagement préalable et conscient dans une culture considérée comme un «système de pensées et de pratiques» dont il ne s'agit plus que de dévéler le sens.

Moins dogmatique peut-être que l'ethnophilosophie tempelsienne, une telle philosophie cherche moins à prolonger les données et les vérités ethnologiques par la recherche interprétative de sens métaphysique. Toutes ces ethnophilosophies restent cependant, tout en recusant l'ontologie rationnelle, des sciences ethnologiques liées aux principes philosophiques à prétention métaphysique.

Il y en a d'autres, par contre, tels les penseurs en quête de «l'âme bantoue» qui accordent à la philosophie qu'ils utilisent une portée franchement métaphysique et ontologique. La pensée philosophique qui se hausse au niveau des sociétés qu'elle cherche à comprendre. Or celles-ci sont des sociétés intégrées, où l'homme est en union intime avec les autres hommes, vivants et morts, avec l'Univers, visible et invisible, avec Dieu. La recherche et la découverte de «l'âme bantoue», de «la sagesse bantoue» c'est en même temps la recherche et la découverte de l'homme, du «muntu», de sa vision du monde et de Dieu. Du même coup l'ethnophilosophe se fait ici ethnologue ou sociologue, philosophe métaphysicien et théologien. Du même coup l'ethnophilosophie devient cette discipline hybride qui embrasse et unifie indistinctement ethnologie, philosophie et religion. L'ethnophilosophie est ainsi une philosophie au sens large, une philosophie qui ignore consciemment ou inconsciemment sa **spécificité exclusive** parmi les autres sciences humaines.

Pour les ethnophilosophes le sens du mot «Philosophie» demeure imprécis, **indéfini.**

2. Ethnophilosophies : Philosophies dogmatiques :

De ce que nous venons de dre, il ressort que si les ethnophilosophies n'ignorent pas la critique, elles méconaissent systématiquement une forme de pensée qui, suscitée par le doute, se retrouverait constamment alimentée par lui. La pensée ethnophilosophique n'est pas la pensée douteuse d'elle-même. Kagame, avec une conscience très lucide du problème, rejette, mais non sans embarras, cette philosophie critique qu'il appelle la philosophie de la Culture occidentale et opte décidément pour une pensée dogmatique, une pensée sûre d'elle-même, sûre de sa valeur. Chez les autres le rejet de la philosophie criti-

que est implicite et est dû soit à l'ignorance d'une telle philosophie soit à la gêne qu'elle cause dans le désir légitime de compréhension totale de l'homme, de sa société et de son univers. Il faut comprendre l'homme africain, son univers matériel, moral et spirituel et ce n'est pas la science, si vaste soit-elle, si érudite soit-elle, qui peut nous mener droit et vite à l'essentiel. Le dogmatisme est ainsi à mettre au compte du désir de compréhension totale qui anime le chercheur, le penseur.

Désir de compréhension totale certes, mais aussi et en même temps un ardent désir d'absolu. Une immense passion religieuse ou, suivant le cas, un vague sentiment religieux est souvent à l'origine de telles études : affirmer son originalité par rapport à la culture européenne, en affirmant fortement la dimension religieuse de sa propre societé. Tout se passe comme si, en prolongeant la science par l'effort philosophique l'on veut par de la saisie intégrale de son esprit absolu et l'entière conscience de son existence sociale, consciemment ou inconsciemment, directement ou indirectement, payer son tribut à la religion. Tout se passe comme si, en face de l'Occident, décidé à se définir de plus en plus par la logique, la technique et la lutte sociale, ces penseurs africains et leurs homologues étrangers s'illusionnant au sujet de l'impact de cet Occident sur l'évolution de l'Afrique, veulent définir cette Afrique par l'Art, la Religion, l'Marmonie sociale et même cosmique.

3. Les ethnophilosophies : philosophies africaines

Bien que philosophies au sens large, unissant les sciences à la Religion, bien que d'allure franchement dogmatique, les ethnophilosophies ont un avantage qu' il faut souligner brièvement. Ces philosophies, en effet, témoignent de la nécessité, pour le penseur, de l'enracinement dans sa culture. Cet enracinement nous semble indispensable à l'élaboration d'une philosophie africaine même moderne. Il n'a pas cependant à être statique, tourné vers le passé : il faut que l'enracinement dans sa culture devienne un engagement culturel actuel. Conscient de son passé le penseur africain ne doit en aucun cas par l'ethnophilosophies se réfugier dans le passé; il se doit de demeurer socieux de l'avenir et porteur de la conscience que la culture aussi est son oeuvre.

2) Le second courant . les Philosophies idéologiques

1. L'Afrique à l'heure de l'idéologie

Il n'est pas nouveau ni exagéré d'affirmer que l'Afrique d'avant la colonisation était, de façon générale, tout entière dominée par ce que nous pouvons dénommer le Culte de la Vie.

L'attachement à la Vie a été et est encore une des forces spirituelles les plus remarquables de nos peuples. Toute l'energie spirituelle semble consacrée à conjurer la mort, et tout ce qui en fait divise et menace la Vie : c'est-à-dire l'espace et le temps. Ne dit. on pas en effet généralement la mort n'est pas africaine, l'enfant pleure en venant à la Vie, et l'on danse à l'occasion du décès. Le culte voué aux ancêtres n'est en fait que le culte voué à la Vie se poursuivant outre tombe.

Nous pouvons ici nous référer au témoignage d'un observateur pénétrant, Griaule, qui écrit «En Afrique, tout groupe se sent constamment lourd de tous ses morts et de tous leurs travaux remontant jusqu'à cette nuit des temps qui, pour lui, est la lumière du mythe. On dirait que tout le poids existentiel et «substantiel» de l'homme noir ainsi que de sa société classique se trouve partagé entre le présent des vivants et le passé des survivants avec une nette supériorité de ceux-ci sur ceux-là»(*).

Il y a, en effet, chez l'Africain traditionnel cette attitude fondamentale qui consiste à nier la réalité de la mort par l'affirmation de la surabondance de la Vie, à nier le temps en résorbant le futur dans le présent en garantissant celui-ci de la consistance du passé.

Cette attitude donne la dimension et la signification de nos sociétés traditionnelles essentiellement métaphysiques et mythiques. Par cette attitude de l'Africain traditionnel, pensée conceptuelle et instrumentale, qui n'est pas inexistante, se trouve cependant niée dans son autonomie, et subordonnée à l'activité constructive de l'imagination collective d'un univers aux valeurs de la survivance, habité par les Ancêtres, plus plongé dans le passé qu'émergeant dans le présent.

La colonisation a porté un coup mortel à cette **conception mythique** du monde ; les entreprises politiques, techniques, intellectuelles de l'Afrique Coloniale et surtout post-coloniale sont toutes des entreprises de démolition des mythes traditionnels. Avec la colonisation et surtout avec la décolonisation s'opère progressivement mais sûrement le passage de la mythologie à l'idéologie.

Mais cette entreprise occidentale de démolition de nos sociétés et mythes traditionnels n'a été et n'est qu'une condition matérielle nécessaire mais pas suffisante. Il a fallu, en outre, de la part des colonisés une nouvelle volonté de réorganisation de soi, présupposant l'engagement dans la lutte de libération. C'est cette volonté nouvelle de lutte de libération, de dépassement de la société traditionnelle en déperdition en même temps que de la société coloniale qui est

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* Extrait de l'intervention de Griaule à l'Assemblée de l'Union Francaise cité par L.V. Thomas in Présence Africaine 4e Trim 1961, p. 21 Note 21.

l'essor et l'essentiel de l'idéologie africaine. Tout le monde sait que cette idéologie est née ainsi chez les minorités noires africaines en contact le plus poussé et le plus intime avec la société européenne et sous l'intense influence idéologique des noirs américains et antillais.

L'influence de l'intellectuel bourgeois Du Bois, de l'apôtre de la Violence et du Messie noir Marcus Garvey, de l'érudit Docteur Price-Mars montre que, dés le début du siècle, l'idéologie africaine est d'origine noire américaine et antillaise. Elle avait alors comme noms : Panafricanisme, Négritude et comme apôtres les intellectuels noirs africains aux études en Europe et en Amérique, un Kwame Nkrumah, un L. S. Senghor. A la base de cette idéologie il y avait le désir de s'enraciner, de se donner une patrie, un cadre dans lequel ils organiseraient la lutte pour la valorisation, la libération de l'homme noir grâce à l'unité de la race.

Ainsi, au début, cette idéologie est-elle un désir, un rêve de liberté; malgré le culturalisme de Price-Mars, le messianisme de Marcus-Garvey et l'action intellectuelle de Du Bois, l'idéologie restait plus ou moins vide au moment de sa pénétration en terre africaine.

Mais peu à peu panafricanisme et négritude allaient, au fur et à mesure que la lutte anticoloniale prenait forme, s'enrichir de contenus spécifiques.

Mais en réalité, la lutte était menée sur deux fronts avec des alliances versatiles qui soulignent l'ambiguité de l'engagement. D'un côté «l'Etat-Nation», alors essentiellement colonial, avec ses contraintes, ses exigences et son esprit; de l'autre, la société traditionnelle, avec ses usages, ses rites et ses mythes. Il fallait, au préalable, s'allier à la Tradition, aux masses pour combattre l'Etat Colonial, certes, pas pour le détruire mais pour se l'approprier, après l'avoir purgé de son caractère d'extériorité. L'on avait, en effet, besoin de l'organisation étatique, une fois le colonialisme vaincu, pour la diriger contre les institutions traditionnelles peu compatibles avec l'idéologie nouvelle.

Telle fut la nature intime de la lutte de libération de l'Afrique; son ambiguité est encore actuelle. C'est grâce à cette lutte que l'idéologie, nouvelle, va passer progressivement de l'idée à la réalité et par là même connaitre de nombreuses métamorphoses.

Au fur et à mesure que la lutte triomphait, que les responsabilités politiques et économiques passaient progressivement aux combattants, se faisait sentir la nécessité de conférer à l'idéologie primitive et originaire, des contenus doctrinaux et pratiques plus précis. Ainsi s'opéra une fragmentation de l'idéologie africaine, par souci de répondre aux exigences concrètes du temps et du milieu. C'est ainsi que le Ghana indépendant passa sans se contredire du panafricanisme au nationalisme jacobiniste, du nationalisme au socialisme

scientifique (défini par l'équipe de The spark) au socialisme dit africain (tel qui défini au Congrès de Dakar de 1962). Le Sénégal lui-même passa de la négritude, beaucoup plus littéraire, au fédéralisme, du fédéralisme au nationalisme, du nationalisme au socialisme africain.

Ainsi de façon générale sous la responsabilité de la lutte réussie et couronnée, l'idéologie africaine se donnait plusieurs contenus, plusieurs configurations, suivant les pays, suivant les époques. Aujourd'hui plusieurs figures sont reconnaissables à l'idéologie africaine à tel point qu'il nous paraît désormais légitime de parler des idéologies africaines qui ont d'ailleurs entre elles des aspects à la fois divergents et complémentaires. Mais suivant la prédominance de tel ou tel trait, nous pouvons les dénommer :

1. Le libéralisme capitaliste (Côte d'Ivoire et le Kenya).
2. Le nationalisme pragmatique authentique (Zaïre).
3. Le socialisme scientifique (Congo, Madagascar, Somalie...).
4. Le socialisme africain (Sénégal, Tanzanie).

2. **La vraie natrue des idéologies africaines :**

Mais la question peut être posée de savoir si toutes ces idéologies africaines sont vraiment des idéologies. Il nous faut, pour y répondre, nous efforcer de dégager la signification philosophique profonde de l'idéologie.

Il ne nous paraît pas possible de saisir la nature exacte de l'idéologie autrement qu'à travers la philosophie occidentale et le genre de société qu'elle a contribué à façonner. Le problème de l'idéologie n'est devenu le problème africain qu'au contact d'ailleurs conflictuel avec cette société et cette philosophie occidentale, que nous ne réussirons à dépasser qu'en les assimilant et non en les rejetant.

L'idéologie nous paraît être l'habit neuf que revêt la Philosophie en Europe depuis le 19e siècle. C'est fin 18e siècle et début 19e siècle qu'il est question d'idéologue et d'idéologie ; et il faut attendre le milieu du 19e siècle pour voir l'idéologe prendre sa forme philosophique actuelle.

Que s'est-il alors passé ?

La philosophie occidentale héritée des Grecs, en ce qu'elle avait d'essentiel, s'est métamorphosée.

Elle consistait d'abord en une réflexion critique individuelle qui avait comme conséquences :

1) de conduire à la découverte de l'autonomie du discours, du logos, à la constitution et à l'essor de la science, discours autonome qui tient sa vérité à sa cohérence interne et à sa confrontation avec le réel, tout le réel.

2) de conduire à la découverte de l'homme comme sujet du discours et par conséquent comme **mesure** (selon l'expression de Protagoras) de tout le réel ; en un mot à la découverte de la **Subjectivité.**

Ce sont ces deux éléments qui consituent la prise de conscience par laquelle se caractérise l'esprit philosophique, qui est à l'origine de l'esprit scientifique. Or au 19è sècle et surtout vers la fin de ce même 19è siècle, il y a eu en même temps l'essor considérable des sciences et des techniques et leur socialisation, ce qui a amené la métamorphose de l'esprit philosophique. La réflexion critique qui définit la philosophie devient de plus en plus **collective** et devait avoir comme conséquence :

1) de faire de la science et des techniques dans tous les domaines l'objet des **débats théoriques et publics** de sorte que rien, ou pratiquement rien d'humain n'échappa plus à leur emprise. La culture toute entière fut soumise au discours scientifique. Et l'autonomie du discours, propre à la philosophie classique se mua en **l'autonomie de la Culture,** et même de la société humaine elle-même toute entière que définit cette culture.

2) de faire de la **Subjectivité individuelle** une **intersubjectivité.** C'est celle-ci et non plus l'effort transcendant d'un penseur individuel qui constitue désormais la mesure de ce qui n'échappe plus ni à la culture ni au dynamisme de la société humaine.

Cette prise de conscience collective de ses capacités de ses efforts, pour un groupe humain, fait de la philosophie une recherche collective du Vrai et du Bien, à travers les formes scientifiques du discours et les exigences techiques du travail. Cette sorte de philosophie nouvelle, on l'a appelée l'idéologie. A cette pensée scientifique et philosophique collective communieront un nombre plus ou moins important des personnes utilisant les mêmes règles et méthodes, aspirant aux mêmes valeurs et luttant ainsi ensemble pour leur réalisation. Ce sont des familles d'esprit; il y aura ainsi autant d'idéologies qu'il y aura des sociétés. Telles sont les conditions socio-historiques qui ont préludé à l'émergence de l'idéologie ; l'idéologie est par nature liée à l'existence des sociétés dynamiques qui visent par la réalisation collective des sciences et des techniques le règne de l'Absolu du Vrai, du Bien. L'idéologie est ainsi à la fois une philosophie individuelle et collective, analytique et synthétique, agonale et triomphante. Elle est, pour une société, un grand débat théorique et pratique permanent en vue de la réalisation collective de l'Absolu, pourtant immanent.

Si telle est la signification philosophique de l'déologie, il va sans dire qu'elle devra pour une société ou un groupe social donné comporter nécessairement trois éléments :

1. D'abord les conditionnements, ou si l'on veut «les déterminismes» matériels, historiques de l'existence humaine collective, ainsi que la somme des connaissances scientifiques et théoriques en sa possession sous forme des débats théoriques et des réalisations techniques actuelles.
2. Ensuite des règles, des lois expriment et constituant son échelle des valeurs.
3. Enfin l'existence ou mieux l'affirmation de son «sacré» c'est-à-dire de ce que l'on ne discute pas, de ce devant quoi on s'incline.

Eh bien ! cette conception philosophique de l'idéologie constitue la toile de fond des sociétés à idéologies. Mais il est certain que dans chacune d'elles la praxis sociale et la praxis politique peuvent conduire et conduisent effectivement à des interprétations sociologique ou politique différentes de l'idéologie, peuvent donner aux trois éléments constitutifs de l'idéologie une importance différente et par là contribuer à donner à l'idéologie des définitions sociologiques ou politiques différentes.

Nous savons, par example, que depuis K. Marx, il y a tendance à définir l'idéologie à partir de la structure bipolaire infrastructure — superstructure. Cela n'est pas tout à fait inexact. Bien qu'il y ait entre les trois niveaux ou éléments de l'idéologie signalés plus haut une interaction ou plutôt bien qu'il **doive normalement** y avoir une interaction réciproque, il est possible que dans une société donnée, à une époque donnée cette dialectique normale n'ait pas lieu. Il est possible, en effet de concevoir dans cette interaction réciproque entre le 1er, le 2è et le 3è éléments de toute idéologie, un ensemble de situations différentes les unes des autres, telle par exemple celle où, sous la domination d'une majorité par une minorité, cette majorité soit privée d'une masse de connaissances objectives l'éclairant sur sa situation réelle (le 1er élément ou niveau), qu'elle soit privée de toute capacité morale et politique et de se déterminer la voie à suivre (v-à-dire que le 2è élément soit purement et simplement inexistant) qu'enfin cette majorité en soit réduite à rêver du Bonheur et à se contenter de l'idéologie de la classe ou même de la société dominante pour la justification de sa propre situation (3é élément) — Dans une telle société — nationale ou internationale — il y aurait ainsi une structure bipolaire :

1. La situation de l'existence dominée de la majorité sans idéologie (au sens strict)
2. Et l'idéologie de la minorité dominante et dirigeante, idéologie extérieure à la majorté dominée et s'imposant à elle comme une superstructure.

Il est difficile et malaisé d'user de l'analyse marxiste de l'idéologie du seul point de vue national africain. Mais placé du point de vue international, elle peut éclairer d'un jour nouveau la position idéologique de la plupart de nos sociétés. Celles-ci apparaissent alors, en effet, comme des sociétés dominées au niveau de l'infrastructure, c'est-à-dire au niveau de la production économique des réalisations scientifiques et techniques qui conditionnent et commandent cette production.

Le premier élément indispensable à l'idéologie est ainsi inexistant, quant au deuxième élément la capacité politique et morale de se diriger, il se trouve considérablement affecté par cette domination infrastructurelle. D'où la tendance pour les idéologies de nos sociétés à se réfugier dans le troisième élément : l'affirmation, voire l'exaltation, de notre sacré : notre Liberté, notre Indépendance totale. Privées de l'efficacité scientifico-technique et de la capacité de production économique, ces sociétés vont de plus en plus s'appuyer sur cette seule exigence suprême pour se dériger. Aussi leurs idéologies tendent-elles à n'être que des idéologies tronquées, des idéologies des sociétés dominées, se réfugiant spontanément soit dans l'activité pragmatique soit dans le mythe (dû à l'absence d'esprit critique et de débats théoriques), pour encore essayer de faire jouer à l'idéologie son rôle normal : celui de ciment de la société pour laquelle elle est idéologie. C'est ainsi, à titre d'exemple, que le socialisme dit africain, tourne le dos à l'analyse objective de nos sociétés actuelles, entrainées malgré elles dans les luttes sociales, constitutives de classes sociales, pour se réfugier dans le communalisme de nos sociétés traditionnelles, pour le prôner en modèle d'intégration sociale. Or nos sociétés traditionnelles n'étaient vraiment intégrées que grâce au mythe que combat et démolit notre insertion dans l'histoire des sociétés industrialisées, des sociétés à idéologies. Ce seul petit exemple illustre à la fois et la nature socio-politique des idéologies africaines et leur faiblesse, qui est aussi la nature et la faiblesse de nos sociétés où la science et la technique ne jouent pas encore un rôle déterminant dans l'organisation matérielle et morale de notre existence sociale, où le théorique et le pratique ne font pas nécessairement ménage.

Cette faiblesse les oblige presque toutes à naviguer entre Charibde et Scylla, entre l'activisme pragmatique et le romantisme mythique. Ce qui a, en partie, provoqué un nouveau courant de pensée philosophique africaine.

3. Le courant des philosophies critiques.

Ce courant de pensée philosophique africain est le plus récent; il est aussi le moins riche en littérature mais pas le moins important.

Il s'est constitué en réaction contre les deux autres courants philosophiques précédents. Parmi les écrits les plus significatifs de ce courant citons entre autres :

1. «Le décollage conceptuel : condition d'une philosophie bantoue» in Diogène, n° 52, 1965 Article de Franz Crahay contre la Philosophie bantoue de Tempels.
2. Toujours contre Tempels, l'article d'Eboussi Boulaga «Le Bantou problématique» in Présence Africaine n° 66, 1968.
3. Hountondji «Remarques sur la philosophie contemporaine» in Diogène n° 71, 1970.
4. idem : «Histoire d'un mythe» in Présence Africaine, n° 91, 1974.
5. «Essai sur la problématique philosophique dans l'Afrique Actuelle» Clé, Yaounde 1971 de M. Towa.
6. «Négritude et Négrologues» de Stanislas Adotevi, Union générale d'éditions, 1972.

De façon générale les philosophes de ce courant que nous considérons comme les représentants de la Philosophie critique, s'insurgent contre les deux autres courants, non pas contre l'ethnologie ni même contre l'idéologie mais contre l'usage philosophique de l'ethnologie et contre l'usage mythique de l'idéologie. Pour mieux saisir leur position résumons brièvement leurs idées sur leur concept de la Philosophie africaine ainsi que sur la destination ou rôle qu'ils lui donnent.

1. Leur concept de la Philosophie africaine :

Il faut d'emblée dire que ce concept se précise en réaction contre les conceptions ethnologiques et idéologico-mythiques de la philosophie africaine.

Que leur reprochent-ils en fait?

D'abord d'être des efforts escamotés de philosophie, de vouloir se constituer en philosophies qui s'ignorent. «Le philosophe» de ce genre, constatent-ils, commence faussement par se mettre entre parenthèses, pour ne se constituer qu'en spectateur qui observe, découvre, en l'exhumant une pensée qui ne serait pas la sienne propre, une pensée constituée, statique, inconsciente d'un groupe considéré. Les philosophes critiques constatent que dans ce travail négatif de la Vraie philosophie les ethno-philosophes, et les idéologues dans la mesure où ils rejoignent les ethnophilosophes par absence de théorie, n'en soulignent pas moins indirectement le caractère personnel, engagé et responsable que comporte toute entreprise philosophique. Ce caractère n'est cependant pas mis en exergue.

Il n'y a des philosophies que là où il y a d'abord des philosophes; et être philosophe c'est d'abord s'engager dans la Voie de la recherche libre de la Vérité, de la Vérite à exprimer plutôte que de la contempler.

L'engagement philosophique est un engagement au discours rationnel comme seul lieu de la Vérité.

Par là les philosophes critiques placent l'essence de la Philosophie dans la pensée délibrément discursive; ils se méfient du mythe, des idéologies non discutées, dans la mesure où l'on en fait des formes normales de l'expression philosophique, dans la même mesure où ils ne sont pas repris par un discourrs rationnel et critique, conscient de ses limites tant au niveau de l'intention signifiante qu'à celui des significations. L'engagement parsonnel, conscient et responsable dans le discours rationnel et critique exige ainsi la rupture d'avec les mythes, d'avec les idées recues, les idées toutes faites.

L'attitude qui consiste à accepter ces idées, ces mythes, à les considérer d'emblée comme les expressions à la fois des réalités et des valeurs, est précisément celle que récusent les philosophes critiques. Adopter une telle attitude mène directement à la recherche de justification des idées, des options morales ou politiques jugées d'emblée comme valables, comme indiscutables. C'est la voie au dogmatique que Eboussi Boulaga reproche à Tempels, Towa au défenseur de la Négritude. Les philosophes critiques s'en prennent ainsi, en voie de conséquence, au contenu des philosophies ethnologiques on même idéologiques. Ne s'engageant pas directement dans un discours rationnel et critique, ces philosophes ont tendance à considérer la philosophie comme étant essentiellement hors et au-dessus d'un tel discours, hors et au-dessus du langage. La philosophie n'est plus parole, logos mais un chose, la chose ou la structure réelle des choses; elle n'est plus un universel abstrait, pouvant servir de médiation entre l'homme et les choses mais un universel concret, ancré dans les choses même. Tous les systèmes de pensée, ayant existé en soi et exprimant absolument «L'âme bantoue», «la personnalité nègre», «la personnalité négro-africaine», «la négritude» comme étant un ensemble de traits factuels, un ensemble des choses hors de la portée du discours actuel, parce qu'extrinsèque et transcendant à lui, font partie de cette catégorie. En face de ces systèmes «ontologiques» qui s'opposent et même qui s'imposent à l'homme, la pensée se fait impuissante et quand elle s'efforce de s'exercer, elle se donne comme tâche l'expression de l'inexprimable, le récit de l'ineffable.

De plus, non seulement «ces systèmes de pensée» se font chose ou structure des choses, mais aussi cette chose ou structure des choses se fait Valeur. Or la chose devenue Valeur c'est l'Absolu, d'être, de pensée et d'action, qui ne se discute pas mais à partir duquel tout le reste s'éclaire. Comme cet absolu-imaginairement constitué-n'a trait qu'à une société donnée, il est paradoxalement Particulier. C'est un universel concret, pouvant s'opposer à d'autres universels concrets, en se particularisant, en se singularisant. Subordonner la pensée à un tel universel particulier c'est nécessairement la faire renoncer à l'universel, l'égarer dans les affirmations exaltantes et défensives des originalités extra-ration-

nelles. «L'âme bantoue» «la personnalité négro-africaine», s'opposeraient ainsi, à titrre d'exemple, à «l'âme européenne» à «l'âme chinoise» non pas en raison mais sur base de quelques autres principes ontologiques affectivement sentis et imaginairement élaborés. L'idôle fabriquée exige l'adoration de la raison. Et du coup la philosophie se donne comme fonction essentielle de servir de justification aux croyances, aux convictions plus ou moins sincères. Ainsi, selon eux, la philosophie, non seulement prendrait sa source dans le coeur et l'imagination en se faisant inspirer par eux, mais considèrerait comme son point de départ indiscutable ce que grâce au coeur et à l'imagination la pensée a mythiquement élaboré, en dehors de la critique du discours rationnel.

2. La destination de la Philosophie africaine :

Si pour les philosophes critiques, la philosophie nait du discours, se nourrit du discours, elle ne saurrait trouver sa dernière justification en dehors de la discussion, que suscite l'autonomie et la multiplicité des discours. Ils reprochent aux philosophies ethnologiques ou même idéologiques de réduire la philosophie en la subordonnant **inconditionnellement** ou à la religion ou à la politique, en faisant «la servante» et non la collaboratrice de la foi religieuse ou de la conviction politique. Ce faisant elles éliminent la philosophie en interdisant la discussion comme source de la Vérité et de la Valeur.

Cela signifie que, selon eux, le seul grand obstacle à surmonter reste la transcendance au discours rationnel, transcendance affirmée en dehors de la raison discursive. L'on ne peut de là conclure que ces philosophes veuillent s'affirmer radicalement contre la Religion ou la Politique, qu'ils soient nécessairement **a-religieux** ou **a-politiques.** Ce qu'ils affirment c'est **l'autonomie de la raison** c'est-à-dire qu'ils s'imaginent la raison et plus concrètement l'homme et sa parole comme obéissant ou tout au moins comme devant obéir à des lois qui leur sont inhérentes, internes, lois auxquelles on ne peut déroger une obéissance à une instance extérieure à la raison. La raison se doit d'obéir à elle-même et trouver en elle-même des règles et normes susceptibles de lui faire découvrir la Vérité à suivre, de lui révéler la Valeur à réaliser.

On le voit, la voie que se sont choisie ces philosophes critiques africains, est la voie du rationalisme, la Voie même de la raison.

Et l'Objection que spontanément on peut leur faire est d'opter ainsi en Afrique pour le concept européen de la Philosophie. Et en fait ils avouent se servir du concept européen de la Philosophie, affirment qu'il n'y a aucune honte à cela, que le plus important, à l'heure actuelle pour l'Afrique, n'est point la recherche morbide de son originalité mais bien le souci de l'enracinement africain dans l'ouverture sur l'Universel ainsi que la préoccupation d'efficacité au service de la liberté et de la dignité africaine et humaine.

M. Towa qui de la façon à la fois critique et positive adopte cette position, en se réferant d'ailleurs à un philosophe des plus représentatifs de la conscience européenne- Hegel- s'explique très nettement à ce sujet : «S'il st vrai que la philosophie européenne moderne se préoccupe essentiellement de développer l'emprise de l'homme sur le milieu physique et humain par la médiation d'un savoir rigoureux, scientifique et libre, alors elle pourrait bien constituer le domaine privilégié de la Culture européenne, qu'il importe d'explorer avec soin afin de percer le secret de la Victoire de l'Europe sur nous et par là même de découvrir la voie de notre libération*.

De là la tendance, pour eux, à concevoir la Philosophie africaine comme essentiellement destinée è servir l'homme- africain avant tout-en lui faisant découvrir la Vérité, en le rendant de plus en plus maître de la nature et aussi de plus en plus libre parmi les hommes. La philosophie africaine doit être ainsi essentiellement un discours théorique se constituant sans cesse sur base de ses propres critères de vérité, s'élargissant de plus en plus au plus grand nombre possible de ses concitoyens. Ainsi, en s'adonnant à ce discours rationnel, le philosophe africain contribuera à aider ses compatriotes à s'approprier rationnellement la Nature, la Politique et la Religion, dans le rejet des justifications complaisantes et intéressées des a-priori mal définis. Ainsi en renoncant à s'adresser à l'Europe comme pour la convaincre de l'originalité africaine, il aidera ses concitoyens à saisir l'essentiel qui consiste non pas à découvrir et à révéler aux autres ce qui nous singularise mais bien à déterminer rationnellement notre possibilité existentielle, à l'appeler à l'existence, en un mot, à nous réaliser tout en réalisant des sociétés où fleuriraient la raison et la liberté.

C'est à cela que doit être destinée la nécessité de l'élaboration théorique, de la destination primaire à ses compatriotes du discours théorique, sur laquelle insistent les philosophes de ce dernier courant de pensée philosophique africaine.

II. L'Unité possible de trois grands courants de pensée philosophique africaine

Tous ces différents courants de pensée philosophique africaine que nous avons analysés jusqu'à présent sont non seulement différents mais même divergents. Ils divergent sur les points importants comme la nature de la philosophie, sa destination, son rôle, à telle enseigne qu'il semble à première vue abusif le terme de Philosophie Africaine.

Et pourtant, un fait est clair et évident: tous ces courants sont issus, comme les ruisseaux, d'une seule et même source. Il y a là l'unité «matérielle» de la source commune d'où ils prennent naissance. Mais cette source quelle est-elle?

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* Essai sur la problématique philosophique dans l'Afrique actuelle. Ed. Clé, p. 67.

1. C'est la situation matérielle et spirituelle de la l'Africque et de l'Africain aujourd'hui.

Cette situation est, en un mot, celle de la domination et de l'asservissement, la domination par l'Occident, l'asservissement à l'Occident, amorcés de facon décisive à l'époque de la colonisation industrielle. Cette domination et cet asservissement ont eu et ont encore comme effet de nous arracher brutalement de notre univers culturel traditionnel, de briser l'harmonie mythico-religieuse de nos sociétés traditionnelles, de nous jeter en un mot dans la lutte où jusqu à présent nous ne savons pas clairement ce qu'il faut défendre et préserver, de la tradition et de la modernité, sinon notre propre survie comme êtres libres.Notre situation matérielle et spirituelle d'africains se trouve ainsi déterminée à la fois par notre double appartenance aux deux mondes en opposition conflictuelle, le monde de la tradition et celui de la modernité ainsi que par notre aspiration à la liberté.

D'abord la double appartenance au monde de la tradition et de la modernité. Cette appartenance n'est pas de tout repos, parce que le monde de la modernité occidentale continue à s'opposer et à s'imposer au monde de la tradition, à tel point que l'appartenance à la tradition peut paraître parfois n'être que temporaire, à tel point que l'appartenance à la modernité prend l'allure de notre déracinement du milieu culturel, et comme nous venons de le dire, de notre asservissement. C'est ce qui explique en fait la déchirure actuelle de la conscience africaine. Nous nous trouvons, nos traditions et nous-mêmes, face à la civilisation moderne occidentale comme face au destin qui entraîne ceux qui lui résistent et guide ceux qui le suivent. Cela signifie que nous sommes déjà embarqués bon gré malgré sur les vaisseaux de l'Occident vers la destination inconnue qui nous éloigne chaque jour davantage de l'organisation traditionnelle de nos sociétés, de l'organisation de la vie au sein de celles ci. Nous sommes au coeur d'un conflit historique tragique entre deux types des sociétés, deux types des civilisations, deux types des cultures où l'un est déjà sûr tôt ou tard de l'emporter. L'enjeu en fait, c'est la possibilité de notre survie dans la liberté ou l'esclavage, au travers de cette métamorphose historique. C'est pourquoi ensuite, notre aspiration à la survie dans la liberté, en relevant le défi nous lance par l'Occident constitue, en plus du conflit lui-même des cultures, le second facteur important de notre situation matérielle et spirituelle. Situation de conflit et de lutte où l'enjeu est la liberté ou l'esclavage, la vie ou la mort de l'homme noir, de l'homme africain. Situation agonale qui provoque chez lui une conscience de déchirure et de désarroi qui pousse à la recherche de solution, de planche de salut.

2. Les différents courants : réactions à la situation fondamentale africaine.

C'est à cette situation que réagissent les différents courants de pensée précités; c'est à cette situation qu'ils se veulent de rémédier en proposant chacun son système de solution.

De ce point de vue la tendance ethnophilosophique peut apparaître comme une espèce de saut dans la tradition, une espèce de fuite dans le passé. Tout se passe alors comme si la situation de conflit et de lutte, il faut tourner le dos à la lutte et au combat, se refugier dans le passé de nos cultures encore vivaces non pas tellement pour s'en inspirer ou y puiser un principe directeur, une nouvelle raison de combattre mais au contraire pour y retrouver la quiétude des sociétés sans histoire, des sociétés intégrées et tranquilles. Le philosophe, curieusement et paradoxalement, met alors entre parenthèses sa propre conscience philosophique née de sa situation matérielle et spirituelle, se projette dans un passé qu'il reconstitue plus avec le concours de l'imagination que de la science. Il va jusqu'à désirer, dans ce retour au passé, l'établissement de la société actuelle, de I'homme actuel en retour au passé. L'établissement de la société actuelle, de l'homme actuel en société et en homme du passé, essentiellement sous l'empire du mythe qui intègre et sécurise. C'est pourquoi il ira jusqu'à plaier la conscience de soi actuelle dans l'affirmation de l'identité et de l'originalité de l'homme et de la société traditionnelle en perte de vitesse.

Ainsi est opérée consciemment ou inconsciemment une fuite dans le passé, dans le mythe, refus des contradictions actuelles et du combat du jour, pour une certaine contemplation mythique qui sauve.

La tendance «idéologique», elle, accepte le combat, ne cherche pas le salut dans la fuite, dans une vague contemplation mythique des sociétés et civilisations imaginairement reconstituées et sauvées de destruction. La preuve c'est que ce courant de pensée s'allie d'emblée à la Politique, entendue au sens large de lutte de libération; il fait sienne l'aspiration à la liberté issue de notre situation de dominés et d'asservis. Du coup ce courant recouvre une nouvelle dimension du temps dans laquelle le présent déjà gros du passé se trouve constamment défini en fonction de l'avenir. Par là même ce courant opte pour la modernité, rejette le temps cyclique et de l'éternel présent propre à la mythologie, propre à la société et à l'homme traditionnelle. On passe de la mythologie à l'idéologie. Et celle-ci concourt à la mise sur pied des moyens appropiés pour chercher dans l'avenir le salut de l'Afrique et de l'Africain: sa libération et sa liberté. La modernité prend le pas sur la tradition. Seulement, comme le courant idéologique voit «les moyens appropriés» dans l'intégration sociale et que cette intégration sociale tend à être définie beaucoup moins en termes de la reconnaissance subjectivité, de la participation des sujets divers et autonomes à la foi révolutionnaire et à la conviction politique commune qu'en termes de préservation de la subjectivation de la société, de la constitution des classes sociales et de lutte sociale, l'avantage de la modernité sur la tradition s'estompe et s'amorce alors subrepticement un certain recours au mythe, un retour camouflé de l'idéologie à la mythologie.

C'est contre cette rechute dans le mythe que s'insurge le courant critique de la philosophie africaine avec la même énergie avec laquelle il combat l'ethnophilosophie.

Mais cette critique n'est pas une critique négative. La philosophie critique accepte l'orientation tournée vers l'avenir des philosophies idéoloiques, elle adopte son projet de libération de l'Afrique et de l'Africain.seulement dans la réalisation de ce projet, elle préconise comme seul remède valable, comme seul chemin à suivre le recours à la raison discursive, aux deux principes philosophiques qu'elle présuppose : l'autonomie du discours et l'émergence de la subjectivité c'est-à-dire de l'homme comme sujet du discours.

Cela entraîne comme conséquence:

1) Qu'il nous faut rompre avec le mythe, le détrôner du rôle qu'il jouait encore, dans nos sociétés et en leurs membres, de ciment de al totalité, de facteur d'intégration.

Comme le remarque J. Howlett dans les sociétés traditionnelles, mythiques, «le cordon ombilical avec la vie et le vaste monde n'était pas tranché. La parole africaine a sa rigueur, cette rigueur consiste à maintenir l'order d'une totalité socialo-mythico-religieuse». **Présence Africaine** n. 9, 1974, p. 20. Dans cet univers mythique, «il n'y a pas d'écart entre l'homme et sa culture. Les choses et les hommes parlent assez, pourquoi un langage de représentation, d'explication, quand il existe des institutions par quoi la Vie quotidienne donne réponse aux situations» **ibid,** p. 16, l. 31.
Eh bien ! il faut que le mythe soit brisé, il faut que soit également brisée la totalité dont il est l'unité ; il faut que le cordon ombilical soit rompu avec la Vie et le Vaste monde, qu'entre le Vaste monde et la Vie d'une part et l'homme d'autre part soit intercalé ce langage de représentation, d'explication, c'est-à-dire la raison discursive dans sa pleine autonomie. C'est ainsi que la pensée décolle du Monde pour ensuite le mieux maîtriser.

2) Que cette raison discursive se développe et s'élargisse. La seule façon de se développer et de s'élargir est l'adoption par nous des sciences et techniques occidentales. Par l'apprentissage scientifique et technique sera donné une consistance à l'autonomie de notre discours théorique et sera envisagée la possibilité de réalisation socio-industrielle que nous n'aurons plus à subir mais à assumer.

3) Que soient adoptées les sciences et les techniques, mais aussi et avant tout l'esprit scientifique, qui est le même que l'esprit de la philosophie critique, s'appuyant sur l'autonomie du discours pour conquérir la vérité, dans tous les domaines, grâce aux critères internes au discours lui-même et aux confontations incessantes avec le Réel. Adopter

l'esprit scientifique cela veut dire ne laisser aucun domaine, y compris celui de l'organisation de l'existence sociale, hors de la portée de la méthode scientifique, toute faite de **discussion** et **d'expérimentation.**

C'est par là que le courant critique de la pensée philosophie africaine se propose lui-même au courant idéologique comme son âme vivifiante et son arme efficace. Dans la détermination de notre possibilité existentielle, de nos projets de société, dans l'effort de réalisation de ces projets, il faut éviter le recours au mythe, il faut au contraire répandre le plus possible l'instruction scientifique et technique par l'éducation, pour que la population soit de plus en plus capable d'attitude et de méthode scientifique dans l'approche des problèmes qui la concernent, pour que dans la recherche de la Vérité, de sa Vérité soient reculées le plus loin possible les solutions mythiques en faveur de la confrontation avec les autres dans les débats publics tant théoriques que pratiques, de la confrontation avec la réalité dans l'observation et l'expérimentation. C'est dans la conquête de la Vérité, dans le creuset de la discussion que se forgera petit à petit mais sûrement le **consensus** national, populaire... au sujet de notre projet **fondamental.**

Car à l'heure actuelle, le plus important c'est ce projet fondamental de nous-mêmes et la façon dont nous nous y prenons pour le réaliser ; et ce projet n'est pas à chercher dans l'Afrique traditionnelle ni dans la modernité **mais en nous,** en notre capacité de mettre l'une et l'autre en contribution pour nous affirmer, nous affranchir et nous réaliser.

3. La découverte de la subjectivité :

L'on voit par là comment, malgré leurs différences, les trois courants de pensée philosophique africaine laissent entrevoir leur unité potentielle. Cette unité consiste dans ce que nous venons d'appeler : «nous», «notre capacité de nous définir et de nous réaliser» c'est-à-dire en termes philosophiques : «la Subjectivité» — La découverte de la subjectivité coincide avec la naissance de la philosophie ; et c'est dans la mesure où les trois courants l'affirment plus ou moins que d'une façon ou d'une autre ils méritent le titre de «Philosophie».

La subjectivité se trouve affirmée dans le courant dit ethnologique, mais de façon voilée et paradoxale. L'ethnophilosophe qui en réalité affirme sa propre subjectivité dans la recherche de l'identité et l'originalité du peuple qu'il étudie se dérobe aussitôt, s'efface presque complètement pour s'identifier à l'âme du peuple qu'il considère «l'âme bantoue», «la personnalité négro-africaine». La subjectivité individuelle s'efface devant la subjectivité collective ; entre les deux n'existe que le lien obscur de l'imagination qui a contribué à façonner ce sujet collectif, le lien tenu du sentiment de nostalgie qui unit le sujet du philosophe au sujet collectif du peuple duquel il descend la plupart du temps. Or ce sujet collectif, exhumé par l'imagination, parce que construit,

n'existe que dans la conscience du philosophe ; mais comme celle-ci se nie comme conscience de soi, ce sujet collectif n'a plus que la consistance de l'imaginaire.

Le Père Tempels, par exemple, devait comprendre que sa «Philosophie bantoue» n'était fondamentalement que sa vision de la Vision bantoue du monde ; que le plus important était sa prise de conscience comme **sujet** de connaissance de la façon dont les Bantous appréhendaient le monde. A partir de là, sans se nier comme sujet il y avait lieu de présenter aux Bantous — de préférence — sous forme de discours théorique — cette même vision et instaurer avec eux un vrai dialogue philosophique. Du dialogue émerge la subjectivité, l'inter-subjectivité ; c'est aussi du dialogue qu'elle se nourrit. Ainsi ce que l'on a appelé l'ethnophilosophie comporte-t-elle une possibilité d'émergence de la subjectivité. C'est en cela qu'elle est, potentiellement du moins, une philosophie.

Cette possibilité devient dans le courant idéologique une réalité. Car l'idéologie qui fait un projet de société, qui recourt à l'intégration sociale pour sa réalisation ne le fait qu'en passant par l'affirmation de sa subjectivité à laquelle il veut rallier les autres subjectivités. Et le courant critique trouve que c'est là une ambition tout à fait légitime, mais que ce ralliement ne peut se faire valablement que par :

1) l'affirmation effective de la subjectivité de chacun et cela dans la mesure du possible. Il faut pour cela aider chacun à adopter l'esprit philosophique, l'esprit scientifique en prenant conscience de son pouvoir du discours et de l'autonomie de celui-ci.

2) l'affirmation de l'inter-subjectivité en développant, dans la recherche de la Vérité et du bonheur, la méthode scientifique de confrontation par débats et confrontation avec la réalité.

C'est dans cette notion de subjectivité et d'inter-subjectivité que ces différents courants se rencontrent. En développant le discours théorique par les Africains dans tous les domaines, en l'adressant principalement à ses compatriotes africains, en leur donnant ou en leur créant l'occasion d'y participer, on les fait passer de la condition **d'objets** de l'action scientifico-technique, socio-politique ... à celle de **sujets** de connaissance, responsables de leur propre vie scientifique, économique, sociale et politique, on contribue à leur libération, on participe à la prise de conscience collective, entretenue par un discours théorique, commun, de plus en plus cohérent qui sera la véritable âme du peuple

A partir de cette conscience et de ce discours et grâce à eux ,tous les problèmes pourront être posés et pourront trouver leurs solutions ou demi-solutions, y compris les problèmes :

1) de l'enracinement dans sa ou ses cultures, qui intéresse l'ethnophilosophie.

2) de sa possibilité existentielle, de projet fondamental de société, d'intégration sociale, d'efficacité, qui intéresse particulièrement le courant idéologique.

3) Comme ceux, spécifiques, de l'appropriation de la science et de son esprit ainsi que de la réalisation concomitante de «plus de liberté» qui préoccupent le courant dit de Philosophie critique.

Ainsi tous ces courants pourront-ils s'intégrer dans un ensemble harmonieux qui pourra, à juste titre, porter le nom de **Philosophie-Africaine**, qui certainement contribuerait au progrès de nos sociétés, à la libération de l'Afrique comme à la liberté et à la dignité des Africains pour le grand bien du monde.

HUMANISM AND MODERNITY IN THE ARAB WORLD TODAY

M. FAKHRY (Lebanon)

By humanism, we are to understand, broadly speaking, the recognition of man, as the arbiter of truth and value in general. There is an absolute form of humanism which some forms of existentialism, such as that of J. Paul Sartre have highlighted in our time. This form regards man, or human subjectivity, as the ultimate and sole criterion of value or truth. There is, on the other hand, a mitigated form of humanism, which, without going to this extreme, recognizes the fundamental significance of man's role in determining his destiny, and transforming the world around him. On either count, it seems to me that it is of the essence of modernity (or active participation in the life of the modern age) that humanism, in some form or other, should be placed at the center of our intellectual, economic, social or political concerns. On this view, humanism becomes the most important element in any program of reform or social change, for which the Arab world has been searching, and continues to search today. Here the philosopher can do a great deal to clarify issues, define objectives of an ideological or ethical nature, and finally contribute to the development of practical reform programs.

Such a contribution, however, will remain peripheral unless it can be related organically to the cultural and social context of the age. The Arab world has been passing through a phase of ferment, of searching, of self-examination, for at least seven decades. The obscurities surrounding this world have not been completely dispelled, and fresh cultural and political goals have not yet been clearly defined. It appears today that such a task cannot be achieved, without a careful philosophical examination of the whole cultural groundwork and this will inevitably force Arab intellectuals and leaders to take a hard look at the past. History, here too, si a great and instructive teacher.

Where in the recesses of Arab cultural history do we come across pockets of humanistic thought which can, be rediscovered, re-examined, and used as a springboard for future progress ? Where, in other words, can the seeker for modernity begin, if he is not rashly to sever all links with the past ?

A fundamental premise of our re-thinking of vital current problems is that the past should nonetheless be properly understood. Arab cultural history, as we see it, was dominated by what a leading American «historian of ideas» Arthur Lovejoy has termed the «otherworldly pathos». There is no doubt in

my own mind that, coupled with theological intensity, this pathos dominated Arab medieval thought for many centuries ; in fact it continues to dominate large sections of Arab thought even today. This is what one might call the «medievalism» of Arabic thought.

Now, the question whether the otherworldly and theological pathos is not in itself an expression of some of the deepest aspirations of our nature is undoubtedly a very pertinent one. The philosopher, or better the metaphysician, should address himself earnestly to its solution. However, in discussing the pressing and vital issues facing us at this conference we can perfectly well bypass this issue. We can, in other words, leave open the question of the ultimate validity or invalidity of this pathos, in its broadest philosophical dimensions, and proceed not-withstanding to maintain that in our time humanism (or the this worldly pathos, as Lovejoy has also termed it) is an essential component of modernity. W need only remind ourselves in the Afro-Asian countries today that our most pressing and vital problems are problems of economic development, political reform, social transformation, intellectual liberation ; and that all of these problems are essentially human and thisworldly.

Whether these problems can be dealt with in total abstraction from the historical cultural contexts of the modern Arab world has already been answered in the negative. My contribution will therefore consist, at least in part, in isolating the pockets of humanism in the Arabic cultural tradition and assessing their significance. The search may appear at first sight hazardous and fruitless, by reason of the great complexity of that culture. We are, however, fortunate enough to be able, like geographical explorers, to identify whole configurations of humanistic thought in Arab history which have unfortunately not received all the attention they deserve. In a very specific way we are even able to identify the temporal coordinates of these configurations or movements, the moment at which the Arab mind is awakened to the great drama of self-examination and self-direction. It all begins in the second/eight centuries at Damascus, under Umayyad rule, at the hands of the early Qadari thinkers, who were forerunners of their great successors, the Mu'tazilah.

That Umayyad Damascus should have been the locus of this epochmaking development is no accident of history. The Umayyads, the first major dynastic power in Islam, were far more concerned with consolidating their political and military hold over their subjects, than in the propagation of the religious message of Islam. The historians give ample illustrations of the «mundane» pre-occupations of the early Umayyad caliphs, that are very well-known to you all. Accordingly, they had a great stake in political stability ; and any doctrinal or intellectual challenge to this stability had therefore to be crushed. Moreover, Damascus had been a major center of cultural and theological contacts between diverse religious and ethnic groups, since late Byzantine times.

An excellent illustration of this development is the fate meted out to two Qadari thinkers of that period, Macbad al-Juhani and Ghaylan al-Dimashqi, executed by order 'Abd al-Malik (685 - 705) and his son Hisham (724 - 743) respectively ; and we have in a famous epistle addressed by the great divine al-Hasan al-Basri to 'Abd al-Malik an account of the questions, both theological and political, which the Qadari controversy obviously raised, and the profound interest of the caliph in their practical political implications.

The successors of the Qadaris, i.e. the Mu'tazilah, drew from their initial enquiries all the political and theological implications that they could. In particualr they stressed the role of reason in determining the nature of right and wrong, that of justice, both human and divine ; but especially the independence of man from the sway of rigid moral and theological forces. In that respect they emerge as the first major champions in Arab history, of reason and free-will, two of the foremost components of any humanistic outlook. In fact we know from the subsequent history of Mu'tazilism that the more daring among them, such as Ibn al-Rawandi (d. ca. 911) asserted the exclusive prerogative of reason to guide man in his search for truth, and the consequent rejection of revelation as a valid, or even profitable, source of truth. (Together with his fellow-Persian contemporary, Abu Bakr al-Razi (d. ca. 925), Ibn al-Rawandi stands out as the greatest **libre-penseur** in Arab-Muslim history).

The humanism of the majority of Mu'tazilite thinkers was naturally tempered by a certain reluctance, except in rare cases (such as that of the already-mentioned Ibn al-Rawandi) to dissociate themselves from religious orthodoxy, for obvious political and personal reasons. But willy-nilly they were the first to sow the seeds of humanism and this-worldliness, and the contemporary modernist is compelled by the imperative of historicity to look upon them as genuine pace-setters. We are naturally required today to exploit to the full the human resources available to us ; and without guarrelling with God or his agents on earth, so to speak, it is necessary to forge ahead in the struggle to solve the burning human and this-worldly problems of our age.

A lot of this analysis will remain academic, unless it can be shown what in our humanistic program is essential to progress, on the one hand, and modernity, on the other. I have already hinted at one essential ingredient of a genuine humanistic outlook; namely the role of reason in guiding man in his endeavours to understand his position in the universe and to grapple successfully with his pressing problems in modern times. In our time, reason has put at man's disposal a very effective method for dealing with the second problem, I mean, science and technology; and it is obvious that it is of the essence of modernity for every nation to adopt or adapt the methods and procedures, theoretical and practical, which science and technology have put at our disposal, in medicine, in industry, in urban construction, agriculture or whatever.

As regards the first problem, i.e. man's understanding of himself and his position in the universe, reason can and should play an equally decisive role. It should be confessed, however, that this role is not as clearly defined, as in the former case. Because our practical problems in medicine, industry and engineering are urgent and concrete, the scientific and technological solutions thereof can be clearly formulated or applied. In this formulation or application, less developed countries are able to draw on the experience of other countries; and this puts them at a certain disadvantage, in so far as it tends to cast them in the role of passive imitators, and to reduce them to a position of dependence on the more scientifically and technologically advanced countries of the world. This, however, is inevitable in the present phase of national growth, but it need not — be permanent. The countries of the Third world have a sworn duty to catch up with the more advanced countries of the world in the fields of science and technology, and to reduce progressively the time-lag separating them. An essential pre-condition of success in that domain is the recognition of the importance of reason, coupled with experiment, in the understanding and harnessing of natural processes, as well as the ultimate control of the environment. The proven success of the advaned nations of the world in the areas of science and technology constitutes the most conclusive evidence for the soundness of the methods and procedures adopted by them.

It may be objected that this success is by no means complete and that the problems of pollution, social strife and international insecurity, as well as the very real atomic threat to the survival of mankind, are serious symptoms of the evils bred by inordinate progress in science and technology. In response to these objections, two points might be made:

a) Without minimizing the seriousness of these evils or ills afflicting the highly industrialized world and indirectly infecting the less highly industrialized, no alternative means of coping with the pressing problems of the world have been devised yet, as an alternative to Western science and technology.

b) The more advanced nations of the world are not unaware of these evils and are continually striving to overcome them. Paradoxically, no thought is given, in the process of seeking solutions, to abandoning modern science and technology. Instead, it is through them that such solutions are actually sought.

To return to the first problem, which can be restated as follows: How far can reason assist man in understanding his position in the universe, and cope with the many moral, social and political problems facing him today. Despite the already-mentioned difficulties, we can re-iterate that in our time we have no other alternative to reason in our search for significant answers. Tradition, customary usage (**al-urf**), revealed systems of value, divinely-ordained principles of economic and social relations have all been tried and found wanting. Pro-

gress, and particularly social and political change, can no longer be legitimately linked (as the Salafi movements recommended) to the resuscitation of old formulas, tried and re-tried without avail. That indeed would appear to be the very esssence of regression, of complete servility to the past, rather than liberation from its bonds. Genuine progress, which should be a fundamental goal of all forward-looking communities or nations, must be geared to the future and must be characterized by a genuine readiness to effect change, wherever change is called for. It must recognize that change is a law of the universe, and that nations which have refused to accept this law have been trampled down or swept aside by the marching hordes of progressive nation. The Arab revival, which has only just started, is organically bound up with the endorsement of the program of modernization or change. Most Arab leaders in practice recognize this fact.

Reason, however, should not be conceived too narrowly. By reason we do not understand an already established system of truths or values, a fixed inventory of propositions or definitions which can neither be substracted from nor added to. Instead, we undertsand by reason a highly pliable and resilient method of searching for truth, of investigation and discovery, but especially of openness to criticism, including self-criticism, and the wilingness to chang one's ideas or attitudes, when reason calls for it. This rationalist method involves the following precepts :

1) Unbounded inquisitiveness, or the readiness to broach every subject, or test every assumption, and to exclude nothing as too sacred or too dangerous. You can see that the store of moral and intellectual courage such a spirit calls for is truly great.

2) Careful and meticulous analysis of the components of the problem or situation at issue. A corollary of this precept is the need for the greatest conscientiousness in the definitions of our terms and concepts, so as to avoid ambiguity and woolliness as far as possible.

3) An acute sense of critical judgment, enabling the searcher to weight responsibly all claims and counterclaims, and to reject unhesitatingly those aspects of the problem which have not stood the test of criticism.

4) A spirit of open-minded receptivity to whatever is noble, beautiful or true, whether it emanates from sense-experience, instinct or mysticism.

You can see that ,on this view, rationalism is never exclusive or one-sided, but is ready to accept truth, however foreign its source might be. As the Arabs stood at the cultural crossroads of the ancient world in the ninth century, al-Kindi (d. ca. 866) the first creative Arab philosopher summed this precept eloquently. «We ought not to be ashamed», he wrote, «of appreciating truth and upholding it, wherever it comes from,

even if it should come from distant races and foreign nations. For nothing is more worthy of the seeker of truth than truth itself ; and he should not belittle truth or disparage its exponent or purveyor. For no one is berated by truth, but the truth ennobles all».

Although humanism stresses the role of the individual in the discovery and actualization of human values, it does not ignore society altogether. Society or the ethical substance, as Hegel has called it, is the locus of genuine human dynamism. Within society, the individual discovers his identity, by acting and reacting to the needs and aspirations of the group, by integrating his own individual will into that of the group.

Arab society has been and continues to be moved, like the Arab individual, by the spirit of traditionalism rather than modernity. It has tended to consecrate to an even greater extent than the Arab individual on the other worldly pathos and to stress collectivism and paternalism. Modernity calls for a constant re-examination of the intellectual and moral systems of values venerated by the group and to revise them, as need and opportunity arises. In addition, it calls for the constant re-definition in clear and rational terms of the relation of the individual to the group.

To understand both tasks, it will be well to consider what the individual, on the one hand, and society, on the other, demand from each other. The individual, in searching for self-fulfillment has unquestionably one major objective : To be allowed freely to discover himself and fulfill his nature. In doing this, his natural right to search for his identity and fulfill it must be respected. This primordial right, however, admits of three other major ramifications : the right to liberty, dignity and material self-sufficiency. These rights, taken in conjunction, constitute the most concrete set of guarantees of individual self-expression, the pre-requisite of individual happiness. They are natural, in the sense that they are inseparable from human nature, and are accordingly independent of any accidental conditions of race, creed or social standing. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations on December 10, 1948, embodies an adequate list of these rights, which can still command universal assent.

Society, on the other hand, has a series of claims on the individual which it cannot forego. They may be designated as the social and political obligations incumbent on him, in his relation to society. The most important instances of these obligations are the obligation to respect the integrity of the state and abide by its laws and ordinances. These obligations which can be summed up in the single obligation of loyalty to the state and its institutions, are predicated on the thesis that the state cannot survive if these obligations

are not discharged by its subjects ; in short, they are the very conditions of the existence of the state and society.

Now, even a casual look at the Arab scene today will reveal how far removed from the foregoing model are the interrelations of the individual and society. In some Arab countries, many of the natural rights of the individual, especially the right of free expression or worship, remain either unrecognized in theory, or actually flouted in practice. Moreover, the Arab individual finds himself very often weighed down by the burdens of centuries of conventionalism, passivity and moral and intellectual torpor. As a consequence, his creative powers are stifled, and he lives in constant fear of society and its taboos.

On the other hand, the laws and institutions of society are often in grave danger, as they are threatened with violation or subversion. Except in those countries which maintain a semblance of stability by force, respect for the «rule of law», as a spontaneous attitude flowing from within, is almost unknown. The constitutional life of the country is accordingly jeopardized, and evolution often proves difficult, if not impossible. Revolution (**thawrah**), which is often a euphemism for **coups d'état,** civil wars and downright political insurrection, become the only means of political and social change.

We might now bring together the major elements in our analysis of humanism and modernity, in so far as they apply to the Arab World today.

1) First, a genuine humanistic outlook, which restores to the Arab individual his sense of personal dignity and freedom from social and religious pressures, is an essential pre-condition of modernity in our time. No progress or reform is possible without a thorough commitment to this outlook.

2) Second, modernity involves on the positive side, a forward looking and progressive spirit ; and on the negative side, a spirit of rebellion against the conventionalism of society and its rigid institutions or laws, and a healthy readiness to break with the past and to cast off its heavy burdens of traditions and taboos, when reason so demands .

3) Third, reason tempered with empiricism and pragmatism, is the most effective means of delineating the kind of reform programs that modernity requires. By reason is to be understood a coherent rational method, rather than a fixed set of propositions or beliefs.

4) Society cannot possibly survive, let alone achieve genuine progress, unless its laws and institutions are respected by the individual. However, the responsibility of constantly changing or reforming these laws and institu-

tions, according to the humanistic creed, devolves upon man, rather than God. For there is nothing sacred about these laws and institutions, except the paramount obligation of promoting the welfare of man and enabling him to fulfill his nature.

Thus, on this view, man replaces God, as the architect of human destiny in the modern age. He can still pay God the highest honors, and seek His assistance and grace, but cannot abdicate his prerogative to change the world and reform society.

TRADITION AND REVOLUTION

OR

PHILOSOPHY AND WORLDPOLITICS

IONNA KUÇURADI (Turkey)

What has the 19th century transmitted to the 20th ? And, if no radical change intervenes, what, apparently, will the 20th century — our century — transmit to the 21st?

If we try to consider these two questions on a worldwide scale, the word «revolt» could be one very likely answer to both of them.

The 19th century has transmitted the idea of the necessity of revolt to our century and this idea has gradually become a reality, to the point that murderous revolt — rebellion — has become the age's tradition.

And what our century will transmit to the next — if, through a «revolution» in international polities, radical changes do not take place — is, mainly, this tradition.

Revolt against what ? And what for ? Revolt against the hypocrisy of the morals prevailing in the western democratic society, so that free — creative individuals may propose new aims to historical development, is the answer of one of the great preachers of revolt in the 19th century — Nietzsche's answer — ; revolt against the alienation of man from his own nature (caused by the domination of his own products over him), so that man may become free, i.e. able to live in accordance with his nature as «social man», that is, to live with «the others», each man being an aim in itself, not a means..., that is the answer of the second preacher of revolt — Marx's answer.

But the answer of these preachers of revolt, who both demand freedom for man from two different perspectives, caused wrong echees. And these wrong echoes, coupled with the image of man of positivism and the historical conditions of the 20th century, shaped contemporary culture, — the cultue we live in, as the culture of our age — and its tradition of revolt.

By «culture» I mean, the conception of man and the conception concerning what is valuable, which prevail for a longer or a shorter while in a human group, whose limits can be drawn according to varying viewpoints and which determine the way of living of this group and the expressions of this way of living (the so

called «modern» approaches in the sciences, arts, language etc., and also the social institutions and their functioning.).

Now, what are the most characteristic features of the culture we live in?

If we consider the actions and decisions which have constituted the most striking political events after the Second World War, if we consider the most widespread philosophical, artistic, moral and social currents, what appears to be the most distinctive feature of contemporary culture, is the de — valution of Man and the oblivion of Man's face : a man's value amounts to naught.

As a natural result of that, people do not count more than a «sum of naughts» and as a chain — result the «everything is permitted» principle, that has been current for almost a century, has become the most widespread principle in practice.

Nevertheless, a part of those who consider people to be a «sum of naughts», include themselves in this sum, as well; but another part, think of themselves as well as of those who take the same points of view, as exceptions.

What characterizes the latter is hypocrisy : their principles of action are incompatible with the morals : (the goods and bads) they advocate, i.e. they use different value-criteria in «having rights» for themselves and in judging the others. Thus in every day discourse and when they impute value to others, they advocate and use value judgements valid in the christian culture ; whereas when they act, these masters in exploitation of value words, look down on these judgments, put no limits to their actions and use the «everything is permitted» principle — a principle derived, inconsistenly, from nihilism and strengthened and amplified by positivism, the man and value conception of which, in fact, put an end to christian culture.

This is how pragmatism presents itself today, the morals and culture of which are the poduct of two incompatible value imputations to man : the religionist and positivist conceptions of man, which both evaluate human potentialities in an unbalanced way.

When we consider pragmatism's attitude in facing the demographic, economic and social changes of the age, i.e. when we look at its policy, we are, I think, allowed to say, that pragmatism has become an ideology ; and the most typical example of pragmatism as a personal attitude would be the religious atom physicits.

This is the ideology best represent by those who protest violently against the attacks of the Soviet Union on Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but highly surpass the Soviet Union in, let us say, the Cuba, the Dominican Republic and the Chile issues. And this is a deadlock.

Pragmatism is the most widespread ideology among those who don't include themselves in the «sum of naughts». What they want, by taking refuge in two mutually excluding evaluations of man and of values — sometimes in one, sometimes in the other, according to the circumstances — is to safeguard their privileged status.

Now, what characterizes these who include themselves in the «sum of naughts», is their their rejection of every value imputed to values before, and their refusal to impute any other value to them.

One of the clear-cut features of contemprorary culture, calling special attention in the so-called developing countries, is this rejection. Nevertheless, those who today refuse to impute any value to values, do impute value to persons and events ; they even do that by means of one single value judgment, and thus they create their own morals and institutions.

This refusal is a kind of revolt. Whose revolt ? Against what ? What for?

It is a revolt against the conditions in which the majority of men find itself at this historical moment we live and against the culture which created these conditions : a culture which secured a comfortable life to a small minority, but did not affect the always increasing majority of men and so widened the already existing gap between these two ; a culture that took man to the moon, but also brought forth Hiroshima.

This is the revolt of those who cannot bear any more to live under the conditions they live, but who nurture no hope of ever seeing these conditions change.

In the name of what, then, do they revolt ? In the name of a state of things that will become a reality in the future and that they themselves will not see a state of things which they call «revolution» and think to be identical with what they call «classless society». No wonder, then, that the only measure they use for evaluating actions and events, is «what precipitates this state of things is good, bad what impedes it». Now, when in addition to that, the «everything is permitted» principle is adopted in practice, revolt transforms itself into rebellion. No wonder, then, that they consent to kill, but also to be killed.

This is an outcome : the outcome of the marxist ideology, which cut off the ideas developed by Marx a hundred years ago, from their source, i.e. Marx's conception of man and value ; and put them, without noticing it, together with positivism's conception of man and its value measures. This is also the sight Marxism presents today, in many countries other than the socialist ones and especially the sight of that particular from of it, that is gradually gaining favour in the so-called developing countries.

What happens is the following : a conception of revolution shaped by some principles derived from the evaluation of a certain state of things on the basis of a certain conception of Man — by some principles expected to determine constantly social action, — is taken to be itself a state of things. In it — that is, in the «classless society» as it is called in relation to the existing order — everything that now impairs the value of man, therefore everything that is undesirable, will be no more, yet, what will come about is not known. Such a state of things, which, in fact, could be the outcome of the constant determining action of the above mentioned principles, is itself put forth as an aim, but the principles are forgotten, and with a view to attain this aim «the everything is permitted» principle is adopted.

This is a case in which a negative state of things has become a belief ; thus all endeavors to attain such an aim deprived of any content, cannot but lead into a deadlock.

So, in this age of revolt, towards the end of the 70's, we live in and witness one of the most intense moments of fight between the two main ideologies of the age, though both appear to be in a deadlock : the deadlock of those who keep speaking of «human rights» at every opportunity, but don't hesitate to violate them every day — the Mogadishou affair being one most typical example(1).

Yet, between these ideologies, there is a fundamental difference, which can be easily observed, if we evaluate what one of them wants and what the other does not, with regard to man's value. But the characteristics they have in common right now, effects of the positivistic conception of man shared by both of them, mark also contemporary culture : the oblivion of the human face and the domination of the «everything is permitted» principle. Nevertheless, those who are now in the marxistic deadlock, also are those, who make us see these characterstics of contemporary culture, and thus compel us to evaluate man's potentialities anew ; they are those who force us to revise the present world order...

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(1) I use the terms «Third World» and «developing countries», both, to denote the same group of countries and I consider the former to be a category of political classification and the latter a category of economical classification. I include in both terms a variety of countries, which have in common only the following : a) on the national scale : deficient economy, gap between the rich and the poor, any kind of conservative government ; b) on the international scale : almost no influence on internatioual politics, dependent economy, dependent politics.

They force us, who as philosophising persons are excepted to be familiar with man's value and who have to account for it more than anybody else. But we, what do we do ? And what can we do in common ? Or : what is the main field, where the co-operation of politics and philosophy has become today more urgent than ever ? And how could this co-operation come to work ?

The end of the Second World War marks the official — or open — start of the fight between the pragmatistic and marxistic ideologies at the international political level. This start coincides also with the official establishment of the United Nations, which has become the open forum of this fight — a fight fought, as both sides claim today, strange indeed, in the name of human rights.

One of the most effective means of this fight is — allow me to repeat these all too well known truths — the economic dependence created under the name of «aid to developing countries», another being the pacts for common defence. And one of its world-wide effects is the political situation in those «developing countries».

Nevertheless, that which caused this economic dependence, is not this fight, but the domestic social and economic policy of the governments in power in most of those countries.

Let us focus our attention on a certain group of «developing countries», whose social policy is marked by «modernisation», the countries most of us are coming from.

In such countries the fight fought at the level of national politics today, is not between the two ideologies mentioned before (though efforts to import such a conflict are not lacking). It is fought between two parties, which could be demoninated only by such relative and vague terms as «right» and «left», which both have different meanings from what «right» and «left» mean in the western world and which, at any rate, do not coincide with pragmatism and marxism. Also we have to keep in mind, that even in this group of countries, «right» is a term denoting most varying political attitudes, their only common feature — as well as what they have in common with what is called «right» in the West — being to be against «revolution» or what each of them calls «left».

The difference between the «right» in this category of «developing countries» and the rest of them, finds its roots in the social and cultural traditions of the countries in questions; as for the variety that the «right» shows today in the countries falling into this category, I think, it is due, to a great extent, to the stage at which now each of them finds itself in the process of modernisation — a process which is likely to be the main factor that has led up to now, though in different degrees, these countries to political decandence.

What does «modernisation» mean? If we look at what of the countries that want to modernize do, it means to try to become like the countries they think of as «modern», **i.e.** they try to westernize themselves. (We must not forget that «modernisation» and «westernization» are often used as synonyms).

At a certain moment, for some reason, people from these countries get in touch with the western world and looking at this world from the «outside», feel owerwhelmed by its high standards of living high, in comparison with their own. Feeling owerwhelmed often leads to revolt. So, in order to make their countries like the West, which they imagine to represent the age, in order to catch up with the age — good intention, indeed . — they try to imitate the western way of living : they try to imitate the morals which are valid — i.e. most wide-spread — in the West, they try to import its institutions and technology. In other words : they try to take the products of a culture and social structure quite different frrom their own, i.e. the institutions of the idustrial society and the morals and concepts of the pragmatistic ideology. Thus they hope that the «existing order of things», against which they revolt, will change and as a consequence their countries will catch up with the age.

Nevertheless, such a race is not only **a priori** in a deadlock, it is also meaningless.

For, what does it mean to «catch up with the age» ? Who represents the age or whose age is it ?

These who represent it are certainly not only those who take for granted the conception of man prevailing at the historical moment we like in and who act in accordance with it ; it is certainly not the age only of those who value things with the yardsticks transmitted to them by any of the offspring of the positivistic tradition. There are also others, the revolt against these yardsticks and some others too — the thinkers of the age, — who with regard to the value or the potentialities of Man pass judgment on them, and point at different possibilities of experience and action, at different principles ; though few, there are people who act in earnest with regard to these principles. And all these men and women live in the age as well.

They live, too. Why, then, «to catch up with the age» should mean, let us say, to try to become like the former or increase the per capita income so as to reach the rate of the so-called developed countries, something that is **per se** impossible ? «To catch up with the age» could mean something else, as well : let us say, to organize the order of things — the social, economical and political order of things — with regard to those principles, which protect the value of man (or : the basic «human rights») ; something that most of the «developed countries» need too, and which is at any moment **per se** possible, **i.e.** depends only on our will, on our decision.

Now, if we evaluate the modernisation movements from the view point of their success in securing the possibility of a more «human» life for the people of each «developing country» as a whole, we have to confess that these movements have proved to be inappropriate. But if we take into account the point where they have led these countries and if we reckon the positive and negative outcomes, we have to judge modernisation movements even more severely.

Let us try to build a chart of the process of modernisation, which finds itself in different stages in these countries, only with regard to the negative results, which weigh the scales down :

Where modernisation movements — i.e. revolt against the traditional system of value judgments — start, there starts also a fight between the modernists (or «progressivists») and the traditionalists (or «conservatives»). Put in sharp terms ,for the «progressivist» (in our case, this term means «westerenist», i.e. an admirer of the pragmatistic ideology) everything «old» — not only that which has grown old — must be demolished ; whereas for the «conservative», not only the tradition but also everything traditional — those things that have grown old included, and let the why's aside — has to be preserved, and everything new is to be rejected, as treachery. So, at this first stage of modernisation the left-right conflict appears as the conflict between the westernists and the traditionalists. Since tradition varies in these countries, the traditionalist right appears under different faces, the most frequent being the religionist (for exemple islamist) — antisecularisationist right.

Lack of social-institutional tradition, degeneration of the imported institutions and the social crisis observed in these countries, to name only a few, are outcomes of this fight. Moral revolt is followed by social revolt.

Meanwhile, the imported technology (: importation of machines without spare parts or without knowing how to repair them ; of machines of no use, let us say refrigerators used as closets in places where there is no power, or, of machines that have been long out of use in the countries from which they were bought), loans for quick development from «developed countries», exploitation of national resources by foreign capital, transnational corporations and foreign trade controlled by a minority, make, as you all know, every child born in these countries and those who will born until, at least, the end of the century, come to this world under a heavy debt, indebted, indeed, to the masters of today's world, and so the gap between the rich and the poor takes on larger dimensions.

To the extent that things approach or reach this point during the process of modernisation or «development», marxist and leftist movements in general, spread in the countries in question. Political revolt follows social revolt, i.e. revolt turns partly into rebellion.

Where political revolt starts, the right-left conflict attains a new stage. Political revolt brings closer together most of the traditionalists and most of the westernists, and by their coalition against the common enemy emerges a nationalist (or «bourgeois») rightist class. The fight is fought now between this nationalistic right and the left, in which not only marxist but also all unbaptized nationalists are included by the rightists.

A characteristic feature of this nationalistic right, is its policy of religious (or sect) and racial (or ethnic) discrimination. So this right, which is in power in many of those countries today, tries to supress not only the active marxists or «revolutionists», but everyone who does not share or fight against this policy. Thus various marxist groups organize underground activities, let — like their «enemy» — «the everything is permitted» principle determine their action, and thus take their place in the picture of the age. In order to fight against them, «counter-guerillas» are used, in most of these countries and thus, a minconception of the revolution shared by both sides, makes that new errors are used as a remedy against other errors.

It is a blood-fend going on now, in the 70's and the face of revolt becomes uglier with the time.

Yet, in spite of all its negative expressions today, revolt paves the way to revolution.

If by «revolution» we mean regulating and carrying into effect social — including economical and political — relations in accordance with new and valuable principles, (i.e. principles protecting the value of Man or the «human rights» of all individuals in a country) ; we can not but confess that the Third World countries are in urgent need of such revolutions.

And when we take into consideration the powers which govern national politics in most of these countries today, we can not but realize that the way of such revolutions passes — and it seems it will pass for a long time yet — through international politics.

On the other hand, if we look at strategies as they are actually applied and not as they happen to be presented verbally, what international politics(2) and national politics in these countries try to hinder by all means, is such revolutions. Let not the **détente** in international politics and the short-winded «reforms» or successive **coup d'état's** in the Third World countries deceive us !

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(2) Ant that, I think, is true of both «superpowers» in their relations with their own camps.

Consequently : without denying that there can be other outlets as well, for each of the Third World countries, and that there even exist a few instances of such outlets ; I would say that, if we do desire bloodless, tortureless revolutions — in the sense defined above — for these countries, what we have to promote in common, is a revolution in international politics.

By «revolution in international politics» I mean, changing the principle that prevails in organizing international relations and in carrying them into effect. Such a change would amount to starting a new world policy concerning «human rights», a policy independent from but in connection with governmental politics. This, in turn, would mean to try to transform international politics from interstate politics into world politics.

What is the main principle which prevails in today's politics and which has to be changed ?

Prehaps we can formulate it as the «protection of group interests» or «the interests of being (we)». The framework of these «groups», or these «we» is, of course, drawn according to the varying common concerns of the «individuals» forming each group, the main one being the «common enemy».

But what does it mean «to protect one's interests», or, how does it differ from «protecting one's rights» ? It means to try to safeguard within the limits of a certain whole — any kind of whole, shared by many, — what is more than what one has the right to possess. As to the question «what does one have the right to possess» ?, its answer is not new at all : within the limits of each whole in question, equal opportunties concerning «human rights» directly or indirectly. So, to try to protect the already possessed more, is nothing but to protect one's interests.

Where there are people who «protect their interests», sooner or later there will emerge people who try to «protect their rights». And so, the fight between the powerful and the weak goes on, most of the time until the roles alternate, after intervals at the point of balance.

A lot of people believe that this is «the law» in politics. No doubt, this is the «law» prevailing now, but it is by no means a «natural law».

It can be changed : this is what the knowledge of human potentialities teaches us, the knowledge of Man's possibilities of knowing, of experience and of action. And if we follow recent trends in the U.N., we may venture to say, that the time has come for such a change in international politics.

International politics can, in fact, become world politcs, This is a conception of international politcs, which considers our world as a whole, consisting not of over one hundred states, but of four billion human beings, living in groups;

that created order — structures called «states», so as they might enjoy «freedom from fear and want», yet, in their great majority, they do live in fear and want. According to this conception, the business of international politics is not to protect the interests of the states(3), but to ensure the protections of the «human rights» if these four billion human beings, who live within States, of which the **raison d'être** cannot but be to protect the «human rights» of all their citizens.

I say «ensuring the potection of human rights», for that is all that can be done at the international level. Their actual protection is the affair and duty of national politics, the obligation of each state. But the governments in power in most of the states of the world, either do not protect these rights at all, or they protect them to the extent that their interests permit it(4) ; hence all his rebellion.

With such a policy, «paving the way of revolution» would be given as an aim to international politics and would no longer remain in the hands of rebellion.

On the subject of «human rights» philosophy must have her say at an international level. Because it is her problem above all, as an anthropological and value problem. She has to take over the task of shedding a new light on what is called «human rights» as a whole and on each of those rights, and to bring to light new ones, on the basis of recent researches on value problems. Philosophy must also establish a dialogue with international politics, to let it become aware of the limits of its part and of the significance of this part.

How should that be done? This «how» and also other «how's, constitute the most spiky and disputable questions we have to cope with.

Some of you, probably, are ready to remind me of the efforts of the United Nations, on «human rights» : its **Universal Declaration,** its **Covenents** with the **Protocol,** and especially the **Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of the States** (1975), or the 25 **Experts Report** (presented in May 1975). In view of recent trends in the U.N., we are allowed to say, that the tendency to change the course of international politics, gain more and more support ; the wish for «more equitable sharing of the world resources», for a «less unfair order in the world», expressed by the Third World countries and some related projects, gain a great majority of the votes.

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(3) Or even the interests of «nations», seeing that this concept also has become very ambiguous today.

(4) This is a contradiction which would allow us to ask, whether a «State» possessing such a government, could still be called a «State».

These are noteworthy steps, which have to be neither under-nor over — estimated; they are steps, which those who care to promote «human rights» may if they proceed carefully, use advantageously. So far as I can see, the proposals made, concern a chang of the role of the Third World countries in shaping international relations, something which would limit their economical exploitation by the «developed» countries — a wish to respect, no doubt —; but they don't seem to have in view a change in the principle. I confess, that there is something that makes me feel uneasy in these proposals made and supported by most of the official state representatives of the Third World countries : most of the states which advocate «more equitable staring» among the members of the U.N., and «less unfair order in the world», do not seem so ready to create such an order in their own countries — i.e. an order which will protect equally the rights of all their citizens.

Whatever the intentions in establishing it and the positive developments in in it (the Unesco, the Unicef, etc.) may be, the U.N. is a political organisation. Its policy is, ultimately, shaped and directed by bodies composed of governmental representatives, who are not free to defend or vote in favour of anything else than what their governments wish. The a-political, sometimes even ethical endevours of its General Secretaries are condemned to be dependent on political interests.

Yet, by some slight but radical changes, the U.N. could, probably, take over the task of paving the way for revolutions and thus remove it from the hands of rebellion. And this is another spiky «how», which has to be answered.

Apart from coordinated researches on human rights, philosophers from all over the world have also to take an active part in the discussion of such «how»s. Non-governmental world organisation of different kinds would be a good place for such discussions. For they are and could be — places, where a training in a new approach to «human rights» could take place and where philosophers and politicians could put into effect their co-operation.

In this discussion and co-operation, I think, a special part rests with the philosophers of the Asian and African world just now. This part they are to play, is closely connected with the change of principle in international politics.

Our world, as a whole, seems to have reached a stage suitable enough to such a change. At this point, an important contribution can be made by Asian and African philosophers, who are well aware of the great difficulties that such an undertaking represents, but also of the possibilities which their countries possess to influence international politics. By their co-operation, a new approach to human rights could be made into an aim of international politics.

Let's try to do more than we think we can, so that we don't hand down rebellion to the 21st Century, so that less people in the world live «in fear and want» in the 21st Century.

PHILOSOPHIE ET MEDITERRANEE

R. HABACHI (Lebanon)

Héraclite, figure de proue de la Méditerranée

On l'a nommé Héraclite l'obscur, cet Ionien né à Ephèse dans notre Asie mineure actuelle, vers 504 avant J.-C. et qui nous a laissé 126 fragments précieux. Obscur, parce que sa prose est effectivement difficile à déchiffrer, se distinguant du grec d'Athènes par sa manière proprement ionienne, et aussi parce que comme toute pensée intuitive, elle comporte des raccourcis étonnants enjambant des arcs de pensée qui nous semblent mériter des intermédiaires discursifs.

Mais l'obscurité vient surtout de la profondeur. Héraclite l'Obscur c'est peut-être Héraclite le Profond. La vision de cet homme passionnément attaché au ruissellement du devenir veut capter une unité, une cohérence, qui donne un sens au temps et un repos à la pensée. Or nous sommes dans l'univers des pré-socratiques, opaque et confus, où tout est enveloppé et enveloppant, où l'on se demande si l'élément premier est l'illimité (l'apeiron d'anaximandre) l'eau (Thalès), l'air (Anaximène), le nombre (Pythagore) ou le feu (Héraclite). Plus loin, réfugié à Elée, Parménide se demande si ce n'est pas l'être, inaugurant ainsi la métaphysique, mais l'être immobile, identique à lui-même, alors que Héraclite ne songe au feu que parce que le feu devient toutes choses, et nourrit son identité du mouvement des contraires.

Lieu privilégié de la philosophie que cette mer Egée qui fourmille d'îlots de pensée avec Milet, Clazomène, Samos et Ephèse. Mais ce qu'on appelle le miracle grec n'est un miracle que parce qu'affluent dans cette mer orientale des hommes et des valeurs venus de partout : Egyptiens et Phéniciens y croisent Grecs et Babyloniens ainsi qu'Extrême-orientaux. Les mathématiques de Chéops, l'alphabet de Byblos se marient à la réflexion grecque. Déjà la Méditerranée c'est la mer des rencontres et des dialogues, des alliages et des synthèses. Et le miracle grec est la résultante de tous ces apports : le sens pharaonique de l'immortalité, l'art phénicien de la communication, et les divinités de l'Olympe.

Néanmoins cette période n'est heureuse que par un effet de perspective. Car politiquement elle est tourmentée, et religieusement les dieux sont en crise. Dès le milieu du VIe siècle, les villes grecques d'Asie mineure sont prises par les Perses : perdue, la liberté ! La révolte gronde en Ionie, mais sera matée par Darius Ier. On est à la veille des guerres médiques. Entre temps, sous le coup de la répression, Milet a été détruite et le temple d'Ephèse incendié.

Culturellement le trouble est plus profond. Les dieux se sont tellement multipliés qu'ils rivalisent en autorité et se contredisent en entrant dans leur crépuscule.

Or que fait Héraclite ? Politiquement, il refuse de se réfugier à Athènes aussi bien que de se laisser inviter en Perse par Darius, afin de ne pas quitter sa patrie. Mais c'est son attitude culturelle qui nous intéresse. On le voit se détourner du polythéisme bavard pour se mettre «à l'écoute du Logos»(1). Non qu'Héraclite écarte radicalement toute idée de la divinité. Mais identifiant le devenir, le Logos et l'Un d'une part, et d'autre part attestant l'existence d'une sagesse séparée, il inaugure ainsi le thème de l'immanence et de la transcendance(2). Or ce thème constituera l'une des arêtes principales de la Méditerranée à travers son histoire, comme l'Un va ouvrir la voie au monothéisme encore non pressenti explicitement par Héraclite, mais que la raison grecque cherche en tâtonnant, à la rencontre de la confirmation qu'apporteront les révélations.

Autre piste qui nous intéresse. Sans doute, le temps héraclitéen tourne-t-il en rond sur lui-même, la roue de l'éternel retour étant commune à la pensée grecque aussi bien qu'orientale de l'Antiquité : ce sont les révélations judaïque, chrétienne et musulmane qui orienteront le Temps comme une ligne droite vers une apocalypse qui sera une éclosion de l'histoire sur l'éternité. Pour le moment, au terme de la grande année une conflagration générale met fin à chaque cycle pour un recommencement du temps. Ainsi le temps héraclitéen est un advenir et un revenir. En tant que revenir le temps est retour, en tant qu'advenir il n'est jamais un surgissement radical mais un engendrement des contraires sous le signe du conflit père de toutes choses. Evitons l'erreur de penser que le conflit engendre par lui-même le devenir : pour affirmer cela il faut attendre que Hegel, ayant fait du non-être une réalité aussi positive que l'être, nourrisse de l'opposition des contradictoires le mouvement dialectique. Pour Hérclite, comme le multiple est phénomène de l'Un, le conflit est le phénomène de la genèse du multiple dans l'identité. Cette unité dans la diversité, cette harmonie dans les contraires c'est la cohérence du feu à travers ses métamorphoses, c'est la justice à travers les injustices, c'est la loi du logos.

Ce Logos qui gouverne toutes choses est la loi du monde aussi bien que de la pensée. Car le Logos n'est pas différent dans la conscience humaine, il

(1) Fragment 50. «A l'écoute non de moi-même mais du Logos, il est sage de reconnaître que tout est un». *Fragments*, traduits et présentés par A. Jeannière, Paris, Editions Aubier-Montaigne, 1977.

(2) Fragment 108. «De tous ceux que j'ai entendu discourir personne n'arrive à ce point : se rendre compte qu'il existe une sagesse séparées de tout».

ne fait que s'augmenter en elle (3). Et la vraie sagesse consiste seulement à se mettre à l'écoute du Logos. L'homme, dans cette vision, ne se sépare pas du monde, il n'oppose pas son autonomie à celle du devenir. L'homme n'est qu'une éminence où peut s'accumuler le Logos si l'homme adhère à lui, — malheureusement, au lieu d'être attentifs au Logos commun, les hommes ont la stupidité de croire que chacun a sa propre intelligence (4). Alors que celui qui laisserait le Logos s'exprimer à travers lui pourrait connaître une certaine immortalité «devant celui qui est là-bas»(5).

Ces pointes avancées au dedans du devenir où s'aventure la pensée d'Héraclite peuvent susciter notre étennement. Mais là où le savant du feu, doublé du philosophe du devenir, doublé du théologien de la sagesse séparée arrache notre admiration, c'est lorsque, par surcroît, sa vision se prolonge en mystique.Serait-ce l'oracle de Delos qui parle par sa bouche? Serait-ce le dieu qui attend de nous le don de notre crédulité ? Car, pour Héraclite, le temps est un enfant qui pousse des pions(6). Mystérieuse intuition qui, à elle seule, mériterait à Héraclite d'être nommé l'Obscur ou le Profond. Cet enfant dont il s'agit est-il celui dont Nietzsche fera le symbole de la joie dyonisiaque, légère d'avoir épousé le hasard ? Non, le hasard n'a pas de place dans le Logos où l'harmonie et la justice s'établissent à travers la ligne brisée des contraires. Comment oublier que le Logos gouverne le tout par le moyen du tout ? Ce qui nous paraît accidentel, capricieux et enfantin n'est autre que l'effet imprévisible du détail gouverné par une totalité qui échappe à notre prise. La gratuité ponctuelle correspond à l'ordre des profondeurs. Peut-être est-ce déjà l'image de ce que sera plus tard la providence ?

Une mentalité méditerranéenne

Je ne chercherai pas à récupérer Héraclite dans le giron de la pensée moderne au risque de lui faire perdre son exceptionnelle originalité. Au contraire, il n'est génial que parce qu'il est lui-même, avec ses éblouissantes et confuses paroles et dans un contexte différent du nôtre. Au lieu de l'intégrer à la modernité méditerranéenne, je voudrais au contraire montrer combien la Méditerranée d'aujourd'hui peut se réclamer de lui.

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(3) Fragment 115. «Propre à l'âme est le Logos qui s'augmente lui-même».

(4) Fragment 2. «Aussi faut-il suivre ce qui est commun. Le Logos est commun, et pourtant la multitude vit comme si chacun avait sa propre intelligence».

(5) Fragment 63. «Il parle encore d'une résurrection de la chair, cette chair visible dans laquelle nous sommes nés, et il sait que Dieu est la cause de cette résurrection, il parle ainsi : Devant celui qui est là-bas, ils se lèvent et deviennent les gardiens vigilants des vivants et des morts».

(6) Fragment 52. «Le temps est un enfant qui pousse des pions : royauté d'un enfant».

Cependant, lorsque le sociologue J. Berque, dans son riche essai sur «Les Arabes d'hier à demain»(7), avec ses analyses remarquables de la mentalité des Arabes aujourd'hui, leur conseille d'opter pour Héraclite contre Abraham, pour le père du devenir contre le père de la foi, pour le dynamisme de la technicité contre les résistances de la religion, je n'ai pas pu ne pas m'opposer. Aucune contradiction dans ma position. Et ce n'est point par préférence de l'immobilisme, ce qui eut constitué une attitude régressive — et d'ailleurs puisqu'on en parle, pourquoi la foi serait-elle immobiliste ? — mais parce que J. Berque ne se référait qu'à la dimension horizontale d'Héraclite, celle du devenir, et n'évoquait aucunement la dimension verticale de ce même Héraclite, celle d'une transcendance saisie à l'aveugle mais indubitable, cette crédulité qui manque aux hommes pour comprendre le dieu, cette sagesse séparée qui gouverne le tout par le moyen du tout, en un mot, cet écho grec d'Abraham le Sémite que Dieu met à l'épreuve du sacrifice comme si le temps était un enfant qui joue aux dés, et dont Abraham accepte le défi uniquement parce qu'il est un croyant.

Par ailleurs, que signifiait cette apologie d'Héraclite liée au développement technique — dont les Arabes et la Méditerranée ont effectivement besoin comme nous le soutiendrons plus loin — comme si le devenir héraclitéen impliquait la technique. Dans un dialogue sur les Arabes entre Massignon et J. Berque n'a-t-on pas entendu le premier s'attacher à la mystique et le second à la technique(8) ? Mais Héraclite, comme la culture grecque de son temps, ne pouvait privilégier la technique. Et cela pour une raison profonde : il est défendu à l'homme grec de porter une main parricide sur la nature, il peut tout au plus ériger des oeuvres d'art pour ennoblir la nature, mais non la modifier par artifice. Il fallait se méfier de l'hybris(9), de la violence qui veut soumettre la nature au désir de l'homme : Prométhée n'est-il pas enchaîné pour avoir tenté de voler le feu aux dieux ?

Mais s'il s'agit de privilégier Héraclite pour son sens du mouvement en même temps que pour son sentiment obscur de la transcendance, alors, pourquoi pas ? A cette condition le dilemme disparaît entre Abraham et Héraclite, et rien n'empêche d'opter pour les deux à la fois(10).

Ce n'est pas sans raison que je me suis arrêté aussi longuement sur Héraclite. Il me semble offrir un prototype de la pensée méditerranéenne. Sous les méandres de l'histoire, à travers l'évolution des riverains de ce lac intérieur

(7) J. Berque, *Les Arabes d'hier à demain*, p. 309, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1976.

(8) Revue *Esprit*, n° 10, octobre 1960.

(9) J. Brun, *Héraclite*, p. 15, Paris, Editions Seghers, 1969.

(10) R. Habachi, *Orient, quel est ton Occident ?*, p. 206, Paris, Editions du Centurion, 1969.

où tant de traits communs survivent, c'est encore Héraclite qu'on retrouve mêlé à la sève originale de chaque terroir. Si la culture officielle, et avec elle les élites ,ont été modifiées par Aristote et Platon, par les philosophes arabes et latins, par les théologiens musulmans et chrétiens du Mashrek ou du Maghreb ou d'Europe, c'est la sagesse d'Héraclite qu'on reconnaît dans les couches populaires arabes, ibériques, latines ou grecques, et qui enveloppe toutes les diversités dans une sorte de «mentalité» méditerranéenne. Les repères que nous retiendrons ici sont les suivants : une notion ambigue de la transcendance, le sentiment d'une justice immanente à la durée, un certain statut de l'homme, et une attitude particulière face à la nature.

(a) Bien que les Révélations, en Méditerranée, aient dégagé la transcendance de ses attaches avec l'immanence et que, de ce point de vue, Héraclite soit largement dépassé, néanmoins cette purification de la transcendance est le privilège des classes cultivées, alors que dans l'ensemble des sociétés arabes, latines, slaves ou hispaniques, grecques ou turques, une osmose assez trouble reste établie entre ciel et terre, la toute-puissance du Dieu-Un et les énergies impersonnelles du cosmos.

Un panthéisme diffus, sans méconnaître l'incommensurabilité de Dieu, le met en connivence avec les réalités temporelles, avec le pouvoir et les chefs politiques spontanément investis d'un carractère religieux, avec les événements cosmiques et politiques, avec les réussites et les catastrophes. Les mythes et les superstitions survivent sous les rites et les cultes, cherchant toujours à capter les forces mystérieuses en faveur des desseins temporels. Le plus spirituel est en complicité avec le plus inavouable. Dieu a une délectable saveur de paganisme, et en retour les effusions naturelles s'accompagnent d'un halo de sacralité.

N'est-ce pas d'ailleurs ce qui fait la permanence du sentiment religieux des peuples méditerranéens . Alors qu'ailleurs la science a purifié le concept de la divinité ou au contraire l'a expulsé des consciences (à tort ou à raison), ici, les foules sont demeurées croyantes, et que les élites désertent la foi, les masses lui resteront fidèles ! Faut-il ou non s'en féliciter ? C'est une autre question. Mais une idéologie athée qui voudrait conquérir ces masses en s'appuyant sur la seule raison avancerait sur un terrain meuble, ne sachant si elle progresse ou s'enlise, à moins d'en sortir transformée, à son grand étonnement.

(b) Autre permanence, la roue du temps revenant sur elle-même. Elle apporte les bienfaits après les deuils, la désolation après la fécondité, et s'identifie à la fatalité pour les uns et à la providence pour les autres. N'est-ce pas une figure du destin, du «c'était écrit», des desseins de la divinité, en tout cas, du poids de la durée ? Aucune des Révélations ne comporte de telles notions, d'autant que celles-ci sont toutes infléchies dans le sens d'un certain déterminisme. Le Méditerranéen fait confiance au temps pour changer les situations

plus qu'à l'initiative humaine. Résignation ou insouciance l'amènent à évaporer sa ferveur dans le présent et à laisser au temps — force du passé ? promesses de l'avenir ? — le soin des perspectives lointaines. Il faut épouser la ligne du temps comme l'homme héraclitéen s'intègre au devenir : les contraires finiront bien par s'équilibrer, chacun prenant sur l'autre sa revanche.

De là l'allure générale d'un immobilisme qui reçoit le présent au sein du passé, faisant affleurer celui-ci à chaque instant, pas seulement par ses monuments mais par ses attitudes et son style de vie.

La Méditerranée semble récapituler l'histoire. Elle ne détruit jamais : elle laisse s'effondrer. Elle juxtapose, édifiant le nouveau sur la disparition de l'ancien. Mais cet immobilisme qui fait résistance au progrès, n'est-il pas en même temps une sagesse de l'histoire, une sorte de mémoire de la durée qui pourrait ouvrir au message de traditions prestigieuses d'autres issues que celle qu'impose la rationalité scientifique et sa suffocante impersonnalité ?

(c) Une troisième permanence concerne le statut de l'homme en particulier. Inséré profondément dans l'univers, prenant obscurément conscience du Logos plus que de lui-même, éprouvant sa liberté cernée par les desseins de la divinité et par la pesanteur du temps, l'homme méditerranéen ne pouvant prendre radicalement appui sur lui-même, se trouve devant deux issues. Ou bien surestimer l'immanence et les valeurs temporelles — la terre, la communauté, l'honneur, l'intensité de l'instant — ou bien s'arracher au monde pour se donner à la transcendance. Ex-stase ou en-stase, les deux extrêmes se rencontrent en Méditerranée, carrefour des passions chaudes et des saintetés ardentes, des fraternités mystiques et des gangs d'aventuriers, de l'ascétisme et de l'opium, à moins que les deux extrêmes ne se côtoient dans les mêmes hommes. Dans tous les cas, c'est l'impulsion du terroir qui émerge dans le coeur et dans le sang, dans l'imagination et le rêve, plus que la puissance de l'abstraction intellectuelle et la froide réflexion.

Dans ce contexte, l'homme ne bénéficie pas d'une position de surplomb, d'une autonomie qu'on appellerait aujourd'hui trancendance et qui l'amènerait à percevoir le monde et à le constuire en fonction de son optique propre, mais au contraire il est porté à se percevoir lui-même en fonction du milieu qui l'enveloppe. Il est branché sur les rythmes du cosmos qui se continuent à travers lui.

Cette sorte de fidélité à la nature implique des inconvénients évidents : n'a-t-elle pas laissé echapper vers l'Occident l'intelligence scientifique et le dynamisme du progrès industriel? Mais ne comporte-t-elle pas aussi l'avantage d'avoir gardé l'homme mieux intégré dans la nature, moins séparé et égocentrique, plus familier et ouvert, apte à la pensée intuitive et à la compassion, prêt à l'hospitalité et à la fraternité humaine?

(d) Enfin dernière permanence à retenir ici, consonnante avec ce qui précède : le respect de l'intégrité de la nature. Bien que des prouesses techniques figurent dans l'héritage méditerranéen, néanmoins, de l'Antiquité à nos jours, ce n'est pas la technique qui le caractérise. La nature porte l'empreinte de la divinité. Elle est objet de contemplation plus que d'action transformatrice. Les Grecs se défendaient de l'hybris, cette violence qui avoue une démesure, les autres éviteront de déranger l'order de la création. Non que les Révélations, plus tard, interdisent l'initiative humaine, mais la création s'offre à l'exploitation plus qu'à la reconstruction et à l'artifice. Sans doute les oeuvres d'art, les monuments religieux ont-ils nécessité des déplacements de matériel et de substances riches, mais c'est à la gloire de la divinité, pour la célébration rituelle et non pour l'asservissement de la nature. Navires phéniciens, voies et aqueducs romains, instruments d'astronomie arabes sont des moyens de communications ou de défense plus que des modifications de paysage. Et si l'artisanat a multiplié les comptoirs d'échanges sur le pourtour de la mer, c'est parce que le Méditerranéen préfère à l'objet industriel la chose qui rappelle son origine naturelle. La pollution des eaux aujourd'hui ne résulte pas de cet artisanat mais d'une activité industrielle venue d'ailleurs.

Cette sorte de résistance de l'homo sapiens à l'homo faber a fait de la Méditerranée un lac de souvenirs. Les invasions politiques et les dominations étrangères ont provisoirement freiné l'inventivité en intimidant les cultures méditerranéennes qui ne sont plus à l'avant-garde du progrès et du développement; mais si touristes et estivants affluent de partout sur le pourtour et dans les îles, c'est afin d'y reprender un bain de nature et d'histoire-au risque, hélas, de défigurer l'une et l'autre.

Peut-être plus profondément, et malgré le retard de la Méditerranée sur la civilisation, l'homme du XXe siècle vient-il en Méditerranée comme pour un pélerinage aux sources afin de retrouver la norme et l'équilibre d'une humantié mieux insérée dans la nature et d'une nature gardant l'effigie humaine et divine.

Mentalité et philosophie

La combinaison de ces quatre permanences héraclitéennes — religiosité teintée de panthéisme, pesanteur et justice du temps, humanisme intégré au cosmos, respect de la nature originelle — est à la source d'une certaine «mentalité» du bassin méditerranéen. Elle a déposé ainsi comme une strate profonde de psychisme à laquelle participent tous les peuples riverains, par ailleurs si différenciés. Cette strate enfouie dans les masses peut d'ailleurs, à l'occasion, monter à la surface dans les classes cultivées. Aux moments pathétiques de leur histoire nationale, les dirigeants politiques y puisent volontiers, remuant ainsi la conscience populaire, et les plus doués des artistes et des écrivains s'en souviennent quand ils ont le génie de l'authenticité.

Mais sur cette strate s'en est déposée une autre, plus récente, portant le legs, plus rationnel et articulé d'Aristote et de Platon fécondés par l'histoire postérieure de la Méditerranée. Et ce legs constitue le cadre de la «philosophie» plus ou moins consciente des classes dominantes. Si bien qu'une dualité s'est installée dans notre culture aussi bien que dans l'épaisseur de nos sociétés entre une mentalité inconsciente et une philosophie consciente, ou plus simplement entre mentalité et philosophie. Cette dualité provoque une crampe de culture, paralysant l'évolution de la Méditerranée et l'empêchant de prendre conscience de son originalité d'abord, puis de communiquer au monde une synthèse qui, si elle pouvait se réaliser, serait un complément précieux et irremplacable à la civilisation au devant de nous.

Les remarquables travaux sur la monumentale collaboration, accomplie par tranches successives, que représente la pensée du Moyen Age sont assez connus pour nous dispenser d'entrer dans le détail(11). La rive sud puis la rive nord de la Méditerranée y ont coopéré. Au bilan de ces travaux on peut dégager la part propre aux philosophes grecs, aux philosophes et aux théologiens arabes, ibériques et latins pris entre la raison aristotélicienne et la vision mystique néoplatonicienne d'une part, et d'autre part le donné révélé du judaïsme, du christianisme et de l'islam. On a également suffisamment traité du problème capital de la raison et de la foi, de leur divorce ou de leur difficile conciliation chez les uns, et de leur synthèse chez les autres, pour que nous n'ayons pas à y revenir ici.

Pour rester dans la ligne centrale de notre recherche, nous remarquerons qui ce qui était enveloppé et implicite dans la «mentalité» héraclitéenne dominée par l'intuition, s'est articulé dans la «philosophie» aristotelicienne et platonicienne selon le dynamisme de la raison et de l'abstraction intellectuelle. Tous les piliers de la culture en sortent transformés. Sur le plan de la philosophie : l'existence de Dieu, les rapports de l'Un et du multiple, le devenir, les substances selon leur double aspect d'essence et d'existence, la vie morale et ses applications. A ce plan s'est ajouté celui de la révélation, transcendant la raison pour son objet mais préparée par elle en tant que préambule : l'étude des sources sacrées, la religion proprement dite, c'est-à-dire les relations entre l'homme et le contenu de sa foi, les fins dernières de l'homme et de l'histoire.

Pour ressembler toutes ces articulations en un seul tableau, on peut dire que la culture s'est organisée selon les divers niveaux d'une classification des savoirs qu'on retrouve assez semblable chez tous les penseurs du Moyen Age : niveau de la connaissance scientifique non emancipée de la philosophie de la nature, niveau de la connaissance métaphysique, niveau de la connaissance religieuse ou révélée. Pour illustrer cette organisation du savoir qui seule pouvait permettre

(11) E. Gilson, Histoire de la philosophie au Moyen Age, Paris, Payot.

le déploiement de la pensée parce qu'elle formulait les critères des divers objets de connaissance et les méthodes d'approche propres à chacun d'eux, il suffit de comparer les classifications de philosophes et théologiens comme Aristote (Ve siècle avant J. — C.), Al-Farâbî (Xe siècle), Al-Ghazzâlî (XIIe siècle) et Thomas d'Aquin (XIIIe siècle) (12).

Pour Aristote, les sciences théorétiques comportent la physique, la mathématique, la métaphysique. Al-Farâbî, dans son Ihsâ, compte les mathématiques, les sciences naturelles, la métaphysique, puis le Kalam. Al-Ghazzâlî plus explicite, distingue les sciences religieuses et les sciences rationnelles, et dans ces dernières, les mathématiques, les sciences naturelles, la métaphysique. Thomas d'Aquin, allant plus loin, distingue les sciences d'ordre naturel et les sciences d'ordre surnaturel, et dans les premières se retrouvent la métaphysique, la mathématique et la **physica** (philosophie de la nature et sciences de la nature).

Ne nous étonnons pas de ne trouver nulle part la connaissance empirique ou vulgaire, puisque celle-ci relève d'une mentalité et n'entre pas dans le savoir (organisé). Rien d'étonnant aussi à la diversité du détail à l'intérieur de ces classifications qui reflète celle des contextes et du progrès historiques. Mais l'important est que la cheville ouvrière de ces classifications est l'intelligence et son objet propre (13). Si bien qu'on pourrait partout retrouve les distinctions entre l'être sensible, l'être de raison, l'être concret, l'être révélé. Et ne nous y trompons pas : une fois l'être saisi par intuition, c'est de la raison que dépend son élaboration. Depuis que l'homme est défini animal raisonnable, c'est la raison qui est le maître d'oeuvre et qui préside à la connaissance et à l'action. Il ne s'agit plus d'écouter le Logos mais de l'organiser et d'en dégager les articulations, avec pour objectif l'évidence d'une vérité qui enregistre la rencontre du réel et de la pensée. L'homme a pris ses distances d'avec le monde. A travers sa subjectivité, il l'analyse et le recompose. Il s'installe en position de surplomb au lieu de demeurer immergé dans l'univers. On aime présenter le Moyen Age comme investi par le sacré, deminé par la théologie(14). Ce n'est pas faux mais très insuffisant. Il eut été étrange qu'enrichi des alluvions grecques et de la mise en valeur de l'homme par les révélations, il n'inaugure pas en même temps l'émergence de l'homme, bien avant la date récente où M. Foucault voit apparaître l'idée d'homme (15). Le Moyen Age méditerranéen a été l'âge du dialogue de Dieu et de l'homme, de la foi et de la raison. L'homme

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(12) Anawati et Gardet, *Théologie comparée*, Paris, Vrin, 1970.

(13) La plupart des philosophes du Moyen Age consacrent un traité au «De intellectu», comme la plupart des philosophes présocraticues composent un «De natura». Le déplacement d'intérêt est significatif.

(14) Régine Pernoud, *Pour en finir avec le Moyen Age*, Paris, Editions du Seuil,1977.

(15) M. Foucault, *Les mots et les choses*, Paris, Editions Gallimard, 1966. C. Lévi-Strauss, *L'homme nu*, Paris, Editions Gallimard, 1971.

est l'interlocuteur valable de la divinité, se tenant debout en équilibre entre son créateur et la création remise à sa responsabilité, conscient de son exigence infinie en même temps que de sa propre finitude.

La double dérivation de la culture en Méditerranée.

Cette période de fécondation heureuse du Moyen Age ne va cependant pas se prolonger. A partir du XIve siècle, la culture méditerranéenne s'estompe, et si une mentalité commune demeure partagée par les deux rives, chacune de celles-ci développe différemment sa superstructure philosophique.

La promotion de la raison devient l'entreprise de la rive latine, où St. Anselme, Thomas d'Aquin font confiance aux capacités rationnelles même dans leur affrontement avec la révélation, alors que sur la rive arabe la foi de Ghazzâlî les a humiliées. La pensée arabe laisse échapper l'apport d'Averroès vers l'Occident, où se développe un averroisme latin à côté d'un augustinisme avicennisant, alors qu'en pays d'Islam la recherche intellectuelle semble entrer en léthargie. La pensée novatrice d'Ibn Khaldoun au XIVe siècle apparaît d'autant plus originale que rien ne la laisse prévoir et rien ne la prolonge.

L'histoire politique de la Méditerranée n'est évidemment pas étrangère à cette disparité de développement. Cause ou effet? Les deux à la fois, sans doute. Les Arabes ayant pris la rive sud en fer à cheval à une vitesse fulgurante, leur empire s'était peut-être trop hâtivement établi pour s'y fixer durablement. Quand ils arrivent devant Poitiers (en 732), les Francs de Charles Martel, fondateur de la dynastie carlolingienne, ont trop pris conscience de la menace pour ne pas les mettre en échec, que Saladin compense en 1187 en mettant fin brillamment aux croisades. Néanmoins, l'empire arabe ne tarde pas à se désarticuler sous la pression de la conquête ottomane aussi bien que celle de forces centrifuges, jusqu'au moment où l'Europe ayant pris le dessus au XIXe siècle suscitera la question d'Orient, et se taillera en Afrique du nord comme au Proche Orient des colonies, puis des protectorats, ne lâchant enfin prise qu'au XXe siècle, devant le réveil des peuples arabes qui jusqu'à présent ne cessent de se délivrer du double néo — colonialisme de l'Occident et de l'Est.

Sur cette toile de fond politique, quelle fut la dérive de la culture sur les deux bords de la Méditerranée? Non seulement les échanges culturels se sont interrompus mais de plus, sur chacun de deux bords la culture s'est gravement désorganisée, comme si c'était le dialogue qui, pendant trois ou quatre siècles, lui avait assuré une unité organique. Il faudra donc désormais suivre séparément le destin de la raison, cette raison qui va triompher jusqu'au délire en Europe, alors qu'elle s'altère profondément à ne rien promouvoir sur la rive africaine.

A) Pour faire bref, on peut dire qu'en Europe la raison philosophique commence d'abord par s'émanciper de la théologie avec Galilée et plus tard Descartes. L'homocentrisme se déséquilibre à vouloir échapper à l'attraction de la Révélation. Le retour à l'Antiquité ne retient des Grecs que le culte de l'homme, et la raison continue sa marche à travers Renaissance, Réforme, Siècle des lumières et Révolutions, en se faisant de plus en plus vindicative. Avec Hegel elle ira jusqu'à résorber en son immanence dialectique la transcendance révélée. Appetit trop ambitieux pour n'être pas payé de la perte de tout réalisme. L'apothéose idéaliste provoque le rationalisme de Marx qui entreprend de désaliéner scientifiquement l'homme en lui rendant le sens du réel. Alors la raison n'étant plus appelée vers le haut par une transcendance expulsée se laisse happer vers le bas par l'organisation temporelle des sociétés et le développement industriel et économique. De philosophique qu'elle était, la raison change de centre de gravitation et se fait exclusivement scientifique et positive. Nietzsche et Freud provoquent deux secousses de la raison mais dans les limites de la raison, comme si l'homme se sentait mal à l'aise dans l'asphyxie rationaliste. L'homme fuit l'angoisse de s'être coupé de ses racines et se jette dans des aventures totalitaires et colonialistes dont les guerres mondiales sont les signaux d'alarme. Et n'est-ce pas la même angoisse qui le lance sur toutes les avenues de la science propageant sa présence à travers l'infiniment grand et l'infiniment petit comme pour compenser par la sortie de soi le vide intérieur qui l'habite, et multipliant ses pouvoirs sur la nature et sur l'espèce humaine comme pour recréer un monde à sa propre mesure au moment où lui-même a perdu toute mesure et cherche à se re-définir.

Au XXe siècle, au lieu que la science soit fonction de l'homme, c'est l'homme qui est fonction de la science. Un moment l'insurrection existentielle stimule la liberté et les valeurs de la vie privée, mais trop exagérée elle ne fait que retarder le processus d'imprsonnalité d'un technologie qui continu d'envahir le champ du savoir et de la vie, appelée d'ailleurs par la montée des masses et les urgences du nombre. Les idéologies libérales autant que marxistes y coopèrent malgré leurs finalités différentes. On ne peut plus s'étonner alors du succès du positivisme logique dans les pays anglo-saxons, du structuralisme dans les pays latins et de l'étouffement de la critique marxiste dans les pays socialistes. Après la mort de Dieu il ne reste plus qu'à enregistrer la mort de l'homme.

On voudrait s'excuser de schématiser aussi cavalièrement une évolution si riche en péripéties mais dont seul le sens général nous intéresse. L'homme d'Occident, dont la rive européenne de la Méditerranée est solidaire ,en s'arrachant à la transcendance s'est en même temps coupé du sol nourricier du Logos, si bien qu'il se trouve stérilisé, séparé, réduit à une fonction de production et de consommation, à la recherche d'une métaphysique de remplacement et d'une éthique à re-découvrir.

B) Face à cette dérive occidentale de la culture méditerranéenne, quelle fut celle des pays arabes ? Le mouvement s'y est ralenti, du moins jusqu'au XIXe siècle. Depuis l'Empire ottoman (1453, prise de Constantinople), le progrès est plus administratif que culturel. En l'absence d'une vitalité rationnelle sur le double plan de la raison philosophique et scientifique, la théologie se survit en se répétant. L'érudition remplace la recherche. Pas un instant les penseurs religieux ne se réfèrent à une nouvelle problématique en fonction du changement des situations, si bien que la théologie décolle de la réalité. Ses formules et préceptes entrent en contact direct avec l'empirisme des masses, figeant celles-ci dans des rites et immobilisant la vie. Cette carence de la culture n'a pas fini d'être payée jusqu'à présent. Elle eut cependant l'avantage de garder les peuples fidèles à l'Islam, sauvant en eux le sens de la transcendance qui leur servira un jour de rempart contre l'anni hilation de leur personnalité par l'Occident colonisateur.

Maintenue en position de clientèle, la rive inférieure de la Méditerranée se contente d'importer la civilisation, se donnant ainsi l'illusion de rejoindre celle des métropoles européennes. En vérité, seules les classes dirigeantes et aisées se parent d'un vernis d'imitation qui laisse inertes les ressorts rationnels de la créativité et abandonnent les masses à un Moyen Age devenu barbare parce qu'anachronique. Quelle que soit la reconnaissance qu'on doive à des hommes comme Champollion et Mariette, ou Ferdinand de Lesseps, n'est-il pas significatif que ce ne sont pas des Arabes qui déchiffrent les hiéroglyphes, qui percent le canal de Suez, et qui plus tard réveilleront l'orientalisme et rendront en quelque manière aux Arabes leur mémoire... alors que l'aînée des universités médiévales fut celle d'El-Azhar, fondée au XIe siècle ?

Les travaux sur la Renaissance arabe, la **Nahda** du XIXe siècle, sont assez nombreux et connus pour nous permettre, là aussi, d'aller à l'essentiel. On peut dire que cette **nahda** fut triple : religieuse-réformiste, littéraire et politique. La première, après de courageuses remises en question semble s'être trouvée dans une impasse(16). La seconde a produit des oeuvres littéraires remarquables, pas toujours originales(17). Mais c'est la **nahda** politique qui a été le plus loin, peut-être pas en profondeur mais sûrement en intensité. Rien d'étonnant que l'activité rationnelle se fasse avant tout politique quand la conjoncture historique impose de redécouvrir son identité par delà la libération de tout impérialisme. Malheureusement, faute de contexte philosophique et scientifique, son aspect défensif et revendicatif a pris le pas sur son aspect positif. Appuyée sur le sentiment de la différence, s'opposant au lieu de se poser, la nation arabe, la **umma** a trouvé ses fondements dans la religion, dans la langue ou dans la communauté de destin des peuples arabes, au lieu d'expri-

(16) Mohammad 'Abdoh, 'Ali 'Abdel Râzek.

(17) Mais c'est le lieu de rappeler le recours de Tâha Hussein à la Méditerranée.

mer avant tout une vision du monde, une conception de l'homme, un développement de la société enracinés dans l'histoire en même temps qu'ouverts au dialogue. Tirée aujourd'hui entre le socialisme d'Etat de certains pays et le libéralisme des autres, la **nahda** politique n'a pas songé à réactiver des motivations originales, se laissant séduire par la science et l'industrie dont elle a évidemment besoin mais sans les accueillir à l'intérieur d'une philosophie de l'homme, de la raison et de la liberté, faute de laquelle on glisse nécessairement au positivisme pragmatique des universitaires ou au marxisme irrationnel des militants ([18]). Hâtivement on a tenu pour acquise la conciliation de la science moderne et de la foi, du socialisme et de l'islam, comme pour éviter tout sentiment d'infériorité, sans prendre la peine d'en examiner les conditions, c'est-à-dire sans esprit critique.

Sur ce désarroi de la culture, il serait injuste de négliger l'impact du problème de la Palestine provoquant un abcès de fixation et une crispation du progrès, faisant délirer les idéologies et la compétition inter-arabe, déséquilibrant l'économie par un effort militaire épuisant, excitant l'absolutisme religieux face à un Etat israélien à fondement religieux, et bloquant toute liberté de pensée en vue d'un développement cohérent de tous les ordres de la culture.

Une fois de plus, il faut s'excuser de tant de schématisme. Mais au total c'est dans un état d'anarchie intellectuelle que la rive arabe de la Méditerranée est entrée de nouveau dans l'histoire en ce XXe siècle où le dialogue des rives a commencé à reprendre.

Conclusion : une question historique

Les interlocuteurs de la Méditerranée sont aujourd'hui assez désemparés. La rive occidentale, qu'elle soit d'obédience Est ou bien Ouest, semble avoir dépassé son complexe de supériorité et de refus — la domination est refus de l'autre — dû aux excès de sa raison scientifique ; mais son abandon de la transcendance, sa résorption de la philosophie de l'homme dans la science positive, l'éclipse de ses valeurs éthiques la laisse angoissée devant l'avenir comme en témoigne sa jeunesse. De son côté, la rive arabe semble avoir dépassé son complexe d'infériorité et de refus — la dépendance appelle le refus de l'autre, — dû à la carence de sa raison philosophique et scientifique ; mais l'archaïsme de son sentiment de la transcendance, son impréparation à la science, sa timidité devant les philosophies étrangères et le retard de son éthique laisse ses masses anxieuses entre traditionalisme et modernité.

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(18) **Des écrivains de tous les pays arabes seraient à citer : trop nombreux pour que nous choisissions.**

La reprise du dialogue pourrait être la chance de la Méditerranée, comme la Méditerranée pourrait être la chance de ce dialogue. Car la Méditerranée attend avec ses acquisitions récentes bien que disparates, déposées sur un Moyen Age qui connut un équilibre heureux en son temps, reposant lui-même sur une mentalité héraclitéenne survivant au coeur des masses.

Toute Personnalité est faite de présent et de mémorie. La prise de conscience du présent ne pourrait-elle appeler du passé ses ressources latentes, non pour les restituer telles qu'elles furent mais pour les ré-activer à travers la grille et les coordonnées des urgences actuelles ? Il ne s'agit pas d'unifier des vocations singulières, mais au contraire de ressusciter leur complémentarité enrichie de leurs différences. Peut-être y trouveraient-elles leur salut. Peut-être pourraient-elles alors donner à l'universel la norme qui lui manque : celle d'un homme en équilibre dans l'univers, original et cependant ouvert à toute coopération, enraciné dans la transcendance en même temps que dans l'histoire, prêt à affronter les problèmes énormes que lui réserve l'avenir en leur apportant d'imprévisibles solutions.

THE UNIVERSALITY OF MEDITERRANEAN THOUGHT AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN OUR DAYS

E. MOUTSOPOULOS (Greece)

I will divide my paper into three parts. In the first section, entitled

The Mediterranean Culture as an Historical Synthesis of Values and Trends, I will discuss the possibility of conceiving a common culture of peoples and nations within the Mediterranean area. The second section, entitled

The Philosophical Foundations of a Unified Mediterranean Thought, ..., refers to the outstanding features of the philosophical basis of such a culture as well as to its sources. Finally in the third section, entitled

The Permanence of Ancient and Pertinence of Contemporary Ideals : Humanism and Development, I will deal with the dialectical relation between the traditional and contemporary ideals of the world

1. The Mediterranean Culture as an Historical Synthesis of Values and Trends :

It would be difficult to designate a geographical domain on our planet within which historical time, i.e. the human time **par excellence,** has ever been more extended and more condensed. It is more extended, because the historical presence of man has been continuously confirmed, within its range, from most ancient times to the present day, and more condensed, because, for various reasons, this same historical presence of man seems to have always been manifested in different ways and above all intensively and decisively for the human condition. The Mediterranean area, with certain restrictions, can be compared to a magnetic field within which certain forces have always been and are still acting. The interaction of these forces might be expressed through a complex function, of which each parameter could be represented by means of another particular function. Such a magnetic field would in its turn exercise a universal radiation.

Mediterranean cultures, which seem to be fully differenciated have manifested themselves not only consecutively, but also simultaneously, during certain periods, in such a way that their diachromic study does not seem to be sufficient. However, such a study should be completed by a synchronic study of the successive stages of the evolution of the Mediterranean Cultural world, each one of them being considered separately. The history of civilizations as well as history in general has been confined up tc now, with a certain complacency, to dissect-

ing concrete data, to circumscribing regions, to delimitating periods or to following the inner evolution of a specific culture, national or supranational. It is only sporadically that unilateral or reciprocal influences, or even interactions that concerned prominent facts (local or even regional however, and, therefore, of a minimized importance) have been envisaged, for a long time, as the objects of an effort of interpretation and appreciation.

Cultural entities, which had been isolated, were perhaps adequate to the great lines that characterized the evolution of a certain number of civilizations considered separately. Nevertheless, these cultural entities neglected the unity of a geographical region which, even in an entirely specific way (as in the case of the Mediterranean region), form an undoubted reality.

Arnold Toynbee and André Malraux, for instance, whose major concern was to determine action fields and force lines in the history of thought and of art from the viewpoint of various cultural regions and of their geographical expansion, have completely neglected this factor. Traditional historians of philosophy have maintained the internal evolution of the great trends of thought that emerged and developed in the Mediterranean area. In doing so, however, they never attempted to make any comparison from a global point of view. Consequently the Mediterranean cultural reality, a complex reality, was never studied as such.

Historians of philosophy have, for example, almost exclusively studied the passage from ancient philosophy to the culmination of Medieval philosophy though the direct road that leads from the Greek world to the Latin world without considering the indirect or peripherical road, so to speak, that moves through the Arab world. Would the great synthesis of the 13th century be conceivable without any osmosis of ideas along this peripherial road . I do not think that it is necessary to present another example to understand the importance of the enrichment that this kind of indirect osmosis entails for the ideas themselves. In fact it allows them to appear in a form which often seems to be misleading, but which is always very fruitful.

«Europe, full of Youth and of surprises, betware from seeking too perfect a resemblance among all your faces», wrote Gaston Berger some fifteen years ago. In the same train of thought and **mutandis mutatis,** it would be useless and even unwholesome to pursue with obstination what seems **prima facie** to reinforce unilaterally the dynamism of the Mediterranean world. As in the past, this dynamism is encountered in our days and will undoubtably be found in the future, in the very complexity of the intellectual factors which define its multidimensional and, in a way, prismatic nature. This nature is confirmed through a certain spirit which, beyond any kind of fanatism, indicates, on the one hand, an unanimous will for preservation of a cultural inlheritage. This will, in several respects, is common to many national cultures in spite of the

misleading appearance (misleading since it is momentaneous) of irreducible divergences which actually are none other than exasperated manifestations of an organic diversity. On the other hand, this same spirit designates an unanimous will for asserting a community of consciences.

It seems that, within this framework, the activity of philosophical research could be concentrated at three different, but complementary levels : **first,** at the level of philosophical considerations, so far as the history of Mediterranean culture is concerned ; **second,** at the level of the history of philosophy in the Mediterranean area and surrounding regions ; **third,** at the level of a minimum common philosophical language that would permit the establishment and promotion of values generally accepted, i.e. values that form the foundations, if not of an integral union, at least of a renewed unity. Such a unity would be highly creative, as it could eventually serve as a bridge branching in many directions, in order to achieve a connection among worlds which are even very distant from each other. In this respect, historical time would be condensed as if it were to dart forth ; and it would also extend itself as if it were to cover humanity on the whole. As for the spatiality of the Mediterranean world, it would tend to annihilate itself «by consumption» in order to transform into a pure intellectuality.

Would this be a reality or a velleity ? A wish or a program ? One would rather see an ambitious, tentative expression of an optimistic viewpoint which expresses the creed of the Mediterranean man in his own presence and in his own destiny.

2. The philosophical Foundations of a Unified Mediterranean Thought

(a) Undoubtably, historical and cultural conditions have lead the peoples of at least the Eastern Mediterranean basin to establish a basic biosophy expressed by the pre-philosophical thought of greece. It's significant that this biosophy which might be considered as emerging from a common mentality through Egyptian and Asiatic influences, underlines the importance of the notion of measure, the latter understood as a contribution of the human factor to the maintaining of universal equilibrium. Every deviation from the criterium of measure presupposes the idea of «Hybris», i.e. of outrage, of exaggeration, which, in its turn, implies the idea of «Nemesis», i.e. of the restoration of order. Both of these ideas are connected with the notion of «Dike», i.e., among other meanings, the idea of punishment. The structural scheme «Hybris» — «Nemesis» was particularly adopted by the Greek Tragics, followed in this by an historian of the class of Herodotus. Herodotus enlarged this scheme in order to conceive it as the fundamental design of any historical process which would then be presented as a kind of oscillation between wrongness and rightness. The rigor of this scheme is believed to be independent from any inter-

vention of man, although the latter is responsible for its functioning. The concept of human responsibility thus put forth is to be developed by Augustin and his successors, through the influence of Hebrew thought, so far as the notion of sin is concerned.

(b) In the prolongation of the idea of intervention as a factor of restructuring the articulation of history's model the opposition of Greek and Christian conception of this problem is found. The Greek point of view is that of a circular historical process implying recourses of historical evolution, i.e. repetitions of history. The Christian point of view, which, in a way, coincides with that of Arabic thought, and which is derived from conceptions of Hebrew origin, is that of a linear historical process divided into more than one segment, by important milestones. Each segment has a particular aspect, or rather denotes a specific aspect of man's condition within the world : fall, redumption and final achievement. Such a dialectical scheme, however, is ultimately adopted by positivistic, Hegelian and Neo-hegelian thought, under various aspects, yet in a way that differs from its original conception. Indeed, Hegelian and Neo-hegelian conceptions induce a kind of synthetical consideration of the two typical Mediterranean patterns of history, by indicating a helicoidal structure of historical process, i.e. of a structure based both on repetition and vectoral tendency. Under this form, Mediterranean conceptions of history acquire not only a universal meaning, but also a constantly renewed aspect which seems to add to their spatial universality a temporal one.

(c) Greek science has dotted the Mediterranean thought with the flavor of a deeply rationalistic mentality. By Greek science one may understand the methodic research of what Aristotle has called «ousia», i.e. essence. In other words, it indicates the intimate quality of reality as the latter had been conceived, since the first pre-Socratic attempts, to seize the foundations of the world, referring either to stability or to instability. Aristotle was, no doubt, the first to consider ontology as a scientific discipline, not simply as the highest, but moreover as the unique discipline that leads to the knowledge of the structure of every being and of the whole world as well. Aristotle's ontology basically contains an epistemological program aiming at the research and knowledge of reality. The entire scientific process in modern times relies on the Aristotelian conception of unalterable quality. This is why, among other sciences, for example classical chemistry has maintained Aristotelian notions in order to designate unchangeable states. It has dealt with the initial and final state of a given chemical reaction. Contemporary chemistry, by contrast, has partly been able to go beyond such a conception, and emphasize the importance of the very process of reaction, thus transposing the scientific interest from apparent stability to apparent instability. This is also why the Mediterranean thought has, in general, tried to insert even religious tendencies into a rationalistic framework.

(d) Aristotle's epistemological considerations have opposed their seal upon medieval Arabic science. Philosophical as well as scientific research among Arab scholars has been deeply influenced by Aristotelian principles. The synthetic character of Arabic thought has derived directly from its relation with the Aristotelian tradition. Arab and Jewish scholars have, each in his own way, contributed to transmitting Aristotelian doctrines to the western world. Arab thinkers proceeded in depth into the investigation of the possibilites which were offered by classical mathematics. One has the impression that non-figurative Islamic art favorized the emergence of a totally abstract, and, therefere universal mathematical thought. Bound by figurative formalistic visions, Greek mathematicians had been unable to liberate themselves from the yoke of the concrete, in order to reach abstraction. This was the acievement of the Arabic genius which helped polarize the preceeding accomplishments of the Greek genius. Contemporary thought is, in this respect, the direct prolongation of a continuously manifested Mediterranean tradition.

3. The Permanence of Ancient and Pertinence of Contemporary Ideals : Humanism and Development.

Development is a procedure through which a given object, being or society, seems to pursue its own achievement. Development is more than the expression of an aspiration towards «more being» ; it is beyond the itinerary of the being towards the confirmation of its proper identities and more than the organization's means of protection of its identity. It obviously differs from evolution with which it has often been confused ,since the latter is an itinerary towards alterity, whereas development is accepted as a kind of accentuation of identity.

There are several points of view according to which the very notion of development and its implications may be approached, and which have a specific traditional significance. However, one of them has become preponderent today, since it has to do directly with a major concern of the modern world. This viewpoint is related to an important feature of life in most contemporary societies, i.e. the eagerness of promotion and final access to the sphere of wealth and happiness, and hence to the realm of established and accepted values, both old and new.

Biological models have mainly contributed to conceiving and creating economical models of development. They have also enabled to define structures of developmental control, in order to avoid any kind of passage without transition from underdevelopment to overdevelopment. Thus, they permit a constant redefinition of the aim of existence and a permanent change of the ways of access to it. Nevertheless, economical models of development imply the necessity of economical, namely of industrial growth, which involves above

all, precise models of development in the field of technology and technological equipment. Consequently this leads to a vicious circle of continuous efforts and subsequent crises.

From a purely economical and technological scope, the world is widely diversified according to its current division in areas and countries (and even in regions within some particular countries), so that it may be considered as containing samples of every possible degree, and a series of differenciated levels of development, from the most traditional societies to the most evaluated ones. Every lower degree of developmnt denotes a situation or state through which every higher degree has been attained, and every higher degree of development indicates a temporary ideal to be accomplished by a society whose development is still of a lower degree. Societies of lowest degrees of development usually still do not have consciousness of their former states, while societies of highest degrees of development have more or less no really accurate consciousness of the states they might reach.

This is the situation in which the whole world finds itself today, in one way or another. Considered either as a real and undeniable status or as an ideal, tentative and desirable position, such a situation is incomplete and precarious even in the cases it has not yet proved to be dangerous. It simply helps maintain an unstable equilibrium between opposed forces and therefore alters in a way the nature of happiness towards which individuals and societies are supposed to move. For, instead of leading to a lasting enjoyment or felicity (and of course, no kind of inactive beatitude is meant by these terms), in fact it leads to anxiety and even to fear, which thus becomes an exaggerated price for a good of depreciated worth.

This does not mean, of course, that the idea of development is a tricky one, and that, as such, it shhould be abandoned. Such an argument would be completely absurd, especially in view of the actual benefacts of development throughout the world, namely the gradual disparison of material misery. However, these benefacts are not sufficient : they are univocal, i.e. they refer exculsively to material goods and proceed from a mentality according to which moral values are, if not denied or wholly neglected, at least partially overlooked. Moral values are thus relegated to a level of presumed secondary importance, this is an effect of exaggeration in estimating priorities and in establishing preferences.

As exaggeration means a lack of measure, either through ommission or through excess, it seems that a criterium for the evaluation of the presence of measure should be looked for, a regulative criterium which, at the same time would be measure itself. Humanism, a concept of Greek origin with a wide applicability, is, I believe, such a criterium. That is to say, a criterium that

fulfills the conditions required for such an aim, in other words universality and efficiency, under the circumstances which are valid, even in different ways, and to different extents, to the Mediterranean world of today.

Humanism is defined as a cultural and moral spirit, and as a tendency towards universally accepted traditional values, whose constant notions of reference are man and human spiritual deeds and creations, especially as they have been celebrated by classics.

In this respect, humanism is a theoretical conception of life and a practical way of behavior as well as a criterium for axiological judgment. Its specificity lies in the very fact of its equal interest in every aspect of human activity.

This precise fact makes of humanism the best expression of measure, i.e. of a serene consideration that prevents exaggeration of any particular or distinctive feature, having a restricted importance, of a given object. In other words, it permits the distinction between the obvious and manifest attractive features of the object of evaluation and the unseen or hidden characters that might be much more substantial than the former, and have a greater importance for its evaluation. In this respect, humanism may help organizing complementary, yet essential, structures of developmental control.

Of the two required conditions, fulfilled by humanism, universality is understood both historically and geographically : historically, because humanism has always displayed the widest conception of the idea of man in relation to the world and to himself ; geographically, because it is nowhere explicitly and specifically denied by any Mediterranean society of our time. As far as efficiency is concerned, it is assumed as the main characteristic of those societies which are considered to be the most brilliant in the whole process of human presence as an act of civilization, i.e. of cultural and moral improvement of man in general.

My tentative conclusion is as follows : since humanism, as understood above, fulfills the conditions of universality and efficiency, it would (as a postulate that guarantees equal interest for every aspect or value of man), if not as a value itself, be worthy of being connected with the more technical and materialistic postulate of development. Humanism should therefore be included in every global effort for promotion of human societes in the Mediterranean world, its classical expressions being admitted, respected and moreover introduced at a larger scale even into those extra-Mediterrenean cultures which have not had as of yet the opportunity of understanding and of including it in their own ways of life.

As for the other cultures, those which are considered as the leading ones in our century, it should be refinded that periods of intense humanistic theoretical and practical activity have always been great periods of human achievements, precisely because they were periods of measure, and, therefore, of lack of crises, of which our epoch is far from having got rid.

Let us suppose that a universalized culture is likely to become soon if not the unique, at least the leading culture of mankind at a planetary level. One of this culture's basic characteristics should be humanism, provided it is wishable that such a universalized culture last for some centuries in a world dominated by a tendency towards uncontrolled growth. In such a world humanism, i.e. preference for measure, would be a factor of moderation and of belief in the splendor of man's possibilities. For this purpose, all actual societies should try to throw an organized and creative retrospective glance to the past of some of them in order to be inspired from it about their own future.

THE RISE OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT WITHIN BLACK AFRICA

CLAUDE SUMNER (Ethiopia)

During the final years of the colonial period and during the immediate post-colonial era, national and cultural self-consciousness has awakened in Black Africa a desire to find a distinctive identity as a people and as a cultural group. Or more precisely, in the words of Professor Ruch, «Africa is searching not so much for its identity as for its destiny.» Amongst the expressions of this self-consciousness philosophy occupies a paramount place.

Already in 1959, on the occasion of the second Congress of Black Writers and Artists held in Rome, the sub-commission on philosophy, clearly conscious of the role of philosophy in the promotion of a truly African culture, suggested to the modern African thinker that he identify the elements of a genuine African wisdom, complementary to other human wisdoms and that he express the specific categories of African thought. The African philosopher, concluded the members of this commission, should safeguard the unitary vision of cosmic reality which characterizes the wise men of traditional Africa.

Now, the expressions of this endeavour have assumed various forms and moved in various directions. It would be preposterous to attempt to give a fair picture of this «rise of philosophical thought within Black Africa» in such a short paper. Even a whole book on the subject could hardly do justice to the magnitude of the subject. I myself after organizing a «Seminar on African Philosophy» in Addis Ababa in December 1976 and writing five volumes on **Ethiopian Philosophy** readily bear witness to the complexity of a subject where the debate on the very existence of an «African Philosophy» still goes on and all the relevant documents on Ethiopian Philosophy have not been printed — let alone analyzed and synthesized.

But enough has been published in the form of articles and books, enough has been discussed in different types of seminars and congresses for us to point out in which directions philosophical research is proceeding in Africa South of the Sahara.

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(1) E.A. Ruch, «African Philosophy : Regressive or Progressive» . p. 7. Unless specified otherwise, all the titles in these footnotes refer to the mimeographed papers presented at the Seminar on African Philosophy, Addis Ababa, 1 — 3 December 1976.

(2) See «Résolution de la sous-commission de philosophie (Deuxième Congrès des écrivains et artistes noirs»). *Présence africaine,* nos 24 — 25, p. 403.

I. The traditional wisdom of Africa

Out of the mass of more less reliable information concerning Africa tratidions, rituals, belief systems, myths and languages, recent researchers have attempted to construct a world view which has come to be called «African (or Bantu) Philosophy.» Some have concentrated their attention on individual aspects of this world view : the concept of man, morality, life after death, God, etc. Others have restricted their research to the world view or an aspect of it in a particular tribe or cultural group. Still others have attempted to make a systhesis which would more or less superficially set out the common lines of a broad spectrum of African philosophies. A few of these attempts are **Bantu Philosophy** by Placide Tempels, **African Religions and Philosophy, Concepts of God** by John Mbiti, **African Traditional Religion** by E.G. Parrinder, **African Systems of Thought** by M. Fortes and G. Dieterlen, **African Ideas of God** by E. Smith, **The Primal Vision** by J.V. Taylor. All these attempts are more or less faithful summaries of a folk philosophy which was, in the past, common to a number of peoples, and which even today still influences the behaviour pattern of such peoples, although they have adopted Christianity, Islam and Western civilization.

A slightly different approach is that of the linguist. By the nature of things such an investigation is restricted to a given language group. A careful and knowledgeable analysis of the vocabulary and grammar of a given language can lead to an understanding of the conceptual framework and logical thought pattern of a people. A typical example of this approach is that of Alexis Kagame : **La philosophie bantu comparée.**

Another technique is that of Marcel Griaule : **Dieu d'eau** (Conversations with Ogotemmeli). Here we have the reflections of an African «Socrates,» an old Dogon hunter, totally illiterate and having had minimal contact with Western thought. On the basis of the traditions of his people, Ogotemmeli produces a personal synthesis of their beliefs.» [3]

Cheik Anta Diop from Dakar, Sénégal, whose study concentrates on Pharaonic Egypt and its influence on the rest of Black Africa, claims that Egypt has had towards Black Africa the same role as Graeco-Latin civilization towards the West.

According to ancient Egyptian cosmogony, each principle of explanation of the universe was doubled with a divinity and as the philosophical thought

(3) See E.A. Ruch, *Op. cit.*, pp. 11 — 12. See also Barry Hallen, «Phenomenology and the Exposition of African Traditional Thought», p. 1 ; J. Kinyongo, «De la discursivité au discours philosophique en Afrique», p. 12 ; Jean M. Parys, «Trente textes de philosophie africaine *Présence africaine* 1955 — 1975», pp. 2 — 4.

develops in Egypt and more particularly in Greece (materialistic school), the former yields to the latter. With the apparition of the demiurge Ra, Egyptian cosmogony which was originally materialistic takes a new direction with the introduction of an idealistic component : Ra brings creation to completion through the word (Judaeo-Christian religion, Islam), through the logos (Heraclitus), through the spirit (the objective idealism of Hegel). Moreover Egyptian cosmogony is, historically speaking, at the origin of revealed religions, Judaeo-Christian in particular. For indeed, Ra is in the history of religious thought the first autogenous God that has not been engendered. On the other hand, Seth, who is jealous because he is sterile, kills his brother Osiris who rises again in order to save mankind from hunger.

The Dogon cosmogony described by Marcel Griaule in Dieu d'eau resembles, by many of its aspects, Egyptian cosmogony. It has the same primitive divinity that would be a reptile occasionally dancing in the dark. [4]

The «Bantu Philosophy» studied by Placide Tempels would be, according to Abbé Kagame, characteristic of the Baluba of Kassai. It reveals, at the basis of the activity of every being, vitalistic conceptions that become semi-conscious. The whole ontological universe is but a hierarchy of vital forces that have the property of being additive. In Egypt, the first manifestation of vitalistic conceptions goes back to the Pharaoh Djozer (III Dynasty, 2800 B.C.) [5].

The criticism levelled against ethnophilosophy are well known from the works of Professor Hountondji. [6] The objection basically is that it is not philosophy. Even if one succeeded in showing some distinctively African contribution to human civilization, this will not be a philosophical contribution since mythology is not philosophy. Philosophy begins where opinion and popular wisdom end, since both are a non-critical acceptation of tradition and of the authority of custom. Philosophy supposes the emergence from orality and from myth in order to become logos and writing. Philosophy is the under-taking of an autonomous subject who is not totally immerged in the group and in the world, but sets himself in front of them. Whatever be the last verdict on the debate, there is no doubt, rooted in the soil of tradition and history, these approaches provide us with a rich descriptive analysis of the wisdom of a people,

(4) Chek Anta Diop, *Nations nègres et culture*, p. 170. Paris, Présence Africaine, New edition, 1964.

(5) Cheik Anta Diop, «Existe-t-il une philosophie africaine» ? pp. 2 — 9.

(6) See for instance Paulin J. Hountondji, «The Myth of Spontaneous Philosophy». *Consequence*, Journal of the Inter-African Council for Philosophy, January — June 1974, pp. 11 — 35.

provided we remember that there are many peoples in Africa and therefore there is more than one type of African world view. (7)

II. The African Identity

But such anthropological studies consider only the African past. There is another group of African thinkers, much larger than the previous one, who are clearly conscious of their cultural past and of their history, as they have been shaped by traditional beliefs and by the impact of slavery and of colonialism. They are the first representatives of the post-colonial Africa, whose personality is still marked by their nation's struggle for social, political and cultural independence. These are the writers who concern themselves primarily with the search for their African identity.

> For too long the Western conception of Africa is that of a continent that has contributed little or nothing to human ideas and human civilization. Egyptian contributions to early Graeco-Roman civilization cannot be denied but it has sometimes been explained away. North African Church Fathers contributed to the development of Christian Theology, but we may be told that they are Hellenized Africans, and that the North Africans are not negroes. African historians have revealed great civilization in Africa that predate any known contacts with the West. African political theorists have analysed and even glorified African traditional systems of government. (...) In Medicine and the Sciences and in other areas of the humanities, Africa is now being studied with an unprecedented intensity. This is the result of post-colonial nationalism. One can understand therefore why society may demand of the philosopher that he too become a participant in Africa's search for rebirth, rediscovery and redirection(8).

The works of Léopold Sédar Senghor on the concept of **négritude** are well known. (9) The various reactions of African writers for or against this concept are useful fuel to an important philosophical debate. However valid these criticisms may be, they diminish very little the philosophical significance of

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(7) See J.K.M. Arthur, «African Philosophers and African Philosophy», p. 5 ; P.J. Hountondji, «Sens du mot «philosophie» dans l'expression «philosophie africaine' », pp. 1 — 7 ; Bernard Nanga, «Le philosophe africain et son milieu», pp. 3 — 5.

(8) Peter O. Bodunrin, «The Problems of, and Prescriptions for, an Action Philosophy in Africa», paper delivered at the Colloquium on the Place and Role of the Humanities in Africa Today, Legon, Ghana, 22 — 26 April, 1975. Mimeograph, pp. 5—6.

(9) For instance, Léopold Sédar Senghor, *De la négritude : Psychologie du négro-africain ; The Foundations of «Africanité» or «Négritude» or «Arabité» ; L'esprit de la civilisation ou les lois de la culture négro-africaine.*

Senghor's enterprise : the assertion of the distinctively African conception of the universe. ([10])

Essays, novels, plays and other works by African authors try to unravel the problems of the African's cultural identity. They debate the value of cultural integration, assimilation and apartheid; they satirize the confusion of identity, the attempts at aping foreign ways of life; they describe the culturally important generation gap between the traditionally oriented elders and the modern, emancipated youth; they voice their protest against the past and present exploitation by foreign domination. In short their works are largely a literature of protest, of selfcriticism and of soul searching. Some of these works are written in the form of treatises; ([11]) some are novels or plays in which these problems are cast in a concrete human and social setting; ([12]) other use the rich images of poetry to get across to the reader their hope, their anxieties, their frustrations and their anger. ([13])

One may query whether to put folklore, rituals, poems and political manifestations on a par with Kant's **Critique,** Descartes' **Discourse on Method or** Aquinas' **Summa Gentiles** is not pushing the point too far. But one may answer that Sartre's **Nausea** gives as useful an insight into existentialism as his **Being and Nothingness** and Camus' **Plague** is as revealing and is more widely read than his **Myth of Sisyphus.** The central problems of human life, God, death, goodness and destiny are ften best broached by a style of reflection which death, goodness and destiny are often best broached by a style of reflection which puts less emphasis on rational cogency and relies more on intuitive emotional and subjective empathy.

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(10) See J.O. Sodipo, «Some Philosophical Aspects of the African Historical Experience», p. 10. See also «Philosophy in Africa Today», paper delivered by Sodipo at the Colloquium on the Place and Role of the Humanities in Africa Today, Legon, Ghana, 22 — 26 April, 1975. Mimeograph, p. 3.

(11) For instance, Aimé Césaire, *Discours sur le colonialisme* ; Franz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks ; Towards the African Revolution : Okot P'Bitek Africa's Cultural Revolution* ; Ezechiel Mphahlele, *Remarks on négritude.*

(12) For instance, Alex La Guma, *The Stone Country : A Walk in the Night* ; T.M. Aluko, *One Man, One Matchet ; One Man, One Wife ; Chief the Honourable Minister ; His Worshipful Majesty* ; Cyprian Ekwenzi, *Jagua Nana ; Beautiful Feathers ; The People of the City* ; Onuora Nzekwu, *Blade Among the Boys ; Highlife for Lizards.* Chinua Achebe, *Things Fall Apart ; No Longer at Ease* ; James Ngugi, *Weep not Child ;* Ezechiel Mphehlele, *The Wonderers.*

(13) Okot P'Bitek's *Song of Lawino* and most of Senghor's poetic works are examples, and so is the sharp irony of most of Oswald Mtshali's poetry as, for example, *Sounds of a Cowhide Drum.*

Perhaps Africa can show the rest of the world that there is value in the symbiotic participation with one's object of study and that the purely analytical, rational and utilitarian approach of the West is a dead end and at best a myth. «European reasoning is analytical, discursive by utilization; Negro-African reasoning is intuitive by participation.» [14] Africa might show to the world a form of thought «which is embrace and not (...) eye» and might thus give back to mankind the communal warmth, the symbol of the image and the cosmic rhythm which instead of dividing and sterilizing, unifies and makes fertile [15]. «The Negro-African culture may rest upon a certain syncretism of notions : it may — for the sake of dynamism and plurality — sacrifice rigorous logic; but by the sympathy which it establishes between man and the rest of the world, it is worth our attention. [16]

III. Philosophy for an African future

While the thinkers we have just mentioned are largely concerned with seeking an African identity, another group, made up mainly of political figures, is concerned with creating a socio-economic and political future for Africa. They concentrate on political philosophy and say relatively little about the wider philosophical problems. This is «An African Orientation in Philosophy» [17] advocated by Wiredu — philosophizing not in a peculiarly African way but on current African problems. The African society is «engaged in a determined but difficult drive towards modernisation and social change and whose resources are limited.» [18] But modernization and social change cannot take place without thought habits and the assumptions on which they are based being subjected to critical analysis, which is a properly philosophical enterprise.

We are referring here to such writer-politicians as Kwame Nkrumah, [19]

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(14) L.S. Senghor, *On African Socialism.* Translated and with an introduction by Mercer Cook, p. 74, London and Dunmow, Pall Mall Press, 1964.

(15) L.S. Senghor, «Pierre Teilhard de Chardin et la politique africaine». *Prose and Poetry.* Selected and translated by John Reed and Clive Wake, p. 99, London, Oxford University Press, 1965.

(16) Hubert Deschamps, *Les religions de l'Afrique Noire*, p. 69. Paris, PUF, 1954. See E.A. Ruch, *Op. cit.*, pp. 14 — 18.

(17) J.E. Wiredu, «On An African Orientation in Philosophy», *Second Order,* An African Journal of Philosophy, University of Ife Press, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, Vol. I, No. 2, July 1972, pp. 3 — 13.

(18) *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

(19) Kwame Nkrumah, *The Way out ; Dark Days in Ghana ; Challenge to the Congo ; Axioms.*

Julius Nyerere, (20) Kenneth Kaunda (21) and Albert Luthuli, (22) to mention but a few. The exception here again is Senghor who besides being a politician, is a poet and philosopher in his own right. In their speeches, their articles and occasionally in full length books, these contemporary African politicians have reflected on the future of their people and have given expression to the aspirations of their nation.

These writers find themselves in a politically privileged situation : in the midst of an often largely illiterate or uneducated people they have a very wide scope for political creativity. Their people look up to them as the teacher, the father-figure and sometimes as the wise, Platonic «philosopher-king.»

Marcien Towa has even characterized the conscientism of Nkrumah as the advent of the philosophical age in modern Africa. «Le consciencisme marque l'âge philosophique de l'Afrique moderne» (23). It is according to him the first work of African philosophy, because it initiates a debate on the level of the pure concept. The question set by the politician philosopher is the following : «How is it possible to organize conceptually the forces that will permit African society to assimilate the Euro-Christian and Moslem elements present in Africa and to transform them in such a way that they will be united in the African personality» (24).

But, as Senghor has so well written, the renaissance of Africa «will be more the work of African writers and artists than of politicians. [...] There can be no political liberation without cultural liberation» (25).

IV. Ethiopia at the crossroads

From all the countries South of the Sahara, Ethiopia deserves to be singled out for two reasons : first because it has a centuries-old written philosophy. second because with two of its philosophers **Zär'a Ya'eqob** and **Wäldä Heywat,** it is the cradle of modern thought together with XVII century France and England.

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(20) Julius Nyerere, *Education for Self-Reliance ; Freedom and Development ; Freedom and Socialism ; Freedom and Unity ; Ujamaa : Essays on Socialism.*

(21) Kenneth Kaunda, *A Humanist in Africa ; Towards Complete Independence ; Zambia shall be Free.*

(22) Albert Luthuli, *Let My People Go.*

(23) Marcien Towa, «Consciencisme». *Présence Africaine,* n. 85, p. 148.

(24) *Ibid.*

(25) L.S. Senghor, «L'esprit de la civilisation ou les lois de la culture négro-africaine» (1956) quoted in L.S. Senghor, *Prose and Poetry,* p. 71. See also J.K.M. Arthur, *Op. cit.,* pp 8 — 10 ; E.A. Ruch, *Op. cit.,* pp. 19 — 23 ; J.M. Van Parys, *Op. cit.,* pp, 10 — 30.

Modern Ethiopia can be the object of many distinctions : geographically between the high plateaus and the lower plains with their deserts ; linguistically, between the Semitic, Hamitic and Nilotic populations ; ethnically ; between the Caucasian and Negroid tribes ; religiously between the Christian, the Moslems, the Jewish Falashas and the adherents of tradtional religions. Ethiopian philosophy is expressed in both oral and written language. But as written documents already existed, it was felt that methodologically one should begin with them and then proceed from them to the unwritten traditions of Ethiopia. This methodological approach in the beginning limits one's investigations, linguistically to the ancient language of **gσ'σz**, usually referred to as «Ethiopic» and culturally to the Christian zones of influence on the high plateaus of Ethiopia.

What kind of philosophy have we found in Ethiopia : a popular, traditional wisdom or a critical examination ; an original inquiry indigenous to the country or a literature of translation and adaptation ? We have not completed our research on Ethiopian written philosophy as yet and we would not like to propose as hasty conclusions that which is still in various stages of investigation or classification. But our work is already sufficiently advanced : the first three volumes of **Ethiopian Philosophy** are already printed([26]) ; the fourth volume is in the printing press([27]) ; the manuscript of the fifth is being completed([28]) ; the sixth and the seventh will be of a synthetic nature, presenting insights into and conclusions drawn from the preceding volumes. We are therefore in a position to make statements that are based upon an inventory of all the basic written texts of Ethiopian philosophy.

What therefore have we found ? There is not one Ethiopian written philosophy, there are many. The first distinction is between translation literature and original works. Let us therefore consider the translation activity that flourished during a long span of Ethiopic thought.

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(26) Claude Sumner, *Ethiopian Philosophy*, Volume I, *The Book of the Wise Philosophers*. Addis Ababa, Central Printing Press, 1974. Volume II, *The Treatise of Zar'a Ya'eqob and of Walda Heywat. Text and Authorship*. Published for the Addis Ababa University by Commercial Printing Press, 1976. Volume III, *The Treatise of Zar'a Ya'eqou and of Walda Heywat. An Analysis*. Published for the Addis Ababa University by Commercial Printing Press, 1977.

(27) C. Sumner, *Ethiopian Philosophy*, Volume IV, *The Life and Maxims of Skendes*. To be published for the Ministry of Culture by Commercial Printing Press.

(28) C. Sumner, *Ethiopian Philosophy*, Volume V, *The Fisalgwos*. To be published by *Abba Salama*.

Ethiopic literature is divided into two great periods separated from each other by a few centuries. The first begins in the IV or V century of the Christian era and comes to a close with the end of the VII century. During this period literature flourishes in the North of Ethiopia, in the kingdom of Aksum ; hence it is conveniently called «the Aksumite Period». The second appears towards the end of the XIII century with the restoration of the so-called Solomonian dynasty, whose first King is **Yσkunno Amlak** in 1270 or shortly after this restoration. It continues up to the XVIII century, and even, for a small number of books, up to our days.

From a philosophical viewpoint, three translation works characterize these periods. To the first period belongs the **Fisalgwos** or **The Physiologue.** It is a small anonymous work of forty-eight short chapters where real or more often fanciful features of sometimes imaginary animals, plants and minerals are described and construed in the way of a Christian symbolism to the spiritual edification of believers. It appears to have been translated directly from the Greek by an Ethiopian living in Alexandria soon after the earlier version of the Scriptures at the beginning of the VII century or at the end of the VI century. Its particular significance is the light it sheds on Ethiopia's mediaeval period, its rich symbolism and its set of moral values.

A second translation work, **The Book of the Wise Philosophers** belongs to the second literary period. It was translated from Arabic **bä'afä Mikael,** «by the mouth of **Mikael**» : this Egyptian priest living in Ethiopia orally rendered the Arabic text into current language and an unknown Ethiopian wrote it in Ethiopic on parchment.

The Book of the Wise Philosophers appears as the quintessence of what various philosophers have said on a certain number of topics, most of which are ethical. But what is here meant by **fälsäfena,** «philosophy» and **falasfa,** «philosopher» ?

Philosophy is here understood in a wider sense as a «wisdom». Taken subjectively, in the person who possesses it, wisdom includes the ability, the inclination and the steady purpose of putting knowledge to good use. Taking the term «wisdom» in an objective sense and regarding it in a most general way, it is the sum total of the things worth knowing and working for.

The simplest and most common form of this wisdom literature is the **'angarä,** the «saying». This is usually a striking sentence that catches the imagination, a maxim, a proverb. But it often develops into more elaborate form, becoming parable, allegory, discourse, argument.

These short, easily memorized sentences were intended for oral instruction. Originally parents taught them to their sons. However, masters of

wisdom liked to retain the name «son» when they were speaking to their disciples. In some cases the disciple bears a specific name, like «Alexander.» In a very great number of cases, the one who receives the advice is designated in a general way, like «a man». Hundreds of sayings are stated in a broad, impersonal way withot any mention of disciple or listener of any kind.

As to the names of the «philosopher», not only has there been historically a mishandling of these names from one collection of sayings to another so that there is a continuous substitution of certain persons for other, but often great names are used only as pretext for the most common practical lore. Sayings are attributed, not only to Greek philosophers, but also to Roman personages, to Old Testament figures and to Christians. Many sayings are attributed in a general way to, let us say, «a wise man». Sometimes reference is made to a written text. Still less personally : «he», «they». A great number of sentences are simply introduced by the general formula : «It is said». Hundreds of them are attributed to no wise man whatever nor do they follow any introduction.

Our Collection of Sayings places side by side and indiscriminately a vast number of aphorisms, some of them beautiful and significant, others true but without importance, some dull and pointless. Several sayings are in opposition between themselves while others are repeated.

A third translation work, **The Life and Maxims of Skandes,** seems to belong to the same period as the preceding one. It was translated from the Arabic and it is an Ethiopian version of the Oedipus story. Like Oedipus, who is given a princely education in Corinth,**Skandes** is educated in the wisdom of the philosophers in Athens and Berytus. After twenty-four years of learning, now that like Oedipus.he has become a man, **Skandes** meets, not his father, but his mother, who no more recognizes her son than Laius recognizes his. Whilst Oedipus marries his mother, **Skandes** only sleeps with her, knowing very well who she is, although she does not recognize him. **Skandes'** mother hangs herself like Jocasa. Oedipus tears out his eyes and disappears mysteriously. **Skendes** withdraws with in his silence, only to communicate with his fellow men through the written word : two series of philosophical maxims, the first of fifty-five and the second of one hundred and eight. In both the Oedipus story and that of **Skendes,** the father is absent, although in the former case through the son's murder.

One question may arise here. Since these three works are translations, to what extent can they be called Ethiopian ? The answer is that Ethiopians never translate literally, at least in the works referred to above. The translation is an adaptation : they add, subtract, modify. In other words, a foreign work becomes indigenous, not through originality of invention, but through originality of style. It is precisely in the comparison between the Arabic or Greek original and the Ethiopian counterpart that lies the native imprint of Ethiopia.

Thus in the case of **Skendes,** the Ethiopic version contains numerous reflections and considerations that are woven into the story and usually introduced with the formula : **wakwonä yeheli.** Thus the Ethiopian translator is clearly distinguishable as a deeply thinking person with a very sensitive power of perception. He is a man for whom reflection is a habit. He places himself, as it were, inside the characters he introduces ; he feels with them ; he understands clearly and thoroughly their sorrows and joys. Thanks to such a fine portraying of moods and temperaments, the story is ethically deepened, its rather crude and shoking content is ennobled and made more acceptable so that there can be no doubt : the Secundus story as it is conveyed in Ethiopic is the most perfect, the most morally exalted and the most chastened of all the preserved Secundus accounts.

However deeply Ethiopia has felt its imprint on these works, it still remains that none of them shows any trace of a critical frame of mind that characterizes modern thought. For this we must turn to a XVII century philosopher by the name of **Zä a Ya eqob,** «The Seed of Jacob», and to his disciple **Wälda Heywat,** «The Son of Life». **Zär a Ya eqob** departs from all other known Ethiopian philosophers in that he gives his own life story, his autobiography. He was born near Aksum, in northern Ethiopia, in 1599 Gregorian Calendar. He pursued his studies in the traditional Ethiopian schools until he reached their highest expression in **qene** oral culture, where one is encouraged to develop critical mental habits and exposed to **ge ez** in all the beauty of its idiomatic purity. During the persecution of the Catholic emperor Susenyos, he escaped from Aksum with only his Dawit or Psalter and he found refuge for two years in a cave at the foot of Takkaze Valley.

The solitude and silence of this voluntary confinement represent the years of maturation. Just as René Descartes, during the winter in Neubourg was forced to stay in a locality where he remained the whole day in seclusion in a room heated by a stove and there occupied his attention with his own thoughts that were later on embodied in his **Discourse on Method,** likewise his contemporary **Zär a Ya eqob,** fleeing from the divisions and conflicts among believers, in the quietness of a cave where he prayed on the Psalms and meditated on the roots of all these antagonisms in the hearts of men, elaborated a new approach to life and thought which later on would constitute his **Hatäta or** «Inquiry».

But the parallel with Descartes goes much deeper than the material circumstances for the elaboration of their respective philosophy. Not that **Zär a Ya eqob** makes use of anything similar to Descartes universal methodic doubt. But there is a «method» in **Zär a Ya eqob** just as there is in Descartes. In both authors we find an occasion for a critical investigation, the need for such an inquiry, a criterion which leads to the establishment of a basic principle that

is applied in both authors to theodicy, ethics and psychology (and in Descartes to cosmology). Although the method of enquiring is revolutionary in both cases, its roots are deeply theological in either philosopher.

The **occasion** for Descartes inquiry is the conflicts, the disagraeement among philosophers : there is not a thing about which there is no discussion, not a thing which is not doubtful. The occasion for **Zär a Yac eqob's Hatäta** is the conflict among believers, mostly among Christians, but also among Mohammedans and Jews, and on a broader level, among all men.

Descartes, therefore, rejects all received opinions, testimony of the senses, information of our conscience, even the most obvious truths of a mathematical nature. He posits the critical problem in all its amplitude, but not for the sake of scepticism His intention is positive, namely to seek an indubitable foundation for sciences. **Zär a Ya eqob's** criticism is not so farreaching. He posits the need, the necessity of a **critical examination** in order to place aside all men's lies proferred in the name of divine revelation and to establish the truth freed and purified from all human accretions.

Descartes **method** for attaining this rock of certitude that no doubt will erode is to base his system on his own thought. In being aware of thinking he is aware of being. This principle is not a reasoning, but the immediate intuition of a fact. Likewise**Zärc a Yac eqob** finds in the light of reason, of a God-given reason, the method whose immediacy will enlighten his investigation.

The clear will become for Descartes the supreme **criterion,** the centre, not only of his method but also of his whole system Likewise the light of reason is for **Zär a Ya eqob** the discriminating criterion between what is of God and what is of men, between the essential tenets of natural religion and the man-made additions to prove men's inventions.

The clear idea, therefore, is for Descartes the **basic principle** which he will apply to all the domains of the reality he is seeking to establish on firm ground : the nature of man, a thinking thing; the nature of God, whose real existence is included in the thought of Himself; the nature of natural body, whose clear idea yields only extension, figure and movement. Likewise, through application of his method **Zär a Ya eqob** has found a basic principle : THE GOODNESS OF THE CREATED NATURE. Oftentimes he describes it as «The order of creation», or «The laws of nature». From this foundation he moves towards theodicy, ethics and psychology, his theodicy being mostly a creational one, his ethics accepting only that which is based on the goodness of the created thing, like that of married life and of food, thus rejecting the time-honoured monastic life and fasting of traditional Ethiopia, and his psychology emphasizing man's freedom and his superiority over the rest of creation.

At this point of the parallel between the two authors, a significant divergence takes place. Descartes' method is linear. Himself a mathematical genius, he hopes to discover the secrets of nature with a clearness and a precision equal to geometrical theorem. **Zär a Ya eqob's** philosophy does not present itself as a mathematical deduction, a straight-lined continuity from a first principle or a first idea, but rather as a fan-like unfolding similar to that of a great number of rays which meet at a common centre, thus safeguarding the complexity and richness of reality.

Now if we analyze the philosophy of Descartes we find that, in spite of its radical universal doubt which marks it off from all preceding philosophy, it has deep **roots in mediaeval thought.** Its notion of God, of substance, of the impossibility for matter to think, to take only a few instances, is taken from the great masters of the 12th and 13th centuries. Descartes' method is radical, his system is conservative.

Likewise **Zära Yaeqob**'s philosophy appears as a radical departure away from Ethiopian traditional thought, especially as concerns revelation, monastic life and fasting. And yet his thought projects deep roots into the traditional theology of Ethiopia, especially in the psalms, and in the critical approach of the **qene** school. **Zära Yaeqob's** attitude is revolutionary, his system is to a great extent conservative, especially inasmuch as the existence of God, the natural law and man's spiritual life are concerned.

There has been some controversy as to the Ethiopian authorship of **Zära Yaεqob** and of his disciple. This discussion does not enter into the scope of our present communication. Anyone interested in the subject may consult the book I have devoted to this question. **The Treatise of Zära Yaeqob and of Wäldä Heywat, Text and Authorship,** Addis Ababa, 1976. If Zara **Yaeqob** is a genuine Ethiopian, it follows that modern philosophy, in the sense of a personal critical investigation, began in Ethiopia, in Africa, at the same time as in Europe.

Ethiopia therefore harbours both types of philosophy : oral and written, traditional and radical, sapiential and critical, popular and personal. It is the land of diverse expressions of philosophy and the birthplace of modern thought.

CERTAIN TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN THOUGHT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY

DEJAN PAVLOV (Bulgaria)

One of the most cogent refutations of the so-called «Eurocentrism» in philosophy, to which, as is well-known, even such a great thinker as Hegel used to pay tribute, is the development of philosophical thinking on the continent of Africa. And yet, despite the facts themselves, and notwithstanding their unanswerable logic, the preposterous «Eurocentrist» or «Western-centrist» aberration is still being professed by certain thinkers. Thus, for instance, in his well known two-volume **History of Philosophy,** no lesser a philosopher than **K. Schilling** claims that «the subject of the history of philosophy in a broad sense is that which directly forms a part of our Western philosophical tradition» (op. Schilling, K., History of Philosophy, volume 2, p. 14. Germ.). The implication is obvious : outside the «Western tradition» there is no history of philosophy for this Western philosopher.

Africa, this most ancient craddle of an original culture and civilization, which started there in deepest antiquity, is already giving again her contribution to the universal depository of the ideological and theoretical thought of our epoch in a great variety of forms. Irrespective of how one and another of such views on the world and man, the human personality and his interrelations with society, man's place in the universe, etc., which spring up from the continent of Africa, may be valued, the very fact of their existence bears witness to the overwhelming need felt by the peoples of this region of the world to build up their own philosophical culture on a new basis.

In Africa today one of the sharpest ideological and political conflicts of the contemporary period, is developing. It affects philosophy as well, and reflects the objective socioeconomic contradictions both on this continent, and on a world scale. Both in their prolonged and difficult struggle against the colonizers, and in the complex processes of the creation of independent nations, the formation of their national cultures and their integral social development, the peoples of Africa have created and are creating the necessary preconditions for the development of their own philosophical thought as a part of world philosophy. In this process new forms are emerging, which are enriching humanity's general forward movement in the last quarter of the 20-th century. «Within the general regularity of the development of the entire history of the world», V.I. Lenin wrote, «separate development stages are by no means excluded, on the contrary, they are presumed, and they represent the peculiarities of the form or the type of this development». (**Lenin, V.I., Works,**

volume 23, p. 279, Moscow ; Rus.). An essential peculiarity of the processes of the spiritual life of Africa south of the Sahara, of which we are treating here, is the fact that the overall forward movement is being accomplished through the emergence and overcoming of complex contradictions in connection with the objective necessity of building up an authentic ideological and theoretical philosophical culture, on the one hand, and the mastering of the great achievements of world progressive thought, on the other. This process takes place under the sign of the so-called spiritual decolonization and the overcoming of the cultural alienation.

The enemies of Africa's progressive development still endeavour to furiously obstruct the noble efforts of the African nations to develop their economy and culture, and their social and political life in accordance with the requirements of our epoch and on the basis of the valuable traditions of the past. The retrograde forces, the former colonizers and their African partners, make use also of ideological forms and means in their efforts to establish an indirect control over the continent's spiritual life. In this sense one can speak of a certain form of neocolonialism in the ideological sphere as well.

As the newest events show, neocolonialism is making use of ideological means in order to rekindle old quarrels and to spread new conflicts on the basis of Africa's ethnic differences, and thus to hamper the consolidation of the nations of Africa in accordance with their essential and vital needs. The well-known Egyptian philosopher and sociologist Mr. **Anuar Abdel Malec** in his book entitled **Social Dialectics** (Paris, 1972 ; French) rightly draws the attention to the dangers involved in the so-called «liberal Eurocentrism». It seems to us that **Jean-Paul Sartre's** ideas about the Africans' spiritual life, belong to this order of scientifically unfounded contentions. Sartre in reality denies the Africans (the Negroes) any logical thinking. To his mind they are unable to evolve any rational culture or technique, they are doomed to live a life of purely emotional and almost mystical beings (op. Sartre, J.-P., **Black Orpheus** ; French). This, by the way, is one of the biased misinterpretations of Africa's cultural and socio-psychological peculiarities most widely received as a consequence of the influence of «Eurocentrism». According to these views the peoples of Africa are doomed to technological and economic backwardness in an irreversible manner by the former colonialist regimes. It is true that Sartre invokes certain cultural and historical facts, certain genuine peculiarities of the social psyche, art, etc., of the African peoples. But his interpretations are utterly biased. Sartre applies a nonscientific «reductionist» approach, in which also a number of other erroneous contemporary conceptions are rooted, which extol the so-called «African exceptionality». As a matter of fact the «African exceptionality» thesis has been used in the past by the continent's progressive forces in their struggle against oppression, for national liberation. But nowadays the ideologists of neocolonialism are trying to make use of a kind

of distorted «African exceptionality» thesis in order to obstruct the anyway complex and contradictory process of the ideological awakening of the broad masses of the people of Africa, of their unification around the progressive socioeconomic programs for construction in all fields of life.

In connection with this fact it should be stressed that at this stage the constructive role of the progressive personality as a subject of the historical process is being enhanced in Africa as, by the way, also throughout the world. But if we speak of an «African personality», this is conditionally only, because various types of personalities, depending on their main and determining charcteristic, namely the socioeconomic one, exist not only in Africa, but in all other continents as well. Yet it is most natural that the problem of the personality, of his relations to society and the collective, of his prospects, etc., should occupy a central place in the philosophical and theoretical discussions in Africa south of the Sahara. In that region a process is developing of a deep-going social differentiation, which leads to the emergence of modern nations and the so-called «national character». The social essence of the «African personality» is steadily changing. The complex phenomena of spiritual transformation in the shaping of the personality are determined by an exceptionally large variety of the forms of economic and social life in Africa. In this region there are national economies which are still closely linked up with their former metropolies and the latter's allies. There also are economies with a predominantly traditional, natural character, based on simple reproduction. But we also more and more meet with forms of social life and economic organization in that part of Africa, which possess a more or less socialist character. On the basis of these socioeconomic differences various types of cultures and of philosophical thinking, are developing. Hence, the picture of the spiritual life of the African nations, in which there also are plenty of elements of their common background, cannot be expected to be extremely differentiated. All this finds its inevitable reflection in the philosophical conceptions of the personality and his internal relations with society. Objectively speaking, in Africa nowadays the task comes to the fore, as Soviet scientist M. Korneev rightly stresses, of «affirming the uniqueness of the African personality, while also turning to account the achievements of world culture for the formation of that personality. (**Korneev, M., Problems of the Social Typology of the Personality, Leningrad,** 1971, p. 89 ; Rus.). Any exaggerated emphasizing of only one or the other of the two aspects of this biune historical task, experience has shown, not only does lead to nonscientific theoretical inferences, but also to practical consequences of a serious character for the respective nations. The nondialectical opposing of the undoubtedly genuine uniqueness of the «African personality» to the personality of the other continents is unfortunately still typical of certain philosophical doctrines in Tropical Africa. This approach can be understood, first and foremost, as rooted in the objective socioeconomic factors. Different

types of social and economic organization, and of social structure, and differring political trends create conditions for the emergence and spreading of different conceptions of the personality in Africa. Here we will dwell on the so-called «négritude» conception, and on the views of the representatives of revolutionary democracy on the personality in Africa.

The complex and internally contradictory conception, known as «négritude», has been most thoroughly elaborated in the important and interesting works of Mr. **Leopold Sedar Senghor,** the great Senegalese thinker, poet, and statesman. The «négritude» trend, as is well-known, emerged as early as the period of the struggle against the colonizers, for the cultural independence and the emancipation of Africa. After the liberation from colonial bondage, the «négritude» conception underwent different further stages in its development and acquired certain new characteristic features. From a scientific standpoint, for instance, Mr. Senghor thesis of the necessity of «rootedness in the own cultural heritage...in order to more actively assimilate the fructifying elements of our epoch», which he presented at the **2nd International Congress of Africanists,** deserves to be fully supported. It is historically entirely correct that leaning on the traditional African culture is the basis for the further spiritual and material development, because without it the building of an authentic culture in the African countries, enriched with the newest acquisitions of humanity, wouldbe impossible. But this is a truth which risks to become counterproductive as soon as it is absolutized and reduced **ad absurdum,** because an one-sided standpoint in this matter tends to lead to a peculiar localism and an excessive traditionalism. Unfortunately precisely this is what is happening to the «négriude» conception, as can be most clearly seen from the philosophical views of Mr. Senghor himself. He goes as far as to explicitly making his own the above generality of J.P. Sartre about the Africans supposedly irreversible «emotionality». To Mr. Senghor too, the Africans are «an embodiment of subjectivity», of pure subjectivism. According to him African thinking is intuitive and emotional, it is pure «value thinking», and it has nothing in common with rational cognition, with the scientific approach (cp. Senghor, L.S., «**Négritude**» and Humanism, Dusseldorf-Koln, 1967 ; Germ.). The African Negro, Mr. Senghor contends, is unable to grasp the «subject/object relationship», because he is «within the object». It is true the this extremely subjectivist thesis is then somewhat moderated by its author, but the latter nevertheless continues to support the idealist view of the «coincidence between subject and object», of the subject, «participation» in the object, of «communing», etc. From a philosophical angle it is easy to sense here the influence of H. Bergson's «élan vital», and of existentialism and phenomenology. The author explicitly states that «the Negro is a mystic», that he everywhere and always is looking for the «supernatural», that he «identifies himself with the object», etc. (op. cit., p. 67).

Scientific philosophy rejects both any absolute and metaphysical identification of the subject with the object, of consciousness with matter, and of the image with the object, as well as any absolute separation and opposition of them. Consciousness would never have appeared without labour, in which man, that essentially social being, realizes his creative forces. In its own turn, neither would have labour appeared if consciousness were not there as a higher form of reflection generally, which for its part is an intrinsic property of all matter and which, in the words of the recently deceased great Bulgarian philosopher Todor Pavlov, is kindred to perception, although not identical with it. Consciousness, however, is not something mechanical, it is an active, creative, dialectical reflection of reality, which is simultaneously filled with contradictions, but also with potentials for their solution. The activity of the consciousness manifests itself in man's faculty of a selective apprehending of the world and of a purposive action on it, of abstract thinking, of building ideal models, of formulating values and ends, of producing aesthetic images ,of artistic creativity, etc. Being a reflection of the external world, images are possessed of an ideal character, but they enable man to exert a practical influence on reality, to chang it with a view to his needs and goals. «Idealization» as a mental operation is simultaneously the gnoseological basis on which one-sided notions of the images unfortunately can also sometimes emerge. And this is the case as regards the development of the «négritude» conception, in which the images have been absolutized and detached from the objects reflected in them.

From the Negro's psychophysiology Mr. Senghor claims to draw conclusions about his philosophy, nay about his very social life (op. cit., P. 157). Calling this view of his «anthropopsychism», and actually adopting several ideas put forward by Roman Catholic philosopher T. de Chardin, Mr. Senghor emerges as an apologist of the irrational and hyperthophies the role of art and myths. In that way he ends by entirely contradicting his own initially proclaimed intent which he had laid down as the basic aim of his activity, namely to attempt to build an authentic «African doctrine». Because of his reductionalist approach he remains alien to the complex dialectics of the interrelationship between the world as a whole and the individual part (the «African personality», respectively). He, the main representative of the «négritude» conception, finds himself in the final count rigged out in a philosophical accounterment consisting of not at all African, but rather entirely European, and at that nonscientific conceptions. In that way his «négritude» ends in a «Eurocentrist captivity» and not only proves to be theoretically unfounded, but also to contradict the objective social and spiritual needs of new Africa freed from colonialism. As has already been realized by many, this is not the way to restore Africa's cultural identity, that the colonialists have destroyed, and to ensure genuine progress. The rejection of European and world science and technology has nothing in common with

the just struggle against the mechanical transplanting unto African soil of ill-suited and nonscientific ideas, which in the final count can only serve the interests of neocolonialism.

The «**Reading Marx and Engels the African Way**» slogan, raised by the most distinguished representative of the «négritude» conception (cp. L.S. Senghor's paper under the same title, presented to a political conference held at Tunis, in 1975), could hardly be of any real use here. The doctrine of Marx, Engels, and Lenin cannot be «Africanized», because it is not American, European, or Asian, but it constitutes simply by its essence international scientific doctrine. It is true that various one-sided nonscientific interpretations of this revolutionary theory do exist, and this is an unfortunately rather wide-spread phenomenon, which is to be attributed to various subjective and objective factors and causes. But this, of course, is a quite different issue. What should be stressed here, is that scientific socialism is possessed of a most powerful methodological arm, namely materialist dialectics, which in humanity's entire history is the only integral teaching of the motion, change, and development of nature, society, and thinking, a teaching to which any dogmatism, relativism, and scepticism, are alien.

As a matter of fact, it is only from the standpoint of scientific philosophy, of materialist dialectics, that the profoundly contradictory essence of the processes of the spiritual life of today's Africa can be correctly understood, and that all reductionism, as well as any aberrations and exaggerations, can be avoided, and it is only within the framework of this approach that the dialectics of the general, particular, and singular, can be correctly appropriated. The general manifests and concretizes itself in and through the particular and the singular, while the particular and the singular, for their part, through their specificity and peculiarity, are enriching the general, enhancing it to a higher level, and contributing to its perfection. It is in this spirit also that the complex problem of the interrelationship between the African national traditions in the field of culture and theoretical thinking, and in the general course of world philosophy and civilization, finds its correct solution. The same is valid of the dialectical relationship between the international and the national in African culture. This approach always requires to put the questions concretely and historically, depending on the place, the conditions, and the time, which is to say that there is not, and cannot be, any «African man generally», i.e. outside and irrespective of the concrete representatives of the social classes and groups of the African continent. There is not, and there cannot be any special, irrational, mystical type of an «African» attitude to the world, which denies the general regularities of the formation and development of the rational knowledge in man such as he is on our planet. Through its dialectical law of negation of the negation, scientific philosophy gives the key to the proper solution of the so complex problem of the attitude to the

African cultural heritage. In his famous **Philosophical Notebooks** Lenin declares against «nacked negation» and proclaims the thesis of «negation as a moment of connection, as an instant of development, with preservation of the positive», etc. As Africa's philosophers they themselves stress, there is a lot in the African cultural tradition which has to be discarded because of its anachronism, but there also is much to be preserved and developed further, because it is positive and because it can be a useful basis for the building of a culture corresponding to the contemporary conditions and practical needs. While the tribal and gentile social structure, which still exists in certain African countries could hardly be preserved in view of the epoch's imperatives, there are many aspects of its being, spiritual life, customs, traditions, etc., which shall be used as building material for the shaping of the new democratic African culture and the new African personality.

In this connection the philosophical views of another major representative of new Africa's social thought and political life, Mr. Ahmed Sekou Thure, are of a considerable interest. In his works he clearly stresses the social determination of the personality, and he resolutely rejects the «négritude» conceptions, and all apologies of irrationalism and mysticism. «It is not the dark pigmentation», Mr. Thure writes, «which should be considered as defining the African,and still less Africa herself. Any policy based on the Africans' characteristic of being black, is based on historical and objective aberrations and leads away from the true road of progress» (cp. **Thure, A.S., Personality, Dignity, and Authenticity**, in **Séminaire**, No. 55; French). Mr. Ahmed Sekou Thure is aware of the complex dynamism and the contradictions of the interrelationship between personality and society. According to him, «society is not something given once and for all; man cannot be understood once and for all...Outside society man is nothing, without society his being is unaccountable, because the human individual's consciousness emerges only in relation to the social existence of the other people. (ibid.). We see here how the striving to affirm the African originality goes hand-in-hand with the attempt to scientifically comprehend the process of the formation of the personality under the concrete conditions of Africa, while also avoiding any artificial schematizing. Mr. Sekou Thure rightly points to the fact «socialism is the expression of a civilization, which it simultaneously creates...By its characteristics it is universal, but by its concrete realization, it is singular». (ibid.). This standpoint makes clear that the changes in the «African personality» are taking place under the impact of the changes in the social relations. The human personality, as many other progressive African philosophers and public figures have rightly understoood, is the totality of all social relations, the unity of man's social and biological characteristics. But the determining role belongs to social relations. This is no less true elsewhere, than it is in Africa herself. «Outside the complete enhancing of the people through its own

culture», Mr. Sekou Thure concludes, it would be illusory to consciously hope to build a new type of man, or a new type of society». (ibid.).

The relations with, and the attitudes of the African peasant, worker, or intellectual to society, and hence to nature, are changing, and so is the new Africans' presonality. As the well-known French Africanist Mr. **Jacques Maques** points out, «a factory worker's contact with life is different from that of the hunter or the warrior». (cp. Maques, J., **Black Civilization,** Paris, 1966; French). The progressive development of the African countries also leads to constant transformations of the personality, to the gradual emergence of a new type of personality in accordance with these changes and as their most valuable result. The new personality which is thus emerging shall be more and more free and educated, he shall possess a scientific world view, while preserving in a dialectically assimilated manner the most valuable features of the traditions of his continent, his country, his people, and even his tribe. On this basis the positions of scientific philosophy in Africa shall be strengthened, because by its deepest essence it not only reflects the law-governed motion, change, and development of social and natural reality as a whole and in its various specific forms and concerete conditions, but it also corresponds to the basic spiritual needs of the emerging new personality. Of course, this is a complex and long-term internally contradictory process, in the course of which there still shall be major difficulties, fluctuations, and sometimes even temporary deviations and setbacks from the overall upward development trend.

The philosophers of socialist Bulgaria, who have consciously adopted and who are consistently applying materialist dialectics, are conveying their feelings of fraternal solidarity to their African and Asian colleagues, and they wish them a complete success in their great struggle for the triumph of truth and real humanism, for the international unity of all peace-and freedom-loving peoples throughout the world.

THE PROBLEM OF THE FUTURE OF PHILOSOPHY

S. GANOVSKY (**Bulgaria**)

Philosophy has a long and rich history, it has played and still continues to play in our times a considerable role in social life and in the development of society. Of last the question is very much coming up, both among philosophers and the other men of science, of the role of philosophy under the conditions of the contemporary social development, which goes parallel with the expanding scientific and technological revolution, a fact that does not remain without its impact and effects, both on science itself, and on philosophy. In that way we also come to the problem of the future of philosophy. Simultaneously, however, the question alsgo arises of the future of society and fo man genearlly, whose prospects are often valued as rather bleak while the world continues to live under the threat of a nulear war.

We must stress that the most characteristic feature of our epoch is the orientation of modern society towards the future. Mankind has entered upon the last quarter of the 20th century in conditions of an exacerbation of the historic antagonism between the two worlds of our epoch, the world of socialism, and the world of capitalism. The arena of their struggle is i nour times extending throughout the planet, all the decisive spheres of humanity's social life, the sphere of economy, politics, ideology, and culture are, included in it.

Under these conditions the question of the outlook for the development, for the very future of philosophy, is becoming particularly urgent.

Unfortunately there already are too many statements of philosophers and other thinkers, on philosophys, they say, depressing past and its no less cheerless prospects. They are too well-known and we do not intend to make a recital of them here. Within the framework of the time at our disposal it is impossible to examine and make a critical review of the various conceptions of the future of philosophy. That is why we intend to restrict ourselves to a very brief exposition of the grounds we have to believe that the future belongs mainly to scientific philosophy, to dialectical and historical materialism, although they in our times are an object of many reckless criticisms, distortions, and even falsehoods, that certain circles are hurling at them, at scientific philosophy, without as much as even trying to grasp its essence.

It should be noted that the human mind has always been, since a remote past, and still is, to that very day, faced with such complex, difficult, and seemingly insoluble questions, as : What is the essence of the world around us ? What is the relationship between nature and mind, between matter and

consciousness ? What is the essence of man and what is his place in the world ? These questions are the essence of philosophy's fundamental question, in the solution of which two main philosophical trends, idealism and materialism, have taken shape.

It is well-known that a number of modern Western philosophers try to prove that philosophy's fundamental question is inexistent, that it is nothing more than a purely imaginary problem. But all such attempts at doing away with the fundamental question of philosophy, at bypassing it, are groundless. What is more, such rejections of the fundamental philosophical question not only do not mean that it does not exist and hence does not require a fundamental answering by philosophy, but on the contrary they only show the helplessness of those who thus want to bypass it, and point to their nonscientific and sometimes reactionary intentions.

We all know the way in which in the remote past philosophy used to encompase all human knowledge, all science. It is only with the development of society and the progress of scientific knowledge that the individual natural and social scientific disciplines took up a separate existence. This misled certain scientists and philosophers and induced them to jump to the erroneous conclusion that philosophy had already emptied of its content and had forfaited its subject. In reality the differentiation of the particular sciences was a progressive process, which resulted in the scientific clarification of the subject and task of philosophy itself, and helped philosophy to differentiate itself as a genuine science in the person of dialectical and historical materialism, although, of course, this qualification of philosophy as a genuine science does not apply to the varoius idealistic and mystical «philosophical» schools and cliques. Scientific philosophy is a result of, and a higher degree in the development of world philosophical thought. In it, in an assimilated manner, everything most valuable and most progressive is concentrated that mankind has created throughout philosophy's age-long development.

With the emergence of the scientific view of society and social development about the middle of the 19th century, and the creation of Marxism, and of dialectical and historical materialism, the scientific, dialectically materialist conception, both of society's material being, and of its spiritual life, became possible. At the same time scientific philosophy gave a scientific solution to the question of the cognizability of the world, and created a scientific theory of knowledge and logic. It also correctly solved the problem of consciousness as a property of highly organized matter, explained its origin, peculiarities, etc. this conception is based, first and foremost, on the fundamental thesis of historical materialism about the dialectics of social consciousness and social being, about social being determining social consciousness, etc. Of course, for its part social consciousness, through the activity of the social subjects (the

various classes, parties, social organizations, etc.) actively influences the development of social being and accelerates, or retards, its development. It is only on the basis of these sound scientific principles of the scientific conception, of scientific philosophy, and of the creative generalization of the new phenomena and processes, that the fruitful exploration of the problems of dialectics, of material and spiritual production, of the relationship between society's material and spiritual life and its contemporary stage of development, became possible.

Inasmuch as the question of the relationship between thinking and being is the major and basic question of philosophy, its other important expression is the question of whether the world is in constant change and development, of whether everything in it is inter-related, or in it rest and a cyclic motion reign supreme, without any intrinsic contradictions and deep qualitative changes. That is why the history of philosophy not only does offer a picture of the age-old struggle between materialism and idealism, but also reflects the contention between dialectics and metaphysics.

Only the dialectically materialist approach to the analysis of nature's phenomena, of social life, and of human consciousness, allows to grasp their real regularities and the motive forces of the development, to prognosticate future scientifically, and to discover realistic ways towards its achievement and building.

Scientific philosophy has shown us that the unity of the reality of nature and society, consists in their materiality. Matter has various, quite different, forms of motion, physical, chemical, biological, social, etc. The particular (both natural, and social) sciences study the regularities of these different forms of the motion of matter. They are sciences precisely because they explore the regularities of the definite forms of matter's motion. Unlike them philosophy, which also is a science, has the more general scope of exploring the most universal regularities of the change and development of nature, society, and human thinking.

Philosophy's task is to explore that very same world, which is studied and explored by the particular, the specializing scientific disciplines. However, in so doing it has to cognize the most general relations and interconnections only, while for their part the particular sciences explore qualitatively specified systems of (mechanical, physical, chemical, biological, economic ,etc.) regularities of the world. But there is no particular science for the exploration of the regularities which are common to the phenomena of nature, the development of society, and human thinking. These general regularities form the subject matter of scientific philosophical knowledge. Materialist dialectics deals with the most general laws of the motion and development of nature, human society, and thinking. The study of these laws constitutes the substance of the content of the scientific philosophy and offers a general methodology for the scientific

cognition of the world, the building of a scientific world-view, etc. In other words, as a teaching of the most general laws of the development of everything existing, materialist dialectics is simultaneously a general method of research, which assumes a specific form for every special science. That is why scientific philosophy serves as a guide showing the way to the cognizing of the most diverse fields of reality, but it does not substitute itself for them, it does not and cannot take their place, the place and functions of the particular scientific disciplines. Scientific philosophy does not come forward with ready made solutions to the questions of the field of the particular sciences, it does not come forward with any solutions to any questions of those sciences, it only equips them with an accurate theory of thinking and with a general method of finding such solutions.

Scientific philosophy does not set against each other ontology, gnoseology, and logic, as many contemporary philosophers use to do. Its principles encompass both being and thinking in their real unity. Being (both natural and social) is considered by scientific philosophy in its relation to man, to his consciousness, thinking, etc.

Scientific philosophy has solved the problem of the unity of the material world, the problem of matter and of the basic patterns of its existence, the problem of motion as its specific form of existence. It stresses that in the world there cannot be matter without motion, nor motion without matter. It has grappled with, and solved, the problem of space and time as forms of the existence of matter in motion.

Scientific philosophy acknowledges the materiailty of the world as part and parcel of the acknowledgement of its continuous change. Matter is, but only in a state of continuous, everlasting motion. Dialectics is the most powerful and deep-going doctrine of development, it forms the soul of scientific philosophy. Dialectics' universal laws reveal the essential features of all developing phenomena, of whatever sector of reality they may be.

These most general laws of scientific philosophy are as follows : transition from quantitative to qualitative changes, and vice versa ; unity and struggle of opposites ; and negation of the negation (or the law of the continuity in the development).

Turning to account all achievements of world philosophical thought and of the special (both natural and social) sciences, scientific philosophy has also elaborated the philosophical categories on a dialectically materialist basis.

Since the categories reflect the general properties, connections, and relations of the material world, they are the source of a huge methodological value, because it is through their use only that nature's, society's, and human thinking's concrete phenomena may be correctly understood. These categories

are : the singular, the individual, and the general ; cause and effect ; necessity and fortuity ; possibility and reality ; form and content ; essence and phenomenon ; etc.

The laws of philosophy do not exist separately and in a pure state, they manifest themselves through the processes and regularities studied by the particular sciences, so that scientific philosophy and the particular scientific disciplines are indivisible : philosophy develops and is enriched through social development and the progress of science, that is why it is, and rightly so, the methodology of the particular sciences.

The differentiation of the particular sciences from philosophy, as well as the development of science itself, lured on, as early as the first half of the 19th century, certain thinkers to create positivism, which is a peculiar philosophical trend, rejecting the specificity of philosophy. Science does not need philosophy or a world outlook, these thinkers say, science itself is philosophy. In that way this new philosophical trend emerged as a definite reaction against the inability of speculative idealistic philosophy, which had proved not to be equal to the task of solving the fundamental cognitive problems posed by the development of science. But the solution that positivism itself put forward was much more an attack against philosophy itself than a genuine solution, so it was not confirmed and substantiated. Yet positivism has not stepped down, in today's neopositivism it has found a continuator. Neopositivism is a renewed rejection of philosophy under the new, modern conditions. It again tries to deprive philosophy of its subject, and pretends that concrete particular-scientific thinking only, is capable of giving us knowledge of reality. This contention, however, cannot affect scientific philosophy. The latter not only possesses a definite subject and deals with definite objective regularities ; it also can scientifically prognosticate and forecast the future of the development both of science and of social progress. Therefore we rightly believe that philosophy is a science which not only can forecast the future, both its own and that of society, but which can also be the philosophy of the future, a philosophy in the future. The neopositivists and others practically deny philosophy any world-view character, any scientific, methodological, or ideological value and function. All reflections and contentions of that kind may be applicable to many other philosophical schools, but they have no bearing on scientific philosophy, which is a scientific discipline, a scientific world view, a scientific method, and a part of the scientific ideology.

Max Planck, the famous scientist, says that the researcher's world view will be always determining with respect to his work. Louis de Broglie points out that the separation between science and philosophy, which developed in the 19th century, has proved harmful to philosophy and to natural science alike. And Max Born categorically states that physics can only be viable if it is aware of the philosophical meaning of its methods and results.

The revolution in the realm of phiolsophy, which took place with the creation of scientific philosophy, consists in that the latter put an end to the contrasting of philosophical knowledge and the knowledge offered by the particular sciences, a contrasting that to one or another degree had been characteristic of almost all philosophies prior to the advent of scientific philosophical thinking, and of idealistic philosophy in particular.

The realm of philosophy is of last being flooded with the utterances of a philosophical trend which claims that philosophy ought to be «deideologized». Philosophy, the proponents of this trend say, ought not to be linked up with ideology, it should not want to be also a world view, etc.

From a gnoseological angle the role of «deideologization» is based also on the principle of the metaphysical contrasting of science and philosophy, on the one hand, and scientific world view and ideology, on the other. The metaphysical opposition of concrete sciences and philosophy, of scientific and technological progress and spiritual culture, is very clearly seen, for instance, in the two extremes that we often witness in the contemporary Western philosophical currents, namely neopositivistic scientism and many of the currents of structuralism, idealistic anthropologism and its varieties, etc.

However, the proponents of «deideologization» make no secret of the fact that philosophy's rejection of ideology should not be understood in the sense of a rejection of ideology generally, but as a measure of the struggle against the scientific-world-view character of revolutionary ideology, of scientific, progressive philosophy, of the ideology of dialectical materialist philosophy, which is related to scientific ideology. The partisans of «deideologization» openly proclaim that in our times «deideologization» appears to be probably «the best arm» for overcoming Marxist-Leninist philosophy (cp. W.W. Rostow, R. Aron, etc.). Of course, there are erroneous ideologies, which are without a scientific foundation, there are even reactionary ideologies. But it also is a fact that there are scientific ideologies, which are based on practice and on the regularities of life, as Marxism is, which is the ideology of the working class and with which scientific philosophy is closely related.

Scientific philosophy is sometimes criticized by certain Western philosophers, who base themselves on the so-called philosophical «pluralism», which is becoming a tool of anti-communism's ideological struggle against the internationalist character both of Marxism, and of scientific philosophy.

The proponents of «pluralism» are trying to substantiate a prognosis of a «breaking up» of scientific philosophy and of the entire revolutionary movement on the basis of national and regional differences. In other cases the «pluralistic» conception is parasitically developed on the basis of the differentiation of contemporary natural and social sciences which, it is pretended,

requires a «pluralization» also of the structure of philosophy. Without such a pluralization, it is contended, philosophy would be unable to «appropriate» and «assimilate» the entire dynamic variety of contemporary natural and social science achievements, of the forward strides of social, and scientific and technological progress.

To similar criticisms it should be made clear that Marxism, that scientific philosophy is an integral and monolithic science of which no breaking up and division is possible. We consider scientific philosophy to be an objective and real science, which has no frontiers, which has no limits in time, which is truly international. It is valid for all peoples, and they all can make use of it in their struggle for liberation from exploitation and oppression, for the building of a new society, of their happiness and well-being.

«Pluralism» in the field of philosophy and sociology is characteristic of the helplessness of certain philosophical schools and cliques to offer a truly scientific explanation of social life and social development, to substantiate social change, and to correctly generalize the newest achievements of science. And it is precisely this that scientific philosophy can and does give.

If, of course, humanity's future shall be built on the basis of private ownership, if the division of society into classes, into exploited and exploiters, shall be perpetuated, then it is certain that various philosophical trends will continue to exist. But inasmuch as society's future lies in its transition to social ownership, to the elimination of the classes and the ending of the exploitation of man by man, etc., and inasmuch as the peoples shall be ideologically, morally, and politically united, it is clear that they shall have a philosophy which is a science, and that their world view and their methodology will be precisely scientific philosophy, steadily further and further enriched and developed on the basis of social progress, the advances of science, etc.

The development of scientific philosophy is inseparable from the development of science, but it is also inseparable from the progress of the working people, who are the basis of social existence and development. And this is the other guarantee of the future of scientific philosophy.

Hence, there are in our times many philosophical schools and cliques, but we are confident that the future belongs to such a philosophy only, which is capable of scientifically solving philosophy's fundamental question, to a philosophy which is a science guiding the study of nature and society, which offers man a scientific world view and method, which is creative. We are confident that the future belongs to such a philosophy only, which can cope with the new problems posed constantly by life, the new issues which are steadily emerging in the process of the development of science, social life, and its knowledge, to a philosophy which meets the mature requirements of social development and

change of the world, which is possessed of a correct attitude to the interests of the progressive forces of society and promotes social progress, and which shows a proper understanding for scientific and technological progress and its nearer or more distant prospects. And we are confident that such a philosophy will be, as it already is, the scientific philosophy of dialectical and historical materialism.

Mr. Chairman,

Dear Colleagues,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We are examining here the important question of philosophy's future, but although it actually is a very important question ,it is not the major, the paramount issue of our times. This paramount and burning issue of our epoch is the issue of the prevention of a new world war, of a nuclear world war, which would end both humanity and culture. This supreme issue is not ideological, it is a generally human issue, that is why I believe that irrespective of our different philosophical, political ,and religious convictions we should unite in order to do our part in the prevention of a world nuclear war, in the defence of the peace and the security of the nations, of social progress and the well-being of humanity. It is only if we shall do this that we shall have done our sacred duty as philosophers.

Thank you for your attention.

CONCLUSIONS

ANDRÉ MERCIER (Berne)

Nous ne savons où l'homme est apparu sur la Terre. Mais l'homogénéité biologique de la race humaine tout entière suggère que l'homme est apparu une seule fois. Par conséquent, tout ce qui s'ensuit doit réfléchir cette homogénéité première, même si, plus tard, une diversification s'est manifestée. Si cette diversification a produit, à cause principalement de conditions géographiques, des systèmes plus ou moins clos, alors des cultures, des religions, des philosophies, et même des facettes de la civilisation ont pu s'ensuivre. Mais il reste un bien commun à tous les systèmes, ancré par ailleurs dans les individus.

Cela, à moins que par suite d'un phénomène spontané ultérieur à l'apparition de la race humaine, la philosophie par exemple ait été l'effet de cette spontanéité au sein de l'un seulement de ces systèmes clos, comme l'apparition d'un excroissance qui n'existerait pas chez les autres. C'est ce que croyaient, en vertu d'un certain romantisme, les membres de générations européennes, notamment germaniques, qui nous ont précédés, et ils situaient ce phénomène spontané en Grèce. Mais personne n'y croit plus aujourd'hui.

La philosophie n'est ni une science, ni un art, ni une morale, ni une mystique particulière, qui sont toutes, — comme cela a été suffisamment affirmé au cours de nos débats, — des formes spécifiques de la connaissance. Donc la philosophie elle-même n'est pas une connaissance.

Alors qu'est-elle ? Ma réponse à cette question sera en même temps une réponse à une autre question : Qu'est-ce que la religion ?

En effet : L'homme se sent, autant en ce qu'il est un individu qu'une partie du groupe qu'on appelle volontiers la société humaine, dans une situation d'inquiétude (M. Habachi parlait d'angoisse) à propos de ce qui le concerne le plus intimement et le plus publiquement à la fois : son être dans le temps, c'est-à-dire son existence, et plus particulièrement les raisons et les fins de cette existence. Or, il a trouvé deux chemins pour sortir de cette inquiétude. Ce sont la religion (qu'il ne faut pas confondre avec la mystique), et la philosophie (qu'il ne faut pas confondre avec la science ou le savoir). Ces deux moments, — je l'affirme, — sont innés dans l'homme d'une manière analogue où les sens physiques sont innés en lui ; mais ils ne sont pas liés à des organes du corps, ils sont liés à des organes subtils qu'une analyse purement physique ne semble pas pouvoir appréhender.

Par l'intermédiaire des sens physiques, l'homme a le sens de son déterminisme, c'est-à-dire qu'il appréhende le passage de ce qui précède vers ce qui

est ; par l'intermédianre des sens de l'esprit, il a le sens de son télos, c'est-à-dire qu'il appréhende le lien qui le lie à ce qui n'est pas encore. La quintessence de ces appréhensions, c'est le sentiment du temps.

Mais d'où provient cette inquiétude originelle ? Elle provient de ce que l'homme est obligé de travailler pour vivre, — ce que sont d'ailleurs aussi les animaux, — mais qu'au contraire des animaux, l'homme le sait et que pour cette raison il se fait inventeur et affairé, afin d'avoir à sa disposition des moments de loisir où il n'a pas besoin de travailler mais peut jouir de ses privilèges.

Le fait qu'il doit s'affairer l'inquiète. D'une part, une voix lui dit ce à quoi il peut s'attendre, c'est là la manifestation de son sens religieux qui lui donne toute la confiance nécessaire pour marcher à la rencontre de l'avenir sans se préoccuper des vicissitudes qui lui tombent dessus. D'autre part, cet affairement même l'engage à tout instant à regarder autour de lui et à nettoyer à chaque pas la place où il est arrivé afin de le faire suivre d'un pas nouveau à partir d'une situation qui lui paraisse claire et nette ; c'est cette dernière manière qui ressortit à son sens philosophique.

Donc l'homme est caractérisé par trois déterminations :

1. Il est un **homo faber et negotiosus,** d'où son **affairement,** en anglais son «busy-ness».

2. Il est un **homo religiosus,** ce qui lui fait dire : **credo, ergo sum.**

3. Il est un **homo philosophicus,** ce qui lui fait dire : **cogito, ergo sum.**

Le **credo** n'est pas réductible au **cogito,** ni le **cogito au credo.** De sorte que **la philosophie** et **la religion** sont complémentaires ; mais toutes deux ensemble sont la compensation de l'affairement : Si l'homme n'avait ni la religion, ni la philosophie, il se noirait dans les affaires, dans le «business».

Un homme complet et intégral travaille, croit et pense à la fois. Telle est le caractère de son existence. Si l'homme n'était doué que des sens physiques, il ne pourrait se sentir que déterminé. Ce déterminisme clos excluerait la liberté. Ce sont donc les sens extra-physiques, la religiosité et la philosophicalité, qui lui confèrent sa liberté. Cela fait que l'existence humaine est située entre un avenir (un à-venir) et un passé, et que tout ce que l'homme entreprend laisse une trace dans ce qu'il appelle le monde. On appelle **histoire** la reconstitution de cette trace. J'appellerai **civilisation** la trace elle-même.

Dès lors, la civilisation est le produit d'un travail, d'une croyance et d'une pensée.

Alors, ou bien, dès le début de l'apparition de l'homme dans le monde, son unité originelle est restée le seul sceau qui puisse laisser son empreinte au monde, et il n'y a qu'une ligne de travail. qu'une croyance possible, qu'une philosophie raisonnable. Ou encore, très vite, des systèmes ou sociétés plus ou moins isolées et quasi-closes se sont séparées et la diversification a commencé, en vertu d'interactions que j'appellerai locales avec un environnement différent dans des conditions différentes.

Je crois que c'est la seconde éventualité qui a prévalu. D'une part, même si les isthmes, les montagnes, et même les eaux qui séparent les continents peuvent être traversés, leurs limites naturelles isolent ces derniers. Nous avons ainsi l'Eurasie, l'Afrique, les Amériques et tant d'îles plus ou moins grandes et plus ou moins éloignées.

Je crois que, de nos jours, nous en savons assez pour pouvoir affirmer que l'Europe est fille de l'Asie moyenne et mineure et non pas inversement, et qu'une portion très considérable de la pensée dite occidentale a sa source dans une Inde très antique, y compris les idées platoniciennes.

Mais l'Inde, — en tant que sous-continent géographique, — même si elle tire son nom du fleuve Indus, comporte deux vallées principales, celle de l'Indus et celle du Gange, et, en outre, tout ce grand plateau du Deccan qui se prolonge vers l'île de Çri Lanka. C'est du Gange, vers le Nord par les hautes montagnes et c'est aussi par le Sud-Est que s'est répandue l'une des grandes religions du monde, le bouddhisme, tandis que l'Indus a servi, bien plus tard, de voie de propagation à l'islam, alors que le bouddhisme avait disparu de l'Inde antique. Le christianisme, lui, à été le facteur le plus important de la civilisation en Occident, plus important à mon avis que la philosophie grecque elle-même. Mais il a dû faire place à l'influence de la science moderne qui n'est ni une religion, ni une philosophie. De sorte que depuis un demi-millénaire, l'Occident est à la fois moins religieux et moins philosophique que la région afro-asiatique. L'Occidental a perdu en partie l'usage des deux sens extraphysiques qui sont l'apanage de l'homme. Seule la Méditerranée et l'Amérique du Sud, sa fille spirituelle et politique, en ont conservé l'usage, mais sous une forme qui semble aujourd'hui désuète. D'abord, même la définition de l'homme comme animal raisonnable est une définition désuète, non seulement parce qu'insuffisante, mais parce que la philosophie ne se définit pas simplement par l'exercice de la raison. La philosophie requiert bien autres choses que la raison, en premier lieu l'engagement, ainsi que l'universel, la tolérance, et d'autres procédures, pour ne rien dire de l'amour.

Ensuite, l'Occidental a perdu le sens d'écoute de la voix divine, et il n'a gardé du christianisme que l'intolérance qu'il a adaptée à sa philosophie. Je crois d'ailleurs que cette intolérance est aussi caractéristique de l'islam, et qu'elle remonte à l'origine judaïque du christianisme et de l'islam.

Tout cela montre, me semble-t-il, que de l'abandon de l'une ou de l'autre voie où l'homme laisse la trace de sa civilisation, résulte un déséquilibre analogue à ce que produirait la perte de l'ouïe, ou de la vue par exemple.

De ce point de vue, l'Occident est, dans le cadre de la civilisation universelle, une excroissance dégénérée, ou peut-être une manifestation pathologique.

Mais on peut se demander si, par ailleurs, d'autres communautés n'ont pas négligé l'exercice de la philosophie pour ne suivre que l'autre voie, ou si elles n'ont pas fait l'erreur de confondre la philosophie avec la religion. Plusieurs des exposés que nous avons entendus le suggèrent.

Peut-être qu'une telle confusion a sa racine dans les mythes, car il semble, à la façon dont on nous a décrit l'origine pharaonique de la pensée africaine noire, que le mythe soit le point d'où émergent les deux voies qui font de l'homme un civilisé et non pas seulement un affairé.

Mais ce n'est pas seulement l'intolérance — philosophique ou religieuse — qui est responsable du déraillement de la pensée moderne. C'est aussi l'usage presque exclusif de la méthode analytique. Car toute analyse détruit son objet puisqu'elle le dissèque en petits morceaux et qu'il n'existe pas de méthode humaine pour refaire ce qui est détruit.

Il y a, derrière toute analyse, le désir d'atteindre l'individuel et le particulier.

Or, la région afro-asiatique ne semble pas interessée, dans son ensemble, par le particulier. C'est une raison pour laquelle le marxisme y rencontre une certaine sympathie puisque l'un des principes du marxisme est que l'individu n'a droit à aucune prétention qui ne soit déjà une prétention de la société.

Mais en même temps, l'intégralité de la pensée traditionnelle, de l'Inde par exemple, est telle, qu'une idéologie comme l'idéologie marxiste ne peut être qu'une goutte d'eau chaude dans un océan à peine tiède et ne peut y provoquer que quelques bulles superficielles, pour être vite absorbée par le tout.

Tout ce que je viens de dire est, sous une forme dialectique qui m'est propre et en substance métaphysique, le résultat des réflexions que m'ont inspirées les débats de notre Conférence, doublé du désri d'en tirer une conclusion suffisamment unitaire pour couvrir cette région historiquement et physiquement terriblement hétérogène qu'est la région afro-asiatique.

Lorsque, il y a une quinzaine de mois, le professeur Mourad Wahba m'a fait part du désir issu en Asie d'avoir une conférence afro-asiatique philosophique, j'ai été d'abord effrayé par une idée pareille. Les deux questions principales de Mourad Wahba ont été 1. de déterminer un thème à la fois suffisamment précis pour permettre un débat fructueux et assez typique pour recouvrir

les préoccupations d'une aussi vaste région, 2. d'examiner la possibilité d'une collaboration occidentale qui rendrait la conférence à la fois régionale et méritoire d'un appui moral et intellectuel de la part de l'organisation internationale que je représente dans le domaine de la philosophie.

La première réflexion qui me vint à l'esprit, c'est que, vu la situation actuelle où tous les pays recouverts par ladite région sont en ébullition et souvent aussi en crise, l'éternelle querelle des Anciens et des Modernes se manifesterait de toute manière et le problème de l'émancipation se poserait, quelle que soit la conception qu'on ait de cette émancipation. Je m'attendais à ce qu'il soit difficile d'empêcher que la question du prestige des cultures nationales se pose, à moins que le thème soit choisi tel et sa structuration décidée de façon que de pareils dangers soient réduits à un minimum et à moins que le choix des orateurs soit fait parmi des personnalités dont la sérénité et la compétence soient bien connues, — ce qui n'est pas toujours facile.

Des conversations très serrées ont eu lieu entre les professeurs Madkour, Wahba et moi-même dans le but de trouver un cadre tel que je viens de le décrire. «La philosophie et la civilisation» nous ont paru remplir les conditions posées, tout en provoquant quelques unes des quesions majeures qui devaient intéresser ladite région.

La forme aussi qui serait donnée à cette conférence nous a beaucoup préoccupés. Nous avons décidé de la structurer en deux étages : D'une part des rapports informatifs sur la relation entre la philosophie et la civilisation dans les sous-régions géographico-philosophiques principales de la région intégrale visée. D'autre part des exposés thématiques permettant la présentation de thèses afin d'inspirer les dépats et de provoquer une discussion fructueuse. C'est de là qu'est sorti le plan de la conférence.

Une fois le premier plan de la conférence élaboré, il a été soumis au président de la Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie en lui demandant s'il serait disposé à le soumettre à la Fédération dans l'intention d'en faire une Conférence régionale de la FISP. Car l'idée de conférences régionales a été celle de notre Président l'Académicien Sava Ganovski, et il ne fait de doute qu'il a eu une idée précise en tête de promotion de la philosophie sur la base des philosophies plus ou moins différentes, plus ou moins avancées et plus ou moins spécialisées des diverses régions.

Grâce à cette conférence, nous avons appris à ne pas confondre le fait d'avoir une religion et celui d'être un homme religieux. Cette spécification de la distinction entre l'avoir et l'être rappelle la philosophie de Gabriel Marcel.

Nous avons appris, à l'exemple d'Iqbal, que le poète est l'incarnation d'une philosophie qui se manifeste dans la subjectivité, comme la métaphysique le fait dans l'objectivité.

Nous avons appris que les courants classifiés dans les manuels, les - ismes jusqu'à l'existentialisme contemporain, se retrovent plus ou moins dans bien des régions du monde.

L'interprétation pessimiste du bouddhisme qui nous vient de Schopenhauer ne tient pas devant celle de la vacuité qui nous a été expliquéé par M. Hasumi. La mystique est revenue à l'honneur, sous sa forme authentique et non comme un mysticisme douteux qu'on a connu au temps de l'hellénisme ou de la Renaissance. Il nous a été expliqué que le monde arabe souffre de l'irrationalisme qui le pénètre, mais qu'il y a de l'espoir à rétablir, par une philosophie de la personnalité, l'unité dans la diversité qui régne dans toute la Méditerranée et jusqu'en Moyen Orient.

Même Sir Alfred Ayer, en dépit de son scepticisme prudent, affirmé que la philosophie a affaire avec la science, avec la morale et avec la mystique (qu'il a appelée religion), mais il a oublié l'art dans cette énumération, ce que M. Alisjahbana a corrigé dans plusieurs interventions.

Si quelqu'un a pu dire de la religion qu'elle est, -et j'ajouterai : dans certaines conditions de dégénérescence seulement, - un opium pour le peuple, nous avons entendu que le même sort peut être imparti à la science elle-même. Aussi était-il bien que quelqu'un - je crois que c'est M. Fakry - nous dise qu'un philosophe devrait, pour être complet et vraiment compétent, connaître au niveau professionnel, la science, la morale etc.

C'est alors qu'à mon avis, le philosophe a une chance de se faire une conception plus correcte et adéquate de la technique (je ne dis pas technologie, qui est un horrible néologisme).

Peut-être a-t-on tort, dans certains milieux de nos jours, de tout vouloir démythifier. Car le mythe ressort constamment, le plus fort des mythes contemporains étant peut-être le myth du progrès.

Quant à la philosophie des valeurs, elle a culminé dans la discussion des droits de l'homme qui sont une émanation des valeurs, et Mme Kucuradi a su trouver des phrases émouvantes pour y attirrer notre attention.

Un problème qui n'a pas été résolu, c'est celui de savoir si la philosophie est liée à la langue particulière d'un peuple. Pour ma part, je crois que c'est le cas, et il m'est arrivé autrefois de chercher à le démontrer. Mais Sir Alfred ne veut pas me croire.

Et puis il n'est pas suffisamment connu, que non seulement l'Europe, mais l'Afrique sont tributaires de sources lointaines, géographiquement et historiquement, de l'Inde jusqu'à l'Egypte antiques.

Je m'arrête là dans le choix de quelques questions qui m'ont frappé. Je crois que la Conférence a été un enrichissement pour nous tous.

Aussi prendrai-je ici la permission de féliciter et d'en remercier les organisateurs, spécialement le professeur Madkour, président de l'Académie des Lettres Arabes, et le professeur Mourad Wahba, de l'Université Ain Shams, pour ce qu'ils nous ont permis de nous rencontrer dans une atmosphère de collaboration internationale et de travail scientifique. Il serait heureux que cette conférence ne soit pas la seule de ce genre mais qu'elle soit suivie d'une série de réunions destinées à renforcer la pensée commune aux pays et nations d'une région qui a tant à dire à l'avenir.

رقم الايداع
١٩٧٩/٢٨١٧

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